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2P R B P  A C  B
This thesis is very largely based on the official records 
available at the Public Records Office. I have however attempted 
to present, along with the official viewpoint, the objective situ­
ation. To my mind there seems to be close connection between the 
historian and his environment. After completing my thesis I became 
conscious of the fact that the problems I had posed reflected a de­
sire shared by the Ceylonese of the present day to understand the 
past without falling into the temptation to moralise on historical 
events. Historians who used to write about the white man's burden 
perhaps tempted others to write about the black man's virtues spoilt 
by European contact. To steer dear of both pitfalls seems to me to 
be the challenge of our times.
I wish to extend my warm thanks to my supervisor, Dr. K. A. 
Ballhatchet, for valuable guidance and for showing much patience and 
tolerance. I wish to thank the British Council for granting me a year's 
scholarship which brought me to London, to Hiss Clive Smith of the 
British Council for her assistance, and to the Vidyalankara University, 
Ceylon, for granting me leave. Finally I wish to mention the warm in­
terest that was shown with regard to my studies by the late Professor 
H. C. Ray of Vidyalankara University, Ceylon. To his memory this 
thesis is dedicated.
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A B S T R A C T
The development of the Civil Service of Ceylon is closely inter­
connected with that of the Headman system. This thesis is partly a study 
of the inter-relation betireen the offices and institutions established by 
the British and the Headman system* Chapter One deals with the growth of 
the central and departmental administrative machinery. A chief feature 
in this growth was a conflict between liberal and authoritarian trends. 
Chapter Two deads with the provincial and local administrative machinery. 
Besides displaying the above conflict the European part of this structure 
as well as the policy of the Government brought about a partial trans­
formation of the office of Headman. Chapter Three deals with administrat­
ive development in the Kandyan provinces. Here the disarrangement of the 
Sinhalese feudal organization was the chief result of the establishment 
of European offices. Chapters Four and Five examine the internal organi­
zation of the Civil Service. The chief factor in the growth of this or­
ganization was the need that was felt to satisfy the aspirations of those 
setting out from England as Civil Servants. Chapter Six examines the 
forces that were behind the movement for reform and states the problems 
of reform. The social and political prblems associated with an exclu­
sive Civil Service were the chief among them. Chapter Seven examines the 
nature of the Colebrooke-Cameron reform proposals. The liberalization 
of the administrative machinery that was recommended by them was the 
natural corollary to a desire to create a more individualistic and com­
petitive economy and society.
4INTRODUCTION
The establishment of foreign authority over a country which 
had its own political, economic and social organization is undoubtedly 
a change of much consequence. At the time the first Europeans arrived 
in Ceylon as conquerors the island had a social, economic and political 
organization which may generally be described as feudal. Perhaps the 
most significant feature during a long period of administrative devel­
opment under the Europeans was the superimposition of European author­
ity and institutions over a part of the administrative machinery which 
had belonged to the medieval feudal monarchs of Ceylon. This seems to 
have been necessitated by the need to win over to their rule the nobil­
ity of the country. This superimposition brought about changes in the 
feudal organization which varied according to the period during which 
the successive European nations ruled the island and the policies that 
were pursued by them.
V/hen the Portuguese became the rulers of the Maritime Provinces 
of the island in 1597 they had the intention of making Ceylon a part 
of Portugal, administering it according to Portuguese laws and ordin­
ances. This intention if implemented would have perhaps involved great 
changes in the administrative machinery. But certain factors took them 
in the opposite direction. Considering the period when the Portuguese 
ruled in Ceylon, they could not have had much objection to the feudal 
character of the institutions which they found in the island. They 
might even have found it convenient to adapt them to suit their interests.
5Besides, the Portuguese appear to have heen faced with the necessity 
of winning over to their rule the nobility of the country. All these 
factors may have combined to bring about the decision reached at 
Kalwana to govern the country according to its laws and customs. The 
Sinhalese Chiefs, representing the districts, or Korales, who were 
summoned to a convention, stood against a change in their laws and in­
stitutions.^
This decision led to the superimposition of Portuguese civil and 
military authority and certah new institutions and offices over the 
civil and military authority retained by the Chiefs, who continued 
in some of their former positions. At time, especially towards the lat­
ter part of the rule of the Portuguese, when they were dissatisfied with 
some Chiefs the policy was followed of retaining native offices but ap­
pointing Portuguese to hold them.
Theoretically the King of Portugal was acknowledged as the sov­
ereign of the country. Butin the eyes of the people of Ceylon the real 
King was the head of the Portuguese administration in Ceylon who was 
called a Captain-General. He enjoyed civil, judicial and military author­
ity, and in fact took the place which the King had occupied under the 
former system. Royal honours were paid to him, and some of the tributory 
ceremonies that had been associated with the former Kings, such as re­
ceiving the Chiefs and their customary tributes, or dekum, three times a
^P. E. Pieris, Portugal in Ceylon, p.10. Ceylon and the Portuguese, 
pp. 139-140, Joao Ribeiro, The Historic Tragedy of the island of Ceilao. 
pp. 24-25.
6year were continued* Similarly in his progress through the country 
he was received as the 'King of Malwana’ with Royal honours* The 
emblems of Royalty were carried during such journeys.^
As in the time of the Kings the Captain-General was the chief 
judicial authority in the country* For the sake of convenience, and 
perhaps as a continuance of a former institution, a tribunal of eight 
high ranking nobles were authorized to dispose the ordinary suits of
the native inhabitants, reserving all matins of importance to the Gen-
2 —
eral* Attached to the General were native officials called Basnayakas
and Mohottiars, and in practice they appear to have wielded a consider­
able amount of influence over the decisions of the General* They also
■55
cated as his chief advisers in other matters such as land grants.
Portuguese Judges named Ouvidors are mentioned as being stationed 
at Colombo and Jaffna. Their special duty seems to have been the trial 
of cases in which the Portuguese were involved, and the charge of those 
banished to the island* It was however alleged that they tried to at­
tract other cases to their courts for the sake of profit* They appear 
to have gone on circuit accompanied by palanquins, secretaries and 
peons, and following the practice of the former system they had to be 
received with honours and provisions by the people (Adukka and Pehindum,
Pieris, Ceylon and the Portuguese, p*140. Ceylon - the Portuguese era, 
Vol. II, pp* 86-87* Ribeiro, The Historic Tragedy of the island of 
Ceilao, p.45.
^Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era, pp. 84, 246-247*
’ibid.
7dressed and raw provisions) so long as they were on duty in the 
districts.^
Pour Portuguese officials, who were designated Maralleiros,
and who were sent once a year to the four disavanis to hold assizes,
are mentioned in contemporary Portuguese historical works* They
were accompanied by native interpreters, assessors etc* and had also
to be received with every mark of honour and hospitality according
to custom* The chief business of these Judges was to examine and
make an inventory of the property of deceasedpersons, look into the
claims of their creditors, and assess the death duty or marala which
had been levied under the Sinhalese system to prevent the accumulation
of property in private hands* Other matters such as thefts, debts etc.
were also investigated, the native assessors giving the opinion on
points of law* Murderers who had taken sanctuary also came before it
to confess and free themselves of the crime. They were fined if they
belonged to the higher castes and sentenced to death if they belonged
to the lower. Oaths and ordeals were popular means of settling disputes.
2
The right of sanctuary was also recognized.
To assist the General in revenue administration there was a Portu­
guese official called Vedor da Pazenda. He supervized the preparation 
of the Thombo or land register and the collection of Royal dues in cash
"hpieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era* Vol. II, pp. 249-250. The Kngdom 
of Jaffnapatam. p.l.
2Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese erat Vol. II, pp. 80-82. Ribeiro,
The Historic Tragedy of the island of Ceilao,pp.58-60.
8or kind* He was given a certain amount of authority independant 
of the General, and this became a considerable source of friction 
and troubled The Vedor was assisted by Factors, Secretaries and 
other Sub-Accountants*
On the military side the Captain-General was assisted by Cap­
tain Majors and Cpptains of Forts and divisions. They were in charge
2
of the Portuguese soldiers, fortresses and camps.
The Portuguese officials were paid partly by fixed salaries 
and partly by being allowed to enjoy various perquisities, some of 
them new, and others the customary privileges which had been attached 
to the native offices under the former system* In addition they became 
closely integrated into it by being assigned villages and lands. Some
of the higher officials thus became lords of villages as well.3
This European structure which, as we have seen, was partly 
integrated into the former system, was built over the provincial ad­
ministrative machinery of the former Kings. In this sphere the decision 
to govern according to the laws and customs of the country led to the 
retention cf what is commonly called the Headman system, but which was 
in fact the former feudal organization without its own King and certain 
offices and institutions that would have been associated with his Court
1
Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era, Vol. II, pp. 331 54-55*
2
ftibeiro, The Historic Tragedy of the island of Ceilao, pp. 40-42.
3
Ibid*. pp. 31f 42. For some particulars regarding the payments in 
the Kingdom of Jaffna, see Pieris, The Kingdom of Jaffnapatam.
9and Household*
As in the time of the King the territory under the Portuguese 
was divided into units called disavanis. During the Portuguese period 
there were four such disavanis in existence. As before, the civil, 
military and judicial administration of these units was entrusted to 
an official called the Disava. He led the Lascarins, or the local 
militia, to battle, administered justice, and looked after the general 
well being and prosperity of the province.^ He was assisted in his 
military functions by Mudaliyars, Muhandirams and Arachchis, and in
.» 2
the judicial functions by Basnayakas and Mohottalas. . At first both
Sinhalese and Portuguese were appointed to the position of Disava.
3
Later however Portuguese were preferred.
Each disavani was divided into a number of smaller units called 
Korales, Presiding over one or more Korales was an official called the 
Korale Vidana, who was a Magistrate as well as a collector of revenue.
It was his business to collect Royal dues, enforce services, and settle 
disputes by fine and otto customary punishments.^ Both Portuguese and 
Sinhalese, many of the latter being those converted to Catholicism, were
^Pieris, Ceylon and the Portuguese, p.140.
2
Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era. Vol. II, pp. 84, 217, 218.
3
Ibid., p. 194*
4
Pieris, Ceylon and the Portuguese, p. 181.
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appointed to these situations. These offices appear to have been 
eagerly sought for by Portuguese, because they found them to be 
lucrative. Attempts appear to have been made, without success, to 
appoint only Portuguese to these situations. There were also attempts, 
perhaps with some success, to reduce the influence and power attached 
to the Vidanas, by taking away some of the villages or Nindagam attached 
to their offices.^ Kudaliyars assisted by Muhandirams appear to have 
exercised jurisdiction over the purely military departments of these 
units.
Groups of villages constituting a department or caste also had
Vidanas for their management. Prominent among then during Portuguese
times on account of the revenue tbd; yielded were the elephant, cinnamon
2
and gem departments. In fact the cinnamon department was so important
that the Portuguese appointed a European known as the Captain of the
Mahabadde to function at the head of it. It is also stated that there
was competition among the Portuguese to secure the gem department as it
3
was a lucrative position.
Villages had a number of petty Headmen whom the Portuguese called 
Mayorals representing either a department or a lord of the village. In 
addition to looking after the interests of the department or the lord
1
Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era. Vol. II, pp. 46- 47, 82, 85, 86.
^Ibid., pp. 62-64, 66-68, 490.
3
Ibid..pp. 65, 76.
11
in such matters as the collection of dues, enforcement of services, 
management of cultivation, enforcement of law and order, and acting 
as guards in times of war, the Mayorals appear to have had the specia 1 
diity of looking after and feeding the soldiers and officials when they 
passed through the village on duty*'**
All the above officials were not paid salaries* Their remunera­
tion was connected with the system of service land tenures prevalent 
in the country. They were thus assigned land according to their official 
position, the benefits of which they enjoyed during the tenure of office.
The higher officials were lords of one or more villages, or Nindagam.
During Portuguese times some of these villages appear to have been taken 
out of the hands of native officials and given over to the Portuguese.
The privileges and honours to which the different grades of officials 
were entitled from one another or from the inhabitants, as well as the 
dues and tributes that had to be paid, and the services that had to be 
performed by each class, either to those above them or to the Crown
were defined by customary law based on caste andland tenures. Thus every
2
official had both obligations and rights.
Though much of the former system was thus retained, yet in practice 
it seems to have begun to function much differently. The Portuguese offi-
■^ Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era. Vol. II, pp. 48, 49, 50, 221, 483, 484. 
Ribeiro, The Historic Tragedy of the island of Ceilao, pp. 28, 32, 42, 43*
2
For an account of the changes supposed to have been made by the Portuguese 
in these rights and duties which gives some indication of the previous 
position, see Femao De Queyroz, Conquest of Ceylon. Book VI, pp. 1003-1060.
cials and lords of villages were not only ignorant of the customary 
laws by which it had been regulated, but also may have been less 
inclined to adhere to them* The officials, some of whom in fact had 
bought their own offices in Portugal, were imbued with greedy ideas 
of profit, which they promoted both in their official and private capa­
cities. The native officials, many of whom were converts to Catholicism, 
may have been inclined to follow their superiors. The result was that 
the traditional system became hopelessly disarranged. Divested of 
its proper setting, customary laws and usages, it gave the officials 
a fearful degree of discretion. A reckless degree of arbitrariness, 
which a Portuguese historian described with the aid of a petition said 
to have been submitted by the people, appears to have set in among all 
ranks of officials. Former tributes and fees, especially in the admini­
stration of justice, degenerated into open bribery. Officials exacted 
more dues than was customary, impressed the people for private services 
and trade, assumed arbitrary powers, honours and privileges. Oppression 
at all levels, arbitrary punishments, desertion of villages, and armies, 
andihe occurrence of rebellions became the order of the day.^
The Dutch who succeeded the Portuguese in 1653 belonged to a Com­
pany of merchants interested in heavy dividends. Nevertheless, they 
brought some semblance of order out of the chaos left behind by the Por­
tuguese. Several general tendencies were prevalent during the period of
'For more details on above see Fernao De Queyroz, Conquest of Ceylon.
Book VI, pp. 1003-1060.
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Dutch administration. Firstly, the European superstructure got further 
enlarged, and with it European authority got further entrenched.
Secondly, the Dutch followed a more exclusive policy than the Portu­
guese and kept all the higher offices in the hands of Europeans, with 
the result that the European structure fell more apart from tie rest 
of the administrative machinery. Lastly, the Dutch period witnessed 
a progressive reduction in the power and position which the Chiefs and 
Headmen had enjoyed in the country. With it there was a partial trans­
formation of the feudal character of the offices that were retained.
At the head of the Dutch Government in Ceylon there was usually
a Governor, who united civil and military power, and who also had a
share in the judicial administration.^" Special Commissioners were placed
in charge of the Government in times of crisis when it was either weakened
by strife among the officials or when the widespread abuses, which crept
2
in from time to time, had to be put down. Though it is likely that 
during the course of time the Governor would have lost the monarchic 
halo which had been attached to this office during Portuguese times, 
there is evidence to show that some of the ceremonies coming down from 
the time of the Sinhalese Kings were continued. Thus for instance, the 
custom of receiving presents and honours from the Chiefs and people was 
kept up as a means of reminding them of their subjection. It is however
^Memoir of R. Van Goens, (Junior) 1679, p.13.
2
See Memoir of J. C. Pielat, 1734, pp. 1-3•
"Memoirs of Van Goens, (junior)l679, p.28; Pielat, 1734, pp. 33-34.
] 4
likely that during the course of time they would have lost their 
former meaning, and become less and less effective.
The Governor was assisted by a Political Council, over which 
he presided, consisting of eight other ex officio members. They were 
the Chief Revenue officer (Eoofd Administrateur) the officer command­
ing the forces, the Disava, the Treasurer, the Political Secretary,
Chief Warehouse keeper, Trade Commissioner and the Public Prosecutor
(Fiscaal), The Commanders of Galle and Jaffna were also given seats
1
in Council whenever they were in Colombo, At first there was dis­
tinction between this Council and another that was known as the Council 
of Ceylon, although the same individuals composed the two bodies.
The power of the former was limited to the area constituting the Com- 
mandary of Colombo, But in course of time, and probably as a matter
of convenience, the Council at Colombo appear to have assumed authority
2
over the whole island. All important decisions affecting the government
of the country were taken by tie Governor after a discussion in Council.
All letters received from the superior authorities had to be opened and
read in Council. Outgoing despatches had also to be signed by members 
3
of the Council. The Council was not always a check against the assump-
4
tion of absolute power.
■^R. G. Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, pp. 181-182.
Slemdr of C. J. Simmons, 1707, pp. 19, 50.
3
K. W. Gunawardena, The Foundations of Dutch power in Ceylon, pp. 141-142. 
Memoirs of Simons, 1707, p. 19, Van Imhoff, 1840, p. 63.
4
See Memoir of Pielat, 1754, pp. 11-12.
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i
j The Dutch territory in Ceylon was divided into the Commandaries
| of Colombo, Galle and Jaffna. At first there was an official known
i
| as the Commander at each of these three places. But the later pract-
! ice was for the Governor to functinn also as the Commander of Colombo.
The Commanders of Galle and Jaffna were the chief military and civil 
officers in their respective divisions. They were assisted by Councils 
over which they presided. The other members of these Councils usually 
were the Disava, the Revenue Officer, the Pay Officer, Trade Commissioner, 
warehouse Keeper, Public Prosecutor and Secretary. These Councils were 
associated in the decision of all important matters such as the renting 
of revenue, sale of goods etc.^ *
At each of the three Commandaries there was usually a Revenue 
Officer, Pay Officer, Trade Commissioner, Warehouse Keeper, Public Pro­
secutor, and other Sub-Accountants and Clerks. In addition Colombo had
2
a Political Secretariat and an Audit Office. It appears likely that 
the offices of Colombo co-ordinated the activities of the three Command­
aries. In addition an office known as the Visite Comptoir was set up
•5
in 1715 to perform the functions of a visiting audit in the outstations. 
There were also many Boards which were set up for special functions whose 
members changed annually. The most prominent among them were the Staads
^Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, p.184.
2
Ibid., Memoir of Simmons, 1707, p.4.
Memoir of H. Becker, 1716, p.41.
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Raad or Town Council in Colombo, Orphans Chamber, Commissioner of
Marriage Causes, School Board and Wardens of the tom and fort.^
In each of the three Commandaries there was a subdivision known
as the Disavani. It was presided over by a Disava, appointed usually
for five years, who acted in subordination to the Commander. This
office was similar to ttet which had existed under the Sinhalese, and
which had been continued by the Portuguese. To the Dutch it denoted
anoffice the duties of which specially lay in the rural districts and
2
with the people of the country. Only Dutchmen were appointed to this
position with the result that it may have somewhat changed in character
during this period. But a part of the pomp, ceremony, perquisites and
duties that had been attached to the former Disavas appear to have been
continued. For instance when the Disava of Colombo went nn circuit
he was accompanied by a battalion, or ranchu, of Lascarins with its
colours, five drums, a horn and a trumpet. As before the Disava was
3 -entitled to free provisions while on duty. The Disava was vested 
with executive judicial and military authority. The judicial powers 
were exercised both as a member of the newly created judicial tribunals, 
and independently, as before, in small disputes.^" The duties of a
"^Memoirs of Van Goens (junior) 1679, p.13. Simons, 1707, pp. 20-21, 30. 
2
Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, p. 184.
Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, p.84. Memoir of Van Goens (Junior) 
1679, p.28.
4
Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, pp. 3-4. Anthonisz, The Dutch in 
Ceylon, p.185.
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Disava were naturally numerous# He was responsible for the mili­
tary outside the forts, acted as the lead of the Lascarins, or local 
militia, attended to the maintenance of roads, tanks and the develop­
ment of agriculture, presided over the Courts and exercised a summary 
and paternal jurisdiction over small disputes#^ These duties were in 
addition to the commercial and administrative duties which he performed 
for the Company as one of its Merchants# The Disavas had in fact so
much to do thdt a Headman called the Attapattu Mudaliyar attended to
2
some of his duties such as inquiring into disputes. During the early 
days of Dutch rule an office of Lieutenant Disava is mentioned# It 
probably referred to the Chief Residents known as Opperhoofd, who were 
stationed in outstations. Their main duty seems to have been to attend
to the collection of revenue, and the interests of trade, under the or-
— 3ders of the Disava.
The Dutch also established an European structure for the admini­
stration of justice# According to Dutch practice seven members were 
necessary to constitute a criminal and five a civil Court# Consequently, 
Boards were set up for the administration of civil and criminal justice# 
The chief judicial tribunal was the Raad Van Justitie of Colombo, Galle
^Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, pp* 3-4. Memoirs of Van Goens, 1679, 
p.13. Pielat, 1734, p.17. Van Imhoff, 1740,pp. 19-20.
2
Memoir of Van Imhoff, 1740, p#20.
3
Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, p.184. Report on the Dutch records in 
the Government Archives, p.7.
18
and JSffna. The President of this court at Colombo was the Chief 
Revenue Officer, and at Galle and Jaffna the Commanders. The other 
members were chosen from among those in the Councils. These Courts 
exercised an exclusive criminal jurisdiction and an original and ap­
pellate civil jurisdiction. The original civil jurisdiction was con­
fined to suits occurring among the Dutch community, or those against 
native inhabitants living within the fort, There the subject matter in 
dispute exceeded 120 rix-dollars. There was an appeal from the inferior 
courts to the Raad Van Justitie of Galle and Jaffna and from all of them 
to the Raad Van Justitie at Colombo.^ In practice the criminal cases 
of these Courts were conducted by the Fiscal, who submitted his records 
and findings to the Court which then gave its decision on them. In ex­
treme cases two Commissioners watched his examination. The Fiscal was
also often found to be imprisoning, fining and flogging the people with-
2
out any reference to the Court. Civil Raad or town courts, also con­
sisting of executive officials were established at Colombo, Galle and
3
Jaffna, to try petty civil cases. In the countryside Courts known as 
Landraads were established to all civil cases, but mainly the disputes 
between the native inhabitants over land. The Disavas presided over the
^Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, pp. 185*186. Memoir of Van Imhoff, 
1740, p. 62.
2
Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, pp. 58-39* North to Court of 
Directors, 26 February and 10 June 1799* C.O. 54, 1. Memoir of Pielat, 
1734, pp. 10-11.
3
Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, pp. 183-184. C. R. de Silva, Ceylon 
under the British Occupation. Vol. I, pp.310-315.
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Landraad Courts at Colombo, Calle and Jaffna. The other members 
were the Fiscal, a junior merchant or a bookkeeper, Thombo holder, 
or the keeper of records, and the Attapattu Mudaliyar.1 There were 
Landraads in other smaller stations, constituted similarly with five 
members, an European President, and a Mudaliyar being among them.
The Dutch thus made no attempt to separate executive and judi­
cial authority. The Courts of Justice were constituted with executive 
officials who were busy with commercial and other duties. As a result
not only were the members of the Courts generally uninformed, but they
2attended to their duties indifferently. Some of the worst defects 
arising out of ignorance appear to have been partly removed by a codi­
fication of some of the customary laws undertaken from the time of Gov­
ernor Joan Simmons. Where the customary laws were not clear Roman 
Dutch law was applied. However, judicial proceedings in tiese Courts 
were generally characterized by delays, negligence and other abuses.
In fact from time to time some of the Landraad Courts, in particular, 
ceased to function altogether. It appears therefore likely that the 
Kudaliyars in these Courts often acted as the real arbitrators in dis- 
putes between the native inhabitants.
■*■(?. R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British Occupation, Vol. I, pp. 310-315. 
Van Sanden, The Chieftains of Ceylon, pp. 3-4. Memoir of Van Imhoff, 1740, 
pp. 21-22. Anthonisz, Report on the Dutch records in the Government 
Archives, pp. 68-69.
^Memoir of Pielat, 1734, pp. 9-10.
3
Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, pp. 30, 51. Memoirf of Van Imhoff,
1740, p.20.
20
The officials that were required to hold the several positions
in the above superstructure were taken from an exclusively European
Civil Service consisting of six grades. The commercial character of
the administration was reflected in the designations that were used
to differentiate these grades. The six grades were the Senior Merchant
(Opperkoppman), Merchant (Koopman), Junior Merchant (Onderkoopman),
Bookkeeper (Boekhouder), Assistant (Adsistent) and Apprentice Clerk
(Ahkweekelingen by de pen).^
All officials were paid salaries varying according to their grade
and office, but they were generally low. Perhaps as compensation, they
enjoyed the right to carry on a certain amount of private trade. This
led to widespread abuses from time to time and attempts to suppress them
never appear to have met with complete success. The officials sometimes
formed a smaller Company of their own and carried on trade to the de-
2
triment of the interests of the Company by which they were employed.
The officials also enjoyed several perquisites and commissions, both 
old and new. The Disavas for instance continued to enjoy some of the 
traditional perquisites that had been attached to these offices. They
3however generally ceased to be lords of villages or Nindagam holders.
It should be noted that in addition to this civilian structure the
^Anthonisz, The Dutch ii Ceylon, p.182.
^Memoirs of Simons, 1707, p. 3* Becker, 1716, pp. 2-3, 19-20. 
Anthonisz, Report on the Dutch records in the government Archives, 
pp.7-8.
^Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, pp. 32-33, 50, 84, 85*
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Company employed a paid army consisting partly of mercenary regi­
ments, The military officials were employed in civilian work when­
ever conditions permitted it.
The European superstructure, civil and military, which was thus 
enlarged, necessarily involved the reduction of the native machnery 
in numbers, importance and position, and also its partial transformation. 
Several important and connected changes took place. As we have already 
noticed the office of Disava changed much in character when it became 
exclusively Dutch. As a result of the establishment of the Dutch judi­
cial institutions the Basnayakas and Mohottalas, who had been associated 
in the administration of justice during Portuguese times, ceased to 
exist. The Mudaliyars who assisted in commanding the local militia sur­
vived because they were still useful. In addition to military duties 
the Mudalyars now began to be associated in whatever civilian duties in 
which their assistance was required. Those associated with the Governor 
came to be known as Kaha Mudaliyars, and those associated with the Dis­
avas were known as Attapattu Mudaliyars. As we have seen these Mudaliyars 
were also given places in the new Courts of Justice.^"
A similar development took place in the lower ranks. As in Portuguese 
times the Dutch at first continued with the office of Morale Vidana, who 
was now called Korala. He looked after the Company’s revenue, collected 
dues and enforced the services of his division. As before, he was assisted 
by Atu koralas. Mudaliyars, assisted by Muhandirams, continued to com-
^See Memoir of Van Imhoff, 1740, pp. 21-23.
mand the militia of the Korales, However from the time of Governor 
Van Imhoff, 1756-1740, the Dutch carried out the policy of abolishing 
the offices of Korala and entrusting their duties to the Mudaliyars 
and Muhandirams respectively. Thus the Mudaliyars of the Korales, as 
they now came to be called, gradually began to be entrusted with both 
civilian and military duties.'*' At first the military duties were real 
as the Dutch continued to maintain the Lascarins on a militaiy footing. 
They were found Id be useful because of the threat of invasion from the 
Kandyan country. But the long period of peace which the Company main­
tained with the Kandyan Kings, as well as the existence of the Euro­
pean army, gradually diminished their importance. The Lascarins began
to be employed more and more in civilian duties as messengers, minor
2
revenue and police officials, and guards to the higher officials. To 
these higher officials the Lascarins who surrounded them became more 
and more a status symbol.
Groups of villages and single villages continued to be presided 
over by Vidanas and Mayorals or petty Headmen. It is likely that when 
separate civil and military officers ceased to exist at the higher levels 
a corresponding reduction of the number of petty Headmen also took place. 
Headmen of different castes also continued to exist, perhaps with re­
duced numbers. As in Portuguese times the cinnamon caste, or Department,
■^ Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, p. 53. Memoir of Van Imhoff,
1740, pp. 24-25.
2
Ibid. pp. 4, 53> 84. Memoirs of Van Goens (junior>, 1679> p. 7.
T. Van Rhee, 1697> p.46.
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continued to have a European Chief as its head. He was assisted by
other Headmen of the caste of varying rank.^ The importance of the
pearl fishery made the Company place it under Dutch Commissioners, who
2
were assisted by the Headmen of the fisher caste. Other castes also 
had Headmen, who collected the taxes and enforced the services due to
the Company from the people of their castes. New fiscal and commercial -
3
policies either reduced or increased their importance.
These Headmen of varying rank were not as yet paid salaries. In 
return for their services to the State they continued to enjoy land 
grants, which were now called accommoddessans, and other perquisites.
It is likely, however, that the whole system of remuneration had moved 
much further away from the traditional system. The practice under the 
Sinhalese Kings, which was continued by the Portuguese, was for the 
higher officials to receive whole villages, (Nindagam) with certain 
rights and duties attached to them. Some of the Headmen appear to have 
enjoyed such villages during early Dutch times. But the Company, which 
was naturally anxious to increase its revenue, and which also deliberately 
set itself to destroy the power of the Headmen, adopted the policy of 
reducing the size of the land grants, and granting uniform fixed portions 
according to rank. The Mudaliyars and Lacarins appear to have received
^See Memoirs of Van Rhee, pp. 40-47* Simons, 1707, p.28.
2
Memoirs of Van Rhee, 1697, p.20, Becker, 1716, p.13.
3
Memoirs of Van Rhee, 1697,pp.28, 32.
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preferential treatment, while the village Headmen were neglected.
These developments undoubtedly had the effect of changing the character
of the higher native offices.
The nobility of the country, thus cut to size to suit the Dutch,
were made use of to promote the interests of the Company. They became
the agents through whom the commercial and mercantile policies of the
2
Dutch Company were carried into effect. Services due to the Company 
were enforced by them. Some of the taxes that had to be paid were rented 
out. Inhere direct collections prevailed it appears to have been the 
practice to come to a settlement with the Headmen for the payment of the 
taxes wifiin their divisions, and to make them responsible in the case 
of a deficit.^" Though the amounts payable by the inhabitants were in­
dicated in the Thombos, or registers, the Company may have been less 
interested in the methods adopted by the Headmen to enforce collection. 
Much larger ideas of private profit entered into the minds of the Head­
men as they were encouraged with land grants, gold chains, medals, and 
so on to open plantation crops in which the Company was interested. The 
Dutch thus exploited the craving which developed among them for such
^Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders , p. 53. Memoirs of Becker, 1716, 
p.23* Van Imhoff, 1740, pp. 26-30. See also Anthonisz, Report on the 
Dutch records in the Government Archives, pp. 52-62.
2
See Memoirs of the Dutch Governors, for information on policies.
3
Ibid., for information on the renting of revenue.
A
Memoir of Van Rhee, 1697, pp. 24-25.
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medals and titles to secure greater dividends for the Company.^
Closely connected with the Headman system was a social and
economic organization which was largely feudal in character. The
two most important aspects of this socio-economic order were a system
2
of service land tenures and the division of society into castes.
Under the Sinhalese system the King was theoretically the lord of 
the soil. Landed property of every description originated in him.
The lien between the King and landholder was one of service. As lord 
of the soil, the King devoted the arable land to various objects of 
state, whether religion, finance, justice or defence, granting it to 
castes classes and individuals, who performed specific services in 
return for their holdings. Cuch services ranged from mere ceremonial 
functions to the most responsible services of war and peace. In each 
province there were broadly three groups of villages. There were the 
Gabadagam, or the villages that were retained by the Crown, Viharagam 
or those granted to the temples, and Nindagam or those granted to the 
nobility of officials. The inhabitants of these villages were liable to 
pay tributes or perform services to the lords of the villages, and, or, 
to the Crown. These services and tributes varied according to the ten­
ure of the land, and caste. Caste was uaually, though not always iden­
tical with a profession, and involved a division of labour by birth. 
Society was divided into a number of castes with varying positions in it.
Tor land tenures and castes see Ribeiro, The Historic Tragedy of the 
island of Ceilao, pp. 26-32; Ceylon - the Portuguese era. Vol. II, pp. 
51-53. Memoirs of Dutch Governors.
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The definition of the position of a caste in society extended into 
detailed matters of dress and marriage. The Vellale or farmer caste 
■was recognized as the highest caste and the chief officers of the 
State were selected from among them. Other castes however had their 
own Headmen.
Both the Portuguese and the Butch made use of this system to 
promote their own interests. The Butch in part, icular, while more 
carefully maintaining it than the Portuguese, perverted it to serve 
the ends of a commercial monopoly. This undoubtedly involved many 
changes of importance. Thus for instance the Viharagam was given to 
the new Christian churches, or rented out and gradually changed beyond 
recognition. Hindagam in the old sense ceased to exist during Butch 
times. The Gabadagam began to be worked according to new modes which 
suited the interest of the Portuguese and the Butch, a part of it being 
rented out in return for payments. All these in turn involved changes 
in the services to which the people were liable, changes in taxation 
etc., some of which even affected caste positions. The land grants given 
by the Portuguese and the Butch on the basis of rent instead of ser­
vice and. the non-enforcement of services which were of no utility, tended 
to increase the proportion of a private property in the country.^ These 
changes undoubtedly weakened the old socio-economic order at many import­
ant points. But it survived the Portuguese and Butch periods and came
For above see Pieris, Ceylon - the Portuguese era, Vol. II, pp. 36-37, 
42-46. Memoirs of Butch Governors.
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down to British times.
While the administrative structure in the Maritime provinces 
thus underwent many changes the Kandyan kingdom, cut off from con­
tact with the rest of the outside world, and consequently more inwards 
looking, maintained its feudal institutions in their medieval purity. 
Under the Kandyan constitution the King was the head of the Government, 
Theoretically he was supreme and absolute. Law was the enactment of 
his will. He was also the highest judicial authority. In practice, how­
ever, it was recognized that the King should act in conformity with 
the institutions and customs of the country. Before innovations of 
importance were carried into effect, or when matters of public interest 
were involved, the principal chiefs and priests were consulted
The authority of the King was exercised through a hierarchy of 
officials. The two officers of the highest rank in the kingdom were 
the Adigars. There were usually two of them, known as the Udagampaha
and Pallegampaha Adigars, (Adigars of the upper and lower regions),
2 —though eometimes a third was added. The two Adigars exercised a gen­
eral jurisdiction over two broad divisions of the kingdom. Within 
their respective divisions they had equal powers and privileges. Their 
duties comprehended those of Court Ministers, Chief Justices, Command­
ers of military forces. They were the channel of the Kingfs orders to
*^John D ’Gyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, p.5* 
2Ibid.. pp. 5-13.
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the Chiefs and people of the provinces, and advised him on such 
matters as the appointment of other Chiefs, granting of lands and 
other rewards for services.1 They tad the charge of special depart­
ments of people such as the ICatupulle (messengers), Kasakara (whip 
crackers) and Rakavallo (guards of the gaol) and also of special
duties at the capital such as its police, the superintendence of pub-
2
lie works and festivals.
The kingdom was divided into twenty one divisions. Twelve of
them were termed Disavanis and each one of them was placed under a
Chief or Governor called Disava. The rest (districts closer to the
capital) were called Ratas and each of them was under a Chief called 
3 —Rate Mahatmaya. The Disava had a general jurisdiction over his divi­
sion, excepting over certain Royal villages or those assigned to a 
separate Head or Chief of a department. He had his distinct flag and 
retainers. He led the armies of the Disavani to battle, exercised 
judicial powers inferior to that of the Adigars, enforced the payment 
of dues and the performance of services, appointed inferior Headmen, and 
looked after the general prosperity of the province.^ The Rate Mahat- 
mayas were of lower rank than the Disavas. No flags or armed guards
^John D ’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, p. 5,
2
Ibid., p.6.
^Ibid., p.13*
4lbid.. pp. 13-29, 38-39.
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were allowed to them. Their duties were similar but less responsible, 
being under more direct supervision from the capital.^
The authority of the Disava was exercised through numerous other 
Headmen. The Disavanis were divided into other smaller units known as 
Korales and Pattus. They were under the general charge of Ivoralas who 
were assisted by Atu ICoralas. These units contained a number of villages 
over whom there were petty Headmen bearing various names. Though these 
Headmen may have exercised a general jurisdiction over their respective 
divisions, their immediate authority seems to have been more parti­
cularly confined to certain groups or departments of people. The Dis- 
ava’s authority over other groups or departments of people, some of whom 
were identical with separate castes, was exercised through departmental
or caste Headmen, usually Lekams and Vidanas in departments of a civil
2
nature, and Muhandirams and Arachchis in those of a military nature.
Some of the more important departments were at times placed under a sep-
3 —arate Chief or Lekam. In such instances the Disavas ceased to exercise
authority over them, and the Lekam assidbed by the Headmen of the depart­
ment had jurisdictiorjover the people belonging to it distributed in the 
different villages of the Disavani. On occasions when it was necessary
■^ D’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, pp. 13, 29-41. 
^Ibid., pp. 16, 29.
^Ibid., pp. 21, 24, 27.
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to obtain the co-operation cf the disavani, they were placed under 
the orders of the Disava,'1' H. Marshall, an army doctor who was in 
Ceylon at the time of the conquest of this kingdom by the British, 
observed that these officials ’’possessed kingly power in their own 
districts and assumed a state and dignity nearly allied to royalty”.
The allegiance of the people was more immediately to the Disava and 
through him to the Xing. It should also be noted that the Xing pos­
sessed no standing army (excepting a few bodyguards) and was dependant 
on the district armies under the command of the Disavas.
Apart from tie Disavas there were various officials attached to 
the King’s Household and Court, some of whom were heads of departments 
which had jurisdiction over people distributed in many villages. There 
were also lay officials or Chiefs who had the management of the villages
granted to the temples. Prominent among them were Chiefs called
3
Diyavadana Nilames.
As we have already noticed, in the Kandyan state the organs ■ of 
executive and judicial administration were not separated. The supreme 
judicial power was vested in the King, and was exercised either in ori­
ginal jurisdiction or in appeal. Cases originally entertained and de­
cided by the King were those that arose between the principal Chiefs
jD’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan kingdom. ppf 24, 29.
2
Marshall, Ceylon, p.169.
3
D'Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan kingdom, p.6.
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or principal officers and servants in his Household and Court, or 
where one of them was a defendant, suits among priests and the more 
serious crimes*^ In civil cases every individual was theoretically 
free to appeal to the King from the decision of any Chief, without re­
ference to time or value. There were well known ways of bringing the 
appeal to the King's notice, such as representation by a Chief or 
courtier, by prostrating oneself on the road when the King was travel­
ling, by prostrating oneself towards the palace, at any other time, 
by ascending a tree near the palace and proclaiming aloud one's griev­
ance, by taking refuge in a Royal or religious sanctuary. The cases 
coming before the King were either heard by him in person, the Chiefs 
questioning the parties according to his directions, or referred to the
Maha Naduwa or the Great Court, for inquiry and report, after which a
2
decision was given by the King.
The Maha lladuva consisted of Adigars, Disavas, Lelcams, and Muhan- 
dirams, or any other Chiefs distinguished for their ability and judg­
ment. It had a civil and criminal jurisdiction. The cases coming before 
it were either those referred to it by the King, or those originally 
instituted before it - usually introduced by the Chief to whose juris­
diction the complaining party belonged. In the latter type of cases
the Court had only the same jurisdiction and powers of punishment as
— 2were vested in the Adigars individually. The Court gave its decision
^D'Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, pp. 53-34.
2Ibid.. pp. 34-36.
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after questioning parties and witnesses, and examining written de­
positions and title deeds. In Hie case of an unresolved difference 
of opinion among the Chiefs the matter was referred to the King."**
Chiefs and Headmen of all ranks exercised both civil and criminal 
jurisdiction, which was limited by the office held. Adigars, Disavas,
Rate Kahatmayas, Lekams, and Chiefs of the King's court and household 
had civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. Their civil jurisdiction 
had no limitation with regard to value. In criminal jurisdiction they 
could hear all cases, except the higher crimes reserved for the King. 
However, they usually reported to the higher authorities any atrocious 
crimes which occurred. In such instances the Adigars and Disavas
reported to the King, while the Lekams, Rate Mahatmayas and other Chiefs
2reported to the Adigars. ’ The most important feature regarding the 
jurisdiction of the above Chiefs was that it was usually confined to the 
people under their control. Thus the Adigars had an exclusive jurisdiction 
only over persons subject to their peculiar authority* As regards people 
under the Disavas or other Heads of departments, the Adigars could not
entertain cases except in communication with the proper Chief or decide
3 —
without his concurrence. Similarly the Disavas normally had a juris­
diction only over persons and land in the Disavani which were not attached
^D'Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, pp. 34-35. 
^Ibid., pp. 36-41.
3Ibid., p. 36.
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to another Chief. He exercised a jurisdictioncverthe latter only- 
on the application of the proper Chief, or when the department was 
specially placed under him. Similarly the other Chiefs above men­
tioned had jurisdiction only over persons subject to their orders.1
Theoretically the above group of Chiefs had unlimited powers 
of punishment. But in practice they were limited by customary law. 
Punishments were assessed according to the rank: and condition of the 
offender. The Chiefs were generally prohibited from inflicting cor­
poral punishments over those immediately below them in office or social 
position. The Adigars had the exclusive privilege of awarding cor­
poral punishment with the cane while the others used the open hand 
or rods called ipal. All these Chiefs could dispossess a person of 
his lands. But only the Adigars acting on behalf of the Mahanaduva 
or the King, or in their own right, the Disavas, and the Chiefs of 
temple villages, could give written decrees with their signature called
Sittu. The others could only issue a written statement without their
2signature, which merely recited the decision. This distinction per­
haps indicated that finality of decision rested with the King and the 
principal Chiefs.
Inferior Headmen of various ranks enjoyed minor powers of civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over persons under their authority. In civil 
matters they usually arbitrated in disputes regarding limits of fields,
^'Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, p.38.
2Ibid.. pp. 37-42.
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small debts, etc. and In criminal matters their power extended to 
robberies, petty assaults and quarrels. Powers of punishment were 
similarly limited to slight corporal punishments on common persons 
or those of low caste, small fines and a few days imprisonment. These 
powers were usually exercised when the Disava or Chief was absent from 
the district. The minor Headmen in the Disavanis had greater powers 
than those in the Ratas, where a reference to the superiors was easy. 
Thus for instance in the Disavani these Headmen could, in land cases, 
grant written decisions without signature, dispossess lands, and se­
quester lands and crops. Those in the Ratas could only sequester lands, 
crops and dwellings. In the Disavanis there was a tendency among the 
minor Headmen to assume greater power than was allowed.^"
At the village level there was a village Court called the Gam- 
sabha, which consisted of the principal and experienced men of the
p
villages. This Couit aimed at the amicable settlement of disputes 
rather than at punishment and exercised both civil and criminal juris­
diction. It declared which party was in the wrong and decided upon
compensation. If a Headman in office was one of the assembly, as it
3
frequently happened, the Court levied fines for offences.
The concepts of justice, like much of the machinery, was medieval 
and feudal in character. Oaths were not as yet a mere formality. If
"4>’0yly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, pp. 42-43*
2
Ibid.t p. 43* J* Forbes, Eleven years in Ceylon, p.71.
3
D’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, p.44.
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after an inquiry and examination of all the evidence on both sides 
a case should still be doubtful it was customary to decide it by 
oaths, which were connected with the religious beliefs of the country* 
Some of them were so important and occasional that only the King, 
the Adigars, and the Disavas, could give permission for their use.^ 
Every person appearing before his Chief, whether on account of a com­
plaint or for any other cause, was expected to bring with him (unless 
very poor) certain customary presents as a token of respect. During 
the course of a suit both parties to it would take presents according 
to their ability. It was a general rule that the presents given must 
be returned on demand by the losing party. The regular and recognized 
fee was the one given by the gainer of a suit upon receiving a written 
decree. All fees and fines were the perquisites of the Chiefs and 
Headmen.^
In normal times, with the paternal concepts of government which 
usually prevailed, with the binding influence of customary law, and 
with the moderating influence of religion, the judicial system secured 
substantial justice within the social and economic order for which it 
was meant, and which it was its chief function to preserve. Like the 
socio-economic order, however, the system was more favourable to the 
higher castes than the lower, to the rich than to the poor. Besides, 
in times of stress it was capable of being oppressive even by its own
"4) ’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, 
pp. 37-58, 40, 56-60.
2lbid., pp. 44-47.
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standards*
As in the Maritime kingdoms before the advent of the Europeans, 
the whole administrative organization was knit together by the same 
system of service land tenures and the division of society into castes. 
At the advent of British rile the socio-economic order in the Kandyan 
kingdom"*" was generally less unhinged than in the Maritime provinces.
Thus when the British arrived in Ceylon at the turn of the nine­
teenth century a long period of European rule in the Maritime provinces 
and resulted in a partial change in the feudal organization that had 
existed there while in the Kandyan kingdom it remained virtually 
intact.
The period of this study covers roughly the first thirty seven 
years of British rule in Ceylon. During the years 1796-1801, Ceylon 
was governed as a part of the possessions of the East India Company 
and was under the government of Madras. In 1801 it was made a Crown 
Colony and this resulted inthe establishment of a separate government 
under the control of the Secretary of State for Colonies.
The period covered by this study was a significant one in the 
history of England. The twin revolutions - the Industrial and French 
revolutions - were bringing about rapid social, economic and political 
changes accompanied by a conflict of ideas and the emergence of new 
ideals. It was truly an age of reform, which culminated in the Reform.
For more details on the social and economic organization of the Kandyan 
kingdom, see R. Pieris, Sinhalese Social Organization - the Kandyan 
period.
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Act of 1832. These events and movements had an undoubted influence 
over Ceylon.
In Ceylon the period up to 1833 saw in many respects a con­
tinuation of the Dutch administrative and economic policies. Follow­
ing the Dutch the British also built an institutional superstructure 
over the Headman system. In this study I have attempted to examine 
the character of the institutions and offices established by the Brit­
ish, the functions they were expected to perform, the powers that were 
conferred upon them, their relation to the Headman system, and the 
nature of the transformation which the latter underwent during this 
period.
The fact that by this time England had a social and economic order 
where the emphasis was on the freedom of the individual naturally 
brought about much conflict of thought and action among the new rulers. 
An attempt has been made to examine the nature of the conflicts oc­
curring in their minds when they were faced with the task of devising 
institutions and offices for Ceylon, in defining their powers, and in 
operating the machinery. In this connection some attempt has been made 
to place the institutional growth in its political social and economic 
setting.
The Civil Service was the main organ through which a transfer of 
power to British hands was carried out. The forces and tendencies behind 
the growth of the Service in such matters as recruitment, salaries, 
promotions and pensions have been traced. An attempt has been made to
3 2
assign to the Civil Servants the social position which they 
occupied in the Colony,
The Colebrooke-Cameron reforms in Ceylon were in many way’s a 
fundamental departure from the traditions of European rule. For the 
first time there was a plan of reform where the European rulers and 
the native ruled were treated as belonging to one large community.
An attempt has therefore been made to state the problems that were 
involved in the reform of the administrative machinery in Ceylon and 
to examine the character of the ref ore Jpropo sals that were put forward 
by the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission.
Chapter I
CENTRAL AND DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
The growth of the central and departmental administrative
machinery displayed several tendencies. When devising institutions
for Ceylon the British could not avoid thinking in terms of offices
and institutions familiar to them either in England or in other
parts of the Empire. Their main functionsin Ceylon however led ho.
of
ease ec£ maintenance Athe monopolistic economy and the feudalistic social
order inherited from the Dutch. Not surprisingly the development of
the administrative machinerytook place amidst much conflict of thought
and action. While the concepts and ideals of administration prevalent
in England at .’the time carried the new rulers towards more liberal
institutions, the political social and economic order in Ceylon pulled
them towards authoritarianism.
When the possessions of the Dutch East India Company in Ceylon
passed into the hands of the English East India Company in 1796, the
X
articles of capitulation provided for the continuance in office, for 
a period of time, of some of the Dutch commercial and judicial serv­
ants in Colombo, in order to enable them to settle the accounts of the 
Company, and the cases pending before the judicial counts. All other 
commercial and political servants were allowed to remain as private 
individuals, and subject to the ratification of the Madras Government
^Articles of capitulation, 15 February 1796, C*0. 54, 1.
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they were promised a reasonable means of subsistence. The native
servants in the different departments were to continue in employment,
subject to such regulations as the British might judge necessary.
These articles of capitulation said nothing about the future form of
the administration.^
The years between 1796 and 1798 marked a period of confusion in
the administration of the conquered provinces* The factors leading to
this confusion were well summarized by Robert Hobart, when he stated
that "the precariousness of our position, the1" short period the whole
of the Dutch settlements have been in our hands, the difficulty of
obtaining information, the distrust of the natives, the indisposition
2
of the Dutch, were obstacles to a successful management". The result 
of this confusion was the breakdown of the old revenue and judicial 
system. Expediency and convenience became the guiding factors. The 
administrative arrangements that wereintroduced, lacked proper form, 
and they had the limited objective of getting as much revenue as possible. 
The Madras Government took the most convenient step of introducing Mad­
ras Civil Servants to Ceylon to hold offices modelled on those in India.
A Resident, who was also Superintendent of Revenue, a Commercial Resi­
dent, and a few Collectors were sent to organize the revenue collections 
of the island. For the sake of convenience they exercised both executive
1Articles of capitulation, 15 February 1796. C.O. 54, 1. 
Minute, 9 June 1797. C.O. 55, 2.
41
and judicial power, in so far as a judiciary was necessary to en­
force the collection of revenue.
Appropriate steps were not taken to have a proper degree of 
central control and direction. The Commander of the forces was no
1
doubt vested with a discretionary authority, both civil and military.
The revenue and commercial servants were to be regarded as subject to
his orders, and they were required to address him on all points on
which a reference was required. A general order dated 10 December
1794 defining the powers and duties of the civil and military servants
in the Northern Circars was to guide the relations between the civil
2
and military servants in Ceylon. How imperfect these arrangements
were is seen from the fact that the revenue and commercial servants
were permitted to correspond direct with the Madras Government without
a reference to the head of the government of Ceylon. The difficulties
created by this situation led James Stuart, the Commander, to request
the Madras Government that all orders to the island should be communi-
cated through himself. In reply he was merely informed that he would
be furnished with copies of all orders transmitted to the revenue offi- 
4cials.
1V7. C. Jackson to James Stuart, 1 March 1796, and 28 April 1796,
C.O. 55, 1.
2Ibid.
Stuart to Hobart, 7 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
4
Jackson to Stuart, 50 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
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Convenience and expediency arising out of the unfamiliarity
with local conditions, the distrust of the native inhabitants, and
the availability of Kalabars who had flocked from India, tempted the
Madras Civil Servants to adopt methods of revenue collection familiar
to them in India. Long established land tenures were set aside and
taxes introduced in their place, the right of collection being also
farmed out to Malabars.^ The means employed to carry out these changes
were equally novel. They involved the appointment of Malabar strangers
2
to positions formerly held by the Headmen, especially the Mudaliyars.
The loss of power and position experienced by the latter was by it­
self sufficient to cause discontent. The Mudaliyars and the other Head­
men under them naturally refused to attend to the orders of the Super­
intendent of Revenue conveyed through his Malabar officials. They were
thereupon threatened with fines imprisonment and confiscation of pro- 
3
perty.
In the judicial administration of the country the disorganization 
was complete. The Dutch court at Colombo, which was authorized to settle 
cases that were pending, found itself unable to continue without suit­
able monthly allowances to its officials.^ Stuart took the position
^"Proclamation, 16 August 1797* C.O. 54, 2.
^North to Mornington, 27 October 1798. Wellesley MS. 13,866.
3
Proclamation, 11 November 1796. C.O. 55, 1*
4
Proclamation, 9 March 1796. C.O* 55, 1. Also Court to Stuart,
26 March 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
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that by the articles of capitulation the British Government was
not bound to pay the expenses of the court* He however authorized
it to make use of the stamp and other duties for the purpose."*" But
without the effective backing of the British the Court at times found
2
itself unable to enforde obedience to its decrees.
Meanwhile, the British began to feel the effects of the sus­
pension of justice in Colombo. Stuart was faced with daily complaints,
for which he had no remedy but that of invoking patience, and referring
•3
to Madras for instructions. The Madras Government advised him to re­
establish the Butch judicial system till such time as the European
situation wqs settled. Stuart therefore authorized the establishment 
of the Butch Courts of justice at Colombo, Galle and Jaffna, with
A.
their former civil and criminal jurisdiction, texcepting over revenue 
cases instituted in the Kachcheries). This intention was however de­
feated by the refusal of the Dutch to continue beyond the period that
5
was necessary to determine the cases that were pending. As the future 
of the conquests was not yet firmly decided, they appear to have not
"^ Stuart to Court, 16 April 1796. C.O. 55, 1*
2Ibid.. 31 August 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
Stuart to Hobart, 1 April 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
4
Act of authorization, 1 June 1796* C.O. 55, 1*
5
Court to Stuart, 11 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
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wished to compromise their position by accepting office under the 
British. Stuart was therefore left with the alternative of provid­
ing for the administration of criminal justice by martial law, and 
requesting for more assistants to attempt the establishment of any
other Courts.'*' The Madras Government merely authorized him to act
2
in whichever way he thought proper. A Court Martial, and a Court 
of Equity in Colombo were the only Courts he was able to provide.
The ordinary inhabitants were at the mercy of the tax farmers who
3
exercised their own authority to enforce the collectionof the revenue.
All the above circumstances produced their inevitable conse­
quences. The restlessness among the people, encouraged and led by the 
displaced Headmen, and perhaps supported by the Dutch, culminated in 
open revolt. It clearly demonstrated that Indian forms and methods 
of administration, however convenient to the officials, could not 
safely be adopted wholesale in Ceylon because of divergent conditions 
in the two countries* This realisation first occurred to Stuart, who 
advised Madras not to reduce the military force ntill after the change 
of system which it may be the intention of Government to introduce in 
the revenue department shall be perfectly understood and established".^
^ourt to Stuart, 16 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1. Also, Stuart, to Hobart, 
22 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
2
Jackson to Stuart, 11 August 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
3
North to Mcmington, 27 October 1798. Wellesley, MS. 13,866.
^"Stuart to Hobart, 7 June 1796. C.O. 55, 1.
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He rightly pointed out that the Mudaliyars and other Headmen were
likely to lose many advantages and suffer in their consequence by
the changes and that they could therefore be expected to make some
struggle to oppose them.^ :The aversion which the Sinhalese must
naturally feel to have the power transferred from the heads of their
own /sic/ casts, to Malabars who are entire strangers, and for whom
they can as yet entertain no respect,” he wrote, ”will greatly assist
2
the Mudaliyars in raising discontent.” Hobart too gave expression 
to such a realization in his minute in council, which set out the 
reasons for the appointment of a committee of investigation. This 
minute expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the manner in which 
revenue administration had been carried on, and implied the need for
the establishment of a system grounded on existing local conditions,
3
especially where they touched upon tie rights of the people. This 
minute in fact amounted to a repudiation of the idea of adopting Indian 
forms and methods of administratinn, and perhaps had some influence 
in counteracting any tendency to merge Ceylon with India, or to treat 
it merely as a part of Britain*s Indian possessions. The first need 
that hhdytb^betae^ebefore establishing any new system was obtaining
^Stuart to Hobart, 7 June 1796. C.O. 5 5 , 1.
2Ibid,
Minute, 9 June 1797. C.O. 55, 2.
46
more information on the Dutch administrative arrangements. This 
object was uppermost in the appointment of a committee of investi­
gation, with Brigadier-General Pierre Frederick de Meuron as Chair­
man, and Robert Andrews and P. Agnew as members.'*' The choice of De 
Meuron, who was acquainted with the country, to be chairman, showed 
the importance that was attached to obtaining information.
De Meuron brought with him a realistic approach to the investi­
gation.
’’The habits and prejudices of a nation,1* he wrote,
"can only be changed by one of two means - gradually 
by mildness and a clear demonstration of the superior 
advantages they will derive from the proposed alter­
ations, or violently by the compulsive efforts of sup­
erior force ... Mildness and pursuasion, it appears, 
were not the distinguishing features of our change of ^  
system, and our force was inadequate to compel obedience."
The De Meuron Committee of investigation was one of the princi­
pal means of bringing back some of the important features of the Dutch 
administrative arrangements. De Meuron took great pains by means of 
Dutch documents to understand what was required to bring about stability. 
The principal recommendation which he put forward in the administrative 
field was the restoration of the hierarchy of Headmen to a share of 
power. This was to be accompanied by a revival of the former land ten- 
ures and a restoration of the Dutch revenue and judicial system.
De Meuron was in command of the mercenary regiment, that was transferred 
frmm the Dutch to the British at the height of the crisis. Robert 
Andrews was a Madras Civil Servant, who was sent as Resident and Super­
intendent of Revenue. Agnew was a military officer who carried out much 
of the negotiations with the Dutch, prior to conquest.
^Proceedings of the De Meuron Committee, C.O. 5 5 ,  2  
3
See Proceedings and report of the De Meuron Committee, C.O. 5 5 , 2.
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Meanwhile an important development took place in England in 
1798, Perhaps because of the importance of the new possessions it 
was decided that the Crown should participate in its administration.
Though at first a complete transfer had been under contemplation, it 
was finally decided to transfer the Sovereignty to the Crown, giving 
to the company the entire administration and the disposal of the re­
venue.^ This led to what is known as the dual system of administration*
The sovereinty of the Crown was asserted by the appointment of a Governor.
2
The Honourable Frederick North was sent as Governor and Commander in 
thief. All powers of Government, legislative, executive, judicial and 
military, were vested in him. He was required to exercise these powers 
in correspondence with the Court of Directors of the East India Company 
and the Secretary of State through the Court. He was to obey orders re­
ceived from the Court of Directors, its secret committee, and from the
3
Governor-General of India. The position that was thus created was no 
doubt a difficult one to execute and partly accounts for the difficulties 
that occurred. North complained that the powers of his Goverrment were 
ill defined and difficult of execution.^
^North to Momington, 5 June 1798* Wellesley MS 15,866.
^Frederick North, 1766-1827, fifth earl of Guilford. He matriculated 
at Oxford and held several important civilian positions. Was member 
of Parliament from 1792-1794. First Governor of Ceylon, 1798— 1805.
3
Royal Commission, 19 April 1798. Royal Instructions 26 March 1798.
C.O. 55, 61.
4
North to Mornington, 5 June 1798. Wellesley MS 13,866.
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By the Royal Instructions North was required to establish
the Dutch judicial and revenue system. He had however the power of
making useful and expedient alterations, in communication with the
Company.'*' As North admitted, Tthe masterly labours1 of the committee
of investigation left him little else to do in the revenue sphere
2
than to carry out its recommendations. Among the recommendations
implemented by North were the re-appointment of the Mudaliyars and
the restoration of the service land tenures. The re-establishment
of the Dutch judicial system, as we shall see later, presented many
difficulties. Here too, however, North succeeded in devising a plan
to rer-establish,in a modified form, some of the Dutch courts in the
provinces. In place vbf the Dutch Raad Van Justitie he proposed a
Supreme Court with a Madras Civil Servant as president and two Dutch
4
Assistants as members. Later he constituted it with the Governor 
as President, the Commander of the forces, the Chief Secretary, and
5
a Barrister as members. It was given full criminal jurisdiction 
throughout the island. To hear civil appeals two Courts were established.
^Royal Instructions, 26 March 1798* C.O. 55, 61.
2
North to Court of Directors, 26 October 1798, C.O. 54, 1*
3
North to Court of Directors, 26 February 1799* C.O. 54, 1*
^North to Mornington, 10 May 1798. Wellesley MS 13,866.
5
Proclamation, 14 October 1 7 9 9 ^keen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government^*pp. 9-11•
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One was called the 'Greater Court of Appeal' and was constituted, in 
accordance with Royal Instructions, with the Governor, the Commander 
of the forces, and the Chitf Secretary. It was to hear appeals exceeding 
2,000 rix-dollars in value. The second Court was called the 'Lesser 
Court* and was constituted on North's own authority with the same mem­
bers to hear appeals in cases exceeding 500 rix-dollars and below 2,000 
rix-dollars.^ Before these underwent a real test another change oc­
curred in the government of the country.
In 1801 the decision was announced to take the administration 
out of the hands of the East India Company, and to turn Ceylon into a 
Crown Colony. The Governor received a new Royal Commission and additional 
instructions. The Royal Commission, which was the regular mode of ap­
pointing a colonial Governor, contained adaort statement of his powers 
and had to be publicly read and proclaimed in the colony. The Royal 
Instructions which accompanied it were more important in that they were 
more exhaustive and defined the powers and duties of the Governor more 
closely. Along with these was sent a Charter of Justice, which created 
a Supreme Court, appointed a Chief Justice, and defined generally the 
main principles of judicial administration. A despatch from Dundas to 
North announced the creation of a Civil Service and laid down the main 
principles on which it was to be^organized. These instruments taken 
together could be said to have provided the constitution of the country.
^Proclamation, 14 October 1799• Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, ppJ^‘9-11. North to Court of Directors,
5 October 1799. C.0. 54, 1.
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These instruments of Government displayed a duality of thought*
The need to display power in the new Colony made it desirable to 
unify, as much as possible, the powers of government in the hands 
of the Governor* An authoritarian form of government similar to that 
prevalent in India was therefore adopted. The Governor was conferred 
with supreme legislative and executive powers and a share in the judi­
cial administration* As against this was the reluctance to confer un­
limited power and authority on an individual, as well as the tendency 
to think in terms of a separation of powers* This duality of thought 
led to the creation of institutions, which were intended to impose 
checks and balances on the exercise of the Governor’s powers, but which 
proved to be ineffective in practice*
The Council which was associated with the Governor was one of 
the ineffectual checks that was thus devised* Henry Dundas instructed 
North to create an Advisory Council, arguing that it was desirable to 
have such an institution for the sake of 'more solemnity1, and to give
more satisfaction to those who would be regulated by the Governor's pro-
1
ceedings in his legislative and executive capacity. These instructions 
show that it was not intended to create a Council whose members were in 
any way to have a share in the legislative and executive authority, 
which was clearly vested in the Governor alone. Consequently, it was 
laid down that the Council was to be consulted on all "great and import-
^Dundas to North, 1 3  March 1801* C.O. 55, 61.
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ant occasions", but at the discretion of the Governor.^* The members
were not to be held responsible for any opinion (or advice) they
might give in thEfc capacity. Questions were not to be put to the
vote, but a member differing from the Governor on any measure under
deliberation, was to be free to enter a minute stating the grounds
2
of his opinion and dissent.
Though no legal limits on the Governor’s powers were thus con­
templated, it was perhaps expected that the Council would impose checks 
and balances on their exercise. Such an intention is noticeable in the 
composition of the Council decided upon by Dundas. It was to consist 
of not more than, five members, of whom the Chief Justice, the Commander 
of the forces, and the Principal Secretary were to be members ex officio. 
The Governor was given freedom to choose the other two members, but Dundas
suggested that it might be useful to have the head of the revenue de-
3
partment as a member of the Council. The Governor was given power to 
suspend any member or to cease to require the attendance of such member 
altogether if he found sufficient reasons for dispensing with his ad­
vice and opinions, or if his attendance would interfere with the exe-
4
cution of his official duties. But these were powers which a Governor
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O# 55, 61.
2i b i a .
3Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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would be reluctant to exercise without clear reasons that could 
justify his actions before the Colonial Office#
YJith such a composition there was a strong possibility of the 
Council developing a fair amount of independence. The Commander, and 
the Chief Justice, who owed their appointments to the Crown, and were 
therefore less dependent on the goodwill of the Governor, could have 
developed into independent-minded members of Council, and therefore 
in a position to provide a reasonable check on the Governors acti­
vities# At first the Chief Secretary too was in a similar position, 
as his appointment was also made by the Crown# In fact such a tendency 
was noticeable in the early days of the Council. General David Douglas 
Wemyss, the Commander of the forces during the time of North, attempted 
to make use of the Council to agitate questions on which there was dis­
agreement with the Governor# Thus for instance on one occasion he re­
quested the Governor to summon a meeting of the Council to decide on
his request for the immediate removal of the Supreme Court from the
fort of C o l o m b o A  meeting was summoned, but North prevented a dis­
cussion by stating that the subject belonged exclusively to the executive 
2
government. Similarly, almost throughout the period of our study the 
Chief Justice made use of the Council to agitate questions on which he 
was interested# The conflicts between the Chief Justice and the Gov­
ernor, of which we shall see more later, which usually involved im-
1
Wemyss to North, 19 October 1804# C#0# 54, 16.
^North to Wemyss, 20 October 1804# C.O# 54, 16#
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portant questions affecting the form of government such as the in­
dependence of the judiciary, usually ended with “both of them entering 
opposing minutes in council* It is clear that the position occupied 
by the Chief Justice in the Council was not much to the Governor's 
liking* On the occasion of one of these conflicts Governor Thomas
Maitland**" took the extreme step of dispensing with the attendance
2
of the Chief Justice. He was re-appointed on the orders of the Secret­
ary of State, but Maitland's action may have affected the character of 
the Council.
Other developments regarding the composition of the Council also 
worked in the direction of making it more subservient to the Governor. 
Though according to the original instructions of Dun das, the Council was 
to consist of five members, North constituted it with only the ex officio 
members. During the time of Maitland, two more were added to the Coun­
cil, the Revenue Commissioner in 1806, and the Vice-Treasurer and Ac­
countant-General in 1810. In 1810 the Colonial Office sent instructions
to make the Vice-Treasurer and the Revenue Commissioner ex officio mem-
3
bers of the Council. While in England however Maitland objected to 
these arrangement^ arguing that a general rule should not be laid down 
but that the additional members should be appointed with reference to 
the person, his characters, and his situation in the Service rather than
^Thomas Maitland, 1759-1824. He had a long and distinguished military 
career in various parts of the Empire, and reached the position of Lord 
Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and Commander-in-Chief of the Medi­
terranean, 1815-1824. Member of Parliament from 1794-1796, and 1800-1804. 
Governor of Ceylon from 1806-1811.
Maitland to Castlereagh, 18 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28. The occasion for 
this conflict is noted on p.
^Liverpool to Maitland, 3 0 September 1810. C.O. 54, 41.
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to the nature of the office he held.1 Because of these objections
the Colonial Office revoked its instructions during the time of
2Governor Hobert Brownrigg* Thus changes which might have had bene­
ficial results were not implemented. Apart from the fact that the new 
members added to the Council belonged to the Civil Service, and were 
therefore dependent on the Governor, their appointment to the Council, 
and their continuance as Councillors, also depended on his goodwill.
As we shall see later the Chief Secretary too fell into a position 
of subservience, with the result that the Council was not composed of 
a majority of members whose main interest was to please and flatter the 
Governor. These developments gradually turned the Council into a con­
venient tool in the hands of the Governor.
This is seen in the manner in which the Council functioned.
Though by the instructions of Dundas no distinction was made between 
the executive and legislative business of the Governor, North at first 
declared his intention of not convoking it "for any subjects but such 
as are of primary, if not of legislative importance*^ Such a distinction 
was however not made in practice, and matters of an executive as well as 
of a legislative nature were brought before the Council. It only met
Memorandum of Maitland, ND. August 1811. C.O. 54, 41*
2
Robert Brownrigg, 1759-1853• He had a long military career which cul­
minated in a promotion to the rank of General in 1819. He was Governor 
of Ceylon from 1811-1820.
Morth to Dundas, 16 March 1802. C.O.54, 5.
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when summoned by the Governor* Legislative measures were presented 
in their final form, and executive measures in the form of minutes 
in council. Some discussions undoubtedly took place, but they were not 
entered in the minutes of the Council, except in the form of a dis­
senting opinion which a Councillor wished to place on record.^ The 
Civil Service members usually supported the Governor, so that Council 
business neither took time, nor did it usually involve prolonged 
controversy* The support from the Civil Service members in fact en­
couraged Maitland to deviate from the usual practice and to permit 
the members to enter minutes of ’positive approbation1, which were 
no doubt useful in strengthening the Governor's hands. Prom the time 
of Brownrigg a practice also developed of sending to the members, oc­
casionally, 'minutes in circulation' on a matter pending before Coun­
cil. Minutes of the Cbuncil were not regularly transmitted to England. 
Brownrigg initiated the practice of sending home regularly those min­
utes in council which usually accompanied the promulgation of new legis-
2lation, or the sanctioning of expenditure over £200. The dissenting 
opinion of the Chief Justice was also usually submitted especially when 
the subject was a matter of controversy. As for the rest of the minutes
3
they were forwarded or not at the discretion of the Governor. This
"^Evidence of Eden, 25 October 1829. C.O. 416, 8. Colebrooke, Report 
upnn the Administration, C.O* 54, 122.
2
Ibid* See also Brownrigg to Liverpool, 7 September 1812. C.O* 54, 44* 
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 10 July 1813. C.O. 54, 47 and 30 November 1813. 
C.O. 54, 49* The sanctioning of expenditure over £75 in Council was 
ordered by the Treasury in 1817. Expenditure over £200 required the 
sanction of the Home Government. See Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon 
Government, 28 January 1817. C.O. 54, 67.
^Colebrooke, Report upon the Administration, C.O. 54, 122.
56
usually enabled him to build up in England an impression of general 
support for his measures.
The Council thus became a convenient instrument which would
afford protection to the Governor, where he needed such protection,
and which would give additional weight to his opinions, where he needed
it to strengthen his hand. It was made use of frequently in this
manner when the Governor was dealing with Civil Service and financial
matters, where he needed both protection and additional weight. Thus
for example from the time of North the Council was associated with
the Governor when he conducted inquiries into the conduct of Civil 
1
Servants. Witnesses were summoned and examined in Council, and the 
Civil Servants involved were called upon to state their defence in 
Council. The decision of the Governor regarding such Civil Servants 
went in the form of a decision in Council. Similarly financial matters, 
such as the sanctioning of expenditure involving large amounts, and 
the granting of remissions to tax farmers were usually performed in 
Council. The association of the Council in the above matters perhaps 
protected the Governor from suspicions of favouritism. It certainly 
gave added weight to his opinions at the Colonial Office, especially 
when they were accompanied by minutes of positive approbation.
A shortlived change in the position of the Council deserves at­
tention. In 1810 on the advice of Alexander Johnston the Colonial Office
^North for instance conducted an inquiry in Council into the conflicts 
between civil and military servants. Minutes of 24 September 1804•
C.O. 54, 18. Maitland similarly associated the Council into the Con­
duct of H.A.Marshall, Provincial Judge of Colombo, Minutes of 27 June 
1810. C.O. 54, 55.
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ordered far-reaching changes in the structure and functions of the 
Council, which if implemented, would have affected the legislative 
and executive powers of the Governor. It was to he re-constituted 
to consist of six members, five of whom were to he ex officio while 
the remaining member was to he nominated by the G o v e r n o r T h e  Chief 
Justice was to he made the President of the Council, while the Gov­
ernor was to he there as the ’King's representative'. The powers of 
the Council were also increased. Functions which the Governor had hitherto 
performed without being hound to consult the Council such as the grant­
ing of lands and the appointment of judicial officers and Headmen, 
were to he henceforth performed by the Governor in Council. All
2
legislative acts were to he enacted by the Governor and Council.
3
These changes were in fact partly carried out. But while out of 
office in England Maitland strongly objected to all the new provisions, 
especially the increase of the powers of the Council, and the improve­
ment of the position of the Chief Justice by making him its president.
He argued that the changes would destroy the authority and position of 
the Governor.^ The objections raised by Maitland seem to have carried 
much weight with the Colonial Office, for it revoked its instructions,
^Liverpool to Maitland, 30 September 1810. C.O. 54, 41•
2
Ibid. The difference in the meaning of the phrases 'Governor in Council' 
and 'Governor and Council' was well understood at the time. The first 
implied acts done by the Governor himself though in Council, while the 
second implied a decision of a majority of Councillors.
3
Wilson to Liverpool, 26 February 1812. C.O* 54, 42.
4
Memorandum, 3 0 August, 1811. C.O* 54, 41.
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and. ordered Brownrigg to restore the Council to its original position#
These developments showed on the one hand a pull towards more 
liberal institutions, and on the other a desire for authoritarian con­
trol. The Government of Ceylon was sensitive to what it considered a 
local need to preserve the authority and prestige of the Governor es­
pecially in the eyes of the native people. In fact Maitland considered
2
the absence of any great differences in Council a virtue. Brownrigg 
wrote of the necessity of "keeping from the view of foreign subjects 
those doubts and difficulties and changes of opinion unavoidably in­
cident to the intricate, difficult and truly delicate duty of devising, 
digesting, and qualifying the provisions necessary even for their benef it... 
He thought that advice on legislation should take place in such a way 
"that measures consulted and resolved on have come forth to the public 
not in an unfinished state, still less under doubt, or debate and con­
troversy, but in the final and obligatory form of a resolution of the
4
Governor in Council". No more ideas of reforming the Council occurred 
until the emergence of the liberal critids on the scene during the latter 
part of our period of study.
This duality of thought found expression in the Charter of Justice, 
which defined in a general way the relations between the executive and
^Liverpool to Brownrigg, 5 November 1811. C.O. 55, 62.
^Memorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41*
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 August 1814. C.O. 54, 52.
4Ibid.
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the judiciary.1 B y  this instrument the Governor was not only given
the power, which rightly belonged to the legislature, of creating
judicial institutions locally, but he was also made the President
of a High Court of appeal over the-value of £200. The other members of
this court were the Chief Justice, the Puisne Justice, and the Chief 
2
Secretary. As against this was the creation of a Supreme Court, 
consisting of well paid professional Judges, over whom the Governor 
had no control except the extreme one of suspending them from office.
It was given original civil and criminal jurisdiction over cases 
arising between the Europeans or where they were defendants. It was 
also given an original civil jurisdiction over the fort and district 
of Colombo. Provision was made for the extension of this jurisdiction 
whenever the Governor thought fit to do so. It was made the supreme 
criminal tribunal throughout the island. The trial of all the graver 
crimes was to take place before it, while it was to have a superintend­
ing control over the Courts to be set up for the trial of small criminal 
offences. It had no jurisdiction over revenue cases except under a 
warrant of the Governor empowering it to try them*
A recurring feature of the subsequent history of the island was 
a clash between the Supreme Court and the Governor. It was partly a
1Charter of Justice, 18 April 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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clash of personalities brought about by the fact that both the 
Chief Justice and the Governor derived their power and emoluments 
from the Crown, and were generally independent of each other* The 
sensitivity of society in Ceylon to distinctions brought about a 
competition between them for status* Thus,for instance, tdi impress 
its authority on the people, the Supreme Court found it necessary 
to assume certain oriental forms of honour associated with power*
When the Court was on circuit it was accompanied by the tom tom 
beaters and other retainersThe  Governor, not without some reason, 
felt that the state assumed by the Supreme Court was a threat to his 
position. Thus Maitland considered it necessary to assume comparable 
honours. Brownrigg complained that the Supreme Court far exceeded 
the executive government in the external appearance of power and, on 
the ground of a reduction of expenditure attempted unsuccessfully to 
do away with its retainers. This competition for status remained 
unchanged throughout the period of our study*
A competition for power also developed between them. It arose 
mainly on account of the imperfect demarcation and definition of legis­
lative and executive authority on the one hand, and judicial authority 
on the other. The Supreme Court, as we have seen, was vested by the 
Charter with a superintending control over the criminal jurisdiction 
of subordinate Courts. On account of the nature of the distribution
■^ See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 13 March 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
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of duties among provincial officials, of which we shall see more
later, it was unavoidable that the exercise of the powers of the
Supreme Court would bring it in contact with the former in one way
or the other. Thus from very early days the Court while on circuit
addressed charges to Magistrates and Justices of the Jeace setting
forth their duties, examined the criminal diaries of Magistrates,
looked into the conduct of Headmen who acted as police officers,of
the Collectors in their capacity of Fiscals and Justices of the
Peace, and of the Provincial Judges in their capacity of Justices of
the Peace.^ The Court had no disciplinary power over these officials
except in the extreme form of judicial censure and punishment. It
also became the usual practice from about 1813, for the Judges to
send to the Govemo reports on their circuits incorporating their
opinion of different officials, the state of the law and other matters
and suggesting remedies. These reports appear to have been a cause of
2
much annoyance to the Governor. Apart from other things the Governor 
appears to have viewed with suspicion the degree of control exercised 
by the Supreme Court over the public service. Maitland and Brownrigg 
disapprovingly noted that the functions exercised by the Court made 
almost every department its ministerial office.
1C. E. Carrington to North, 25 November 1802. 0.0. 55, 37.
2
Brownrigg to Liverpool, 21 January 1813. C.O. 54, 46.
3
Memorandum of Maitland, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41. Brownrigg to 
Bathurst, 13 March 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
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This circumstance combined with the fact that the supervisory 
duties of the Court were ill defined, and the legislative and judicial 
spheres of authority imperfectly demarcated, resulted in the occur­
rence of a series of conflicts between the Governor and the Judges. 
Brownrigg objected to a number of orders issued by the Supreme Court 
on the ground that they encroached on the legislative authority of 
the Governor. Prom the early days of British rule it became the usual 
practice for the Governor to issue instructions to the subordinate judi­
cial and police officers, laying down their duties and the modes and 
forms in which they should be exercised.^ These usually took the form
of legislative enactment, though sometimes executive orders were also
2
issued. In course of time, and especially when Alexander Johnston was 
the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court also began to issue similar in­
structions by way of Court orders. Brownrigg objected to several such
orders regulating the conduct and practice of Magistrates, and the
3
control and superintendence of the police. He pointed out that in both
See Regulation VIII of 1806 laying down instructions tp Magistrates.
C.O. 54, 25. Regulation XVIII of 1815, on the mode of keeping diaries, 
and taking information in criminal cases by Provincial Judges and 
Justices of the Peace. C.O. 54, 49.
2Sir Alexander Johnston, 1775-1849* He spent his childhood in India wiih 
his parents and thus acquired a sympathetic understanding of Asians. 
Returning to England he studied law and was called to the bar. He came 
to Ceylon as Advocate-Fiscal in 1805, was appointed Chief Justice in 
1811, and continued in this situation till his retirement in 1819.
3
-'Most of the orders considered to be objectionable were directed at Sitting 
Magistrates, Provincial Judges, Fiscals, and Justices of the Peace, and 
mainly concerned the exercise of their police duties. Thus for instance 
they were required to report on the defects of the police, and on the 
means of remedying them, the conduct of Police Vidanas, the causes for 
the increase or decrease of crime etc. Fiscals were directed to see that 
a certain number of the Police Vidanas were in attendance on the Supreme 
Court whenit went on circuit. For details see Barnes to Huskisson, 24 July 
1828. C.O. 54, 101. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 9 July 1817. C.O. 54, 66.
these spheres directions had been given by the Government from time 
to time and that if fresh directions were required they should eman­
ate from the same authority. The proper function of the Court, he 
thought, was to control the power exercised by the inferior Magis­
trates, correct erroneous and illegal proceedings, and punish violation 
of duty. Such duty, however, was to be measured not by the orders of 
the Court, but by the law of the land. He thus argued that the Supreme 
Court had usurpdd the authority arid regulations of government, de­
parted from its proper province, and ’’assumed completely the character 
of politicalpc^er”.^  Brownrigg seems to have been particularly sen­
sitive to the fact that the orders of the Supreme Court had placed the 
Magistrates, as well as the whole establishment of peace officers under 
a degree of subjectinn and subservience to the Court. He complained that
the Government's management of the police through the Collectors and the
2
various gradations of Headmen had been disarranged.
The Governors who followed Brownrigg continued to protest at the 
'encroachments’ of the Supreme Court. Thus James Campbell urged the 
Secretary of State to annul the orders to which Brownrigg had objected.^
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 9 July 1817. C.O. 54, 66.
2
Ibid. Also, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 17 November 1815. C.O. 54, 57.
3
He was Commander of the forces when Edward Paget who was Governor for a 
short time from August 1821 to March 1823 left the island to take up 
another appointment. He thus acted as Governor of the island till the 
arrival of Barnes towards the end of 1824.
4 
Campbell to Bathurst, 12 January 1824. C.O. 54, 86.
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Governor Edward Barnes^ complained of the 'injudicious and illegal' 
manner in whichthe Supreme Court continued to exercise its super­
intending power, and urged that orders and rules framed by it should
2be subjected to the revision and approbation of the Governor*
At first the only decision taken by the Colonial Office was to
insist that the Supreme Court should, when sending its orders for the
Secretary of State's sanction, submit them through the Governor and
3
not directly as before. It was thought unwilling to give a decision 
on the general points that were raised regarding the relationship be­
tween the executive and the judiciary until the matter was investigated 
more fully. However, in 1825, on the advice of James Stephen, it ruled 
that though the Supreme Court possessed the power of regulating its 
own practice, process and proceedings, it hdd exceeded its powers in 
framing rules for the general regulation of the police throughout the 
colony, which properly belonged to the Governor in Council, It there­
fore ordered the revocation of many of the objectionable orders and 
their promulgation, where necessary, as regulations of the Governor
4
in Council, The Supreme Court thus found itself faced with the nec­
essity of revoking orders issued since 1807, and Barnes proceeded to
5
provide for some of them by legislative enactment.
After a long military career during which he also held administrative 
positions in the ¥est Indian Colonies, Sir Edward Barnes arrived in Cey­
lon as Acting Governor on the departure of Brownrigg in 1820. He was dis­
placed for a short time by Paget and returned to England, However he re­
turned with the appointment of Governor in 1824 and held it till 1831,
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 20 July 1825* C.O, 54, 89*
3
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 21 November 1816. C.O, 55, 63.
^Bathurst to Barnes, 12 September 1825, and, 14 June 1826. C.O, 55, 69*
^o?eil!i??68 3° §^s^ § son, ^  July 1828. C.O. 54, 101. Regulations V and VI
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Barnes also objected to the manner in which the Supreme Court 
had carried out its power of supervision over the proceedings of in­
ferior Magistrates* He complained that the court had often quashed 
and superceded the convictions of inferior Magistrates without any 
complaints by any of the parties to a case but merely by an examination 
of their proceedings* He regarded it as an illegal exercise of power, 
which was prejudicial to the police and good order of the country* In 
this connection he objected to an order of the Supreme Court which 
called upon the Magistrates to send copies of their monthly diaries#***
He argued that these orders and practices had the effect of depriving 
the population of the services, in the capacity of Magistrates, of 
British gentlemen of the regular Civil Service, and throwing it into 
a class receiving low salaries, for whom the native inhabitants had 
little respect and esteem. He requested the removal of this 'degrading 
system1 of proceeding to enable him to csll upon the Civil Servants to
give their aid to the administration of justice in the capacity of 
2
Magistrates# By attributing to the practices of the Supreme Court 
the reluctance of the Civil Servants to perform Magisterial duties, 
and the consequent predominance of Dutchmen in this field of employment, 
Barnes was, as we shall see later, taking a partial view of the situ­
ation*
While the above conflicts, though partly motivated by a competition 
for power and position, also reflected the desire of the legislature to
■*Barnes to Bathurst, 11 March 1821# C*0. 54, 79. Barnes to Bathurst,
20 July 1825. G*0* 54, 89.
2Ibid.
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safeguard its sphere of authority, others showed the Judiciary as 
represented by the Supreme Court struggling for its independence. 
Drawing inspiration from the forms and ideals of Government prevalent 
in England it stood out for judicial independence, individual liberty, 
or liberty of the subject as it was called, and generally for a more 
liberal form of government. The executive on the other hand looked 
at problems from the point of view of governing a country under con­
quest where the people were not only different in race, language, re­
ligion and customs, but were also living under different social and 
economic conditions. Apart from a need to display power the executive 
government was faced with the task of enforcing services, collecting 
a land tax from numerous small landholders, and maintaining monopolies. 
It was therefore not only opposed to an independent judiciary but gener­
ally stood out for a more authoritarian form of government.
Maitland stressed one factor when he made out a case for keeping 
the revenue courts under the control of the executive government.
"Revenue in India,” he wrote, "is of a nature so differ­
ent from that of any other country - the habits of the 
people are so singular in themselves, and the mode of col­
lection so very different from what exists in any other 
part of Europe that no rules applicable here can be re­
lied on as forming any analogy upon which we ought to pro­
ceed there; and if we are, in all instances, to limit the 
trial of revenue cases or the practical modes of collect­
ing revenue, to the strict and precise formula of the 
proceedings of a British Court of justice, I must fear that 
without giving any satisfaction to the natives we will mat­
erially deteriorate the revenue of the island."1
^Memorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
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During the early days of British rule the sense of insecurity
in fact tempted the Government to assume\extra-Judicial power. The
instructions issued to the Governors of this period authorized them
to remove from the island persons whom they suspected of adhering
to the eft£my, or whose residence might be inconvenient or prejudicial
to the peace, order and security of the settlement.*^ * Up to 1806 it
was generally understood that the execution of this power necessitated
prior legal proceedings. In 1806 not only was this condition removed
but also the clause conferring this power was given a wider construction.
It was laid down that whenever it appeared that such offences existed,
and where it was not possible from various causes to institute legal
proceedings, all such offending persons would be banished to the island
2
of Delft till such time as the Governor thought fit. As Delft was 
within the Jurisdiction of the Government of Ceylon, it amounted, in 
effect, to an assumption of the power of imprisonment without triil.
This power was, however, seldom exercised.
The pull in the direction of more liberal forms and institutions 
on the one hand, and towards authoritarianism on the other, was reflected 
in some of the issues raised by the Supreme Court. One of the earliest 
to arise involved the right of the Supreme Court, on its own initiative, 
to prevent the execution of a Governor's order on legal grounds. In]808, 
Maitland issued a warrant of pardon to a prisoner, thereby exercising
^See Revised Royal Instructions to Governor North, 18 February 1801.
C.O. 559 61. The Royal Commissions and Instructions issued to the other
Governors were generally based on those issued to North. Important
changes took place only in the Commission and Instructions issued to 
Horton. (1831J
^Regulation XII, 14 August 1806# clause iv, Skeen. A Collection of Legis­
lative Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p.9t77
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the prerogative powers vested in him, When it went before the Supreme 
Court the Chief Justice held that the warrant was not legal as it con­
tained the signature of the Deputy Secretary and not that of the Chief 
Secretary as required by the Governor1s instructions. The warrant was 
returned with directions to draw a fresh one. On hearing this Maitland 
directed the Advocate-Fiscal to carry it into execution. The Supreme 
Court then issued a warrant to re-arrest the man, Maitland thereupon 
issued a regulation legalising the signature of the Deputy Secretary.^ 
Maitland took objection to the action of the Chief Justice on 
several grounds, both particular and general. Firstly, he questioned 
the right of the Supreme Court to ground a judgment on the instructions
issued to him as Governor which, he said, were not meant to be public 
2
documents. Secondly, he questioned the general right of the Supreme
Court to agitate questions of this nature. The proper mode, he thought,
was for the Chief Justice to make representations to the Secretary of
State, if he found the Governor exceeding his powers, or acting against
the honour and interests of the branch of government entrusted to the 
3
Supreme Court, Ee conceded that the action of the Chief Justice could 
not be found fault with when viewed in the light of the principles of 
the Biitish Constitution*. But he questioned the applicability of these
■^Maitland to Castlereagh, 18 August 1808. C.O, 54, 28.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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principles to Ceylon.
"I am well aware," he wrote, "it may he said that the 
opinion of a Judge is of that nature that following 
it can degrade no Government. I am extremely well aware 
of all the doctrines that can he held upon the subject 
according to the enlightened and well understood prin­
ciples of the British Government. But when you come to 
apply those principles to this country, if you come to say 
once that everything that is most salutary in England may 
not under certain circumstances be extremely prejudicial 
here, but still because it is good in England it is good 
in this country, I am afraid you will not find any con­
siderate man, whether Judge orGovernor, who will not tell 
you a very different story. Indeed, ... if you were to 
follow all those minute rules and distinctions that are 
followed in England to the letter of what a Judge might do, 
you would overthrow the possibility of carrying on the Gov­
ernment itself. "^*
While conceding that the objection of the Chief Justice was to the
form of the warrant and not the act of pardoning, he maintained that in
the eyes of the native inhabitants the exertion of authority on the
part of the Supreme Court, amounted to a transfer of power from the
2
Governor to the Chief Justice. Maitland thus viewed the subject not 
as a question of strict law, but as one of policy which involved a threat 
to the authority of the Governor in the eyes of the people. His atti­
tude displayed his sensitiveness to what he called "the feelings of
3
the natives regarding superior authorities..." He was supported in 
this attitude by the Civil Service, whose spokesman in Council asserted 
that the collision between the executive and the judiciary had the effect
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 18 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2m a .
5
Maitland to Edward Cooke, 5 September 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
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of "lessening in the minds of the natives the powers of Government 
by causing doubts to arise upon the supremacy of the executive 
authority",^
A second conflict that arose between the Governor and the Supreme 
Court displayed similar opposing tendencies. In 1818, a case came be­
fore the Court where a Mudaliyar was charged with having abused his 
authority in pressing coolies for the army. The case was postponed 
on account of the absence of a material witness. But the Wsne Justice, 
addressing the Magistrates, Civil Servants and Headmen who M e r e present, 
referred to the English law about pressing for troops. He informed 
them that the legal and proper mode was for a Collector or any other 
person to be authorized by a commission to exercise these powers. He 
should in turn direct his warrant to the principal Headmen, In the 
case of a fugitive coolie the Headmen should make an affidavit before 
a Magistrate, whereupon the latter dxould issue a warrant of arrest.
The Puisne Justice suggested to the Governor the drafting of a regulation
2to give effect to these suggestions. Meanwhile, the Collector of Col­
ombo complained to the Governor that the address from the bench had 
placed him in a situation of 1unprecedented embarrassment1, and that 
the Chief Justice had not taken into account the system of service land 
tenures prevalent in the country. He held that because of the limited
^Minute of Wood, the Revenue Commissioner, 10 December 1808. C.O. 54,32.
2
See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 17 July 1818: C,0, 54, 71.
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number of Magistrates, it was not possible to execute that branch of 
his duty under the restrictions placed by the Puisne Justice.^ Brown­
rigg accepted the Collector's viewpoint and,instead of adopting the 
regulation suggested by the Puisne Justice, exacted one which declared
2
that the practices which had hitherto prevailed were 'entirely legal1*
He supported his stand by obtaining the opinions of the Collectors
and the Maha Mudaliyar on the services which the various castes of
3people were liable to perform* This conflict illustrated the manner 
in which the Supreme Court stood for the liberty of the individual, 
while the system of compulsory services carried the executive Govern­
ment towards authoritarianism.
A short time later the Supreme Court took an important stand on 
caste. At a session in Jaffna it examined the proceedings of the Col­
lector in his capacity of a Justice of the Peace, and without any indi­
vidual complaints quashed a conviction against a person of the slave 
caste (Covia) for using a palanquin. The Judge based his decision on 
the ground that there being no known regulation on the subject, the action
of the Collector was illegal, and also that it fostered and perpetuated 
4distinctions. The Collector submitted the case to the Governor for
^See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 17 July 1818. C.O. 54, 71.
2IWd.
3ibia.
4,
Julges to Barnes, 3 July 1820. See Barnes to Bathurst, 11 March 1821. 
C..0. 54, 79.
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instructions as to whether it was part of his duty to maintain the
customs and usages connected with caste. He held that Hthis infraction
of the customs and usages of the district was calculated to create a
serious ferment”, and cited instances where his predecessors had checked
them by punishing people.^ He was supported by the Revenue Commissioner,
who raised the fear that the decision of the Supreme Court would become
a precedent for the inferior Courts, and that it would be regarded by
the higher class of the native inhabitants as an important violation
2
of their ancient customs. Barnes recognized that the privileges of 
caste stood in the my of development by ”cramping the energies of the
lower orders”, but considered it neither political or just* to sub-
3
vert them by any premature act of power. In this case he showed a re­
luctance 'to bring in new legislatinn. Hav-er-theless, he enacted a regu­
lation which implied that the laws on the subject in the Dutch codes 
were valid until repealed by the British Government.^
The most important conflict which aroused a great deal of inter­
est and controversy in the Colony, and which even went before the Brit­
ish Parliament, concerned a soldier in the Companyfs service. In 1823
"^ Hooper to H. Boyd1, 13 April 1820. C.O. 54, 79*
2
See Barnes to Bathurst, 11 March 1821. C.O. 54, 79*
3Ibid.
4
Ibid. Regulation II, 5 February 1821* C.O. 54, 79.
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the Governor of Ceylon, James Campbell, received a letter from Cal­
cutta enclosing a description of a soldier named Daniel Rossier who, 
it was said, had deserted without leave, and was travelling in a ship 
bound for England. It contained a request that this person might be 
apprehended and sent to Bengal. The Governor ordered the Sitting Magis­
trate of Colombo to arrest the man and keep him in custody until fur­
ther orders. A short time later an application came before the Supreme 
Court for a writ of Habeas Corpus. The application was granted and the 
Supreme Court directed that the prisoner be bropght before it with the 
authority on which he was detained. Before the matter came up for 
hearing the Governor issued a regulation Mfor removing all doubts re­
specting the right of the Governor of this island to arrest and detain 
in custody any persons within the same1*.^  Without denying the Supreme 
Court the right to issue writs of Habeas Corpus, this regulation pro­
vided that it was lawful for any officer, civil or military, under whose 
custody there may be persons kept under the orders of the Governor, to 
produce a copy of such orders as the authority under which they were de­
tained, in return to any process of court. Such a return was to be taken 
as a bar to any further legal proceedings. When tie case came up for hear­
ing the Supreme Court was faced with a new legislative enactment. The 
Chief Justice was thus compelled to dismiss the case after addressing the
■^Regulation I, 10 January 1824. C*0. 54, 86.
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Court in words which later echoed in the British Parliament*
"It is not that such a regulation impends over me as 
well as every other subject on the island," said Sir 
Hardinge Giffard,^ "it is not from the possible case 
of a bad Governor, though a tremendous use might be made 
of this power, that I abstain from making any observation.
I trust that if personal danger only were to be encountered,
I should not fail in my duty but it is because I bow to the 
authority of my Sovereign, thus, as I trust, temporarily 
exercised by his delegate, that I saw that this return is 
supported by the regulation, that this regulation is the 
law of Ceylon, and that we have no right to inquire why 
this British subject is deprived of his liberty; and that 
this Court is reduced to the heart-breaking necessity of 
saying that his Majesty’s writ of habeas corpus is of no 
effect."3
The Governor justified himself on the ground that it had always 
been the practice for the Governor to arrest and detain persons in 
custody, and that the action of the Supreme Court was subversive of 
the authority of the Governor. He thought that he was defending the 
"official privileges and authorities of the King’s representative",
4
who had been delegated with the political administration of the country. 
He argued that on account of the existence of certain state prisoners, 
who had beencfetained after a rebellion in the ^andyan provinces, the 
release of persons held under the Governor’s authority on the process 
of a law court "would plunge the island into the most serious and irre-
^For details of this case see Campbell to Bathurst, 14 January 1842.0.0.54,86* 
2
Sir Ambrose Hardinge Giffard, 1771-1827* After studying law he was called 
to the bar. He arrived in Ceylon as Advocate-Fiscal, in 1811, was ap­
pointed Puisne Justice in 1818 and succeeded Johnston as Chief Justice 
in 1820. He held this situation till 1827*
3
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, new series, Vol. XXIV, p. 1158.
4
Campbell to Bathurst, 14 January 1824. C.O. 54, 86. Minute, 10 January 
1824. C.O. 54, 86.
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mediable evils”.'*' The Chief Justice naturally protested against 
the regulation, which he thought condemned every person in the
2
island to perpetual imprisonment at the pleasure of the Governor.
He argued that after its enactment ”British and Indian subjects must
3
alike hold their liberty at the tenure of the Governor’s good pleasure”. 
He appealed to the Home Government to rescue the island ”from the re­
proach of being the only part of his dominions where His subjects pos-
4
sess no security for their personal liberty”. In a direct communication 
to the Secretary of State he added an explanation as to why there would be 
no protests in Ceylon at the Governor’s action. ”The British and Euro­
pean subjects here," he wrote,’’almost universally hold their means of 
existence at the will of the Governor ... and the natives are too deeply
imbued with reverence for authority to suppose that they have a right
5
to think upon such matters.” The Chief Justice was supported by the 
Advocate Fiscal, who in a protest sent direct to the Secretary of State, 
characterized the regulation as ’’contrary to the fundamental principles 
of English law, and so subversive of those personal rights, inalienable 
but by act of Parliament, which British subjects are entitled to claim
1
Minute, 10 January 1824* C.O. 54, 86.
2
Minute of Giffard, 10 January 1824. C.O. 54, 86. Also, Giffard to 
Bathurst, 14 January 1824. C.O. 54, 87.
3
Minute of Giffard, 10 January 1824. C.O. 54, 86.
4Ibid.
■^Giffard to Bathurst, 14 January 1824. C.O. 54, 87.
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wherever the King’s Courts of justice are established.,?^ He said that
if such a regulation is permitted ’’the Governor would be absolutely
2
despotic, and accountable only to God and his conscience”.
On the advice of James Stephen, to whom the matter was referred
by the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State ordered the immediate
repeal of the regulation, and its substitution by another which provided
for the case of the political prisoners. In such cases the order of
detention was to be signed by the Governor, and two Council members,
3
and reported to the Home Government for approval. Barnes, by whom this 
despatch was received, put off its implementation on the ground of the 
existence of certain defects in the wording of the draft regulation
4
sent by the Colonial Office. This question therefore remained in abey­
ance till revived by the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission.
^C. Marshall to Bathurst, 16 January 1824* C.O.54, 66.
2Itdd.
3
Stephen to Robert Wilmot, 2 3 January 1824. C.O. 54, 87. Also Bathurst 
to Barnes, 8 July 1824. C.OI 55, 66.
^Barnes objected to the phrase ”the Governor of His ^jesty’s island of 
Ceylon by and with the advice of His Majesty’s Council”, which was 
used in the draft regulation. He argued that the adoption of the re­
gulation in this form would bring about a change of the Constitution*
It was clear that Barnes was merely making it an excuse to postpone the 
implementation of the orders. He disliked the requirement that two 
members of the Council should sign detention orders, and was against 
giving the Supreme Court an unqualified power to grant writs of Hhbeas 
Corpus. He too acted on a desire to preserve the Governor’s authority. 
Another draft regulation was submitted by him which while conceding 
the right of the Supreme Court to issue writs, excluded the examination 
of those detained under the Governor’s orders. See Barnes to Bathurst, 
12 May 1825. C.O. 54, 88.
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The opposing tendencies above noted were also reflected in the 
discussion of judicial reforms in Ceylon. The Governors, quite ex­
pectedly, not only opposed the strengthening of the judiciary, but 
even dfesired more control over it. The Judges, understandably, stood 
for a greater degree of judicial independence. As early as 1802 North 
urged in a private letter the removal of the Chief Justice and the 
transfer of the supreme criminal jurisdiction to a Court composed of the 
Governor, Commander of the forces, an experienced lawyer and the Chief 
Secretary. Maitland desired more control over the Supreme Court.
Arguing that the power vested in the Governor of suspending a Supreme 
Court Judge was of no utility for ordinary purposes of government, be­
cause of its exercise was of a delicate nature, he argued that the 
executive should be armed with the power of suspending the proceedings 
of the Supreme Court, assigning the reasons for doing so in Council, 
and transmitting them home by the first opportunity.^* The grounds on 
which he considered such a power desirable were political. He had in 
mind a situation where an executive order was challenged by an indivi­
dual, and where the Judges had no alternative but that of acting accord­
ing to the strict rules of their duty, though they were aware that such 
action would cause immense political injury to the Government. In fact 
he cited the instance of an ord&r made by him to seize a horsfc that was 
being taken to the Kandyan kingdom, when there was no general prohi­
bition against an exportation of horses there, and where a contest before
^Maitland to Alexander Johnston, ND. 1809. C.O. 54, 51.
78
the Supreme Court had been avoided by persuading the owner to with­
draw it."*"
It was mainly to urge the point of view of the executive that
Maitland sent Alexander Johnston, who was then Advocate Fiscal, to 
2
England, While in England,however, Johnston, who had by then been 
appointed Chief Justice, tendered very different advice. On his re­
commendation a ne w Charter of Justice was drawn, which extended the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and enhanced the power and position 
of the Chief Justice. It extended the civil jurisdiction of the Sup­
reme Court over the whole island giving it also a revenue juris­
diction, gave the Chief Justice the power to establish inferior courts 
at suitable places and determine their jurisdiction, and with the con­
currence of the Governor to make rules of proceeding and appoint Sec­
retaries and other officers. All judicial and semi-judicial officers 
were to be constituted into a judicial department, which was to be 
directly under the control and management of the Chief Justice, who was 
to be required to make a report of the state of his department and the 
conduct of the officials to the Governor in Council once every six 
months.
The new Charter was brought by Johnston himself and was proclaimed 
in the Colony. A judicial depariment was created, and a circular was
^Maitland to Alexander Johnston, ND. 1809, C.O. 54, 31*
Slemorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
3
Charter of Justice 9 August 1810. C.O. 55, 62. Also Liverpool to 
Maitland, 30 September]810. C.O. 55, 62.
79
issued giving instructions that all judicial correspondence hitherto
addressed to the Chief Secretary should in future he sent to a newly
establiished Deputy Secretary for the information of the Chief Justice.^
Meanwhile the Charter came under the observation of Maitland,
who was by then out of office in England. Accusing Johnston of acting
through a greed for more power, he opposed vehemently the changes that 
2
had been made. The extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
was opposed on the ground that it would handicap the collection of the
5revenue, cause delays, and affect the tranquillity of the country.
The power given to the Chief Justice to decide on the establishment of 
inferior courts at suitable places was opposed on the ground that the 
Governor being responsible for the revenue he was the best judge to de­
cide on their formation. The proposed change, he said, took away from
4
him the power by which he had hitherto collected the revenue. Patron­
age, he thought, should rest with the Governor alone as it was nec­
essary for the due maintenance of his authority . ’’The moment a single 
appointment of one of the regular Civil Servants is taken out of the 
hands of the Governor,’1 he wrote, ’’that moment there is an end of the 
whole constitution of the Civil Service as it at present stands.”**
^Wilson to Liverpool, 26 February 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
Memorandum, 3 0 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
Ibid.
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The creation of the judicial department was opposed because it would
/
place almost the whole Civil Service under the special authority of 
the Chief Justice, lead to a collision of authority and furnish the 
inferior officers with an apology for inactivity*^ Finally, he argued 
that the main effect of the changes would be to alter the character 
of the office of Governor in the eyes of the native inhabitants, there­
by paralysing the means of maintaining subordination and good govern­
ment.^
Maitland's objections appear to have carried much weight with
the Colonial Office for it replaced the new Charter of Justice with
another which restored the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
■3
powers of the Chief Justice to their original position. No more 
changes occurred in the constitution of the Supreme Court till 1853, 
though discussions on the subject continued to take place in the colony* 
An important change which was initiated by Alexander Johnston 
along with the above reforms was, however, allowed to continue. This 
was the introduction of trial by jury for the decision of criminal 
cases coming before this court. The Jury system established in Ceylon 
was however much different from that prevalent in England. There was 
no intervention of a Grand Jury and the prosecution therefore depended
Memorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
2Ibid.
3
Charter of Justice, 30 October 1811. C.O. 55, 62. Liverpool to Brownrigg,
5 November 1811. C.O. 55, 62. Brownrigg to Liverpool, 29 March 1812.
C.O. 54, 42.
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entirely on the officials. The petty jury consisted of thirteen 
members and unlike in England decisions were by a simple majority.
The juries were selected according to the race of caste of the ac­
cused persons. Though the system was thus very different its intro­
duction was regarded as a liberal measure which was beneficial in 
practice.'*' It certainly did not evoke any protests from the exe­
cutive.
Another office of a judicial nature which was involved in con­
flicts with the executive during this period was that of Advocate- 
Fiscal. It was created by the Charter of Justice and was held by
a Crown nominee. Its duties were not defined in detail, the Charter
2
merely assigning it the functions of a public prosecutor. From the 
early days of British rule the Advocate-Fiscal began to assist the
executive in framing laws, acted as the legal adviser of the Govem-
3ment, and performed the functions of a public prosecutor. Partly
on account of the fact that the powers of the Advocate-Fiscal were
ill defined, but also as a result of the appointment of a Deputy
Secretary in charge of legal matters, which appears to have brought
4
about a loss authority to the former, there were several conflicts
■*"See evidence of Johnston, 16 March 1830. Report from the select 
committee of the House of Lords on the affairs of the East India 
Company, pp. 220-232.
2
Charter of Justice, 18 April 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
3
Memorial of Alexander Johnston, 14 June 1803, C.O. 54, 11*
i 4I See p. 12.. The Supreme Court gave this as the reason for the occurrence
| of conflicts. See Johnston and Coke to Bathurst, 12 October 1816.
| C.O. 54, 64.
i
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between the Advocate Fiscal and the Governor during the time of
Brownrigg, They may have been accentuated by personal differences
between Brownrigg and Hardinge Giffard. As regards his duties as
public prosecutor the Advocate-Fiscal, supported by the Supreme Court,
began to act under the view that he was exempt from executive control.^
On the other hand Brownrigg objected to any independent authority being
given to the Advocate-Fiscal which would tend to limit the power of
2
the Government to protect its interests before the courts of law.
The Colonisl Office was inclined towards the point of view of the Ad­
vocate Fiscal. It held that though the Governor had a discretionary 
authority he took upon himself *a heavy and unnecessary responsibility1
if he acted according to that discretion in a case where the law author-
3
ity pronounced that there was no prospect of success. Brownrigg also 
protested that the tendency displayed by the Advocate-Fiscal to inter­
pose his advice uncalled for by the executive. In matters submitted for 
the drafting of regulations he had decided not only on their form but 
also on their substance. He regarded it as an arbitrary assumption of
4
power which infringed upon the legislative authority of the Governor.
■^Johnston and Coke to Bathurst, 12 October 1816. C.O. 54, 64.
Aso Brownrigg to Bathurst, 50 November 1815. C.O. 54, 48.
2
Ibid. Also Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 August 1814. C.O. 54, 52.
5
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 50 July 1814. C.O. 55, 65.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 August 1814. C.O. 54, 52.
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In this matter the Advocate-Fiscal appears to have been clearly- 
exceeding the limit of authority which the Colonial Office was in­
clining to assign to it* The Advocate-Fiscal was told that on matters 
of legal advice he held the same position which the Attorney-General 
held in relation to the Crown.^ Partly on account of the above de­
cisions and partly because of changes of personnel as more conflicts 
occurred between the Governor and the Advocate-Fiscal after the period 
of Brownrigg* During 1his time the office in fact provided a link be­
tween the executive and the judiciary and one means through which the 
executive maintained a degree of control over the Provincial Judges 
and the Magistrates* The Governor was thread of a centralized ad­
ministration* A tendency towards greater centralization was already 
present during the time of North, as is seen in the establishment of 
a number of central offices designed to assist the Governor in maintain­
ing this control. But it was certainly incomplete because of a failure 
to draw up adequate rules for the purpose. North*s period of Governor­
ship generally marked a formative period during which foundations were 
laid but the structure was incomplete. Though offices and departments 
were established their powers, duties and modes of proceedings, were as 
yet ill defined.
Maitland found on arrival that the Civil Servants were enjoying 
a good deal of independent authority in practice. The heads of depart-
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 20 June 1817. C.O. 55f 65.
2
Cameron, Report upon the Judicial establishments and procedure.
C.O. 54, 122.
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merits as well as provincial officers had hitherto enjoyed a consider­
able amount of freedom to arrange their establishments, subject how­
ever to the approval of the Governor* In spite of the existence of 
a central Treasury, Maitland found that every Kachcheri of a Collector 
had virtually become a separate Treasury and every Collector a public 
Accountant*^ Similarly in spite of the existence of a central Revenue
Board, he found that the Collectors had almost unlimited freedom in
2
the farming of the revenue, and the granting of remissions. He also
found that officers had considerable powers of initiating expenditure,
provided they were supported by receipts which, he added, were often
irregularly drawn up* He wrote about a "monstrous view of having with
a revenue which has never exceeded £100,000 gross, six Treasuries open,
with every individual in the island a Public Account, and drawing upon
3
them as he choose". Ee noted that the practice prevailing regarding
expenditure was for the subordinate officers to spend according to
their own fancy first, and then apply for the sanction of the Govern- 
4
ment. Added to all this, confusion had been caused by defective modes 
of keeping accounts and the absence of uniformity in them* The absence 
of detailed codes defining the duties of the different officers had
Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808* C.O. 54, 28.
Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O* 54, 18.
3
Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 21.
4
Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
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given them the opportunity of taking shelter behind excuses such as 
ignorance of duty, or that they were merely following what their pre­
decessors ±1 office had done, whenever they were found fault with.
The laxity with which even existing rules had been enforced also came 
to the notice of Maitland. For instance, he was informed that the in­
structions issued by the Board of Revenue and Commerce Regarding the 
keeping of accounts had not been adhered to by some of the Collectors.^" 
The circumstance which gave Maitland a quick insight into these 
defects was an inquiry into the conduct of the Collector of Jaffna, of
whom we shall say more later* He conducted this inquiry not merely to
probe into the activities of this particular Civil Servant, but also 
with a view to find out general defects. "Before however we enter 
into any new system, or adopt any new measure," he told Wood, the
Commissioner of Revenue, who conducted the inquiry, "it is absolutely
necessary that we should be thoroughly aware of every part of the pract-
2ice and proceedings of those who have hitherto conducted it." Both
during and after the inquiry his intention was to devise permanent
regulations for the future guidance of the Civil Servants. In devising 
these regulations Maitland was much influenced by considerations arising 
from the condition in which he found the Civil Service, of which we shall 
say more later. On account of these conditions he did not place much
^"Edwards to Maitland, 12 December 1805* C.O. 54, 20. 
^Maitland to Wood, 14 November 1805. C.O. 54, 20. 
Maitland to Wood, 15 December 1805. C.O. 54, 20.
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confidence in the Civil Service. This in tarn made him reluctant to 
place original authority in the hands of the Civil Servants. Conse­
quently, in the regulations that he drew up during this period, he 
attempted not merely to bring the provincial Civil Servants under 
more central control, but also to have, as far as possible, a personal 
direction in the administration, especially in matters of finance.
Maitland’s reforms in this sphere began in 1806, when he adopted 
some far reaching changes regarding the expenditure of public money. He 
himself laid down afterwards the principles on which his regulations 
were based. Firstly, "that the necessity of ... expenditure should be 
clear and defined antecedent to a shilling being laid out on the ob­
ject whatever it may be, and that the necessity and propriety of the 
expenditure should be fixed solely by the person who has the right of 
expenditure in him’.^  Secondly, "that the necessity of that expendi­
ture should be as nearly ascertained as possible before the expense 
2
commences". Thirdly, "that when expended upon any object,, the best 
possible report should be had on how far the expense is moderate for 
the work done". Maitland’s reforms of 1806 and 1808 were no doubt 
based on the above principles. By the reforms of 1806 the expenditure 
of the Government was divided into three heads. The first head was to be
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2I b i a .
3Ibid.
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the civil expenditure which would he fixed at the beginning of 
each year on the basis of returns obtained from the different offices* 
Maitland initiated the practice of fixing this category of expenditure 
by an annual legislative enactment, which was to be the authority for 
incurring such expenditure. The second head was to be fixed contin­
gent expenditure, that is expenditure contingent in amount but certain 
in occurrence. The authority necessary for incurring this expenditure 
was to be obtained every month by applying to the Chief Secretary1s
•j
Office. The third head was to be unfixed contingent expenditure,
that is expenditure contingent both in amount and in oocurrence. As
regards this category, which was by far the most important, Maitland
imposed the rule that no expenditure should be incurred under this
2
head without previous sanction from the Secretary's office.
The salary increase given to the Civil Servants in 1808, of which
we shall say more later, was turned into an opportunity to enforce more
3
comprehensive rules for the guidance of the different officers. The 
general regulations for the Civil Service promulgated in 1808 were 
based on the financial regulations imposed earlier. They defined the 
powers and duties of the principal officers of the Government, so that 
no one could plead ignorance of duty in the future. The central offices
^■Regulation XVII of 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 104-106.
2
Regulation XVIII, 27 October 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 104-106.
3
Instructions to Hedcis of Department, 25 August 1808* C.O. 54, 28.
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were turned into more efficient instruments of financial control, 
while the limits of authority and power enjoyed by the different 
officers were defined. Simplified but uniform modes of keeping ac­
counts were laid down which aimed at getting a quick and clear picture 
of the revenue and expenditure of the Government.^
The rules drawn up by Maitland are important for several reasons. 
They marked the first comprehensive effort made by the British to re­
gularize the systematize Government procedure. The administrative system 
which had hitherto rested too much on the strength and character of 
personalities, was now made to depend on rules and regulations binding 
on both the Governor and the Civil Servants. An organized machinery was 
thereby created which would enable the Government to go on irrespective 
of changes in personnel. ’’These rules,” declared Maitland, ’’will in 
future prevent any considerable change in the essential forms of con­
ducting business, and hinder either myself, or any other Governor ap­
pointed by His Majesty, from breaking through the fundamental rules
established for the guidance not only of all subordinate officers of
2
Government, but of the Governor himself.” They also marked the estab­
lishment of a greater degree of central control. Maitland not only ar­
ranged the duties of the central offices in such a manner that they would
instructions to Heads of Department, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2
Maitland to Castlereagh, 17' August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
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become effective instruments of central control, but also brought 
under the Chi£f Secretary's office, which was more under his personal 
supervision, the duty of sanctioning all expenditure. As early as 
1806 he was able to claim that not a shilling was advanced or paid 
without his previous authority and warrant, and that on the tenth of 
every month he was aware of every shilling expended and received in 
the antecedent one.*'"
The codes and rules drawn by Maitland were approved by the Com­
missioners of the Treasury in England, and remained in force throughout
2
the period of our study* The financial rules acquired more force when 
in 1817, the Treasury issued a new set of permanent instructions fob the 
conduct of the Government of Ceylon, based on those already in exist-
3
ence. Though these new instructions contained some modifications on 
points of detail they did not alter the system laid down by Maitland
The principal means by which the Governor exercised control were 
a number of central offices. Though they originated during the time 
of North their position in the administrative machinery was more parti­
cularly determined during the time of Maitland. Generally speaking they
“'‘Maitland to Camden, 26 February 1806. C.O. 54, 20.
2
See Commissioners of Audit to Commissioners of the Treasury, C.O. 54, 39. 
Also, Commissioners of the Treasury to Peel, 16 August 1810. C.O. 54, 39.
3Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon Government, 28 January 1817.
C.O. 54, 67.
4
Additional Instructions to the Heads of department, 31 December 1817.
C.O. 54, 70.
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remained, throughout this period, on the f06ting on which they were
placed by him. These offices were usually presided over by a senior
Civil Servant and functioned with or without a junior Civil Servant
as Assistant, and a varying number of Clerks drawn from the local
European community.^
The most important among the central offices was that of the
Chief Secretary. It was by how an established practice in colonial
administration to have a Chief Secretary associated with a colonial
Governor. Hence the office was first created wilh the appointment
of North as Governor in 1798. Hugh Cleghorn, whose services had been
valuable in the conquest of Ceylon, was appointed Secretary, perhaps
2as a reward for those services. His powers and duties were not defined
in detail, but he was generally to hold a position similar to that oc-
3
cupied by the Chief Secretary at the Cape of Good Hope. In the Royal 
Instructions to Governor North it was laid down that "all public acts 
and judicial proceedings shall be done, issued, and performed, in the 
name of the Governor, and previous to being published or put in exe­
cution, be signed by the Chief Secretary to the Government by the author­
ity of the Governor”.^  The factihat he was the only other person besides
^See schedules of annual fixed civil establishment for this period.
2
Cleghorn rendered very useful service at the time of the conquest by 
negotiating the transfer of the De Neuron regiment. See W. Neil (ed.) 
The Cleghorn papers.
3
North to Mornington, 5 June 1798. Wellesley, No. 13866.
A
Royal Instructions to North, 26 March 1798. C.O. 55 > 61.
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the Governor to be appointed to an office by the Grown in 1798 added 
to his importance. It is therefore not surprising that it took some 
time for the relations between the Governor and the Chief Secretary 
to be adjusted. At first Cleghorn was in the habit of corresponding 
directly with the Secretary of State on official matters. This, and 
other circumstances, made North suspect tht he was allied with the 
Madras civilians to offset his authority. A bitter conflict prevailed 
between Worth and the Chief Secretary, which culminated in the prema­
ture departure of Cleghorn.^"
Cleghorn was followed in office by Robert Arbuthnot who was on 
friendly terms with North. He was followed by John Rodney, who held 
the office almost as a sinecure till 1831. He was noted for his in-
2
efficiency and was generally ignored by the Governors of this period. 
These factors prevented the growth of a fair degree of independence in 
the office of Chief Secretary. Besides, with the creation of the Civil 
Service it was decided that the practice of appointing the Chief Sec­
retary directly from England would cease and that it would be thrown 
open to the Service. Though this decision could not be implemented im­
mediately, yet it would have worked towards reducing the importance of 
the position.
Though the Chief Secretary thus fell in importance, the Governor 
required a Secretariat to handle the multifarious work tint he had to
^See Worth to Mornington, 15 July 1799, 14 September 1799, and 19 January 
1800. Wellesley MS 13,866, 13,867.
2
See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 November 1817. C.O. 54, 66.
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deal with. The result was that other Civil Servants attached to 
the Chief Secretary's office, who i^ ere trusted, and were efficient, 
began to be employed directly in duties belonging to the Chief Secret­
ary. The office that assumed most importance in this manner was that 
of the Deputy Secretary. It was first created by North in 1798, and 
was certainly intended to assist the Chief Secretary. But when con­
flicts occurred between North and Cleghorn, North appointed one of his 
favourites to the office and began to handle business through him with­
out reference to the Chief Secretary. Thus, for example, public acts 
such as Proclamations were issued on the authority of the Governor by 
the Deputy Secretary, though by a strict interpretation of the Royal 
instructions of 1798, they were perhaps invalid. This was not however 
challenged at the time and Maitland therefore continued to make use of 
the Deputy Secretary, in the same manner as North had done. It led to 
a dispute with the Chief Justice over the validity of acts which con­
tained the signature of the Deputy Secretary and led to the passing
1
of the regulation already noticed. This gave a legal status to the 
position already acquired by the Deputy Secretary.
The instructions to create a separate judicial department under 
the control of the Chief Justice led to the appointment of another Deputy 
Secretary. Lieutenant Governor Wilson in whose time the instructions 
were received created the office of Deputy Secretary, Judicial department,
^See p.
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which was to be combined with that of the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court. ^ Though, as we have seen, these instructions were revoked, 
Brownrigg allowed the Deputy Secretary, Judicial Department, whose 
office was now separated from that of the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court, to remain under the complete control of the Governor. He trans­
ferred to this office all the work connected with the preparation and 
transmission of despatches to England, and it was now named that of 
Deputy Secretary, Political, Home and Judicial Departments. With the 
annexation of the Kandyan provinces a Kandyan Department was created 
under the same Deputy. Though one of the Deputies was removed in the 
third decade of the nineteenth centuiy, the Deputy Secretary continued 
to occupy the chief place in the Secretary's office.
T hough the .^standing of the different officers in the Chief Sec­
retary's office changed, yet taken collectively it became the main
2'organ' of the central Government. The duties handled by this office 
could be divided into a few brodd categories. It handled all matters 
connected with the Civil Service as well as the other public services.
All applications or references from any officers regarding their situ­
ations, which did not relate merely to revenue, were addressed in the 
first instance to the Chief Secretary's office. All order and regula­
tions were to be issued in the fird instance from the Secretary’s office,
^Wilson to Liverpool, 26 February 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
2
Instructions to Heads of Department, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
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though various departments participated in their preparation. It 
was *the great office of record in the island1.^  All despatches were 
received, filed, and the answers prepared and despatched in the Secret­
ary’s office. In this category could he placed the publication of the 
Government Gazette, which also served as a newspaper during this time,
The Governor's orders, and other correspondence regarding judicial af­
fairs, though originally part of the ordinary business of the Chief 
Secretary's office, was separated from it in 1811 and thereafter became 
a separate category of work handled by the office in a separate depart­
ment, With the capture of Kandy the office handled a large volume of 
Kandyan affairs, which were also handled by a separate department.
Finally it handled an increasing volume of financial business. As early 
as..1802 abstracts of allowances of the employees of outstation offices 
were sent to the Chief Secretary's office for sanction and signature.
But because of Maitland's emphasis on more centralized control and per­
sonal direction, a large volume of financial work came to be handled in 
the Chief Secretary's office. As Brownrigg observed, Maitland enforced
the principle "of debarring all departments from the exercise of original 
2
authority". Consequently, all warrants for the expenditure of public 
money had to be obtained by applying to the Chief Secretary's office.
This brought about a considerable amount of work, especially because Mait' 
land enforced the rule that no expenditure was to be undertaken without
^Instructions to Heads of Department, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2
Broxmrigg to Bathurst, 30 April 1813. C.O. 54, 47.
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previously obtaining such a warrant.- Brownrigg very well summarized
the change that had occurred in this office.
"The term Chief Secretary's office," he wrote,"can hardly 
convey to your Lordship an idea sufficiently comprehensive 
of the details which fall under that department, through 
which, by an arrangement apparently capable of much bene­
ficial change, all the civil accounts of the island at pre­
sent pass; that is to say the warrants of the civil expendi­
ture, the preliminary authority for all such charges as are 
contingent, the cash accounts or returns of receipt from all 
departments of collection, the accounts of the Agents as well 
as the Presidencies of India, as that of the Colonial Agent 
in London, besides various other matters in the simple branch 
of public accounts."^-
He therefore pointed out that as a result the Chief Secretary's office
was burdened with business which little corresponded to the common ideas
of such an office.
The Governor's control over the revenue was exercised through
a central revenue office which underwent several changes during this
period. Between 1796 and 1798 the central revenue direction was carried
on by officers named the Superintendent of Revenue aid the Commercial 
2
Resident. Worth abolished the office of Superintendent of Revenue 
almost immediately after his arrival. He gave two reasons for taking 
this step. Fiidly, that the appointment of a Governor rendered it use-
3
less. Secondly, that "being vested in one person, and extending with 
absolute authority over the most important and complicated branch of 
the public service, it was an ineffectual control over others and was
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 17 August 1814. C.O. 54> 52.
2 Superi* h<n4ef‘h
The rr~i on or of Revenue also functioned as Resident in the island
and Ambassador to Kandy.
■^ North to Mornington, 27 October 1798, Wellesley IIS 13,866.
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itself difficult to be controlled”,^  The first argument was invalid,
as he himself soon found. The second, though true under the conditions
prevailing when he arrived in the island, could have been remedied by
a proper organization of the office. The real reason for the abolition
is to be found in his anxiety to get rid of Robert Andrews, who had
!t shown no disposition either to overthrow his old system or to reform 
2
its abuses’1. The most convenient way of getting rid of him was to 
abolish his office. This is supported by the fact thi he did not im­
mediately abolish the office of Commercial Resident.
North did not breate a central agency in its place but gave the 
Collectors independent control over parts of the island. It did not, however 
take long for him to see the need for a central revenue office. Because 
of the influence of India, where Boards of revenue existed in each of 
the Presidencies, he conceived the central office in the form of a Board 
with several members. But very strong local circumstances took him in 
the same direction* Great emphasis was placed on pearl fisheries during 
this time and North believed that the revenue from land rents, taxes, and
customs would not equal in any degree the revenue from the pearl fisher-
3ies. He therefore thought that the superintendence of this ’’will be
^North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3* 
^North to Mornington, 27 October 1798. Wellesley MS 13,866. 
North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3*
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vested with much more propriety in a Board .... than in any individual 
Collector”.'*' Secondly, he argued that a Board would remove the danger 
of making the revenue collections dependent on the inclinations and tal­
ents of individual Collectors. He said that under the former system 
great inconveniences and extensive evils will follow from any accidents 
which may deprive the Government of an experienced Collector ”whose 
place would be directly supplied by a person new to the country, un­
acquainted with its customs and resources, and open to the false and
interested suggestions of the native or half European agents of his 
2
Kachcheri”. Thirdly, he argued that experience would be constantly 
secured in the administration by the permanency of the Board and the 
accession of a new member would be attended with little inconvenience. 
"The weaknesses that are inseparable from humanity, prepossession, ir­
resolution, occasional negligence, want of information on particular 
subjects, illness, inability of temper, all those things of which the
effect in an individual Collector are dangerous to a province,” he
3
wrote, “cannot pervade a Board.” There was yet another reason, though 
not definitely stated, which led to North's decision. The conflicts be­
tween him and the Madras Civilians of which we shall say more later made 
him reluctant to confer independent authority on Provincial Collectors
^North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54» 3.
Ibid.
3Ibid.
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drawn from the Madras Civil Service. They also made him think of 
ways and means of confining the employment of Madras Civilians. He 
therefore thought that he could by this means confine the Madras 
Civilians to the revenue board at the centre, and employ the local re­
cruits, for whom he was anxious to provide employment, in the provinces 
as agents of the Board.^
This plan was carried into effect in 1801 when North created 
the Board of Revenue and Commerce, consisting of six members, a sec­
retary and a deputy secretary. This Board was to take up the entire 
superintendence and control of revenue and commerce, and exercise the
duties of the former Commercial Resident and Collectors whose offices
2
were suppressed. His plan provided for the appointment of agents of 
the Board to be stationed in the provinces ai a much lower footing than 
the former Collectors. Thus it is seen that North aimed at a good deal 
of centralized control in revenue collections.
The establishment of Crown Colony rule and of the Civil Service 
brought about a change in the structure and functions of the Revenue 
Board. Indian influence at the Colonial Office made Dundas. instruct 
North to create a Board of Revenue consisting of three members, with 
powers "to superintend, examine, and control ... all matters relative 
to the public receipt and expenditure"It was to be given authority
1
North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3* Also North 
to Momington, 13 August 1801. Wellesley MS. 13,867.
^North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3*
^North to Mornington, 12 August 1800. Wellesley MS 13,867.
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
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over all local Collectors and officers of revenue. Worth was speci­
fically required to arrange it by a reference to the regulations and 
usages of the Boards of Revenue in India, in as much as they were 
applicable to Ceylon.1 It appears that the Board suggested by Dun- 
das, though smaller in numbers, was not very different from the one 
already established by North. But other changes which accompanied the 
establishment of the new Board brought about a change in its character 
and functions.
The establishment of the Civil Service, which led to the re-creation 
of the office of Collector, with more authority and power in the pro­
vinces, made North doubt the usefulness of continuing such an expen­
sive Board, and to contemplate another change in its structure. In 
September 1802 he wrote that the business of that Board, which is not 
very immense, might be well executed by one composed of the Chief Sec­
retary, the Vice-Treasurer, Civil Auditor and Accountant General, and
2
the Paymaster-General. This was accepted by the Colonial Office, which 
instructed North to constitute the new Board and entrust it with the duty 
of directing and controlling the revenue and commerce of the country ac- 
cording to such regulations as he might establish. The members of the 
Board were to receive no other allowances than the salaries attached to
1Dundas to North, 1 3  March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
Sforth to Hobart, 11 September 1802. C.O. 54, 7.
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their situations.
This structural change accentuated the tendency already prevalent 
to vest more authority in the hands of the Collectors, and to make the 
Board more a supervisory one. The new members of the Board, who were 
called upon to do this work in addition to their other duties, could 
not have been expected to undertake a detailed management of the revenue. 
In fact a good part of the work of the Board was performed by a Secret­
ary attached to it, recruited from the Civil Service, who on that ac­
count later claimed that he was the head of the revenue department.
Thus the Board became more and more an ineffectual supervisory, or audit 
Board.
After Maitland became Governor a change took place in the central 
revenue office. He was not satisfied with the functinning of the Board 
and was convinced that it had failed to keep proper control over the 
activities of the Collectors. tfAs a Board of audit,” he wrote, ”it was 
perfectly nugatory as far as related to the interests of Government, 
but it was undoubtedly not nugatory as far as related to the unfair in­
terests of individuals."^ Besides, in view of the condition in which 
he found the Civil Service, he was less inclined to give independent 
authority to the Collectors, and was determined to take personal charge 
of such matters as the letting of rentsand the granting of remissions. 
All this required a central revenue office more easily manoeuvreable
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 1 March 1806, C.O. 54> 22.
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than a Board consisting of several members. A single person function­
ing directly under the Governor’s orders was better suited to the type 
of central control that the Governor desired. He therefore abolished 
the Board of Revenue and appointed a Commissioner of Revenue in its 
place.
"The utility of this appointment,!T wrote Maitland, "would 
consist not in his sitting down here and receiving ex- 
parte statements, by letters, from the different Collectors, 
but in being actively employed under the orders of the Gov­
ernor, in visiting the different posts in the island, in 
controlling all the different pOtty abuses that might occur 
in any district, and in generally convincing the natives as 
well as the Collectors, that the first are to look to the 
Government and not to the Collector for protection; that 
the second would have no refuge in any statement they could 
make under the control of an active and effective head of 
the revenue.
The manner in which Maitland hoped to make use of the Commissioner
c.
of Revenue for more central control in revenue matters is seen from the 
powers and duties vested in him by the instructions issued in 1808. He 
was given complete powers, subject to the orders of the Governor, over 
the receipt of revenue, but no authority whatsoever over the expenditure. 
In all points of detail and reference from the Collectors, the Com­
missioner was given the power to decide at once, except in certain mat­
ters which he had to refer to the Governor. Of the latter the most im­
portant was the approval of the annual revenue farms and the recommenda­
tion for remissions. Both duties were to be exercised by the Governor 
in Council, no doubt taking into consideration the recommendatinn of the
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 1 March 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
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Collectors, and the advice and opinion of the Commissioner* Hitherto
the Collectors had the power of appointing Headmen below the rank of
Muhandiram. This power was now taken out of their hands and vested
in the Commissioner of Revenue, who was to exercise it after giving due
weight to the recommendations of the Collectors, and according to spefiit—
2
fic instructions from the Governor.
The most important part of the Commissioner's duties was his super­
visory and audit duties. He was to go on circuit examining the acti­
vities of the different Collectors and giving orders on the spot where 
necessary, which were to be obeyed as direct orders from the Governor. 
During such circuits he was to have the power of suspending any of the
Civil Servants belonging to the revenue department, or any of the higher
3
native officers, until a reference could be made to the Governor. As 
it was considered impossible to submit revenue receipts to any other audit 
more rigid or efficient than that of the Commissioner of Revenue, he was 
to be the final audit for the revenue. The Collectors were required to 
submit a number of quarterly, monthly andsnnual statements, which were 
to be compared with the conditions laid down in the rents, with a view to 
ascertaining the difference and the causes for it. Also the monthly
1
Instructions to Heads of Departments, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2r b i d .
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cash accounts of the Collectors were to he closely examined with 
the receipts accompanying them* On the basis of the different state­
ments received from the Collectors, the Commissioner was required to 
prepare general quarterly and annual statements for the whole island.^- 
Thus it is seen that Maitland made use of the newly established office 
to bring about more central control in revenue matters.
In practice the Revenue Commissioner's offi.ce fell far short of 
these expectations. In many matters it merely acted as the medium 
through which the Collectors corresponded with the Chief Secretary's
Office. The usefulness of the office was therefore much in doubt to-
2
wards the end of this period.
As the Governor’s chief responsibility during this period was 
finance it was natural that a number of offices would be created through 
which he could exercise financial control. Moreover, there seems to 
have been an irresistible tendency to think in terms of offices exist­
ing in England, irrespective of the smallness of the Colony, and the 
small scale of its finances. The establishment of the Civil Service, 
which brought with it the need to establish a gradation of offices, 
also brought about a tendency to multiply offices.
A central office of finance which arose during this peridd was 
that of the Vice-Treasurer. This office was at first meant to be under
^Instructions to Heads of department, 25 August, 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
Also, Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon Government, 28 January 1817. 
C.O. 54, 67. Additional Instructions to'Heads of department, 51 December 
1817. C.O. 54, 70.
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 15 November 1819. C.O. 54, 74. R. Boyd who was the 
Commissioner of Revenue for nearly two decades was of different opinion. 
See Evidence of Boyd, 20 February 1850. C.O. 416, 7.
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the immediate control of the Governor as the latter was the ex
officio Treasurer of the Colony. North created the post in 1799,
and appointed his favourite William, B0yd to it in addition to the
other offices that he held. This led the Colonial Office to suspect
that it was a sinecure, and also, perhaps, that it was unwise to
allow a person so close to North to hold the office. This was perhaps
why he was instructed to vest the office either in the hands of the
Chief Secretary or the Deputy Secretary.’*' North however objected,
explaining that it was by no means a sinecure, and that it required
a constant attention to minute details which could not be neglected
without danger. He proposed handing it over to the president of the
Board of Revenue, or to one of its members, if no salary was to be
annexed to it. This seems to have been a means of continuing William
Boyd in the post for the latter was appointed a member of the Board 
2
of Revenue. However, the Colonial Office appears to have regarded
the office as one that would provide a check on the exercise of the
Governor’s power as Treasurer, This is seen by the fact that it sent
Capt, John Rodney from England with instructions to North to appoint
3him Vice-Treasurer. This order was carried out in September 1804.
Hobart to North, 7 Hay 1803. C.O. 55, 62.
^North to Hobart, 1 January 1804. C.O. 54, 13* 
North to Hobart, 25 September 1804. C.O. 54, 13.
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Mainly on account of the inefficiency of Rodney, but also from
a feeling that the office was unnecessary, Maitland recommended its
abolition.'*' Later, however, he withdrew the recommendation on the
ground that he did not wish to do away with ’’an office created by His
Majesty’s Government, and which might be in some degree considered as
2
one instituted to be a check on myself as Governor.” Though the 
office was neither originally created by the Home Government, nor 
intended to be a check on the Governor, yet the reply given by the 
Colonial Office shows that it had begun to conceive of its importance 
in that manner. ’’There can be no doubt of its being most accurately 
managed in your hands,” wrote Castlereagh, "hut it is not to be ex­
pected that all your successors shall be either as laborious as your­
self, or as well versed in the details of business. And it seems nec­
essary from keeping the offices of Governor and Treasurer distinct that
3
they should be reciprocal checks upon each other." The Vice-Treasurer 
was however not to be independent of the Governor's control, for it was 
stipulated that he should not be authorized to issue money without the 
Governor’s warrant, and that he should be subject to such checks and 
balances as might be decided by the Governor and approved in England.^
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 1 March 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
Maitland to Windham, 20 September 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
3
Castlereagh to Maitland, 11 June 1807* C.O. 55, 62.
4Ibid.
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One result of this development was the transfer of a good part 
of the work which normally belnngs to a Treasury, such as the sanction­
ing of expenditure, to the Chief Secretary's office, which was more
under the immediate supervision of the Governor, The Vice-Treasurer
1
became, as Maitland termed him, 'the universal receiver'. The import­
ance of the office considerably increased with Maitland's desire for more 
centralization. As we have seen, he resisted the tendency to have
2
separate Treasuries, and enforced the rule of a central Treasury, In
1808 the rules to be followed by the Vice-Treasurer and tjie duties of
3
his office were laid down along with others. He was to be in general 
charge of the receipt and disbursement of money in the island (under 
the instructions of the Governor) and the preparation of a weekly state­
ment. The Accounts had to be made up monthly specifying the balance at
4the end of each month.
The office of Auditor and Accountant was first created by North 
in 1798. The tendency to multiply offices, which the existence of the 
Civil Service brought about, tempted North not only to separate the office
•^Instructions to Heads of departments, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 18.
^See p. 34..
3
Instructions to Heads of departments, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 18.
4
Ibid. Also, Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon Government, 28 January 
1817. C.O. 54, 67, Additional Instructions to Heads of departments,
31 December 1817. C.O. 54, 70. For details on the nature of the re­
ceipts and issues of the Vice-Treasurer, see evidence of ¥. Granville,
2 December 1829* C.O. 416, 7.
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of Accountant from that of Auditor, hut also to create several audit 
offices for civil, judicial, and military accounts. The Colonial 
Office objected to the plan of a separate audit for judicial accounts, 
stating that it ought to constitute a part of the duty of the civil 
Auditor.'1' It instructed North to have one auditor for civil accounts 
in all its branches. It does not appear that the office of Civil 
Auditor-General -which thus came into being, was organized properly, 
or that it functioned efficiently during the time of North. But with 
Maitland’s emphasis on centralized financial control it began to assume 
a new importance. This is reflected in the rules that Maitland drew 
up for the Auditor-General’s office. They show that he intended to 
make use of this office to enforce strictly the financial rules imposed 
by him. On the revenue side the Auditor-General was required to under­
take only a general audit, as the Revenue Commissioner’s office was 
expected to provide a detailed one. Here his main duty was merely to 
see that the Commissioner of Revenue had complied with the Governor’s 
instructions in the examination of the accounts of the Collectors. But 
on the expenditure side he was to check every detail of expenditure, 
mainly with a view to finding out whether the Civil Servants had com­
plied with the rule that no expenditure could be incurred without the
2previous authority of the Governor.
1Eobart to North, 7 May 1803. C.O. 55, 62.
2
Instructions to Heads of departments, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28. Also 
Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon Government, 28 January 1817. C.O.
54, 67* Additional Instructions to the Heads of departments, 51 December 
1817. C.O. 54, 70. Evidence of H. A. Marshall, 10 December 1829*
| C.O. 416, 7.
Li
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The Accountant-General’s Office was from time to time combined 
either with that of the Auditor-General, Vice-Treasurer, or Controller
of Customs. This office certainly did not handle sufficient work to
justify a separate existence. Its duty was to keep the general account 
books of the Government, preparing them from the statements of revenue 
andexpenditure which the various departments were expected to send, 
and the preparation of the annual statements of account, both civil 
and military, which were required for submission to England.^- Maitland 
made use of the office for a general picture of the state of the fin­
ances of the country every three months. For this purpose the Accountant- 
General was required to make up a general statement of the money trans­
actions of the island at the close of every quarter. This office was 
also charged with the duty of preparing and issuing, on the Governor’s 
orders, all bills and debentures, and maintaining registers of them.
It had also to register all issues of paper currency ordered by the
2
Governor.
The remaining important office of financial control was that of 
Civil and Military Paymaster-General. This office arose during the days 
of Company's rule and was modelled on that of the Paymaster-General in 
India. The establishment of the Civil Service led North to create the 
offices of Civil Paymaster and Military Paymaster. However, Lord Hobart
1  T n s t - v v .  c V  i o . «  o f  D* 2.5 A m ^ u s H  \9 o 9. C * o .  5^^^. i f t q j u f y
ir>s|*r»u c. W  OHS It)* G o v ^ n m e ^ t ;  2.9 c ,  O, 5 lj., *>1. E v*«U » \ce
ep, w A- Jo 1*2-1 • C-.O. 4-16,1,
2.. i m .
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instructed, him to vest both offices on one person with the designation
of Civil and military Paymaster-General
As is seen by the rules drawn by Maitland he intended to make use
of this office too to tighten the central control over finance, Ke
characterized the Paymaster-General as the 'universal expender' through
2
whose hands passed the whole expenditure of the island. But in the 
instructions to the Paymaster-General it was stated that no disbursement
of any kind, however, minute, will be admitted in his accounts unless
3
authorized by warrants sanctioned by the Governor.
This period also witnessed the growth of departments with specialized 
functions, and offices entrusted with special duties. They were mostly 
concerned with the revenue or with policies of land reform and economic 
development.
One sphere in which there was at first a tendency towards the em­
ergence of a departmental structure was that of the customs. Its, begin­
nings go back to 1796, when the Madras Government sent an officer named 
the Commercial Resident to take charge of the commercial side of the 
revenue collection, which included the management pf the Government trade 
monopolies and the collection of the custom duties.^ The revenue assist-
'’’Hobart to North, 7 May 1803. C.O. 55, 52.
2
Instructions to Heads of departments, 25 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
3
Ibid. Also, Treasury Instructions to the Ceylon Government, 28 January 
1817. C.O. 54, 67* Additional Instructions to Heads of departments,
31 December 1817. C.O. 54, 70.
4
See p. 4-0*
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ants who functioned during the period 1796 to 1798 seem to have 
assisted in the collection of hoth land and customs revenue. It 
also appears that there were subordinate officers named 'Sea Customers' 
stationed at Galle and Colombo.^ In a plan submitted by Robert Alex­
ander, the acting Superintendent of Revenue, to the De Meuron Committee 
of investigation in 1798 it was proposed to appoint such 'Sea Customers' 
to eight ports in the island, with a view to a better collection of the
customs duties. The Madras Government, however, deferred a decision till
2
the arrival of North, VJhen the latter drew up his plans for the better 
collection of custom revenue, he created the posts of Custom Master.
They were stationed, at the principal ports in the island to function 
under the Board of Revenue and the Chief Secretary's office.
In accordance with the arrangements made by North Lord Hobart pro­
vided three Civil Service posts of Custom Master at Colombo, Galle and
3
Jaffna. When the Service was classified in 1808, Maitland provided
4
for only two posts at Colombo and Jaffna. Besides these, custom offices 
were established at various smaller ports in the island and the Custom
^Proceedings of the De Meuron Committee, 15 June 1798, C.O. 55, 2.
2Ibid.
■^ Hobart to North, 7 May 1805. C.O. 55, 62.
4
General regulations of the Civil Service, ND. 1808. C*0. 54, 28.
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Masters of these places were drawn from the local European community 
on smaller salaries.'1' A subsequent development was for the Collectors, 
excepting the one at Colombo, to be appointed Collectors of Customs as 
well. Only the office of Custom Master, Colombo, now named the Col­
lector of Customs, Colombo, thus remained as a separate Civil Service 
post. These changes relegated the local European Custom Masters, by whom
3
the work was actually performed, to the rank of Assistant Custom Masters.
It also led to the disappearance of the departmental structure which at 
first showed signs of emerging.
The custom officers of this period acted as the main instruments 
through whom the restrictive trade policy inherited from the hutch was 
carried out. There were state monopolies in certain articles of ex­
port carried over from Dutch times, where there was a complete prohibition 
of private export. In addition there were prohibited imports such as 
gunpowder. The customs officers were expected to enforde these pro­
hibitions, and were therefore given the power to board ships and search 
for such goods.^ In the case of articles in which trade was allowed, 
but on which import and export duties were levied, they had to collect 
the duties and issue port clearance certificates. To prevent fraud they
^By 1829 custom offices were located at Colombo, Galle, V7eligama, Tangalle, 
Trincomalee, Mulativu, Jaffna, Pt. Pedro, Kaits, Manar, and Calpentyn.
See Return of the duties performed by the public officers of Ceylon, C.O.
416, 8.
2
See schedules of the annual fixed establishments for the second half of 
this period. Also, Return of the duties performed by the public officers 
of Ceylon, C.O. 416. 8.
^Ibid.
4proclamation, 30 September 1802. Skeen, A Collection of the Legislative
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. Regulation VI, 6 March 1820.
vcont.J
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were g i v e n  the powers of search and confiscation of goods.^ It should
be noted that all Collectors and Assistant Custom Masters, whenever they
were appointed as Sitting Magistrates, had the power of Magistracy.
In 1817, perhaps to complete the departmental structure that
was then emerging, and also to provide for a displaced Civil Servant,
2
Maitland created the post of Controller-General of Customs. He exer­
cised an ill defined supervision over the customs officers. As the 
Commissioner of Revenue audited and checked the customs revenue the 
Controller's office became a mere repository of correspondence and ac­
counts. He was required to supply the Governor with a monthly statement
3of the total receipts from the customs. In addition he would have also
functioned as an adviser to the Governor in regulating and modifying
custom :duties and on general commercial policy. The advisory capacity
appears to have been prominent during the time:.- in which Bertolacci,
4who was very conversant’.-with commercial affairs, held the office. But 
during the time of his successors this aspect of the functions also fell 
in importance. On account of the non-emergence of a departmental struct-
5
ure the office gradually lost its utility and was finally abolished.
(cont.) C.O. 54, 77. Regulation X V I X ,  16 November 1820. C.O. 54, 79.
^Ibid.
2
Maitland had allowed A. Bertolacci to continue in trade taking the rank 
of an unemployed Civil Servant. When later he wished togive up his trad­
ing connections, and return to a more active public life, Maitland faced 
"the problem of finding him a suitable post.
3
Additional instructions to the Heads of department, 31 December 1817.
C.O. 54, 70.
4
His book published during this time indicates much acquaintance with com­
mercial affairs. His usefulness was also acknowledged by Brownrigg.
^See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
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Closely associated with the customs officers were the Master 
Attendants. Their origin goes back to the days of Company rule when 
the Madras Government sent a few rules for the conduct of what was 
then called a ’Beach department1 .'at Trincomalee under a Master Attend­
ant.^ North found on arrival three Master Attendants at Colombo, Galle 
and Trincomalee. He increased their salaries thereby raising the im­
portance of the offices. The establishment of Civil Service salary 
scales in the island, brought about a corresponding increase in the 
salaries of the Master Attendants, thereby bringing about a further in­
crease in the importance of these offices. A Master Attendant was also 
appointed for Manar. This expansion disturbed the Colonial Office, for 
it instructed North to discontinue the post of Master Attendant at 
Manar and to conduct an inquiry into the emoluments and advantages of
the department, as it appeared to have been organized on a scale much
2
higher than was required in the island. The Master Attendant at Manar 
was consequently removed, but the others continued to exist up to the end 
of this period.
Their offices having been modelled on similar ones in India, the 
Master Attendants were required to perform identical functions. They 
were in charge of the pilotage of ships into the harbours, had to see 
that all goods liable to duties were landed at the allotted places, and
"H/ebbe to Committee of investigation, 30 September 1797. C.O. 5 5 , 2. 
^Hobart to North, 8 February 1803* C.O. 5 5 , 61.
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were required not to sign the clearance certificates of the Customs 
Masters until all dues had been settled. They had to maintain re­
gisters of all vessels arriving and departing, with the names of 
the passengers and the tonnage of goods that they carried and send 
monthly returns on them to the Commissioner of Revenue.^ They super­
intended the embarkation and disembarkation of Government troops and
stores, sometimes tendering for goods available for sale indiips, on
2
behalf of the Government. In this connection it should be noted 
that regulation SIX of 1813, which laid down rules for the ports and 
harbours, sought to provide more revenue for the Government, and more 
work for the Master Attendants, by controlling and regulating private 
enterprise ii the ports. Thus it was laid down that all square rigged 
vessels, sloops and schooners, must employ the boats attached to the 
Master Attendant’s Department for the landing and shipping of cargoes, 
and no others. As the Master Attendant’s fleet would not be sufficient 
for this purpose, he was to license a certain number of private boats, 
whose boatmen were to be subject to all his order s. A two third share 
was to go to the owners of the boats, while the remaining one third
3
was to be Government revenue.
^"Regulation XVIX, 5 August 1813. C.O. 54, 49. Skeen, A Collection of
the Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 159-166.
2
Ibid. Also Bagshaw to Arbuthnot, 16 October B02. G.O. 54, 37. Gordon 
to Arbuthnot, 20 December 1802. C.O. 54, 37. Return of the duties per­
formed by the public officers of Ceylon, C.O. 416, 8.
3
Regulation XVIX, 5 August 1813. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts
of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 159-166.
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One of the traditional caste departments whose lone survival
had "been ensured by the lucrative cinnamon monopoly was the Mahahadde.
Its continuation hy the British was made necessary by the existence
of the monopoly as well as of the policy of controlling the caste of
cinnamon peelers in the same manner in which it was done in Dutch times*
During the brief regime of the Madras Government the cinnamon monopoly
was placed under the Commercial Resident and the Dutch department was
also abandoned. This, combined with the abplition of service tenures,
brought about considerable disadvantages. Apart from a loss of revenue
the Challias, or caste of cinnamon peelers, it was said, began to show
independence of authority excepting that of their own immediate chiefs,
and to claim various privileges and exemptions.'*' It was therefore
thought that to bring them under control it was necessary to appoint a
2
separate European Chief as in Dutch times. North carried out this re­
commendation and established an officer named the Superintendent of 
Cinnamon.
The main duty of the Superintendent, who was assisted by Headmen 
of the caste, was to manage the Government cinnamon gardens planted by 
the Dutch, and to collect and prepare the cinnamon for exportation.
Both duties involved the enforcement of the compulsory services due from 
the people of the cinnamon caste. As in Dutch times therefore the Sup- 
intendent had to settle disputes among these people or those regarding
“^Proceedings of the De Meuron Committee, 10 November 1798* C.O. 5 5 , 2.
2 r b i d .
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services and was therefore vested with the powers of Magistracy.^"
To reduce the dependence of the Superintendent on the Headmen
three to four European Assistant Superintendents were appointed in
2
1822 on the suggestion of Paget. They were charged with the daily 
superintendence of labour in the plantations.
The pearl fisheries formed another branch of the revenue which 
atracted early attention. The Madras Government, as well as Notth, 
acted on the belief that it was the main source of Government revenue. 
This accounts for the importance that was attached to the pearl fisher­
ies during the early period. Towards the end of our period of study 
however, the pearl banks became unproductive mainly because of contin­
uous and unscientific fishing. The pearl fisheries were conducted as 
in former times. They were usually rented out to speculators, generally 
drawn from the coast, who could fish only in certain specified areas, 
for a specified time, and a stipulated number of boats and divers.
It was only occasionally, and that too as experiments on a small scale, 
that the fishery was conducted on Government account. Under the rent­
ing system the principal concern of the Government was to supervise the 
fishery, and especially to see that the renters abided by the conditions 
of their farms.
A Return of the duties performed by the public officers of Ceylon,
C.O. 416, 8. Evidence of Rajapaksa Mudaliyar of the cinnamon depart­
ment. 24 June 1830. C.O. 54, 145.
2
Paget to Bathurst, 31 October 1822. C.O. 54, 82. Bathurst to Barnes,
25 July 1823. C.O. 55, 66.
•^ Barnes to Bathurst, 19 May 1820. C.O. 54, 77. Evidence of Boyd, 20 
February 1830. C.O. 416,7. J. Steuart, An Account of the Pearl Fisheries 
of Ceylon, pp. 9-21.
117
To perform these functions North experimented with a body con­
sisting of the Chief Secretary and two Madras Civil Servants, who 
were named the pearl Commissioners, He was considerably dissatisfied 
with the conduct of these Commissioners, and with the intention of hav­
ing a personal control over the fishery he initiated the practice of 
placing it in charge of his private secretary, who in that capacity 
was known as the Superintendent of the Pearl Fishei^, and enjoyed a 
percentage of the collection. He was assisted by an Inspector of the 
Pearl Banks, who was usually the Master Attendant of Coloimho. This 
arrangement continued till Barnes complained, in 1822, of the ineffectual 
custody and superintendence of the fishery, resulting in loss of revenue.^- 
The Colonial Office authorized the appointment of a permanent Super­
intendent. But in view of the uncertainty of the revenue, Paget showed 
an unwillingness to create such a situation. He however took the step 
of making the custody of the fishery a part of the duties of the Col­
lector of Manar who in that capacity was to be known as the Supervisor 
of the Pearl Banks and was entitled to a separate allowance. The Com­
missioner of Revenue was to take charge of operations during the time 
2
of a fishery.
The duty of the Superintendent, or supervisor, as well as the 
Inspector of the Pearl Banks, was to examine the banks from time to time
^Barnes to Bathurst, 19 May 1820. C.O. 54, 77.
2
Pgtget to Barthurst, 1 June 1822. C.O. 54> 82.
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with the aid of the fisher caste Headmen, and to report upon the
feasibility of holding a fishery. They also supervised Government
interests on the occasion of a fishery. Each fishery also involved
special duties for the Supervisor such as the erection-of quarters
for the Government officers by means of compulsory labour.^*
Salt had played a prominent part in the politics of the Dutch
period, especially in their relations with the Sinhalese kingdom.
It was therefore a closely guarded monopoly in Dutch times. The Brit^
ish continued almost the same arrangements for the management of this
monopoly. At first there was a tendency towards the emergence of de-
parmental structure, when an Agent for salt was stationed at Himbantota,
the main salt producing district. Perhaps on account of the fact that
the salt, which was naturally formed, was collected mainly through
compulsory labour over which the Collectors had the supervision, the
latter were entrusted with the duty of collecting the salt, storing
and transporting it. They were assisted by Salt Storekeepers, who
were generally local Europeans, and by Headmen. Salt was retailed at
fixed prices by a group of semi-officials known as Salt Retailers, chosen
2from among the local Europeans.
Timber was a source of revenue which did not attract much atten­
tion during this period. The British continued to derive revenue from
■^ J. Steuart, An Account of the Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon, pp. 21-22.
2
See evidence of Collectors. Answers to questions 74-91. C.O. 416,
29-32.
119
it in very much the same way that the Dutch had done. Licenses
had to be obtained for the felling of timber and the Government
collected taxes and duties from its sale and exportation. Mudaliyars,
functioning under the control of the Collectors, attended to the duties
connected with it.^ * The Government from the time of North was conscious
that these arrangements were unsatisfactory. Proposals were made in
1812 to divide the island into certain areas and to appoint Superintend-
2
ents of Porest to act under the Collectors. These plans were however
not carried into effect during this period.
The attempt to continue the Dutch cotton plantations led to the
appointment of a Superintendent of Cotton Plantations. This attempt
failed and the office was abolished in 1803. The creation of a new
monopoly in tobacco led to the creation of the office of Agent for
3Tobacco at Jaffna. The duty of the Agent was to purchase tobacco from 
the inhabitants at fixed rates, superintend its preparation for exporta- 
tion, and sell it by contract or public sale. The Colonial Office 
however discouraged the idea of establishing any new monopolies, though 
it did not go to the extent of revoking the arrangements that had been
^Evidence of Collectors. Answers to question; 7Qv. ... C.O. 416, 29-32.
2
¥ilson to Liverpool, 26 Pebruary 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
3
Regulation 71, 18 May 1812. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 141-142.
4
Ibid.
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made.1 Perhaps on account of this objection, but also because of
the death of the Civil Servant who originated the plan, Brownrigg
2
abolished the monopoly and the Agency in 1813. The continuance 
of the Dutch horse breeding establishment at Delft led to the creation 
of the post of Superintendent of Delft. He exercised the duties of a 
Collector as well as of Sitting Magistrate within the island, in addi-
3
tion to superintending the breeding establishment.
A special department under a Registrar General arose during the 
time of North on account of the ideas of land reform which he enter­
tained. Though at the beginning he re-established the service tenures 
abolished hastily by the Madras Civil Servants, yet he himself could 
not resist a desire to promote the concept of private property, or as 
he called it, ’’the spirit of industry and individual property ... more 
rational, more equitable, and more calculated for the mutual benefit
4
of the Government and the Governed’1. By the first land regulation he
made provision for the voluntary conversion of service tenures into 
private tenures, and for the voluntary division of undivided land among
5
the several owners. This attempt at voluntary commutation appears to
Liverpool to Brownrigg, 23 January 1813. C.O. 55, 63*
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April 1813- C.O. 54, 47.
^Memorial of Nolan, 27 April 1829. C.O. 54, 106.
4
North to Cuurt of Directors, 30 August 1800. C.O. 54, 2.
5
Proclamation, 3 May 1800. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Government of Ceylon, Vol. I, pp.
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have met with little response, probably because of the influence of 
the Headmen, with whose interests the old system was closely bound.
The next step was to introduce an element of compulsion, which was 
done by a Proclamation in 1801. Without abandoning the right to 
require the people to serve the Government according to their castes, 
adequate payment being given in return, North abolished the obligation 
of service on tenure of land and imposed a grain tax varying from one 
tenth to one fourth of the produce.^ The new policy does not appear to 
have evoked opposition probably because North took care to win over 
the principal Headmen by assigning them salaries in place of their 
accommodessans.^
North attempted to enforce these land reforms with the assist­
ance of a department of land registry. With the expectation of a large 
scale transfer of property, and changes of tenure, he saw a need for a 
better organized department, both as a means of recording such changes 
and to ensure their proper enforcement. At first the arrangement that 
appears to have been made was to have a registration section under the 
control of the Collector of the district. But whatever the advantages 
and disadvantages were it appears that North could not resist thinking 
in terms of a special department of land registration.
Such a department was virtually created by the Proclamation of
1 March 1801. This act authorized the presidents and acting presidents
^Proclamation, 5 September 1801. Skeen, A Collection of jfrggislative 
Acts of the Government of Ceylon, Vol. I, p.
2
North to Hobart, 10 September 1802. C.O. 54, 7* For further information 
on North's land reforms see Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British 
Occupation, Vol. II, Chapter XI.
of the Civil and Landraad Courts to hold the offices of Registers 
of land within their district. They were not only to draw up 
and register title deeds of the changes of property taking place 
under the land regulations, hut were also to attend to all transfers 
in the future. It was stipulated that such transfers could be drawn 
up and registered in future only by the persons authorized to be Re­
gisters. All customary rights, power and authority hitherto vested 
in any other persons were abolished. Perhaps with a view to the en­
forcement of the land reforms, and the re-registration of old titles, 
it was laid down that the title deeds made by the new Registers would 
have preference over those which had been executed before a notary or 
any other person.^ The organisation of the department was completed 
by the creation of a central office called the Registrar-General1s
office, to direct and supervise the activities of the district Registers,
2
and through which the Governor could maintain his control over them.
judicial reforms which brought about the abolition of the Landraad 
and Civil Courts, and problems arising out of the establishment of the 
Civil Service, tempted North to remodel the land registry. By the 
Proclamation of 9 May 1803 he took into his hands the power of appoint­
ing separate officers called Registers of Land at such places as he con-
3
sidered necessary. Several Registers were appointed to different
1
Proclamation, 1 March 1801. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of 
the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 31-33*
2
Proclamation, 9 May 1803. Ibid., pp. 48-49*
■ P^roclamation, 9 May 1803* Ibid., pp. 48-49*
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districts, a few of them regular Civil Servants, but most of them 
Dutchmen. These changes made the Registrar-General’s department 
ever more specialized than before.
North’s land reforms did not produe the results that he ex­
pected. Assuming some form of co-operation from the Headmen, his 
measures were not sufficiently attractive to the people. Formerly 
each holder of service lands knew the exact extent of his liabilities, 
by way of service, to the Governnent. Now in addition to service (though 
payment was promised) he was called upon to pay taxesBesides, land 
registration as North planned it involved examining old Dutch and 
native titles, and surveying and assessing the value of the land.
Such activities besides being suspected by the people could not be 
handled by the machinery that he created. The Registers were therefore
idling, except where an enterprising man forced registration on the
2
people, thereby producing a 'crop of deeds’.
North soon realized that the department of land registration was 
a failure. But he was inclined to attribute it to the absence of proper 
direction.
"The want of perfect comprehension of the nature of 
the registry of lands and deed," he wrote, "had oc­
casioned such dissimilitude of practice between the 
various register holders, that I have at last been 
convinced that they could neither be brought into 
a regular or uniform system, nor kept in it, without 
the establishment of a central committee, which may
See Colvin R. De Silva, Ceylon under the British Occupation, Vol. II, 
Chapter XI.
2
See Farrell to Arbuthnot, 20 October 1802. C.O. 55, 57. Also, Maitland 
to Edward Cooke, 19 October 1805. C.O. 54, 13.
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first investigate, and afterwards regulate their pro­
ceedings. ”1
Thus a central committee consisting of five officials was appointed
2
to investigate and regulate the proceedings of the Eegisters. Three 
months later he reported that the new pommittee had brought good re-
3
suits. But by then Maitland had arrived.
Maitland arrived with discretionary authority to take whatever
4
steps necessary regarding the land registry. He brought with him a 
conservative approach to the land problem which had necessitated the 
registry.
"It would have been a most strange and unaccountable 
measure, supposing it possible, when we were in this 
state of society,M he wrote, "if one of the ancient 
Barons had pulled out of his pocket Adam Smith, and 
said, I will apply to you vassals, whose situation 
renders it impossible to carry it into effect, all the 
rules and regulations laid down by him for a society 
in the last state of civilization and wealth."5
Apart from considering the measures adopted by North as being pre­
mature, Maitland found that the expenditure of the Government had in-
g
creased on account of hired labour, thereby occasioning a loss. He 
also believed that they diminished the ’political power and energy of
^North to damden, 1 March 1805. C.O. 54, 17.
2Ibid.
3
North to Camden, 15 June 1805. C.O. 54, 17.
4
Camden to Maitland, 21 February 1805. C.O. 55, 62.
5
Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 20.
6Ibid.
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Government’."^ He destroyed North’s measures by administrative action 
which restored compulsory services in particular fields, and completed 
it by a legislative regulation in 1809* This regulation however repre­
sented only a partial reversion to the old system, which was more bene­
ficial to the Government than to the people. It declared that service 
lands were inalienable, thereby merely implying that they were liable
to services as before. But services were not positively reinstituted,
2
the land tax was retained, and the accommodessans were not restored.
Thus Maitland’s regulation gave the Government much greater freedom with 
regard to services, thus making the whole system more oppressive on the 
people in practice.
The natural corollary to these measures was a change in the land 
registration department. He wrote that the Registers "did nothing ex- 
cept where they deluded the people and plundered the public..." He 
therefore decided to abolish the Registers as well as the committee 
formed at the centre. In devising institutions to take their place 
Maitland was very much influenced by the arrangements that had been made 
during Butch times. Following the Butch practice the School Masters 
or the Headmen were re-appointed to take charge of the Thombos or
^Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54» 20. For further information 
on Maitland’s ideas see Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British 
Occupation, Vol. 11-,; Chapter XI.
2
Regulation VIII, 18 October 1809. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p.
^Maitland to Edward Cooke, 19 October 1805. C.O. 54, 18.
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registers of land.1 Ee also reverted to the Dutch arrangements to
record the new transfers of private property. In the toms of Colombo,
Galle, Jaffna, and Trincomalee, licensed notaries public were in future
to attend to all transfers of property. In other areas persons to be
appointed as licensed sub-distributors of stamps were to function as
notaries, and to draw up transfers of property at the request of indi- 
2
viduals. They were entitled to fixed fees, the European and Burgher
3
Notaries at a higher rate and the native Notaries at a lower. The 
Notaries were required to draw up the deeds in duplicate and send them 
to the Collectors, who, after checking the accounts, were to forward 
them to the Provincial Courtsf where one copy was to be filed as a re-
4
cord, while the other was to be signed and sent back to the Notary.
The arrangements made by Maitland remained unchanged throughout this 
period. It should be noted thht in practice the Government began to 
pay less and less attention to the old Thombos. With regard to trans­
fers it was laid down in 1824 that no deed relating to land would be
5
valid unless passed and executed before a Notary.
Regulation XVIII, 9 December 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 106-107.
2
Regulation I, 1 January 1806. Ibid, pp. 81-82, 128.
Ibid. Also Regulation XX, 16 December 1824. C.O. 54, 88,
4Ibid. Also Instructions to Provincial Courts, 20 December 1824. C.O. 54, 88
5
Regulation XX, 16 December 1824. C.O. 54, 88.
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The establishment of the Surveyor-General’s department was also
very much connected with North1s land reforms. At first he was much
impressed by the arrangements that had been made by the Dutch for
the survey of the land, whenever necessary. There had been a number
of sworn Surveyors, whose services had been specially required when
the Courts were deciding upon land cases, and when drawing out new
title deeds. Their surveys were submitted to a Board of Engineers,
who finally ratified them.1 North called it an ’excellent institution’,
which had not cost the State fifteen hundred pagodas, as the Surveyors
were remunerated by the fees paid by the individuals who made use of
their services. He therefore declared his intention of re-establishing 
2
it. Much larger plans, however, came to his mind in connection with 
his land reforms. Simultaneously with the provision for the registration
of land, North established the Surveyor-General’s department by a Pro-
3
clamation of 22 August 1800. It provided for the appointment of a 
Surveyor-General, who was to reside at Colombo, and receive orders dir­
ectly from the Governor. There were to be five principal Surveyors, to 
be stationed at Negombo, Colombo, Matara, Trincoiaalee and Jaffna, each 
having one Assistant Surveyor and one sub-surveyor under him. They were
^orth to Momington, 27 October 1798. Wellesley MS. 13,866.
2Ibid.
3
Proclamation, 22 August 1800. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Yol. I, pp. 20-21.
128
to obey the requisitions of the Collectors and Landraads. The
surveys made in the districts were to be sent to the Surveyor-
1
General’s office, where the final plan was to be drawn. Perhaps 
to provide more work for the department the Proclamation of 1 March 
1801, which provided for the registration of land, also provided 
for its compulsory survey. It was here laid down that no deed of 
property would be valid unless it was authenticated by a figure issued 
by the office of the Surveyor-General. All transfers had to be ac­
companied by a new survey.^
The first signs that the department was not functioning as ex­
pected was a Proclamation in 1802, which repealed the rule that deeds 
would not be valid unless accompanied by a survey. The limited 
number of Surveyors, it was said, made the regulation inconvenient and 
impracticable. The Surveyor-General's department however continued 
to exist throughout the period of our study, though on a smaller scale 
than that envisaged by North. Bach Collectorate had one or more District 
Surveyors, drawn from among the local Europeans, whose duty it was to 
survey land belonging to Government, but which had been granted to in­
dividuals for cultivation, for the purpose of executing regular title
4
deeds for them. They could undertake private work on being paid for 
the same. The departmental structure was not clear cut even towards the
^"Proclamation, 22 August 1800. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.
^Proclamation, 1 March 1801. Ibid., pp. 51-35•
3
Proclamation, 14 July 1802. Ibid., p. 62.
4
PLeturn of the duties performed by the public officers of Cpylon, C.O.416,8.
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end of our period. The District Surveyors functioned under the im­
mediate control of the Collectors, though the Surveyor-General also 
appears to have exercised some form of general supervision. The re­
duction of the importance of the Surveyor-general1s office is sug­
gested by the fact that though at first a Civil Servant was appointed 
to the situation it was later handed over tc|a Dutch military officer.
The office of Civil Engineer originated in a grand idea of 
economic development. Lord Glenbervie, North’s brother-ii-law, conceived 
it as a useful instrument to conduct and superintend the repair of ir­
rigation works.^ Dundas endorsed it when he observed that "the assist­
ance of an able Civil Engineer, as suggested by Lord Glenbervie, appears
2
... so essential in the island". But though there was a desire on the 
part of “the Colonial Office, as well as the local Government, to encour­
age the repair of irrigation works, yet they depended too much on the 
possibility of attracting private capital. Even when the Government was 
willing to invest in such ventures, there was hardly any money left 
after paying the civil and military services. The application of com­
pulsory labour for other purposes worked in the same direction.
It was therefore not surprising th&t Maitland found the office
3
' totally unwarrantable". He wrote that Lord Glenberviie's idea was 
"as ludicrous and •.• romantic ... as anything tbd; is found in the Arab-
^See Dundas to North, 1 3 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
2Ibid.
Maitland to Windham, 20 September 1806. C.O. 54. 22.
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ian Nights entertainment”. ”His Lordship chooses to suppose," he 
continued, "that when the surplus revenue amounted, which he had 
no doubt it would in a year or two, from £50 to £150 thousand, then 
that £25 to £50 thousand could not be better thrown away than under 
the fortunate auspices of the Civil Engineer.”'*’ Maitland, however, 
allowed the situation to continue on a small scale, combined as it was 
now with that of the Surveyor-General, and held by the same Butch mili­
tary officer. He was kept occupied by such duties as the repair of 
Government buildings. Even when the great era of road building began 
under Barnes the office failed to become useful, on account of the
fact that it was bypassed, the military officers of the Corps of Royal
2
Engineers being employed in planning and -supervising them. Besides,
the system of compulsory services would have stood in the way of the
emergence of a centralised public works department, for the execution
3
of public works very much depended on the Collectors.
Another office that was established with a view to future economic 
development was that of the Chief Gardener, later known as the Superin­
tendent of the Botanic Gardens. He was in charge of the Botanic Gardens 
established at Colombo and later at Peradeniya, and was expected to im­
prove the horticulture of the island, make discoveries in botany, collect
"^Maitland to Windham, 20 September 1806, C.O. 54, 22.
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 1 June 1821. C.O. 54, 80.
3
Colebrooke, Report upon the Administration. C.O. 54, 80.
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useful plants and seeds for transmission to England, and introduce 
useful plants from other places into the Colony.1
The character of certain other departments and offices, which 
became the nucleus of important departments in later times, must be 
briefly noted. The existence of army doctors, and the need to provide 
medical assistance to the European civil population led to the forma­
tion of a civil medical establishment. The head of this establishment 
was a military doctor, who in the former capacity was designated the 
Inspector of Civil Hospitals in 1796, Chief Medical Superintendent by 
1803 and Superintendent-General of the Vaccine establishment towards 
the end of our period. He was assisted by military doctors known as 
Superintendents of Vaccine stationed in the principal towns. The main 
duty of the civil medical establishment was to attend to the needs of 
the European civil population. But very early in the existence of this
department it was called upon to perform preventive duties against small
2
pox and attend to the native population in cases of epidemic.
The continuation of the Dutch policy of having State aided schools 
led to the formation of the Schools establishment. Quite in keeping with 
the general attitude towards education during this time State aid was 
given to the Anglican Church, which was now the established Church in 
the Colony. At first the Colonial Chaplain, and later the Archdeacon,
Return of duties performed by the public officers of Ceylon. 
C.O. 416, 8.
^Ibid.
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was therefore the head of the Schools establishment. In that capa­
city he was designated the Principal of Schools. He was assisted by 
numerous proponents and School Masters, both European and native, 
the latter being converts to Christianity. They were in charge of 
Schools, kept the registers of marriages, and baptisms, and in certain 
places tie Thombos.^
The need for a postal service brought into existence the office 
of Postmaster-General. As in Dutch times the department was at first 
organized with the aid of the free services rendered by the holders 
of service lands. Towards the end of our period, however, as services 
became unpopular, the tendency was to employ hired runners. At first
the Postmaster-General was assisted by Mudaliyars at outstations, who
2
in that capacity were known as Postholders. But on account of the
change towards a paid establishment, and in conformity to the general
policy of reducing the influence of the Headmen, separate Postholders
were appointed from among the local European community. The Postmaster-
Generd exercised a general superintendence over the conveyance of mails
3
and kept the accounts of the department. Another office which for one 
reason or other was kept separate from tbd of the Postmaster-General
Return of the duties performed by the public officers of Ceylon.- 
C.O. 416, 8.
2 Ibid.
■ I  0  1  '--i. •
i!
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was that of the Commissioner of Stamps, The nature of the duties 
performed by this officer made his office of doubtful utility. Stamped 
paper was issued by the Chief Secretary’s office on an estimate placed 
by the Commissioner of Stamps. They were then re-issued to the Collect­
ors, Judges and Magistrates, and in turn sold through licensed stamp 
distributors. The provincial officers accounted direct to the Commissioner 
of Revenue, so that the Commissioner of Stamps merely performed the duty 
of a transmitting office.
Chapter II 
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES
The main tendency in the development of the provincial admini­
strative machinery during this period was an increase in the number 
of European executive and judicial officials, and almost a complete 
transfer of original authority to them. This expansion marked a further 
departure from the traditions of provincial administration in the country.
The main unit of provincial administration during this period, 
except for a brief interlude, was the Collectorate. The division into 
three Disavanis that had prevailed during Dutch times was more or less 
continued by the British when the Maritime Provinces fell into their 
hands. The Madras Civil Servants preferred to call these units Collect- 
orates because they had by this time become the recognized and established 
units of administration in India. The conquered provinces were therefore 
divided into three Collectorates, which were reduced to two and increased 
to four according to particular exigencies.^
With the creation of the Board of Revenue and Commerce in 1801, 
North abolished the Collectorates and established in their place thirteen 
Agencies in charge of Agents of revenue and commerce who were, both in 
salary and authority, inferior to the former Collectors. He considered
^These Collectors were stationed at Jaffna, Galle, Batticaloa and Colombo. 
See North to Court of Directors, 26 February 1799. C.O. 55> 3.
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this division, not quite accurately, a ‘natural division* for the
Agencies were “almost all different from each other in their manners
customs, religion, and even language of the inhabitants"The Agents
in the Northern provinces were placed in the immediate charge of a person
2
designated the Commissioner Extraordinary. The Agents of Batticaloa
and Magampattu were designated Land Regents and were invested with special
powers on account of their distance from Colombo, and on account of other
3special circumstances which appear to have existed.
The establishment of the Civil Service led North to change the 
thirteen Agencies into six Collectorates, at Colombo, Jaffna, Matara, 
Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Puttalam. The reason for this step was stated 
to be the necessity of establishing a regular gradation of offices among 
Civil Servants, and the facility with which six superior Agents would 
manage the territorial revenue, "without employing to any dangerous ex-
A
tent the ministry of native agents".
The tendency during this period, brought about mainly by the exist-
5ence of the Civil Service, was for the Collectorates to increase in number. 
Thus by 1815 separate Collectorates had been established at Kaiutara , Galle,
^North to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3*
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4
North to Hobart, 10 September 1802. C.O. 54, 7.
5
See schedules of the fixed civil establishments for this period.
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Magampattu, Wanny and Manar, bringing the total number to eleven*
As Bertolacci, a retired Civil Servant, pointed out, the Collectorates 
were far too numerous in the context of the conditions prevalent during 
this time*1 It would have been beneficial to have had a larger number 
if, as intended by Maitland, a positivecgricultural policy had been car­
ried out* Circumstances such as the employment of compulsory labour for 
non-agricultural purposes and the lack of funds prevented the implementa­
tion of such a policy. Without it so many Collectorates appeared un­
necessary to supervise the collectinn of revenue* When therefore the 
Government faced a need for economy in the Civil Service certain Collect­
orates were amalgamated with others so that by the end of our period of
2
study the number had been reduced to eight. The centres were now at 
Colombo, Galle, Tangalle, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Jaffna, Manar and 
Chilaw.^
The chief representative of the executive Govenment in these 
units was the Collector, who, after the establishment of the Civil Ser­
vice, ms almost always a comparatively senior Civil Servant. He functioned 
with or without a junior Civil Servant as Assistant. The establishment of 
the Eachcheri or the Collector's office, consisted of a Kachcheri Muda- 
liyar, a varying number of European Clerks, numerous Lascarins, and other
bertolacci, Agricultural* Commercial and Financial interests of Ceylon. 
p. 438.
2
See schedules of the fixed civil establishments for this period.
3Colebrooke, Report on AdministiEtion, C.O* 54, 122.
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inferior native servants, the most important among the latter being 
the tom-tom beaters, who published the orders of the Government.^"
The establishment of the office of Collector and the powers and 
duties allotted to it marked in some ways, though not in all, a de­
parture from the position that had been occupied by the former Disavas. 
Such a departure occurred when the military functions were separated 
from the civilian. Prom the early days of British rule the need to 
station troops at strategic points, for security reasons, brought about 
the existence of Commandants of garrisons and other military officers#
The area covered by a Commandant did not necessarily correspond with 
that of a Collectorate. Until the establishment of the Civil Service, 
and for a short time afterwards, these military officers were freely 
employed in civilian work. They were required to assist in the enforce­
ment of Government regulations, while some were appointed to specific
posts as that of Agent of Revenue and Commerce, Magistrate, Fiscal and
2
President of Landraad and Civil Courts.
The social and economic order in Ceylon made the separation of the 
civil and military concerns somewhat inconvenient. For instance, the 
military authorities were much dependant on the system of compulsory ser­
vices and on materials procured through the medium of the civil authority. 
Thus, as Barnes pointed out, in many instances the Collectors of the dis-
^See schedules of the fixed civil establishments for this period.
^Proclamations, 18 December 1798, and 30 July 1801. Skeen, A Collection 
of Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 4, 50-53*
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tricts had actually to attend to the construction of military works.*
This factor combined with the loss of emoluments and authority
which the military officers suffered, together with the privileged
position occupied by the newly arrived Civil Servant, did not fail
to excite antagonism. It took some time for the re-adjustment of the
relations between the civil and military authorities in the provinces.
Several conflicts took place during the time of North and Maitland,
on various issues, which affected not onlythe provincial civil and
military servants but also the Governor, the Commander of the forces,
2
and the Supreme Court. It led Maitland to issue a strongly worded 
minute, forbidding the exertion of individual authority on the part 
of a Civil Servant to counteract the orders of the military authorities, 
or the use of irritating correspondence to redress a supposed grievance. 
It directed that all remonstrances should be addressed immediately to 
the Governor.
"No serious quarrel,” he wrote, "can ever occur when both 
parties are actuated by that conciliatory and forbearing 
spirit which can alone secure a continuation of harmony 
and union between the two services ... His Excellency will 
therefore in future consider the fact of a difference ex­
isting, without reference to a critical investigation of 
who may be right or wrong, to be strong prima facie ground _
for displeasure and for the removal of the parties concerned.”
*Bames to Bathurst, 11 August 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
^For details of the most acute conflict that took place see North to
Hobart, 5 October 1804* C.O. 54, 14* North to Camden, 26 December
1804, C.O. 54, 15. 24 Apri 1805, C.O. 54, 17.
3
Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805. C.O. 54, 18*
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Whatever the effect of this minute was, in course of time the civil 
and military officers became accustomed to their respective positions* 
This, together with the peaceful state of affairs which usually pre­
vailed and which reduced the need to invoke the aid of the military, 
tended to remove the occurrence of conflicts* The fact that both ser­
vices were under the Governor's complete control, from the time of 
Maitland, also minimized them*
The new Collectors also lost the traditional military position 
which the command of the local militia had given to the Dutch Disavas* 
The British abandoned completely the maintenance of & militia on the 
old footing with the result that the Mudaliyars and Lascarins were 
completely transformed into civilians* Some of the Lascarins, who 
were now either paid small salaries instead of being allotted accommo- 
dessans, or served gratuitously, were usefully employed as messengers, 
peons, guards and minor police officials attached to the Civil Serv­
ants* Others became pure status symbols to which the Governor and 
the higher officials, and more specially the Collectors, clung with 
a remarkable fondness*^ They were considered to be external marks of 
authority, and distinctions essential to their ranks, to which the 
native inhabitants, who were "fond of state" were long accustomed. 
Their removal, it was thought, would "introduce a state of things so
These Lascarins attended the carriages of the officials, held umbrellas 
over them and accompanied them when travelling* See Horton to Goderich, 
2 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
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foreign to the native mind”, and take away part of the authority
attached to the offices*1 The officials also compared themselves
with the 1 good folk at home” who were also fond of show, though of
2
a different kind*
On acoount of the duality of thought already noticed with regard 
to the relations between the executive and the judiciary, and the 
controversies prevalent in India, the question whether the Collectors 
should be vested with judicial power became a subject of controversy, 
among the new rulers* Some stood for a separation of functions, while 
others thought that a combination was necessary*
During the days of Company rule in Ceylon, the Collectors assumed 
such judicial powers as were necessary to enforce the collection of 
the revenue* Bat in view of the disturbances of 1797$ which were partly 
occasioned by the excesses committed by the Malabar agents of the Col­
lectors, the De Meuron Committee took the matter under their considera-
3
tion* De Meuron and Agnew were strongly in favour of a separation*
They did not give substantial reasons for their opinion, but appear to 
have been largely carried away by the feeling that the union of the 
powers of Collector and Judge was oppressive, and incompatible with the 
liberty of the subject* They were supported by North and Hobart*^ North
1See Horton to Goderich, 2 October 1832. C.O* 54, 118. Also, Horton 
to Goderich, 1 February 1832* C.O* 54, 118.
2Ibid.
3
Minutes of De Meuron and Agnew, 16 September 1797* C.O. 54> 2.
4
Hobart to Committee of investigation, 10 October 1797* C.O. 55, 2.
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wrote of a "vicious system of Government which vests the judicial 
powers in the Collector".^
"The wise and humane establishment of Adawlats in 
Bengal," he wrote, "has sufficiently declared to the 
world your opinion of the necessity of separating the 
judicial powers from the collection of the revenue* I 
need therefore, I presume, state at length the incon­
venience which naturally rgsu^ts from their union in 
the Collector’s Cutchery £3ic/, or the advantage which
of course would arise from the re-establishment of
distinct and independent Courts of law."^
As against these views was the opinion of Robert Andrews, who
opposed a strict separation on the ground that it would place Ob­
'S
stacles to the collection of revenue* Robert Alexander, who was
later appointed to the committee of investigation, after pointing
out thsfc during Butch times the Bisavas had presided over the Courts,
maintained that it was necessary to vest the revenue manager with a
certain amount of control by making his signature necessary for the
execution of court decrees, and obliging him if he dissented to refer
4
his reasons to the Government* The point of view of these persons
was later well stated by Maitland when he pointed out that without
maintaining the supreme authority of the Collector over the district, 
it would be impossible for him to collect the revenue.
^Rorth to Court of Birectors, 26 October 1798* C.O* 54» 3*
^orth to Court of Birectors, 10 June 1799* C.O. 54, %
^Minute, 16 September 1797. C.O. 54, 2.
^Minute, 9 November 1798* C.O. 55, 2.
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"It is not the name of the Collector, not the in­
structions of Government, that enable him to collect 
the revenue," he wrote, "but the onviction in the minds 
of the natives that he has power to enforce such col­
lection, and whenever they are persuaded that he has 
either no such power, or that they can go to any quarter 
where the effects of such power may be counteracted, from 
that moment there is an end of all hopes of the Collector 
being able to execute the functions of his office."
This duality of thought among the rulers was reflectedin the
powers and duties that were assigned to the Collectors. Although,
in keeping with the views already noted, North established courts
of civil and criminal justice, which, unlike in Dutch times, were
presided over by judicial or semi-judicial officers, he made no
attempt at a strict demarcation of the executive and judicial spheres
of authority.
The fact that the Collectors were placed in general charge of 
the police in their respective divisions and were expected to super­
vise inferior police officers, appears to have made it necessary to 
confer on them minor powers of criminal jurisdiction. Prior to 1801
all Collectors were required to act as Magistrates within the dis-
2
tricts in which they resided. After 1801 North conferred the powers 
of Magistracy on Collectors and Assistant Collectors, wherever he con­
sidered it expedient to do so. During the time of Maitland to give the 
Collectors greater authority a regulation was passed which made all
^Memorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 34, 41.
2
See Proclamation, 30 July 1801. Skeen, A Colection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p. 52.
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Collectors Justices of the Peace for their provinces, and which
also conferred on them the powers of Magistracy*^ They were also
?-
made the Fiscals of the province. This regulation remained unre­
pealed till the end of our period so that Collectors were legally 
vested with the powers of Magistracy, which carried with it a juris­
diction over small criminal cases*
It is difficult to determine with exactness the extent and 
manner in which these powers were exercised* It appears however that 
they were intended to be reserve powers which Collectors would exer­
cise in the event of a need to do so* Maitland for instance indicated 
that they were meant to give them more weight in the country, rather 
than that they were to be considered as a primary part of their duty.
He told the Collectors that generally speaking where there was a Pro­
vincial Judge or a Sitting Magistrate, all judicial discussions ought
to be left to them* He also advised the Collectors to make use of
4their judicial powers principally during circuits* These factors, as 
well as the reluctance shown by the Civil Servants to exercise Magis­
terial duties, appear to have brought about the tendency to refer drim-
^Regulation I, 19 October 1805* Skedn* AXdllection of Legislative Acts 
rof the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p*80.
Ibid*
3
Instructions to Collectors of Jaffna and Matara, H.D. 1806. C*0* 54, 25*
4Ibid.
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inal cases, which involved prolonged investigation, to the Magis­
trates* Perhaps to display their authority, the Collectors appear 
to have inflicted summary punishments in small cases that came be­
fore them*
As regards civil jurisdiction the judges and Magistrates were 
normally expected to try all civil cases according to the jurisdiction 
given to them* But the power of Magistracy given to the Collectors 
carried with it a limited civil jurisdiction* Besides, several re­
gulations of this period empowered the Justices of the Peace (all 
Collectors were Justices of the Peacd) to inflict punishments for the 
breach of revenue laws*^ The social and economic order prevalent in 
Ceylon, as well as a need to display power, appears to have led the 
Government to abandon the adherence to judicial forms and resort to 
the former practice of summary punishments. ThusV for instance, after 
establishing separate courts of justice for the protection of the 
liberty of the subject, North fell into the contrary position of de­
claring that no new law or order was meant to take away the right of 
every head of departent or other person superintending the execution 
of any public service to inflict reasonable and moderate correction 
immediately on Hie persons employed under him when they disobeyed his
orders, such punishments by no means exceeding twenty five strokes 
p
with a rattan.
^Evidence of Collectors Answers to Question' 69* C.O* 416, 25-28.
2
See Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
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The role played by the Collector is best understood by examin­
ing the broad divisions into which the civil cases generally fell* 
Firstly, there were the disputes between the inhabitants or between 
them and the Government concerning landed property* These disputes 
were almost entirely left to the decision of the courts* Secondly, thg^e 
were complaints by the renters or Headmen concerning the non-payment 
of taxes or the non-performance of services* These cases, many of 
which involved small amounts, appear to have been summarily punished 
by the Collectors as well as by the Judges and Magistrates* Thirdly, 
there were the complaints made by the people against the tax farmers or 
their agents* It appears that such complaints were seldom carried to 
the courts of law, but that they were inquired into by the Collectors 
or their agents*'*' This was partly on account of the fact that the 
sums involved were usually small, and as one Magistrate observed, ”any
poor person would sooner loose two or "three rix-dollars than have recourse
2
to a tedious and circuitous application for justice”* Perhaps as a 
continuation of former practice it became usual to appeal to the Col­
lector for redress* This mode was in fact encouraged by the Government*
Thus Maitland instructed the Collectors to inquire into the complaints
3
of the tax farmers while they were on circuit. Finally, there were
^E\ddence of Collectors* Answers to Question 69* C*0* 416, 25-28*
^0*Connell to Arbuthnot. 16 June 1802* C.O. 55, 57*
3
Maitland’s instructions to the Heads of Departments, 25 August 1808.
C.O. 54, 28.
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cases in which a tax farmer either defaulted or claimed damages 
from the Government* As regards the former it is clear that the Col­
lectors had to sue the renter before a Provincial Judge or Magistrate 
empowered with revenue jurisdiction* It should however be noted here 
that the special procedure laid down in 1809 for the trial of revenue 
cases gave the Collector certain special powers* It was laid down 
that he could act in advance upon mere knowledge or notice of a de­
fault of payment and seize property to an amount sufficient to cover
the debt, after which the Judge or Magistrate m s  required to give the 
Collector a warrant to sequester the property* The trial of the case 
was to begin only subsequent to all this*^ It appears that the latter 
type of case had not been put to a test till the year 1813* During
this year a case was filed against the Collector of Trincomalee by
the renter of a toddy farm claiming damages for obstructing the exer­
cise of his privileges, by imposing restrictions on the sale of toddy* 
This case occasioned a regulation which laid down that ”no suit could 
be instituted before any Magistrate appointed for the trial of revenue 
cases but by the officers of the Crown in behalf of His Majesty*s re­
venue, nor concerning any act done in the collection of such revenue
according to the usage and practice of the country, or the regulations
2
of His Excellency the Governor in Council”* Brownrigg explained the
Regulation VII, 9 September 1809» Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Yol* I, p* 121*
Regulation I, 8 January 1813* Ibid* * p* 147
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intenticm of this regulation as that of protecting the Collectors
"against vexatious demands on the part of a multitude of public
farmers of revenue",1 He claimed that the renters were protected
sufficiently by the established modes of settling demands on the
part of the Crown, where renters' complaints were regularly matters 
2
of defence* Besides, he referred to the "constant, easy and well
known access to Government by petition, wherein subjects of remission
3
are most commonly and most regularly brought forward"• It is clear
from this observation that the usual mode of action in matters in
which renters claimed damages was not to institute a court case,
but to appeal to the Collector for a remission*
The authority which the possession of judicial power secured to
the Collectors was enhanced when they were appointed to function as
Fiscals to the courts of law* The two important duties attached to
this office were the charge of prisons and prisoners and the execution
of writs of courts The exercise of these duties was at first ill
defined: as a result very much discretion was left to individuals
and there were great variations between the different districts* This
situation was partly remedied when the Fiscal's power over the prison-
4ers under him was defined* More control by the Governor was a principal
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 26 January 1813* C*0* 54* 46*
2Xbid.
3Ibid.
4
See Proclamation 30 July 1801* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government*0^ 1* 52* Regulation VI, 4 May 1807, Ibid*. p*lll*
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outcome of this definition. His powers and duties connected with 
the execution of w±its remained ill defined till 1824» when on the 
occasion of a Supreme Court decision that resistance to legal process 
might be justified if such process had been executed in an illegal 
manner, a regulation was passed which laid down the general duties 
and responsibilities of the Fiscal and the manner in which they ought 
to be exercised.^
As in the time of the Dutch Disavas the main executive duty of 
the Collector was to attend to the interests of the Government in re­
venue collections, enforce services due to the State, and superintend 
public works undertaken by means of compulsory labour. His revenue 
duties were much simplified by the renting system which was extended 
by the British when the collection of the new grain tax was also rented
out. Only a small proportion of the revenue was collected directly
2
through the Headmen. When the collection*as thus rented out the duty 
of the Collector was the monotonous one of drawing up the conditions 
on which the farms were to be sold (which were generally the seme from 
year to year), deciding on their amounts, and selling them by public 
auction. Thereafter he was expected to enforce the collection, where 
necessary, see that the renters did not default or oppress the people, 
prosecute defaulters, and report on claims for remissions. From the
^Regulations XIII, 26 Harch 1824> and XIII, 30 November 1827* Skeen,
A Collection of Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government*01, pp. 305-308, 
348-352.
2
Evidence of Boyd, 20 February 1829* C.O. 416, 7*
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time of Maitland these duties were performed under much central control* 
The power of sanctioning rents and remissions was taken into the hands 
of the Governor in Council* The Collector was also required to submit 
to the central Government various monthly and annual statements of 
account*
The general duty of supervising the renters was comparatively easy 
as they w ere in fact a group of semi-officials under adequate security 
and legal obligations* The difficult part of the duty, which was to 
prevent oppression by the renters, tended to be somewhat neglected*
As a liberal critic alleged, it is possible that the average Collector 
interf erred as little as possible w±h the renters fearing that it would 
diminish the revenue and in turn his commission*^ When inquiries were 
conducted through the agents of the Collector, who were not under a 
sufficient sense of responsibility, it is possible that proper justice 
was not done as his agents could be bought over or influenced by the 
renters* The evils of the renting system were well known and acknow­
ledged* They were perhaps exaggerated because the cultivators were of-
2ten more aware of their rights than they were thought to be* Never­
theless, it is possible to agree with Hobart that the renting system 
amounted to transferring a good portion of the powers of Government 
into the hands of people whose rapacious dispositions were perpetually
^Feter Gordon, ’The actual political condition of Ceylon’, C*0. 54, 112. 
2
Evidence of Boyd, 20 February 1829* C*0* 416, 7*
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encouraged by the precariousness of their tenure*^ Maitland de­
scribed it as a "system destructive of Eis Majesty's interests,
extremely oppressive to the people, and directly in the teeth of
2
everyprinciple that ought to be maintained on the subject". In
spite of the awareness of the evils the renting system was continued
3
as it was found to be the most convenient and economical* The in- 
abilitjflbf the Collectors to supervise a system of direct collections, 
and the reluctance to place responsible power in the hands of local 
men, made it impossible for the Government to provide the necessary 
administrative machinery for direct collections* To a Government so
4
circumscribed it was a choice of evils*
The duties attached to the enforcement of compulsory services, 
the attendance of Lascarins, and summary punishments may have sur­
rounded the Collectors with some of the traditional characteristics 
that had been attached to the office of Disava* Indeed the existence 
of a feeling of continuity in the popular mind is indicated in the use 
of the word Disava to denote a Collector* The traditional position 
would however have been further weakened by other changes that took 
place and by the manner in which the new Collectors functioned* For 
instance, though Lascarins continued to attend on the Collectors this
^Minute, 9 June 1797* C.O* 55, 2*
^Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1806* C*0. 54# 28*
3
Evidence of Boyd, 20 February 1829* C*0* 416, 7*
^Observations of Anstruther, W.D* 1831* C*0* 54, 114*
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would not have had the former appearance and effect of the attendance 
of a militia. The fact that the new Civil Servants were paid regular 
salaries and forbidden to draw perquisites may have hastened a change 
in the relationship between the Collector and the people. Through 
sheer force of habit the people continued to give presents to the 
Civil Servant^ which the Iberal critics of the day regarded as bribery.1 
They may, however, have lost much of their former meaning. Increased 
central control in such matters as the appointment of inferior Head­
men, and the enforcement of services may have also worked towards a 
change in the character of the office. The emphasis on the Collector's 
revenue duties and the further neglect of his traditional responsi­
bilities to agriculture, may have worked in ihe same directions.
Maitland was perhaps attempting to re-establish a useful aspect 
of the old system when he insisted on the Collector making circuits 
through his districts. He noticed that the common duties of a Collector 
had hitherto been considered to be limited to a residence in the chief 
town of his district. The Government of North, he thought, had encour­
aged that view by allowing an extra charge for travelling expenses when-
2
ever they moved from the place of their immediate residence.
"In the view I entertain of the duties of an Agent of
Revenue and Commerce," he wrote, "by much the most im­
portant part of it appears to me to make himself thor-
1
See Peter Gordon, 'The actual political condition of Ceylon', C.O. 54, 112
2
Instructions to the Collectors of Jaffna and Matara, N.D. 1806, C.O. 54,25
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oughly master of the situation and the state of his 
district by frequent and personal inspection; and I 
cannot admit for one of any extra charge when an offi­
cer of Government is merely executing any common part 
of his Immediate duty. "3-
He therefore instructed the Collectors to make a complete circuit
of their districts once a year usually during the time of letting
the rents* They were required to keep diaries of the proceedings of
such circuits and to forward them to the Government through the Com-
2
missioner of Revenue*
These circuits were partly intended to make the revenue duties 
of the Collector more effective* They were intended to prevent op­
pression by the renters on the one hand and frivolous complaints by
3
the people on the other* They were aimed at bringing about more
personal contact between "the Collector and the people, and more per-
4sonal supervision over the activities of the inferior Headmen* Above 
all they marked an attempt to make the fuze tion of the Collector some­
thing more than one of mere revenue collection* It is clear that Mait­
land expected the Collectors to carry out positive agricultural acti­
vity* They were required to inform themselves of the state of culti­
vation in the districts, meet people and explain that the Government 
was prepared to assist and support them in the cultivation of waste
^Instructions to the Collectors of Jaffna and Matara, N.D* 1806* C.O.54, 25*
2
^Instructions to the Heads of Department, 25 August 1808. C.O* 54, 28*
3
Instructions to the Heads of Department, 25 August 1808* C.O. 54, 28*
4Ibid.
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lands, to look into the ways and means of supplying water to the
cultivators, to repair and clear up tanks and canals, and to find
out hy personal inspection whether any taxes were oppressive and
injurious to agriculture* Luring their circuits they were also to
make advances of various kinds in order to stimulate the inhabitants
to an increased cultivation of rice*^
Maitland no doubt expected much benefit from these circuits*
"Possessing on the one hand," he wrote, "the ready 
means of setting all disputes in the different vil­
lages of his district, without moving the inhabitants 
to a distant court, and on the other the means of sup­
plying them with seed grain, clothing and agricultural 
tools, and, as far as may be, relieving them from the 
vexation of a tax gatherer by letting to the cultivators 
themselves the tythes of their villgges, Government has 
a right to expect that such circuits of the Collector 
must be, and will be, attended with the happiest conse­
quences to the district over which he presides*
These hopes were not fulfilled to any great extent* The fact that 
the Collectors had now to bear the expenses of circuit, ihe diffi­
culties involved in travelling, the general disinterestedness which 
the Civil Servants of this period showed in establishing direct con­
tact with the people, the ineffectiveness of the intended agricultural
policy, seem to have all combined to make circuits less frequent*
3
They appear to have ceased entirely from about 1824* Even when
^Instructions to Collectors of Jaffna and Matara, EL* 1806* C*0* 54, 25 
Also, Instructions to Heads of Lepartment, 25 August 1808. C.O* 54, 28
2Ibid.
3
Colebrooke, Report upon the Administration, C*0. 54, 122.
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undertaken the circuits may have looked very different from the 
entry into a district of a former Disava surrounfed by his militia*
The Collector’s office or Kachcheri became a general co-ordinat­
ing office for the Government activities of the province* The Col­
lectors were expected to pubicize all Government regulations by beat 
of tom-tom* All provincial officers, excepting the Provincial Judge, 
functioned in a degree of subordination to the Collector, although 
the relationships were as yet not very well defined* All officers in 
the provinces were required to submit their collections and accounts 
to the Kachcheri to be examined and credited to revenue* The Collectors1 
office was similarly becoming a general pay office for the whole pro­
vince *^
The judicial officers in the provinces varied with the changes 
in the judicial system* These changes were frqquent during the forma­
tive years 1798-1805* After 1805 the judicial system was more or less 
fixed till the end of our period of study*
As we have seen North arrived in the island with instructions to
establish the Dutch judicial system* He had also the power to make
2
expedient and useful alterations* Shortly afterwards he proposed 
the establishment of seven or eight Landraads for the decision of civil 
cases among tie inhabitants, composed of a European President and the
instructions to Heads of Department, 25 August 1808.0*0 * 54 , 28.
2„See p.
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usual number of Mudaliyars* He also proposed the appointment of 
three Fiscals to manage the police, to receive and examine criminal 
accusations from the Magistrates and Mudaliyars, and to commit persons 
for trial.^ *
This plan was however defeated by what North called the "ob-
2stinate refusal of the Butch" to take the oath of allegiance* By 
the time these obstacles had ceased to exist, North had turned a 
reformer* Judging matters by-foe forms and concepts of justice to which 
he was accustomed, he became critical of the Butch Raad Van Justitie,
"composed of men unlearned in the law, without salary as Judges, and
3
even the obligation of hearing cases in open court*..." The manner
of their proceeding, he thought, "was liable to every defect of neg-
4
ligence, uncertainty and corruption..*" The Butch Civil Courts, ex­
cepting the Landraads, were also considered unsatisfactory on similar
5
grounds* He proposed to remove the Judges from other civil employ­
ments, and pay them adequate salaries in order to ensure judicial in­
dependence*^ He wrote of the need for a judicial system "for securing
^North to Momington, 10 May 1798. 10 May 1798* Vellesley MS 15,866.
^North to Momington, 3 October 1798* Ibid* Also North to Court of 
Birectors, 10 June 1799* C*0* 54, 1* North to Bundas, 10 September 1802* 
C.O. 54, 7.
3>North to Court of Birectors, 10 June 1799, 5 October 1799* C.O. 54, 1«
4
North to Court of Birectors, 10 June 1799* C.O. 54, 1*
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
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the property of the people, and for suppressingihe arbitrary
authority of their Chiefs”*^
When therefore the proposed judicial system reached the stage
of finality considerable modifications had been made* The Rand Van
Justitie of Colombo, Galle, and Jaffna was abolished, and criminal
jurisdiction throughout the island was vested in one tribunal over
2
which the Governor presided* The jurisdiction of the Dutch Civil 
Courts was enlarged to cover all civil cases occurring within their 
local limits* The Dutch practice of having five Judges to constitute 
a civil court was abandoned, and it was declared that one Judge was
sufficient to form a competent court* The Landraads were re-established
3
in the same form as under the Dutch* A subsequent proclamation shows 
that they were established at eleven different places throughout the
4
island* The Dutch practice of having witnesses or accused examined 
by a Fiscal or a Commission out of court was abandoned, and all cases 
were required to be publicly examined in court* The Fiscal and others 
appointed by the Governor was to continue to try inferior offences and 
disorders against the police* As the Dutch procedure was considered 
"unnecessary and impracticable" they were to be simplified* In civil 
suits the proceedings were to be summary* Torture of suspected persons
^Rorth to Court of Directors, 10 June 1799* C*0* 54* 1*
See p*
3
Proclamation, 23 September 1799* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government* Vol. I, pp. 6-9*
4
See Proclamation, 22 January 1801. Ibid* * pp.25-30*
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and ’’barbarous” modes of execution and punishment were abolished.
Further changes were made during the following year. Minor 
courts styled the Fiscal's Court, composed of three members with 
the Fiscal as president were established at various places in the 
island. They were empowered to try small civil cases where the sum 
or matter in dispute did not exceed 25 rix-dollars, and small crimin­
al cases. Powers of punishment were limited to fines not exceeding
50 rix-dollars, imprisonment not exceeding one month and corporal
2
punishment not exceeding 40 strokes. Subsequently their jurisdiction 
and powers of punishment were enlarged, twice within one year. By 
July 1801 they were given jurisdiction over all criminal offences, 
excepting certain higher crimes that were named, and were given the 
power to impose fines to any amount whatever short of entire forfeit­
ure of property, imprisonment to any term short of the term of natural 
life and corporal punishment to any degree short of loss of life.
However, when any sentence exceeded two months' imprisonment, a fine 
exceeding 100 rix-dollars or corporal punishment exceeding 100 lashes, 
the sentence was not to be carried into execution until approved by 
the Governor. The Fiscals acting singly were given the jurisdiction 
and powers of a Magistrate, of which we shall say more later.
^Proclamation, 23 September 1799* Ibid., pp. 6-9.
^Proclamation, 2 July 1800* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p.19.
3
Proclamations, 20 February 1801, and, 30 July 1801. Ibid.. pp. 31, 50-53*
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The summary trials prescribed in 1799 led to such diversities 
of practice that a uniform procedure based on the former Dutch pro­
cedure, but with certain modifications, was laid down for the Civil 
and Landraad Courts* Suits under 25 rix-dollars were to be heard 
and determined in a summary manner* No written pleadings were to 
be required in land cases between 25 and 50 rix-dollars in value 
and in other cases between 25 and 100 rix-dollars* In cases above 
100 rix-dollars pleadings were to be by petition* The manner in which 
the courts were to proceed to trial was also prescribed.^ Prior to 
the arrival of the Civil Servants the courts thus constituted were 
presided over by military officers and Dutchmen.
The establishment of Crown Colony rule, which brought with it 
a Charter of Justice and a Civil Service, led to further changes in
i
the judicial system. The Charter of Justice, besides establishing a
Supreme Court laid down that all inferior offences should be tried
2
before Justices of the Peace and Magistrates. This led to the de­
velopment of the Magistracy of which we shall say jnore later. The 
Charter also created an Office of Fiscal for the purpose of executing 
the processes of the Supreme Court. It therefore became necessary, 
in order to avoid confusion, to change the former Fiscal1 s court to 
that of the Court of the Justices of the Peace. Its powers of punish­
ment were reduced to fine not exceeding 75 rix-dollars, imprisonment
“^Proclamation, 22 January 1801. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, 23-50.
2
Charter of Justice, 18 April 1801. C.O. 55* 61.
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not exceeding two months and whipping not exceeding 100 strokes*
Its civil jurisdiction was extended to cover cases, excepting those
1on land, up to 100 rix-dollars in value*
The establishment of the Civil Service, which necessitated
the transfer of superior judicial power to new hands, led to the
gradual disappearance of the Civil and Landraad Courts* The process
began when the Landraads of Galle and Jaffna were abolished and their
jurisdiction vested in the Civil Courts* This step was justified on
the ground that it was convenient if cases occurring within the dis-
2
trict were tried by one and the same tribunal* A further step was
taken when the name of the Landraad Court at Colombo was changed to
that of Provincial Court and a Civil Servant was appointed as its
president* Thereafter the Landraads and Civil Courts were amalganEted,
forming six Provincial Courts at Colombo, Hatara, Puttalam, Trincomalee,
4Batticaloa and Jaffna* These changes were justified on the ground 
that it was, M expedient that the several tribunals*••• should be as 
few in number as may be consistent with the due and convenient admini-
5
stration of justice”* The number of Judges in these Courts was not
1
Proclamations, 13 February 1802, and 25 June 1802* Skeen, A Collection 
of Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp* 59-62*
^Proclamation, 20 August 1801* Ibid*. p*54*
3
Proclamation, 13 February 1802* Ibid*. pp. 59-60.
4See Proclamations, 25 June, 12 July, and 10 November 1802* Ibid*, 
pp* 61-64* North to Hobart, 10 September 1802* C.O. 54, 7*
5
Proclamation, 25 June 1802. Ibid* * pp. 61-62*
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specified, the Governor reserving the right to decide on it*
The practice followed by North was to constitute them with two
persons, a senior Civil Servant as president, and a junior person
as member* These Courts were given the power to determine all
civil matters in the district, where the sum or matter in dispute
exceeded 100 rix-dollars in value One important consequence of
these changes was the displacement of the Mudaliyars from a share
of judicial power*
Haitland, who arrived with instructions to reduce expenditure,
rounded off the process that had set in during the time of North*
On the reporlfcf Chief Justice C. E. Carrington, from whom he obtained
advise on the best means of effecting economy, he carried out several 
2changes* Thus the Courts of the Justices of the Peace were abolished* 
The proclamation announcing the decision contained thezeason that led 
to it. It was stated that the number of Civil Servants were too small 
to admit of the establishment of Courts, with three Judges as members,
3
at all the stations at which they were required. The number of the 
Provincial Courts was fixed at five. They were now to be constituted 
with only one Judge selected from the Civil Service. The Provincial 
Judges were made Justices of the Peace throughout the island, and given
^North to Hobart, 10 September 1802. C.O* 54, 7.
2
See Carrington to Maitland, 5 October 1805* C.O* 54, 18.
3
Proclamation, 19 November 1805* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, p.80.
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jurisdiction over small criminal offences, with powers of punishment 
by fine not exceeding 100 rix-dollars, by imprisonment not exceeding 
three months, and by whipping not exceeding 100 lashes* They were 
to have a civil jurisdiction over all cases of whatever nature be­
tween the native inhabitants, and over all cases not exceeding 100 
rix-dollars between Europeans.^ As it was reported that much incon­
venience would be caused by making the people travel from one part of
the province to another to attend the Provincial Courts, the Judges
2
were required to proceed on circuit twice every year. As it ap­
peared that in some districts the inhabitants were in the habit of 
settling disputes among themselves by arbitration, it was announced
3
that no such practice could be admitted under the British Government.
This seems to have been in accordance with Maitland*s wish to reduce 
the authority of the Mudaliyars.
Perhaps on account of a recognition thsfc the system of Provincial 
Courts was not as successful as desired, the Governor in Council con­
templated the re-establishment of Landraad Courts, with the Collector
4
as president and other suitable members. On the advice of Alexander
^Regulation I, 19 November 1805. Ibid.
2
Carrington to Maitland, 5 October 1805. C.O. 54,18. Also, Regulation I, 
19 November 1805. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of the 
Ceylon Government. Vol. I, p.80.
3
Maitland to Wood, 26 December 1805. C.O. 54, 20.
4
See Minutes in Council, 14 December 1808. C.O. 54, 52. Maitland to 
Johnston N.D.1809. C.O. 54, 31.
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Johnston , the Colonial Office made provision for their re-establish­
ment by the Charter of Justice of 1810.1 Landraads had a brief spell 
of existence when they were established in 1811. But on the arrival 
of the second Charter: vof Justice the Provincial Courts were re-established. 
Thus the system of Provincial Courts remained on the footing on which they 
were placed by Maitland till the end of our period of study.
The number of these Courts was, from time to time, increased to 
six or reduced to four according to the exigencies created by the Civil 
Service. At the end of our period of study there were sevenProvincial 
Courts in existence at Colombo, Galle and Matara, Jaffna, Trincomalee, 
Kalpitiya, Manar and Batticaloa. At the latter two places the Collector
of the area functioned as Judge, without however the power over the
4revenue cases of his Collectorate.
At each of these Courts the Civil Service Judge was assisted by 
a Dutch Secretary and Clerks, and a native interpreter with or without
5
the rank of Mudaliyar and Muhandiram. However, both on account of the 
nature of the rules of proceeding drawn for the functioning of these 
Courts, and the fact that the Judges had constantly in mind the Courts
^Charter of Justice, 6 August 1810. C.O. 55, 62*
o
Wilson to Liverpool, 26 February 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
3
Brownrigg to Liverpool, 29 March 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
4See Barnes to Bathurst, 6 January 1821. C.O. 54, 13*
5See Schedules of annual fixed civil establishment for this period.
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of Justice familiar to them, the Provincial Court began to conform 
more and more to the type of Court prevalent in England* The rules 
of evidence and procedure were based on what was prevalent in England* 
Pleadings were by affidavit, and the litigants were required to pay 
certain fees which varied in amount from time to time - the Governor 
having the power to regulate them by executive order* Unlike in 
England however the Courts functioned without a Jury* This circum­
stance combined with the fact that the Judges were generally ignorant 
of the customary law of Ceylon may have not only led to mistaken judg­
ments, but also made the Judges dependent on the advice given by out­
siders or interpreters, who may have lacked a sufficient sense of re­
sponsibility.^
The arrangements that were thus made for the provincial admini­
stration of the country resulted in the existence, in the provinces, 
of two members of the Civil Service, holding two different jurisdictions, 
one mainly of an executive and the other of a judicial nature* On ac­
count of the increase in the number of Collectorates the Judge had 
usually a larger area of jurisdiction than the Collector*
At first, in the Civil Service, there was a preference for Col- 
lectorships. They were considered to be more lucrative, while the judi­
cial offices were considered to be more laborious and difficult, and as
Cameron, Report on the judicial establishments and procedure, 
C.O. 54, 122.
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having lesser prospects of promotion.'*’ This situation however 
changed from the time of Maitland. The Collectorships lost part 
of their attraction on account of the salary increases and other 
changes that he carried out. Collectors and Provincial Judges were 
placed on one line of promotion with the latter office being made 
more attractive than many of the former. In fact it became an ob­
ject of ambition to some of those holding the office of Collector.
This situation would have naturally caused difficulties in 
places where the Provincial Judge was senior, and was holding the 
more important post in the Service, on account of the fact that the 
Collector was the chief representative of the executive government.
It was perhaps this factor that accounted^for the mutual jealousy
2
between the Collector and the Judge which Maitland noticed. In fact
he regarded it as a virtue provided it was not carried to ’unbecoming
3and indecorous lengths’.
Mo serious quarrel however took place between the Judges and 
Collectors, in spite of a situation which had^otentialities for such 
conflict, either on account of a competition in the Service, or a clash 
of duties. Several factors contributed to bring about this comparative
*See memorial of S. Tolfrey, 21 Movember 1803* C.O. 54, 13* Part of 
the dislike for judicial office arose on account of the fact that 
Morth attempted to keep Civil Servants appointed as Judges permanently 
in those places. Besides, the Collectors enjoyed commissions while the 
Judges were not allowed fees for themselves. It was also likely that 
during the early days a Collectorship provided more opportunities for 
private trade.
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805- C.O. 54, 18.
5Ibid.
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harmony. Firstly, the practice grew up of giving precedence in 
the province to the more senior Civil Servant, whether Judge or 
Collector. Secondly, the nature of the duties entrusted to them, 
as well as the fact that they were transferable from one to another, 
made the offices less antagonistic to each other than would have been 
brought about by a strict separation. Thus while the Collectors per­
formed functions of a judicial nature, the Judges were from time to 
time called upon to participate in executive duties either singly 
or in various committees. Lastly, as the head of the executive the 
Governor exercised disciplinary control over the Civil Service as 
a whole, irrespective of office. Besides, the supervision over the 
civil jurisdiction of the Provincial Judges rested with a Court over 
which the Governor presided, although in criminal matters both Col­
lectors and Judges were liable to judicial censure by the Supreme 
Court. The fact that ultimately both the Collector and the Judge 
held allegiance to a common head also prevented the two offices from 
being too antagonistic to one another. This was, as we have seen, 
one of the grounds on which Maitland objected to the judicial reforms 
of 1810.1
The more numerous class of judicial officers in the provinces 
were the Magistrates. Perhaps having the Magistracy of England in 
mind, and in order to make the authority of the new rulers felt in the
^See p. $o.
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country, North conferred the powers of Magistracy on a large
number of European officers, civil and military, who held other
appointmentsSome of them were designated Sitting Magistrates,
as North considered it expedient to have persons charged with the
more regular duty of watching over the police and giving daily at- 
2
tendance to it.
The establishment of Crown Colony rule led to further changes.
By stipulating that inferior offences should be tried by the Justices 
of the Peace and Magistrates, the Charter of Justice gave an import­
ant direction to the development of the Magistracy. The establishment 
of the Civil Service brought about the tendency to remove military 
officers from the exercise of Magisterial duties. The office of Sit­
ting Magistrate began to have a separate and independent existence.
It was given mostly to persons displaced by the Civil Service, some 
of whom were Dutchmen. They were sent to areas where there were no
Civil Servants, and where, it was supposed, the inhabitants required
3
the presence of a Magistrate.
When Maitland arrived, perhaps on account of some confusion that 
prevailed, he laid down that no one was to exercise the powers of
4
Magistracy without a warrant from him. As we have already noticed
^See Proclamiion, 30 July 1801. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 50-53*
^Proclamation, 25 June 1802. Ibid., 61-62.
3
Arbuthnot to Sullivan, 15 June 1803. C.O. 54, 11.
4
Regulation VIII, of 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 85-86.
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he appointed all Collectors and Assistant Collectors to he Justices
of the Peace and conferred on them the powers of Magistracy.^ At
the same time the number of Sitting Magistrates was increased. They
were sent to the interior of the country with the declared intention
2
of reducing the influence of the Headmen. Most of the Sitting Magis­
trates thus appointed were Dutchmen.
This increase was not much liked by the Colonial Office which
raised the fear that it would lead to dissatisfaction among the Muda-
3
liyars, and also result in an increase of expenditure. In reply Mait­
land expressed no fears about the Mudaliyars, while on the question of 
expenditure he put forward a dangerous doctrine. He argued that the 
Magistrates had 1nettedf enough to pay their establishment charges 
and gave the Colonial Office the assurance 'that where an inferior 
Magistrate did not net a revenue to Government independent of his salary,
4
such Magistrate’s situation should immediately cease”.
Subsequent to Maitland's period the officesof Sitting Magistrate 
increased in number. At one stage there were about twenty eight of them
5
dispersed in different parts of the country. The need for economy 
felt during later years reduced the number to about eighteen. By the
^See p. 1^ 3.
^Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1807. C.O. 54, 25.
3
Castlereagh to Maitland, 29 February 1808. C.O. 55, 62.
^Maitland to Windham, 20 September 1806. C.O. 54, 22. Also, Maitland 
to Castlereagh, 21 August 1808. C.O. 54, 29.
5
See schedules of fixed civil establishments up to 1820.
168
end of our period of study Magistrates were stationed at Colombo, 
Kalutara, Panadura, Negombo, Balapitimodera, Matara, Tangalle,
Hambantota, Galle, Mhllaitivu, Point Pedro, Mallagam, Kayts, Chava- 
kachcheri, Jaffna, Valigama, Poneryn, Kalpitiya* Of these, the 
Magistrates at Colombo and Jaffna were usually Civil Servants, while 
the rest were Dutchmen* On the occasion of one of the increases that 
took place during the time of Brownrigg, the Colonial Office repeated 
Maitland's principle, and informed the Governor that they would be 
sanctioned only if the increase of revenue was sufficient to cover 
their expenses.^ Brownrigg therefore found it necessary to point out 
the dangers inherent in such a principle. He pointed out that a needy 
man obtaining the situation of a Sitting Magistrate under any idea 
that its permanency would depend on a collection of fees and fines, 
would instead of being the mediator and reconciler of disputes, con­
sider it to be his object to see that they would end up in cases and
2
fines which would enrich the coffers of the Court* The establishment of 
the Magistrate consisted of a native interpreter, with or without the 
rank of Mudaliyar or Muhandiram, and a Secretary who was also a Dutch­
man*
The fact that Dutchmen predominated in this field of employment 
brought to the office of Sitting Magistrate a badge of inferiority in
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 23 January 1813. C.O* 55, 62* 
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 August, 1813* C*0. 54, 43.
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the minds of the Civil Servants as well as the native inhabitants*
The Civil Servants showed a marked reluctance to be associated with 
what the inhabitants called the ♦Dutch Magistracy*.^
The Magistracy was more particularly meant to control the police 
of the country. North gave the Magistrates the power to apprehend 
persons, sending them to prison or releasing them on bail, taking
2
information and committing them for trial before the competent courts*
Maitland found the Magistrates exercising these powers without a proper
degree of definition, with the result that in certain districts many
people had been confined for months without any information being
3
lodged or proceedings being takenagainst them* It was therefore laid 
down tiat committals were not to take place unless a well grounded sus­
picion existed about the guilt of the person on the information of one
4
or more persons taken upon oath* A person had to be confined to prison 
or released on bail within three days of arrest, the prisoner being 
sent to the Fiscal in case of imprisonment. The Magistrate was given 
the power to search suspected persons and property, and in greater 
crimes where a positive suspicion prevailed, and where the offender
^ e e  p. 45.
2
Proclamation, 30 July 1801* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 50-53*
3
Regulation VIII, of 1806. Ibid.. pp. 85-86. Also, Maitland to Camden,
28 February 1806. C.O. 54» 21.
4
Regulation VIII, of 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of 
the (ferlon Government, Vol. I, pp. 85-86
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had absconded, to have the property under sequestration.1 They were
required to keep copies of the information taken and to forward them
to the competent courts, and the Fiscal.
As police officers the Magistrates were immediately in charge
of the nstive policemen called Police Vidanas in the rural areas, and
2
constables in the principal towns. This control was however exercised 
in sibordination to the Collectors and the Provincial Judges. The Magis­
trates were called upon to perform various duties, some connected with 
the police, but others only remotely connected with it. Thus several 
regulations of this period required some of the Magistrates to act as 
the licensing authority for goldsmiths, silversmiths, brass founders, 
gambling houses, butchers, fishing boats, bakeries, etc. In the towns
the Magistrates performed the duty of enforcing cleanliness, extinguishing
3
fires, regulating the building of houses. It should also be noted that 
the office was at times combined with that of Custom Master or Assistant
4
Custom Master.
In addition to their duties of a police and an executive nature, 
the Magistrates were called upon to act as Judges in small civil and 
crhihal cases. In fact they became another link between the executive
^Regulation VIII, of 1806. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of 
the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 85-86.
2See Regulations V, VI, and VII of 8 May 1813, VI, of 22 July 1815.
I M d . . pp. 91-95, 149-155, 183-185.
3
Ibid. Also XI, of 5 August 1806, III, of 5 February 1814, VI, of 22 July 
1815. Ibid., pp. 89-90, 169, 185-185.
4
See schedules of fixed civil establishment for this period*
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and the judiciary* North gave to some of the large number of Magis­
trates that he created the power to hear and determine inferior and 
petty offences, other than those involving property, and punish them 
by fines up to 10 rix-dollars, and by whipping up to 50 strokes.1 
Subsequently they were empowered t> try and determine civil cases,
excepting those over land, where the sum or matter in dispute did
2
not exceed 50 rix-dollars.
These powers were enlarged during the time of Maitland. In crimi­
nal matters the powers of punishment were increased to fines not ex­
ceeding 50 rix-dollars, imprisonment at hard labour not exceeding two 
months, and whipping not exceeding 50 lashes. They were given a civil 
jurisdiction over all cases of whatever nature, excepting those con­
cerning the revenue, where the sum or matter in dispute did not exceed 
100 rix-dollars in value. Maitland believed that such an extension 
of powers and jurisdiction would enable all small cases to be decided
4on or near the spot, thereby reducing the influence of the Mudaliyars. 
Subsequently, some of the Magistrates resident in the principal towns 
were given the power of punishment by fine not exceeding 100 rix-dollars, 
by imprisonment not exceeding three months, and by whipping not exceed-
^Proclamation, 30 July 1801. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 50-53.
2
Proclamation, 10 November 1802. Ibid., p.64.
3
Regulation I, 19 November 1805. Ibid.. p.80.
a
Maitland to Vindham, 28 February 1807. C.O. 54, 25*
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ing 100 lashes. Their civil jurisdiction was extended to cover suits,
excepting those over revenue, where the sum in dispute did not exceed
300 rix-dollars.1 Though at first Magistrates were generally excluded
from the trial of revenue cases (perhaps on account of the fact that
many of them were Dutchmen), Maitland took into his hands the power
2
to appoint any of them to try them. On account of the special powers 
given to the Collector, which we have already noticed, the revenue juris­
diction thus given to the Magistrates was much subordinated to the in­
's
terests of the executive. The special duty of these revenue Magis­
trates in fact became the enforcement of the regulations passed from 
time to time for the protection of monopolies and other branches of the 
revenue.
The inferior and semi-judicial nature of the office of Magistrate 
made his position more difficult than that of a Provincial Judge. The 
conflicts between the executive and the judicial heads over the control
4
and supervision of judicial officers have already been noted. These 
conflicts are an index to the difficult conditions under which the Magis­
trates were called upon to perform iheir functions. On the one hand 
they could be criticized by the Supreme Court for lapses in their judi­
cial functions, while on the other hand they were liable to the censure 
of the Governor for disregarding the interests of the executive. These
■^See Regulations V, 26 July 1808, XV, 28 November 1812, XII, 26 June 1813* 
Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, 
pp. 114-115t 146, and 156.
2
Regulation VII, 9 September 1809. Ibid., p.121.
^See p.
^See p.
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difficulties are noticeable in a case that cropped up in 1818. In 
this year a complaint was made to the Sitting Magistrate of Negombo 
by a burgher family that their servant was taken away forcibly by 
a Mudaliyar and his men. The Magistrate held an inquiry and committed 
the latter for trial before the Supreme Court. There was no doubt that 
there were sufficient grounds for a trial, for when the case was re­
ferred to the Advocate Fiscal he held this view. The Collector of 
Colombo however objected to the manner in which the Magistrate had 
performed his functions, as it involved an action against a Headman 
supposed to be acting under his orders.^- He maintained that the proper 
mode would have been to communicate with him first. He was supported 
by the Commissioner of Revenue, who held that the Magistrate had been 
endeavouring to set up his authority in opposition to that of the Col­
lector, and that he certainly ought to have reported the conduct of
p
the Mudaliyar instead of taking a strict legal line. The Deputy Sec­
retary on behalf of Brownrigg wrote to the Magistrate disapproving of 
his conduct in exercising his Jurisdiction with a disregard for the 
convenience and interests of the Government, and finding him guilty
3
of bringing into contempt the authority of the Collector. The Magis­
trate was dismissed while the Supreme Court helplessly looked on.
The fact that the High Court of Appeal at the centre of Government 
did not have Jurisdiction over cases under £30, or 300 rix-dollars, in 
^Deane to Boyd, 14 April3818. C.O. 54, 71.
^Boyd to Rodney, 16 April 1818, C.O. 54, 71.
3
Lusignam to Tranchell,18 April 1818, 6.0. 54, 71.
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value led to the creation, in 1809, of provincial courts of appeal*
By legislative enactment the Governor took into his hands the power
to constitute courts called the Minor Courts of Appeal at suitable
stations* There were usually four of them at Colombo, Jaffna, Trin-
comalee, and Galle. They were to consist of two or more principal Civil
Servants or other suitable persons available at such stations. They
were so near civil appeals (excepting those touching the revenue) below
the amount appealable to the High Court of Appeal.^ It was soon found
that the appeals from the Provincial and Magistrates Courts were too
numerous and that the Minor Courts of Appeal could not cope with them •
It was therefore decided to limit the right of appeal to these courts.
Enunciating the doctrine that the right of appeal in cases of trifling
value serves only to encourage petty litigation, it was laid down that
appeals from the Provincial Courts would be limited to cases over 200
rix-dollars in value, and those from the Magistrates Courts to 25 rix-
dollars in value. In land cases however appeals were to be allowed
2irrespective of the amount in dispute.
The administrative structure described in the foregoing pages was 
in many ways a superstructure. Below this were the remains of an in­
digenous structure consisting of Headmen of varying rank. It provided 
the Government with an essential link with the people. It generally
^■Regulation V, 51 July 1809. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Yol. I, pp. 118-119.
^Regulation IX, 17 August 1814. Ibid.. p.172.
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provided social stability, though perhaps at the expense of social 
change. It is a clue to the question how a body of Civil Servants, 
foreign to the country, ignorant of its customs, social values,and 
generally ignorant of its,languages, were able to carry on the ad­
ministration. Maitland was perhaps not exaggerating when he observed 
that the power of the Headmen "approximates so much to a perfect Im- 
perium in Imperio that in truth the real Government of the island is 
more that of the Modeliers /sic/ than of the British Government...
The social and political stability which the system of Headmen 
provided is best seen from the consequences that followed the attempt 
to replace it with a hierarchy of Malabar officials. The result was
confusion and discontent leading to open revolt, as Stuart had anti- 
2
cipated. The Be Meuron committee, which looked into the ways and
means of restoring order in Ceylon recommended that this system should
3
be re-established. In particular, the committee recommended the re­
appointment of the Mudaliyars, who were to be invested with judicial 
power in lieu of that exercised by the farmers of revenue. They were 
to determine in the first instance all disputes and civil causes be­
tween the native inhabitants, or between them and thefarmers of revenue.
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 54» 18.
^See p.
3
Proceedings of the Be Meuron Committee, 16 August 1797. C.O. 55, 2.
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They were to be the channel of communication for all orders from 
the Government to the districts, excepting those on the subject of
|
| revenue* Each Mudaliyar was to be held responsible for the police
I
and good regulation of the district presided over by him* The com­
mittee recommended the payment to them of monthly salaries, till such 
time as the old system of tax free land grants was re-established.^*
All the members of the committee agreed that the restoration of 
the Mudaliyars was the surest means of restoring order. Besides De
Meuron held the view that the Headman system was a good means of pro-
2viding the country with a police system without much expense. Agnew 
saw in it the means of providing a permanent barrier for the inhabitants 
against the oppression of the farmers.of revenue, and a means of obtain­
ing justice independent of the revenue officers. As such, though a few 
Mudaliyars had already become renters he thought that they should be 
considered as Exceptions. Though Andrews agreed to the re-appahtment 
of Mudaliyars he held the view thefc their appointment and removal should 
be vested in the Superintendent of revenue, and that all orders to them 
should be given in his name. He maintained that if the Mudaliyars were 
appointed independent of the Superintendent of revenue it would be a sure
^Proceedings of the Meuron Committee, 16 August 1797. C.O. 55, 2* 
Minute, 16 August 1797. C.O. 55, 2.
Minute, 16 September 1797. C.O. 54, 2.
means of creating dissensions and parties among the inhabitants*
The Madras Government was more in agreement with the views expressed
by De Meuron and Agnew.
"By vesting the Modeliars /sic/ with all the authority 
that may be deemed advisable to intrust to the superior 
native servants," wrote the Madras Government, " you 
confide power to men who are remarkable for the value 
they set upon their situations, who have a thorough know­
ledge of the disposition, prejudices, and customs of the 
people, to whose authority the inhabitants are in the 
habit of submitting, and whom ancient usage has tau^it
them to respect"*2
3The Madras Government ordered the restorationcf the Mudaliyars. This 
was carried out by the Proclamation of 3 July 1798.
At first North was very much in agreement with one committee con­
cerning the importance of the Headman system.
"The class of Modeliars /.sic/ who are regarded as the 
nobility of the country," he wrote, "are all Christians 
and occupy very inferior posts of police, revenue, and 
justice, in the island with the perfect goodwill of the 
inhabitants, whoare so much attached to them that their 
degradation by the Malabar Dubashes was one of the princi- 
psl caudes ofthe discontent of the people*"4
But soon he too became suspicious of the 1 nearly unlimited1 authority
of the Mudaliyars, especially in commanding the services of the people,
5
and spoke of a necessity of defining their authority. The good relations
"^ Minute, 16 September 1797* C.O. 54, 2.
2
Revenue Department to De Meuron Committee, 10 May 1798. Wellesley MS 13866. 
Hobart to Committee, 10 October 1797. C.O. 55, 2.
^Koirtht to Moraington, 27 October 1798. Wellesley MS 13866.
5
North to Court of Directors, 26 February 1799. C.O* 54, 1.
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subsisting between North and the Mudaliyars, especially the Maha 
Mudaliyar, made him confident of carrying through some reforms.
The establishment of the Civil Service on an exclusive principle took 
him in the same direction, for it brought about a need to assert, in 
a much greater manner, the superiority of the European officials.
His reforms aimed at reducing the number of Headmen, resuming 
the accommodessans and paying salaries instead, and reducing discretion­
ary power which he said led to abuse of authority.^ The appointment of 
a large number of European Magistrates was intended to reduce the judi­
cial powers of the Mudaliyars. With the abolition of the Civil and 
Landraad courts the Mudaliyars were not associated with the new Pro­
vincial courts that were created in their place. These reforms appear 
to have been carried out without much opposition. North explained it 
away by stating that "a settled and ample income, a dignity secured 
and increased by the reduction of the number of individuals who enjoyed 
it, and above all the certainty of not being able to carry on their old 
system of capricious discretionary oppression, under a Government more 
vigilant and a people less servile than they were formerly accustomed 
to, has entirely reconciled them to this necessary and temperate reform11. 
It however appears that North was misjudging the situation. It was dif­
ficult to imagine that a people who had revolted with the Headmen a few
"Storth to Court of Directors, 10 February 1801. C.O. 54, 3. 
2
North to Dundas, 16 March 1802. C.O. 54, 6.
179
years back were not less servile than formerly. It is equally diffi­
cult to think that the civil officers who were new to the country had 
so soon developed a degree of vigilance which prevented oppression 
and reconciled the Headmen to the new changes. It is of course true 
the military power would have encouraged submission. But it was not 
quite accurate to say that the payment of salaries, or the reduction 
of numbers, gave the Headmen a new dignity which the land that they 
formerly enjoyed could not provide. The absence of opposition may have 
beenpartly due to the good relations between Notth and the Mudaliyars. 
But it appears that it was also due to the fact that whatever legal 
changes were brought about by North’s reforms they were not as fully 
effective in practice. The Headmen seem to have been little affected 
by the changes and in particular their social position remained un­
changed.
Lord Hobart, now the Secretary of State, seems to have correctly
anticipated what actually happened.
’’The Moodeliars ^ sic/,” he wrote, ’’were a body of men, 
who from various circumstances had obtained an important 
influence over the minds of the inhabitants, who had a 
thorough knowledge of their prejudices, customs and dis­
positions, and who, being held in the highest veneration 
and respect, had in fact become an important link of con­
nection between the Government and the people: by reduc­
ing this establishment in the manner you propose you lower 
the condition of those whom you retain in the service, and 
relinquish that security for their attachment and fidelity, 
which was derived from the value they were at all times 
known to set upon their situations, and inevitably render 
them not only less disposed, but less capable of being use­
ful instruments of Government.
Hobart to North, 1 Kay 1802. C.O. 55, 61.
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The accuracy of this judgment is borne out by an examination of 
the contemporary situation. The reduction of the number of Headmen 
was not in practice as effective as North expected. It partly ex­
plains the existencecf a group of self-constituted Headmen which Mait­
land noticed.^ The confusion thus created was only remedied by regulation 
VI of 1809 drawn up by Maitland, which was styled Ha regulation for as­
certaining the persons holding the employs or title of Native Headmen 
in the Sinhalese districts, and for preventing the assumption of the 
authority of title of a Headman by persons not duly appointed for that 
purpose”. B y  this regulation provision was made for the issue of new 
acts of appointment to the Headmen after the examination of old acts. 
Onlylhose who received such new appointments would be considered as 
authorized Headmen, and provision was made for the punishment of all
those who assumed the rank and title of Headmen without such an appoint- 
3
ment. Explaining the promulgation of this regulation Maitland observed 
that the abuses that it intended to correct were of a "flagrant and ex­
tensive nature”, and that it put an end ”to the assumed power of a number 
of self-constituted Headmen hardly credible, and that when it adds to
the power of real Headmen it has relieved the people from a system of
4most vexatious oppression". Similarly, the removal of the Mudaliyars
Maitland to Castlereagh, 25 January 1810. C.O. 54, 37. 
regulation VI, 1908. C.O. 54, 37.
5Ibid.
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 25 January 1810. C.O. 54, 37.
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from the legal exercise of judicial powers did not entirely prevent 
them from continuing to enjoy such powers. Maitland for instance 
observed that the Mudaliyars derived considerable power and influence 
by deciding 'arbitrarily' on differenoes and disputes between native 
inhabitantsi The resumption of accommodessans and the abolition of ser­
vice tenures upset the traditional balance of rights and duties, without 
something else equally binding taking its place, and also without under­
mining the social position of the Headmen to any appreciable extent.
The Agent of Revenue and Commerce at Puttalam observed the change that 
had taken place when he wrote that "before the Accommodessans were re­
sumed each Coral /sic/had four Lascoryns /sic/ and some petty officers 
called Vidans /sic/ and Atu Corals /sic/ to assist him and all the people 
were obliged when called upon to carry Olas to any part of their Pattu.
Since the first of May the inferior officers have in general murmured 
at being obliged to serve without some compensation, and the people have 
positively refused to act as Lascoryns /sic/ unless paid as such.
This statement suggests two possible ways in which north's measures would 
have brought about social disorder. There may have been genuine instances 
which some people refused to serve, when called upon to do so, on the 
ground that they nolonger possessed service lands. It is also probable 
that the Headmen now found ready excuses for the non-performance of 
their duties. Either way it brought about a general tendency for the
Maitland to Johnston, N.D. 1809. C.O. 54, 31.
2
A* Johnston to Arbuthnot^, 24 October 1802. C.O. 55, 37. Korala, Atu Koralas
Vidana and Lascarin. Olas were letters written on the leaves of a palm
tree. They were still in use forcommunicating with Headmen.
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Headmen to be less attentive to their duties*
These developments resulted in the breakdown of the village 
organization, and partly account for the increase of crime and general 
disorder which Maitland noticed. Gangs of robbers went about their 
activities undetected. It was partly this confusion that led Maitland 
to re-establish the service tenures. It was also the same confusion 
that made him introduce an element of compulsion by regulation XII of 
1806. It was laid down here that all Headmen of whatever rank would 
be strictly held responsible for seeing that no illegal combinations 
existed within their districts without being immediately reported by 
them to Government. If it were found that such combinations existed, 
of which the Headmen had not given information, such Headmen were to be 
dismissed from their situations and punished by fine and imprisonment.
MIt is impossible to suppose from the nature of the Government here," 
wrote Maitland, "that any such combination of the kind could have ex­
isted without their knowledge, I might almost say, without their positive 
authority.••.
It is therefore clear that, as Hobart had anticipated, the Headmen 
were now less disposed, and less capable of being useful instruments 
of Government. Their capacity to do good had been reduced by the removal 
of their legal judicial powers, while flieir social position which remained 
undiminished, together with the freedom gained from the confusion in the 
traditional rights and duties increased their capacity to do evil. It is
■^Regulation XII of 1806. C.O. 54, 25. Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1807*
C.O. 54, 25*
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therefore not surprising that Maitland saw the evils of the Headman
system in a much darker light than North* He described the control
and power vested in the hands of the Mudaliyars as the 'greatest evil'.^
Maitland clearly saw the factors which gave this power and influence
to the Mudaliyars. One was their social position, which he said had been
strengthened by the appointments made by North. He maintained that the
selection of Mudaliyars made by North on the adlrice of his Maha Mudaljyar
had "thrown the whole of the power of the Mudaliyars, or in other words
the real and efficient authority over the whole of the Sinhalese part of
His Majesty's dominions in this island, into the hands of the Maha Muda-
liyar of this place. His family uniformly enjoys every place of power
and emolument in the districts of Coombo, Galle, and Matara, and in fact
to all intents and purposes carry on a distinct and separate Government 
2of their own."
Maitland also recognized that the Civil Service had failed to keep 
a check on the activities of the Headmen to the extent that the Government 
desired. He attributed it to the "natural disinclination from the un­
healthiness of the interior, for our Civil Servants to interfere in the
3
country". He would have been nearer the truth liad he stated that the
Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1807. C.O. 54, 25.
Maitland's instructions to the Collector of Matara. N.D. 1806. C.O. 54, 25 
Maitland to Johnston, N.D. 1809. C.O. 54, 31.
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Civil Servants were very much dependent on the Mudaliyars and other 
Headmen, which in turn increased the power and influence of the latter* 
The Collectors were dependent on the Mudaliyars for the information 
about their districts* A good part of the information available to them 
was what the Mudaliyars chose to tell. They were dependent on Headmen 
to carry out all types of orders into effect. Inquiries into complaints 
by the people were often made by the Headmen. Similarly the Headmen were 
in immediate charge of the duty of summoniiig the people for various ser­
vices. During the time when private trade was permitted some of the 
Collectors were even dependent on the Mudaliyars for the furtherance of 
their trading transactions. It was such dependence whict$)ermitted Mait­
land to tell the Collector of Matara without the fear of offending him, 
"that the whole of your district may be with truth said to be under the 
indirect, if not the positive control of the Modeliars /sic/ they being 
the Government servants".^ The position of the other provincial officers 
was not very different. The Magistrates required the assistance of the 
Headmen to execute their police and judicial functions. Ignorance of tie 
native languages made all officials dependent on interpreters, whose 
number and power thereby considerably increased. The functioning of some 
special departments were also very much dependent on the Headmen. For 
instance, regarding the functioning of the Cinnamon department Brownrigg 
observed that "the efficient realization of this important part of the
^Maitland’s instructions to the Collector of Matara N.D. 1806. C.O. 54, 25
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revenue very principally depends, whatever pains or talents may "be
employed by the Gentlemen in charge, on a few Headmen of the Challia
caste • ••• Through those Headmen alone by long established custom all
orders to the peeling classes must pass, and they are in consequence
necessarily entrusted with the assembling and distribution of the peelers,
1
as well as the payment of hire,” Similarly with the exception of the 
Post Master General, the rest of the postal services were at first car­
ried out by the Mudaliyars and the men under them.
The social position|of the Headmen, as well as the dependence of the 
Civil Service on them, placed the Government in a dilemma. It is clear 
that all the Governors of thi^period were dissatisfied with the extent 
of control and influence which the Headmen were able to wield. Like
North, Maitland held that the limitation of their powers was 1 indispensably 
2
necessary'. He was conscious of the political threat to the British 
power that it brought about. He also held that it operated as a "para-
3
lysing medium between the Government and the people". It is equally 
clear, however, that the Governors were in a sense helpless, and that 
certainly they had to be cautious. Maitland for instance declared that 
the reduction of the powers of the Mudaliyars was a matter of extreme 
delicacy, and that it must be done, if done at all, with great caution
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 4 March 1813. C.O. 54, 46.
^Maitland to Johnston, N.D. 1809. C.O. 54, 31.
3Ibid.
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and by slow degrees.^-
It was this difficulty which made Maitland conceive ofindirect,
rather than direct, methods to reduce their power and influence. It
is true that he continued the changes already initiated by North. The
payment of salaries instead of alloting tax free lands was continued
as it was considered 'wise and politic' in that it tended to diminish
2
their uncontrolled influence in the interior of the country. The Head­
men were also not re-anvested with the judicial powers taken away by 
North. In addition, however, Maitland devised a policy of divide and 
rule. He worked to derive maximum benefits by exciting old feudal jeal­
ousies, and by creating new ones. This policy is clearly seen in several 
of the measures adopted by him.
Observing that part of the powers of the Mudaliyars rested on their 
kinship with one another he attempted to excite jealousies between families 
"The policy therefore upon the whole, I wish you to observe with regard 
to the Modeliars /sic/" he told the Collector of Matara, ''is 1st to ex­
cite as much jealousy as you possibly can, between the Maha Modeliar 
/sic/ of Matura /sic/ and this place, and 2nd, that you keep alive the 
system of jealousy that must prevail in the district itself against the 
Maha Modeliar /sic/ of Matura /sic/"^ However, he warned the Collector
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 54, 18.
Slaitland to Windham, 26 February 1806. C.O. 54> 20.
3
Maitland's instructions to the Collector of Matara, N.D. 1806. C.O. 54, 25
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that the success of this policy would depend onectreme caution.
Similarly he attempted to create jealousies between the Mudaliyars, 
who were generally Christians, and the heads of the Buddhist religion, 
by maintaining friendly relations with the latter. This, however, ex­
cited jealousies in an unexpected quarter too. The Missionaries pro­
tested to the Colonial Office that Maitland was undermining the spread 
of the Christian religion. This compelled the Colonial Office to call 
for the observations of Maitland.
"It is surely rather a perversion of any doctrine I 
have ever held on the occasion,” wrote Maitland, ttto 
insinuate that because I wis& ta diminish the political 
influence of the Modeliars /sic/profess ... What I com­
plain of his, that this political consequence is now, 
and has ever been, attended with prejudicial effects; and 
if this complaint is well bottomed and founded I would 
then wish to ask whether the Modeliars /sic/ being of one 
religion or another, alters in the smallest degree the 
evil of which I complain.
The death of the Maha Mudaliyar of Colombo in 1809 was made by Maitland an 
occasion to assert some principles which he wished to follow in the ap­
pointment of native officers, and which would again enable him to excite 
family jealousies. In selecting a successor he was prepared to recognize 
only the one positive rule that he should be a Sinhalese native of high 
family. He refused to recognize the claims of the male heir of the per­
son deceased, and also of the second Mudaliyar, intending to break through
rules of heredity and seniority - rules nif not positive in themselves,
2at least constantly attempted to beheld out by the natives as such”.
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 4 March 1809. C.O. 54, 34. 
^Minute in Council 30 November 1809* C.O. 54> 37.
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Several measures were also adopted with the aim of building
up a counterpoise to the power and influence of the older families*
Regulation VI of 1806 created a class of Headmen called the Police
Vidanas, who were to be appointed by the Collectors and to be vested
with powers of search and arrest.^ Maitland told the Collector of
Jaffna that "the Police Vidaans /sic/, if well managed**** are the
best possible checks which you can have of the conduct of the Monigars
/sic/"^ "Be particular in the men that you appoint Vidaans ./sic/",
he wrote, "make them give you weekly reports of all that passes in
their divisions; throw all the power you consistently can into their
hands instead of into those of the ^nigars /sic/; appoint the police
Vidaans /sic/as much as youcan out of the class from which School Masters
3
were formerly chosen." These instructions clearly show that by appointing
Police Vidanas Maitland intended to counterbalance the power of the
regular Headmen. The re-appointment of the School Masters as agents of
Government, whose position was further strengthened by making them in
certain places notaries and sub-distributors of stamps, was also intended
as a means "to come at a more thorough knowledge of the real state of 
4the interior"* Similarly Maitland considered North's policy of appoint­
ing Sitting Magistrates successful because this too created a class of
^■Regulation 6 of 1806* 0*0. 54, 25.
^Mii.tldnd's instructions to the Collector of Jaffna N.D. 1806* C.O. 54, 25* 
Maniagar was a term used to describe the Headmen of the Tamil provinces, 
of the rank of Mudaliyar.
3rbid.
4Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 54, 25•
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officials, who were useful to undermine one of 1he greatest sources 
of power of the Mudaliyars. This was the practice continued by the 
latter of arbitrating in disputes between the native inhabitants.*^ *
He therefore increased the number of Magistrates and appointed them 
to the interior parts of the country.
It is clear that though Maitland enunciated a strong policy, he 
was extremely cautious in carrying it out. In reply to the fears raised 
by the Colonial Office that serious consequences might flow from his 
policy he replied that however strongly he was convinced of the prin­
ciple, he would not carry it into effect in a manner "to commit the
2integrity, or to hazard the tranquillity of His Majesty’s Government".
Besides, the success of his policy very much depended on the activity
and alertness of the Civil Servants in charge of the provinces. It was
the realization of this fact which partly accounts for his insistence
3
on circuits and a study of the native language. But in both these spheres 
he was not as successful as he wished. The result was that the policy to­
wards the Headmen was not as effective as he intended. This is seen from 
the observations of the Chief Justice, Alexander Johnston that the Col­
lectors were generally obliged to appoint Police Vidanas, on the re­
commendation of the chief Headmep, who would naturally put forward men in
^Maitland to Johnston, , N.D. C.O. 54, 51•
2Ibid.
See p. 151.
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whom they were interested. *^ This development was the exact opposite
of the intentions of Maitland. It is also clear from the observations
of Johnston that in certain places the newly appointed Police Vidanas
were not much respected and that several cases came before him where
2
resistance was offered to them, some being badly wounded or killed.
Johnston attributed it to bad selection and to ignorance of the law,
3
while Brownrigg attributed it to a contempt for the law. It peihaps 
showed a contempt for change which was bound to appear in such a period 
of transition. A remedy for these difficulties, suggested by the Chief 
Justice, was that the Collectors should be required to appointas Vidanas
4
only such men recommended by the Magistrate of the district. But the 
necessity to maintain the balance of power and authority between the 
Collectors, who were Civil Servants, and the Magistrates, who were gener­
ally of Dutch origin, seems to have prevented the implementation of this 
recommendation. Brownrigg, in whose time the question was raised, ob­
served that the "proposed measure of making such recommendations mandatory 
on the Collectors would be a radical change • ••• in the general management 
of the district, withdrawing from the Government which the Collectors 
represent, the appointment of a great body of Native Headmen, and raising 
a new power in the country hitherto unknown in any political view, and 
possessing a power of control over the Collector not consistent with that
*4>ee Brownrigg to Liverpool, 22 September 1812. C.O. 54* 44.
Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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authority which the interests of the revenue make it necessary to 
place in his hands"
After the period of Maitland’s Governorship no further ideas of 
plans of reform originated with the local Government. It was partly 
a recognition of the difficulties which must have been prevalent in 
reforming a system bound up with the interests of the most powerful 
group of native inhabitants. The local Government would also have been 
reluctant to disturb a system on which the Civil Service was much de­
pendent. Any radical plans of reform could hardly be expected amidst 
the reluctance and inability to disturb radically the economic and social 
set-up so closely tied to the Headmen system, and the unwillingness to 
trust local men with original power. The public service was, as we shall 
see later, already out of proportion to the revenue of the country, and 
this factor may have prevented the occurrence of any ideas of reform which 
involved additional expenses. The sense of urgency with which North and 
Mai-Band felt the need for reform seems to have also lessened during the 
second and third decades of the 19th century. North and Maitland governed 
at a time when the transfer of power to the new Civil Service was being 
carried out, accompanied perhaps by a certain amount of dissatisfaction 
on the part of the Headmen with the loss of certain privileges and powers 
which they had previously enjoyed. It was generally a period of re-adjust- 
ment of the relations of the new and the old rulers. The second and the
^Brownrigg to Liverpool, 22 September 1812. C.O. 54, 44.
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third decades brought about more certainty in these relationships*
The original executive and judicial authority exclusively given to 
the Civil Servants and other Europeans brought them the necessary 
authority and position in the country. The Headmen as a class gradually 
began to be reconciled to their loss of power and were more transformed 
into a class of officials who carried out the orders of the European 
superiors. After a few years of patronage exercised by the new Govern­
ment cordial relationships generally developed between the Government, 
the Civil Servants and the Headmen. Even during the time of a rebellion 
in the Kandyan Provinces, hardly a doubt was expressed about the allegiance 
of the low country Headmen. All these factors may have given the local 
Government a sense of satisfaction with the new position occupied by the 
Headmen in the administrative set-up. Barnes perhaps expressed this satis­
faction when he took his stand against reformist tendencies that came from 
outside. "It makes no difference,” hewote, referring to the inferior and 
superior Headmen, whether they and their superiors are called Lords,
Lieutant Governors of Countries, High Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, &c 
or Disavas, Rattamahatmayas /sic/ Ratturales /sic/ Modeliars /sic/ Koralas 
Mohotales /sio7 Mahandirams /sic7& - there must be persons in all countries 
to administer the laws and execute the public duties.
Par from originating any new plans of reform th®e was less enthusiasm, 
and also perhaps an inability, to carry forward the policies that were en­
unciated by North and Maitland. Thus a reluctance to displease the class
1Bames to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112.
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of Headmen appears to have stood in the way of carrying forward the 
policy of reducing their number which North initiated* Even where 
reductions were carried out they were spasmodic and unconnected with 
any plan* When it was found convenient and desirable to suppress an 
office the usual practice was to wait till the death or retirement of 
an incumbent
The reductions that were occasionally carried out did not alter
to any great extent the basic structure of the Headman system prevalent
2
at the advent of British rule* The Maha Mudaliyars, Kachcheri Muda­
liyars, Korale Mudaliyars, Maniagars, assisted by other inferior Headmen, 
continued to remain in their respective positions though with reduced 
powers* In fact the number of Kachcheri Mudaliyars increased with the 
increase ii the number of Gollectorates* There was hardly a change in 
the number of Korale Mudaliyars* Reductions generally affected the inferior 
ranks of Headmen* The Mudaliyars of Kachcheries and Morales continued to 
be selected from the Parmer caste. Headmen belonging to other castes 
also continued their existence though with reduced numbers* The Fisher 
and Cinnamon castes in particular continued to have He&dmen of the rank
of Mudaliyar downwards* Single villages continued to be presided over by
*  3
Vidanas generally belonging to the caste of the majority of its inhabitants*
1
Horton to Goderich, 9 November 1831* C.O. 54, 114*
2
See pp Zl-Z<h-
3
See schedules of fixed civil establishments for the period* Also, Return 
of the duties performed by the several public officers under the Colonial 
Government of Ceylon. C*0. 416, 8*
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The spasmodic reductions and changes however led to certain 
important tendencies* One was that reductions affected the caste or 
departmental Headmen much more than those presiding over territorial 
units, thereby giving a considerable accession of strength to the 
farmer Headmen* The general practice was to do away with or reduce the 
Headmen of castes, which had ceased to perform useful functions or ser­
vices to the State, and to bring the people belonging to these castes 
under the control of the territorial Headmen* The fisher and the Cinna­
mon castes were the two least affected by this tendency. Though the 
collection of the fish tax and the conduct of the pearl fisheries were 
usually rented out, thus reducing the usefulness of Fisher caste Headmen, 
so far as the Government was concerned, yet this caste continued to enjoy 
the privilege of having Headmen of the rank of Mudaliyar downwards, per­
haps because of the large number of people belonging to it.^ These Head­
men were dispersed throughout the districts in which this caste of people 
predominated* But as the petitions sent by the Fisher caste inhabitants
indicate, reductions of fisher Headmen had also been occasionally carried
2
out, thus bringing the people under the control of the Farmer Headmen.
By 1833 there were proposals to do away with these Headmen altogether or
3
to transform them into custom house officials* The existence of the
^See Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C.O. 54, 131*
2
Petition of thirty inhabitants of the fisher caste of Weligama, Ho. 138, 
N.D. 1829* C*0. 416, £9* Petition of 427 fisher inhabitants, 10 November 
1830. C.O. 54, 131.
3
Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C.O. 54, 131.
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cinnamon monopoly kept alive the usefulness of the Headmen of the
cinnamon caste* A Mudaliyar was associated with the Superintendent
of the Cinnamon Department and the orders of the latter, directed
to the district Headmen of the caste, were conveyed through him*
The areas in which the cinnamon caste resided were divided into six
divisions each under a Mudaliyar and other subordinate Headmen.^
As we have seen, the European Superintendent was much dependent on
2
these Headmen for the management of the monopoly* Their importance
diminished with the introduction of European Assistant Superintendents
3
to manage the Government cinnamon plantations* They became almost 
completely useless to the Government from about 1829 with the abandon­
ment of compulsory services to procure labourers and peelers for the 
department. Plans were therefore made to retire some of them with pen­
sions and to bring the people of the caste under the control of the 
farmer Headmen.4
The disposition of the Government to transfer Headmen who were 
less usefully employed to other spheres of public service brought about 
the tendency to attach some of them to the Government offices, both at 
the centre and in the provinces, and to the courts of justice, as inter-
^Evidence of Rajapaksa Mudaliyar of the cinnamon department, 24 June 1830* 
C*0* 54, 145. Also Horton to Goderich, 16 July 1832. C.O. 54, 117.
2
See py 164,
^See p. \\L»
^See Horton to Goderich, 16 July 1832. C.O* 54, 117.
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preters and translators. They came to be designated as Interpreter 
Mudaliyars or Muhandirams.^
The reluctance to displease the class of Headmen made the Govern­
ment ailow some of them to continue with their titles sometimes with 
a small retirement allowance. They were called Titular Hudaliyars or
Muhandirams and they continued to exist throughout the period of this 
2
study. The existence of such a group would have naturally brought
about some confusion. This is seen by the fact that as late as 1820
there appears to have been much uncertainty in the Tamil provinces as
to the Headmen in actual office. In this year a regulation ms drawn
3up similar to the one enacted for the Sinhalese provinces in 1809»
to prevent the assumption of the authority or title of a Headman by
4persons not duly appointed for that purpose. This regulation noted
the existence of abuses practiced by persons merely having the rank
5
and title of Malabar Headmen.
The patronage of the whole system was shared between the Governor, 
the Revenue Commissioner, and the Collectors. All superior Headmen were 
appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Collectors sent 
through the Revenue Commissioner. The latter either supported the nomin­
ations of the Collector or proposed another, assigning his reasons for
^See schedules of fixed civil establishments of this period. Also Horton 
to Goderich, 21 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114*
2Tbid. See also Memorandum showing the amount of pay and allowances drawn 
monthly by the several district Headmen, 4 February 1830. C.O. 416, 8.
30 See p. i
4
Regulation XXIV, 14 December 1829* C.O. 54, 79*
it, and the final decision rested with the Governor#1 Inferior 
Headmen were appointed by the Revenue Commissioner on the recommenda-
p
tion of the Collector. In the Sinhalese provinces the Maha Mudaliyars 
and the Mudaliyars appear to have been consulted in making inferior 
appointments, and they may have wielded much unofficial influence over 
them. In the Tamil provinces there were the remnants of an elective 
principle in operation. The Collector summoned the inhabitants when­
ever a vacancy occurred and obtained their opinion before submitting
3
his recommendation. A knowledge of the English and native languages 
was considered as an essential qualification for a Mudaliyar of a Kach­
cheri, but a knowledge of English was not considered important in the
- 4case of a Korale Mudaliyar.
The policy proclaimed by Maitland of making appointments strictly 
according to suitability does not appear to have been carried forward to 
any appreciable extent. In order to preserve the respectability of the 
office, a rank or station by birth and a certain amount of propertyin
5
the district were considered requisite for an appointment. Conse­
quently, the appointments of superior Headmen were generally confined to
Evidence of R. Boyd, 15 July 1830. C.O. 416, 7.
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a few families. A greater amount of flexibility seems to have 
been prevalent in the appointment of inferior Headmen* Here the 
attempts to secure the patronage of the European officials, occasional 
dismissals, the disposition to overlook former families which held 
these offices, the limited field of employment open to the native 
inhabitants, the value and social status attached to these positions, 
all combined to bring about a peculiar form of competition, though it 
is difficult to determine the extent to which it prevailed* The usual 
mode of operation was for a person eyeing an office, and ftho was power­
ful enough to challenge a Headman in office, to attempt to win over 
the Government officials by various means, and especially by becoming 
informers against those in office*1 In "the Tamil provinces in particular
each appointment left one party dissatisfied and desirous of accomplish-
2ing the dismissal of the successful individual. This mayhave had the 
advantage of keeping the Headmen alert. But petitions alleging wrongful 
dismissal indicate the possible existence of a certain amount of faction­
alism, and instances where European officials had been misled by an op- 
3
posing faction.
The policy originated by North of jaying fixed salaries to the Head­
men was also not carried to its full extent. Till the end of our period
1Several petitions dispersed in the volumes C.O. 416, 29-32 indicate the 
existence of such competition. For some instances see petitions 11, 29, 92, 
102, 111, 120, of 1829 in C.O. 416, 29 and 151, 157, 171 of 1829 in C.O. 
416, 30.
^Evidence of Boyd, 15 July 1830. C.O. 416, 7.
3
See petitions referred to above.
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of study only Headmen of superior rank in the Sinhalese provinces were
paid regular salaries.1 The original idea in paying regular salaries
was to do away with the system of perquisites which had been attached
to office* But neither were the salaries that were assigned adequate,
nor were all the Headmen paid, to enable Government to put an end to
them. Thus certain Headmen continued to draw recognized fees from the 
2people, while all of them derived indirect and unrecognized advantages 
by virtue of holding office. The Government also continued and even 
extended the practice of providing some of them with remuneration by 
way of commissions.^ The policy initiated by North of not investing 
the Headmen with original executive and judicial authority was consistently
^See schedules of fixed civil establishments of this period.
2The fisher caste Headmen for instance were entitled to a share of the 
fish caught by the fishermen. Similarly the Headmen of this caste asso­
ciated in the pearl fisheries were entitled to certain perquisites.
See Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C.O. 54» 131* la certain dis­
tricts Headmen were allowed to draw from the cultivators a share of the 
produce under the name of Huwandiram. See replies of the Collectors of 
Galle, Matara and Tangalle to a query by the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission 
C.O. 416, 9* la certain Tamil districts Headmen who were charged with 
the duty of registering marriages, measuring land, and granting thombo 
exgracts, were entitled to charge a fee from the people. See answers 
of Collectors to a query of the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission. C.O. 416, 9 
Also, correspondence on the payment of the Headmen of the Maritime pro­
vinces, Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C*0. 54, 131*
3
It was for instance well known, though not officially recognized that 
the Headmen derived indirect advantages from the system of compulsory ser­
vices. See H0rton to Stanley, 22 November 1833* C.O. 54, 130.
4In the Tamil districts commissions were paid on the taxes collected dir­
ectly. A practice developed of paying small commissions for serving the 
processes of the Courts. Police Yidanas were paid a commission on the 
stolen goods that were recovered. See Correspondence on the payment of 
the Headmen of the Maritime provinces. H rton to Stanley, 9 December 
1833. C.O. 54, 131. 0
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followed. Though, as we have seen, the Headmen continued to arbitrate 
in disputes between native inhabitants, the fact that the judicial de­
cisions of the Magistrates and not those of the ^*udaliyars had a legal 
sanction, compelled the inhabitants to seek the aid of the former when­
ever they required such legal sanction.
In their position of subordination to the European officials in 
the provinces, the Hdadmen continued to play an indispensable role in 
the administration. The Mudaliyars attached to the Kachcheries acted 
as the channel of communication between the Collectors on the one hand, 
and the inferior Headmen and the people on the other. They acted as the 
medium through which the orders of the Collector were sent out, counter­
signing them in some of the districts. Replies were similarly communi­
cated to the Collector through the Mudaliyars. This did not, however, 
entirely prevent direct communications. These Mudaliyars were also in 
charge of the correspondence and the records in the native languages.
They sometimes accompanied the Collector on circuit, interpreted to him, 
and settled small disputes, reporting to the former, cases which required 
further investigation.^* The sale of revenue farms and direct collections 
wherever they were prevalent, were supervised jointly by the Collectors 
and the Mudaliyars. In general they acted as the chief advisers to the 
Collectors, whenever matters which involved local knowledge arose. The 
Mudaliyars of the Korales, and Headmen of similar rank in the Tamil pro-
■^Return of the duties performed by the several public officers under 
the colonial Government of Ceylon, C.O. 416, 8.
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vinces, supervised in their respective divisions the execution of 
the orders sent out from the Kachcheris and the Courts of Justice*
They superintended the pressing of the people for Government services, 
the collection of direct taxes and the execution of judicial processes* 
Theyvere expected to be in general charge of the cultivation of their 
respective divisions.^* The Muhandirams generally functioned as Assist­
ants to the Mudaliyars in the performance of their duties* The Headmen 
below this rank were in charge of the actual execution or orders. They 
pressed the people for services, supervised working parties, assessed 
and collected direct taxes, and compiled lists of paddy fields and esti­
mated their probable produce for the guidance of the revenue farmers and
the Government when the taxes were farmed out, and carried judicial
2
processes into execution. The Headmen of castes, wherever they continued 
to exist, carried out the Government orders pertaining to the people of 
their respective castes, especially those relating to Government services.-* 
Though a separate set of Police Vidanas were created, Headmen of all ranks 
also acted as police officers. Many of these duties involved constant 
attendance, and some of them much travelling, time and expense.
The net result of these developments was a further partial trans­
formation in the office of Headman from what it was at the advent of Brit­
ish rule. Certain feudal and traditional characteristics that had continued
^Return of the duties performed by the several public officers under 
the colonial Government of Ceylon, C.O. 416, 8*
^Ibid.
3Ibid.
9 0 *>t*
to surround these offices were much weakened though not entirely- 
overthrown. Thus the loss of accommodessans reducedthe capacity 
of the superior Headmen to support retainers on the old basis, though 
society continued to present a need for them. The loss of judicial 
power reduced the means of supporting their authority, while that 
authority continued to be indispensable to the Government. It also 
reduced their capacity to maintain the socio-economic order on which 
-their authority rested. The existence of a much larger number of Euro­
pean officials in the provinces, with executive and judicial power 
concentrated in their hands, made the Headmen more vulnerable to attacks, 
especially by an opposing faction. But the close dependence of the Euro­
peans on them, especially on tiose of superior rank, made them still much 
feared by the people. As one Magistrate observed, the people found that 
those to whom complaints had to be made were so far away from them in 
every respect while those against whom complaints were made were so near 
that if displeased they were capable of ruining them.^ The very nature of 
the duties which the Headmen continued to perform as well as the social 
and economic position which they occupied, gave them some controlling in­
fluence over the people and the Government. Some Headmen were transformed 
into salaried officials while others were not. Inadequate remuneration 
made the former partially dependent on the old social and economic system, 
while those not remunerated at all were wholly dependent on it.
1 T- FacreU ho Robt»l- ftrUHin.l*, 6' OcHoUr c-o. 55. 31
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This partial transformation may have worked towards a further 
loosening of the feudal and traditional bonds of rights and duties 
between the Headmen and the people. Already the Dutch commercial policy 
appears to have made the Headmen, through whose agency it was carried 
out, more speculative-minded and susceptible to change. Brownrigg 
noticed in3814 that the Headmen had in them a more enterprising spirit 
than was found among the common people.** These tendencies may have 
been accentuated by the new changes in the system.
European officials of the day often saw the Headman system as 
something very oppressive. Coming from a country where society was 
unlergoing rapid changes, it is likely that they misunderstood the re­
lations between the people and the Headmen. For instance, it is likely 
that they misunderstood the custom of the country, which still survived,
for the people, including the Headmen, to assist each other in the till-
2
age of the soil. It is also likely that change s in the Headman system 
as well as in the socio-economic order made the Headmen appear to be more 
oppressive in the minds of the people thus bringing about a dislike for 
what had been quite legitimate before. Thus ag?oup of fishermen no longer 
saw any reason why they should pay fees to the Headmen of their caste when
*5
the others were paid salaries by the Government. Besides these factors,
^■Brownrigg to Bathurst, 22 September, 1812. C.O* 54, 44.
2
Colebrooke Report upon the Administration. C.O. 54$ 122.
3
Petition of 58 fisher inhabitants, 27 October 1832. C.O. 54» 131#
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however, it is generally true that, deprived of their service lands 
and made more dependent on the indirect advantages of office, less 
inclined to keep their rights within the traditional limits, less 
conscious of traditional duties and less capable of executing them, 
less conscious of having responsible power, more conscious of private 
profit, and under imperfect supervision from above, the Headmen became 
even more oppressive and less useful to the community than before.
The nature of their neglect of duty and of their oppression is 
seen by examining the broad groups into which the complaints generally 
fell. Firstly, it was alleged that the Headmen neglected their tradi­
tional duties towards agriculture in such matters as the maintenance of
1
tanks, protection of crops from stray cattle etc. This neglect of 
duty had taken place foam Dutch times and is partly explained by the fact 
that the Headmen were not only less inclined, but (not having independent 
control over service labour) less capable of performing it. Secondly, 
there were complaints regarding the enforcement of the services of the 
people. The Headmen were clarged with forcing the people to work free in 
their fields, with using their cattle for the same purpose, with taking 
a part of their produce and with exempting people from services either 
out of favour or for pecuniary considerations. The frequency of such 
complaints was perhaps an indication of a further loosening of the old
^Colebrooke Report upon the Administration. C.O. 54, 122.
2
See Horton to Goderich, 20 May 1833* C.O. 54, Also, numerous petitions 
in volumes C.O. 4,6 29-51*
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society. It is likely that many of the people who complained no
longer saw sufficient reason why they should serve the Headmen gratuitously,
especially since the latter no longer paid sufficient attention to their
agricultural needs. Besides, during the %itish period the Headmen appeare
to have enjoyed a muchlarger area of discretion in enforcing Government
services. While the order requiring people to he sent for services came
from above, the details were arranged by the Headmen who had necessarily
a discretionary authority in selecting personnel. Formerly this discretion
had been limited by the land tenures, the rights and duties attached to
castes etc. which was recorded in the Thombos. When the British began
to enforce services without reference to land tenures but according to
what was vaguely termed as custom, and when the people were employed in
new services to which they had not been liable before, sometimes without
reference to caste, the area of discretion enjoyed by the Headmen was
necessarily enlarged.'*’ It is therefore likely that the Headmen gained
more opportunities of acting according to personal inclinations. Besides,
no new registers or thombos were formed by which the Headmen were to be
guided in calling out the people. In certain districts the Headmen kept
2no record of their activities at all. It is therefore likely that they 
gained better opportunities of acting according to their personal inclina­
tions. In any case the whole system of services became more oppressive 
and part of the odium fell on the Headmen by whom they were enforced.^
^Colebrooke, Report upon the compulsory services, C.O. 54, 145.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the Administration, C.O. 55, 122.
3
See Colebrooke, Report upon the Compulsory Services, C.O. 54, 45.
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Thirdly, there were complaints concerning the collection of taxes*
It was said that when taxes were collected directly through the Headmen
they frequently omitted names from the lists either through favour or
for pecuniary considerations and exacted more than was due.^ Both
offences were generally committed by the unpaid petty Headmen by whom
the details were arranged, and who were generally needy individuals under
much temptation to abuse authority* Where taxes were farmed out there
were complaints that the principal Headmen were connected with them
either directly or indirectly. Although it appears that the Government
did not encourage the Headmen to become renters there had been no ab-
2
solute prohibition till 1831* Even where rents were not taken directly 
some of the Headmen appear to have been much interested as sureties or 
as men behind the scenes. It is likely that such combinations brought 
about oppressive effects from which the people had very little hopes 
of redress* Part of the responsibility for this state of affairs re&ted 
with the Government* Perhaps because of the consciousness that the Head- 
men were paid inadequately, there was a tendency to disclaim Government 
responsibility for the possible oppression caused by the activities of
3
the Headmen in their capacity as renters. On the whole, therefore, it
^See Scott to Boyd, 5 October 1824, and 10 December 1824* C*0. 54, 88.
Also, Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C.O* 54, 131* Numerous petitions 
in C.O. 416, 29-32.
2 ^
See Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833* C.O. 54, 131*
3
Ibid. MBut surely in investing these Headmen with such arbitrary and 
oppressive power, and in sanctioning their remuneration in so objectionable 
a way,11 wrote Colebrooke, "the Government could not divest itself of re­
sponsibility for the abuses which ensued.” Colebrooke to J.C.S.Lesevre,
(cont.)
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is possible to agree with the Collector of Jaffna, P. A. Dyke, that 
there was a need for reforms which would make the offices open to 
the native community an advantage rather than a burden to them, thus 
giving the principal men of the country "the opportunity of being 
honest without a loss to themselves"
(cont*) N.D# June 1834. C.O. 54, 145.
"4>ee Horton to Stanley, 9 December 1833. C.O. 54, 131.
Chapter
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KANDYAN PROVINCES
1815 - 1833
The Kandyan kingdom, which constituted the interior parts of 
Ceylon, fell into the hands of the British in 1815. A detailed analy­
sis of the events leading to this conquest does not fall within the 
purview of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was a 
culmination to long drawn out diplomacy,^ interspersed by occasional 
warfare and expeditions on the part of the British. The occasion for 
this diplomacy and warfare was provided by the fact that the kingdom 
was going through one of the periodical struggles for power inherent 
in its economic, social and political set-up. The struggle however 
became unusual because of the presence of the British in the Maritime 
provinces, awaiting an opportunity to annex the kingdom to its domin­
ions. When therefore the chief minister of the Kingdom, Ehelapola, 
felt himself persuaded that he could rely on the help of the British 
in his struggle with the King, the fate of the kingdom was virtually 
decided. With the guidance and assistance of Ehelapola and his faction 
the British armies marched triumphantly to Kandy, proclaiming on the
way that the object ofthe war was the deliverance of the Kandyan people
2
from the tyranny of the existing ruler. The nature of ihe victory
^For some aspects of this diplomacy, see H. W. Codrington, (ed.)
Diary of Sir John D !Qyly.
^Proclamation, 11 February 1815. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. 1, p. 177.
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becomes obvious when it is known that not a single soldier was lost
in battle. In a military sense the resistance and consequently the
danger was small# The principal Chief’s of the kingdom arrived with
their retainers and submitted* The struggle was soon over when the
King, isolated and abandoned by his Chiefs, was captured and taken
prisoner* Brownriggobserved that it was an Enterprise which#• •••
could not with any common prudence have been entered upon except with
the most credible assurances of the concurring wishes of the Chiefs
and the people, nor could ever have been brought to a successful
issue without their acquiescence and aid11.^
The very nature of the conquest however imposed/obligations when
it came to the question of the formation of a new government. Some of
these obligations were embodied in the 'Convention* signed on 2 March
1815 at the Palace between the principal Chiefs and the British# It
was stated to have been signed by the principal Chiefs on helnlf of the
inhabitants, and in the presence of the subordinate Headmen and the 
2
people. After a recital of the cruelties and the oppressions of the 
Malabar ruler and his "contempt and contravention of all civil rights", 
he was declared to have forfeited all claims to the power of Kingship,
3
and to have been deposed from the' office of King. The claim of his
4
dynasty to the dominion was declared to be abolished. The King and
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 25 February 1851# C.O* 54, 55.
2
Proclamation, 2 March 1815* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of 
the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, pp. 180-181.
5Ibid.
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his relatives were proclaimed enemies of the kingdom, excluded and 
prohibited from entering it under the threat of heavy penalties,1 
Those Chiefs who had had any 'intention of mounting the throne them­
selves must have perhaps suffered their first disappointment when, 
along with the King also went the age-long institution of Kingship in
Ceylon, and when the Kandyan provinces were declared to be vested in
2
the Sovereign of the British empire.
One section of the former rulers were thus easily got rid of 
by banishing them. The more powerful section, constituting the Kandyan 
chiefs, remained to be dealt with. The obvious need for their support 
in order to hold the kingdom prompted the British to assure them, and 
the subordinate Headmen "lawfully appointed by the authority of the 
British Government", the rights privileges and powers of their respect-
3
ive offices. All classes of people were assured the safety of their
persons and property, and civil rights and immunities according to the
4laws, institutions and customs in force among them. The religion of 
the Buddha professed by the Chiefs and the inhabitants was declared
inviolable1 and its rites, ministers and places of worship were to be
5maintained and protected. The administration of civil and criminal
1
Proclamation, 2 March 1815. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government, Vol. i, pp. 180-181.
2Ibid.. p.181.
5Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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justice and police was to be exercised according to established forms, 
and by the ordinary authorities, saving to the Government **the in­
herent right to redress grievances and reform abuses in all instances
whatever, particular or general”.* The Sovereign of England was to
2
be represented by the Governor and ’Accredited Agents’* The Royal dues
and revenues were to be managed and collected according to lawful customs
3
under the direction and superintendence of the ’Accredited Agents’.
The nature of the political settlement thus embodied in the 
’Convention* accounted for the small amount of change tha^ was intro­
duced into the government of the new province, and the establishment 
of a separate government distinct from that in the Maritime provinces.
The Governor assumed full powers over it without the interposition of 
a Council. The Supreme Court was also excluded from the new province.
A representative was appointed to function as Resident, and the obvious
choice was D'Oyly, who was largely responsible for the victory, and who
4was intimately acquainted with the Chiefs. He was provided with two 
Assistants..* A few military officers were appointed to function as 
’Accredited Agents’ under the instructions of the Resident. The powers
^Proclamation, 2 March 1815* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government. Yol. I, p.181.
2Ibld..
3Ibid., p.182.
A
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815. C.O. 54, 55•
O 1 oJ. A*
and functions assigned to them were vague* In accordance with the
terms of the ‘Convention* they were no doubt expected to direct and
superintend the collection of revenue* They were also given some
powers of Magistracy* It was however statdd that these powers were
1
not to extend to the Kandyans* This inconsistent position was un­
doubtedly occasioned by the feeling that it was wwholly impracticable
to introduce English gentlemen into situations of authority in the
2
different provinces***
These arrangements led to the super-imposition of a loose form 
of European authority over a good part of the feudal organization 
that had belonged to the former monarchs. Certain offices and in­
stitutions associated with the King's Court and household disappeared 
along with Kingship* The provincial organization was maintained virtu­
ally intact* The Government took particular care to conciliate the 
Chiefs* Brownrigg invited some of them to Colombo on the occasion 
of the King's birthday, received them with all possible attention to 
their dignity and comfort, introduced them with great state and pleased 
them with presents* By such means he thought he was laying the "founda- 
tions of a friendly and confidential intercourse"• In the manner of 
former Kings both he and D'Oyly held audiences with the Chiefs to hear 
their reports regarding the administration of justice, etc., and to
"^Instructions to Accredited Agents, 30 September 1815. 0*0* 54, 61.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815. C.O* 54, 55*
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 July 1820. C.O. 54, 56.
attend to changes of appointment and grants of land* The Governor 
also attempted to keep up in his person something of the old royalty*
As in the King’s time ornamental arches were erected, and the streets 
decorated, when the Governor travelled about the country, attended by 
those who accompanied the King on similar occasions. Both Brownrigg 
and D ’Oyly considered it an object of first importance to prevail on 
the Chiefs and the Priests to bring back the relic of the Buddha, 
secreted in the time of the invasion, to its temple. Having persuaded 
them to do so with some difficulty, the ceremonies connected with it 
took plaoe with all "the state and solemnity usual on such occasions, 
and with proper marks of honour on the part of 1he British Residency and 
garrison".2
In spite of these precautions the very establishment of a foreign
authority was by itself such a change that a great deal of uncertainty,
as well as a loosening of former feudal relationships, was unavoidable.
Major Hardy and Simon Sawers, who travelled about the country shortly
after the conquest, found many villages deserted and the fields un-
3
cultivated, the people having taken refuge in the jungles. The few 
people who were seen about these places complained that they had been 
plundered by Hie soldiers of the army and its followers, who had been 
quartered in various parts of the country.^ The army was busy searching
^Minute, 25 April 1816. C.O. 54, 60.
2Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 July 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
3
Hardy to Brownrigg, 21 May 1815. C.O. 54, 56. Also, Sawers to 
Brownrigg, 5 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
^Hardy to Brownrigg, 21 May 1815. C.O* 54, 56.
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for prize property, and what was found soon presented Brownrigg with 
a problem.
It clung to the jewels and other valuables that were found 
secreted, amidst the claims by the Chiefs and Priests that part of 
it belonged to the temples. The negotiations and the bargainings that 
followed naturally disturbed the policy that was being followed by the 
Government to win over the higher classes.^* There was also a certain 
amount of uncertainty concerning the exact policy that ought to be 
followed. The presence of some persons inclined to complain against 
their Chiefs tempted some of the British officials to form an exaggerated 
notion of the oppressive rule of the Disavas and to believe that the 
British Government would be strengthened by making the change of govern­
ment appear beneficial to the people. Major Hardy, to whose views Brown­
rigg seems to have been more inclined, thought that the removal of the
former system of exacting fines and levying taxes was the thing most
2
eagerly looked for by the lower classes in the interior. As against 
this was the opinion of D ’Oyly, who thought that there was no extra- 
ordinary degree of oppression. While agreeing that the British Govern­
ment should liberate the people from their Chiefs, and that the rights 
and privileges of the latter which were incompatible with ’principles
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 July 1815# 0.0. 54, 56.
^Hardy to Brownrigg, 12 June 1815. C.O. 54» 56.
^D'Oyly to Brownrigg, 12 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
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of justice* should be done away with, he cautioned against sudden 
change. He believed that innovations must be attempted with a 
"cautious hand, and if possible accomplished with the consent of 
those who make the surrender"The conflicting desire to win over 
the people without at the same time disturbing the Chiefs, and with­
out making the former feel that the latter were not supported by the 
Government, involved it in some confusion of thought and action.
Thus the Disavas were kept back at Kandy for a while and not 
allowed to go to their stations to avoid the levying of fees, which
were legitimate dues under the former system, and which usually fol-
2
lowed new appointments. It was also felt that the burden of maintain­
ing the Disavas and their numerous followers might indispose the in-
3
habitants to the change of government. As a result of this some of
the inferior Headmen were either left with uncontrolled power, or in
4doubt as to whether their authority fell with the King. There were 
also ambitious men who had been in office, but who had now no prospect 
of securing it from the Disavas, or those who had not been in office 
before, but who were aspiring to it. Such persons pinned their hopes 
on winning the goodwill of the British. They were probably loud in 
their complaints against the Disava, and other Headmen in office, and
*4)'0yly to Brownrigg, 12 June 1815. C.O. 54» 56.
2
Brownrigg to Barthurst, 20 July 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
5Ibid.
A
Hardy to Brownrigg, 7 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
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by doing so they probably thought that they came nearer to the attain­
ment of their object.^- At certain other places the people declared 
that they knew nothing of the terms of the ’Convention’, and as to 
whether they were to continue under the orders of the Adigars and Dis­
avas
The requirements of the army, as well as a lack of understanding 
of the proper channels of procedure in the administrative system, in­
volved the Biitish in actions which disturbed the former feudal re­
lationships. Thus, to secure provisions or transport, the army offi­
cers entered into direct contracts with the inferior Headmen, or the 
people, thereby not only disturbing the authority of the superior 
Chiefs, but also affecting the system of services. By paying higher 
prices for such services or provisions a part of the people were tempted 
to accept them. Major Hardy’s mission in the interior, for instance, was
to secure bullocks to transport grain. He entered into direct contracts
« 3
with the "Moors" of Vellassa, without going through the Disava. It 
led to such incidents as the Disava ordering a group of "Moors" back
to their village, when he met them going with their cattle on government
4 5service. These "Moors", being generally the traders of the kingdom,
^Sawers to Brownrigg, 14 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
2
Sawers to Brownrigg, 5 June 1815. C.O. 54* 56.
3
Hardy to Brownrigg, 10 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
4
Sawers to Brownrigg, 9 June 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
5
See H. Marshall, Ceylon, pp. 180-181.
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had much larger ideas of independence from the Disava1s control*
They may therefore have been inclined to complain against the Disava 
in exaggerated terms* They complained of heavy levies, and punish­
ments hy fines and imprisonment.^ With the feeling for individual 
rights which flashed across the minds of Englishmen of the time,Hardy 
was tempted to speech making in which he assured the "Moors’1 "that
they were now British subjects - that no person on earth whether
- - 2British officer or soldier, Disava or Raterala should injure them**”
The presence of a person inquiring into grievances promising redress, 
and the desire to benefit by engaging in trade and other transactions 
unhampered by the restrictions of the former system, encouraged the 
Moors to overthrow the Disava’s authority. The Disava complained that
contrary to custom the ’Moors’ did not wait upon him when he visited
3
the district. He may have been perhaps annoyed when Hardy met him 
and communicated the complaints of the 'Moors’, and urged t he removal
4
of the former system of exacting fines and levying taxes. Hardy thus 
overlooked the fact that what the 'Moors* complained about were legiti­
mate dues and services which they owed to the State and to the Disava 
under the former system. While Hardy was tempted to encourage the'Moors’
^Sawers to Brownrigg, 14 June 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
^Hardy to Brownrigg, 10 June 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
^D’Oyly to Brownrigg, 9 July 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
4
Hardy to Brownrigg, 12 June 1815, C.O. 54, 56.
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D'Oyly held to the opinion that the Government could not countenance 
their actions in overthrowing the legitimate authority of the Disava.^ 
Generally speaking the attitude of the Sinhalese inhabitants of 
the several districts was a sharp contrast to that of the 'Moors' of 
Vellassa. They showed their Chiefs a degree of respect and obedience 
amounting almost to veneration, and were generally prepared to follow 
them in whichever direction they moved* This perhaps accounts for the 
fact that while certain districts, where the Chiefs appear to have been 
more satisfied with their position, remained quiet, others in which the 
Chiefs themselves were much dissatisfied, beoame discont ented and rest­
ive. Sawers noticed that the Sinhalese inhabitants of Uva and Vellassa
showed an unfriendly disposition to the British, and doubted the perman-
2
ence of the new government. Rumours of dissatisfaction and revolt by 
the Chiefs and people of these areas tempted Brownrigg to sent the First 
Assistant of the Resident to Badulla, with authority to hear complaints, 
repress abuses and restore order and confidence. ThaLt perhaps made the 
situation worse. "Interposition was regarded with great jealousy both 
by the Disavas and the inferior Headmen," wrote Brownrigg, "and the re­
venue and services therefore did not materially improve, and the in­
habitants though perfectly subdued to the new order of things did not
■^ D'Oyly to Brownrigg, 27 June 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
2
Sawers to Brownrigg, 9 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 July 185. C.O. 54, 56.
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evince attachment and confidence” The Headmen showed an unwilling­
ness to obey orders under the plea that the people had thrown off
their authority” in consequence of having been sometimes directly
2
applied to be English gentlemen”* In the case of the inferior Head­
men it was also likely that they acted either through attachment to
•  3
or fear of the superior Disava, or on his instructions. This situation
led to such incidents as the Disava ordering the people not to give 
their bullocks to a certain Vidana who was supplying the garrison with 
provisions for payment,on the ground that he was acting contrary to 
custom, followed by an order of the British official to reverse this
4
order.
Besides all these conflicts the absence of a King created a void 
which was hard to fill. The new men and their measures were poor sub­
stitutes for kings and the splendour of their courts. What Brownrigg 
wrote of D'Oyly was also true of himself.
”The Court of the late King,” he wrote, ”baihaious as 
it was, had yet a certain splendour sufficient to 
attract a great interest - and the Chiefs though slaves 
in one relation, and hourly threatened with the indis- 
criminating violence of absolute and wanton power, were 
in another view potentates themselves exercising high 
and extensive authority, and receiving without measure 
the increased flattery and abject submission from their 
inferiors. To this state it is probable that their taste 
was completely formed by habit and education, and that 
they view not without disadvantageous comparisons a re-
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 June 1816. C.O. 54,60*
2Ibid.
3
Sawers to Brownrigg, 5 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
4
Sawers to Df0yly, 50 June 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
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presentation of government where the principal officer 
is a private gentleman of very retired and unostentatious 
habits - and their own situation pretty much that of at­
tending at his audiences - their consequence most sen­
sibly fallen, and their power considerably abridged as 
well as their emoluments.”^
The strong desire for the re-establishment of Kingship was
not unconnected with the ambitions of Ehelapola, who began to assume
2
Kingly state and show pretensions to the throne. He may have been 
supported by the Buddhist priests, who are known to have thought that 
a Sinhalese King was necessary to protect their religion. This feel­
ing however was kept down by the feudal jealousies, which kept Ehela­
pola apart from some of the other principal Chiefs. The first Adigar,
who was next in importance and rank to Ehelapola, protested against
4the pretensions and interference of the latter. There is much evi­
dence of these two factions clashing with each other on various matters. 
Thus the British found much relief when it became obvious that Ehelapola 
was not supported by the inclinations and interests of the class of 
Chiefs as a body. Though the people may have desired Kingship, and 
though they respected their Chiefs to a very great extent, it did not 
go to the extent of conferring Royal Honours on a Chief unconnected
5
with a dynasty.
1Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 November 1815* C.O. 54# 61.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 Julyl815. C.O. 54, 56.
Ibid.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 26 September 1815* C.O. 54, 56.
5
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 July 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
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Brownrigg was also faced with, a conflict in his own camp over 
a legal question raised hy his somewhat insubordinate Advocate- 
Fiscal, underlying which was a consciousness of the rights of British 
subjects and a preference for British institutions. By the eighth 
and ninth sections of the Convention*, Brownrigg, while providing for 
the administration of justice to the Kandyans according to their laws 
and institutions, had laid down separate provisions for Europeans and 
non-Kandyans.^ Europeans serving in the army were made liable to mili­
tary discipline. All other non-Kandyans were to be tried for civil 
and criminal offences by the *Accredited Agent* or Agents. In cases
of murder they were to be tried by special Commissions to be issued by 
2
the Governor. The Advocate-Fiscal basing himself on some provisions 
in the Charter of Justice of 1801, argued that these sections, as well 
as those which provided for the administration of justice for the Kandyans 
according to their own laws and institutions, were illegal, and that 
every person in the newly acquired provinces, whether native or Euro­
pean, was subject to the criminal jurisdictioncf the Supreme Court, 
and entitled to the privileges of a trial by jury.^ A varying claim 
was put forward by the Chief Justice, who while accepting that the 
Supreme Court did not necessarily have a jurisdiction over Kandyans,
^See p.zio*
^Proclamation, 2 March 1815# Skeen, A Colection of Legislative Acts 
of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, p. 181.
H^. Giffard to Brownrigg, 11 March 1815. C.O. 54, 55.
argued that the Charter of Justice provided it with a jurisdiction 
over all non-Kandyans resorting to that country.^
This conflict, which reached Council level, not only made Brown­
rigg feel uneasy ahout the political settlement he had reached in the 
Kandyan country, and the administrative arrangements that followed, 
but also made him anxious to create the impression that it was only a 
temporary phase, and to display intentions of future change. Apart 
from pointing cut that the provisions for the administration of justice 
arose out of an unavoidable political settlement he adduced further 
reasons to justify himself before the Home authorities. Firstly, he 
argued, that a ”very considerable period must elapse before His Majesty1s 
new territory will safely admit the exercise of any authority, poli­
tical civil, or judicial, which does not in a direct and ostensible
2
manner emanate from the executive government11 * He thought it to be 
politically unsafe to introduce a judicial establishment, which stood 
in competition for power with the executive authority, and far exceeded
3
it in external appearance. Secondly, he pointed out that his arrange­
ments would enable the Home Government to decide upon a revenue and
4
judicial system unimpeded by anything established on local authority.
^See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 17 November 1815. C.O. 54, 57.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815* C.O. 54* 55*
3
Ibid. See p. feo,
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815* C.O* 54, 55*
Thirdly, he dwelt on the necessity to have more time to collect in­
formation. He believed that there was no particular hurry for a new 
system, and that any change should be founded on accurate facts obtained 
from a careful inquiry. Such a plan would avoid violent changes and 
facilitate cautions measures, which would "gradually and insensibly 
supercede the deeprooted prejudices of these people without their 
perceiving them to be attacked”.^  It is clear from these arguments 
that Brownrigg was playing for time to undermine the institutions he 
had guaranteed.
The first task was to collect information, a task which was im­
mediately entrusted to the officials sent to the Kandyan country, es­
pecially to D*Oyly. Brownrigg also undertook a tour of the country to 
make himself acquainted with the possibilities of reform. There were 
several lines of change which immediately occurred to him. He was soon 
convinced that the original policy of introducing as few British officials
as possible was a mistake which might be fatal to Britishjinterests and 
2
commerce. A plan was therefore drawn up to divide the Kandyan prov­
inces into five divisions, and to place a British official at the head
3
of each, with powers agreeable to the provisions of the * Convention*.
The implementation of this proposal was however postponed in deference
*Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815. C.O. 54> 55* 
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 26 July 1816. C.O. 54,60.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 July 1815. C.O. 54, 56.
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to D'Oyly’s opinion, who objected to the additional expenses involved, 
but who may have had misgivings about the policy involved in this change* 
The disagreements with D’Oyly would have perhaps prompted Brown- 
rigg to make changes in the establishment of the Residency. He was 
certainly impatient with D f0yly!s fondness for a minute study of Kand­
yan institutions, to the neglect of what he thought was practical busi­
ness.^ Brownrigg may have also had misgivings about vesting in one 
individual so much of power and authority. In any case he considered
the duties devolving on the Residency too much to be handled by one in- 
2
dividual. He therefore decided to divide the functions of the Resi­
dency between three Civil Servants. One was to be immediately in charge 
of the collection of the revenue, the Government lands, cattle and other 
property, and the exaction of services. The second official was to be 
immediately in charge of the judicial work. Ho attempt was yet made 
to contravene the provisions of the Convention*. The main function 
of the Judicial Commissioner was to be present at the trial of capital 
cases and to witness any other inquiry of importance. The Commissioner 
was however informed that the eighth clause of the ’Convention*, which 
gave the British a right to reform abuses in the judicial system, ad­
mitted of a great latitude of supervision and review. He was also told
■^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 June 1816. C.O. 54, 60. 
^Minute, of Brownrigg, N.D. 1816, C.O. 54, 60. 
3Ibid.
that by a rule laid down by the Governor at an Audience with the 
Chiefs to the effect that it was "the custom and duty of a British 
Government to return a distinct answer to every application for 
justice, a ground is laid down for considering every complaint what­
ever in the light of an appeal".'*" D’Oyly who was to be thus relieved 
from details was to represent the Government on all necessary occasions, 
and to have a general superintending control over the whole government. 
It is significant to note that the Assistants were not debarred from 
communicating direct with the Government at Colombo, the Governor also
reserving a right to send orders direct to them. D ’Oyly was however to
2
have a right to see such correspondence.
Further changes were made a little later when the three Civil 
Servants were constituted into a Board of Commissioners. This Board 
was to be presided over by the Resident. Correspondence addressed to 
the three officials was to be regarded as addressed to the Board, and 
was to be discussed at its meetings and minuted. Similarly all acts 
and proceedings of the three Civil Servants, and correspondence origin­
ating with them, were to be noted in the minutes of the Board. The Board 
was to deal with matters concerning the general administration of the 
Kandyan provinces on the motion of one of its members. No measures 
were, however, to take effect without the assent of the Resident or in
^J. Sutherland to Gay^O September 1816. C.O. 416, 19.
Stinute of Brownrigg, N.D. 1816. C.O. 54, 60.
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his absence the senior Commissioner. D'Oyly was also given the power to
reserve to himself matters of a secret and political nature, reporting
them to the Government.^" The Board thus constituted was immediately
entrusted with the task of collecting information on the various aspects
relating to Kandyan administration, and to suggest remedies that would
2
be expedient for correcting defects. Soon after, Brownrigg reported
that the Board was functioning with "unanimity and great activity"; that
the Chiefs have been brought into constant and active co-operation, and
that there was now "the impression of a regular ostensible and energetic 
3
Government", He believed that it would pave the way for a permanent 
4constitution. Meanwhile it appears from correspondence that changes 
in the Headman system, the system of compulsory services, and in the ad-
5
ministration of justice were under contemplation.
It was not surprising that this sort of development should have 
ended in a rebellion, which was however not supported by a section of 
the Chiefs, and the people under their control. Brownrigg was not en­
tirely unprepared for it as is seen from the measures taken to keep up 
the military strength. He was aware that it was very sanguine to expect 
that the Chiefs would be|fondly attached to the new order of thir^.^
It is not the intention here to examine the events connected with the
^Commission constituting the Board, 30 September 1816. Also, Minute, 
Brownrigg, 21 October 1816. C.O. 54, 61.
2Tbid.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 November 1816. C.O. 54, 61.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 29 May 1817. C.O. 54, 65*
5See Brownrigg to D f0yly, 21 February 1816. C.O. 54,60. Also, Brownrigg 
to Bathurst, 5 June 181b. C.O* 54,60.
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 November 1816. C.O. 54, 61.
rebellion which occurred towards the end of 1817 and continued 
throughout a good part of 1818. It is sufficient to note that a 
number of Chiefs were directly or indirectly involved, while others 
were undecided and still others were positively loyal to the Govern­
ment. The appearance of a pretender to the throne, claiming descent 
from the former Royal dynasty, shows that the aims and interests of 
the rebels were identified with a restoration of Kingship and an 
independent State. The magnitude of the rebellion, its protracted 
nature, and the difficulties of suppressing it, were probably not 
accurately anticipated. Strong military measures, combined with dis­
unity among the rebel Chiefs, as well as the aloofness of others, finally 
put an end to it.
The rebellion though attended with much difficulty also provided 
Brownrigg with a much desired opportunity. As he himself observed, 
its successful suppressinn helped to establish British dominion in the 
Kandyan provinces on a more permanent basis.^ Even before the re­
bellion was suppressed Brownrigg had decided to make use of the oppor- 
tunity to introduce far-reaching changes in the Government. He neg­
lected rebel overtures to surrender on condition of being restored to 
favour in order to be more free to frame a constitution, which would
3
secure sovereign authority to the British. The fact that certain Chiefs 
^"Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 October 18181. C.O. 54, 71.
X
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 November 1817* C.O. 54, 66.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 9 October 1818 . C.O. 54, 71.
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had participated in the rebellion gave him the argument that, since 
they had broken their part of the Convention1, it was no longer 
completely binding*^ The new military strength naturally gave him 
the courage to undertake reforms which required a great deal of im­
position. He was impressed with the necessity to act without loss 
of time.^
A measure adopted even before the rebellion was completely over 
indicated the direction in which reforms were coming. Making use of 
the opportunity provided by the implication of the Disavas of Sabara- 
gamuwa, and the Seven Morales in the rebellion, Brownrigg appointed 
two British officials to function as Agents of Government in these 
areas, with powers of control over the Chiefs, and of punishing them 
and the people for disobedience of orders. The new Chiefs that were 
appointed to these provinces were required to agree to act under the 
orders of the Agents of Government. Appointments of the inferior Head­
men were to emanate from the Agent and not as before from the Disava.
In Sabaragamuwa the additional step was taken of carving three divisions 
out of the area formerly held by the Disava, and appointing three Chiefs 
to function under the Agent. The Agent, acting with the Disava, was given 
the power to try civil cases subject to appeal in cases over 100 rix-
Hlinute, of Brownrigg, N.D. 1818. C.O. 54, 13*
2ibia.
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 12 April 1818. C.O. 54, 70.
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dollars or reference in case of disagreement between the Disava 
and the Agent, to the Resident* Brownrigg also declared his intention 
of vesting the Agent sitting with the Disava with an extensive criminal 
jurisdiction.^-
The successful suppression of the rebellion provided the oppor­
tunity to consider a more comprehensive plan of reform. Several con­
nected aims and objects naturally entered into the minds of the British, 
when they considered changes in the Kandyan administrative machinery. 
Firstly, there was a desire to introduce more British Agents, to fortify 
their hands by increased judicial and executive powers, and to place them
in a position of superiority over the Chiefs both in appearance and in 
2
reality. Secondly, there was the connected aim of reducing "the 
Aristocracy obstructive of the operation of Government, and oppressive 
of the populace”, to the rank and office of stipendiary organs for car­
rying out the regulations and orders of the supreme executive authority.^ 
Thirdly, it was thought desirable to give independent ideas to the mass 
of the population, ween them away from their dependence on their Chiefs, 
and to establish a nearer connection between them and the Government*^
1
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 12 April 1818... C.O. 54, 70.
^Minute, of Brownrigg, N.D. 1818. Also Brownrigg to Bathurst,
8 January 1819# C.O, 54, 75*
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 19 February 18181. C.O. 54, 71. Brownrigg to 
Board of Commissioners, 25 September 1818. C.O. 54, 75.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 19 February 1818. C.O. 54, 70. Also,
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 January 18181, C.O. 54, 75.
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Lastly, there was a desire to do away with or transform institutions 
to suit the ideas and interests of the new Government*
All.: the ahove aims and objects were visible in the Proclamation 
of 21 November 1818, which announced the new system of government*1 
Unlike the earlier ’Convention’ it was an instrument issued on the sole 
authority of the British* It began by a reference to the rebellion 
that had occurred. It put the blame for it on the Chiefs who, it was 
stated, had been "restored to honours and security by the sole inter­
vention of the British power", and who had been "seeking for an oppor­
tunity to subvert the Government for no purpose but to assume to them­
selves absolute power over the lives and properties of the general mass 
2
of subjects". After referring to the evil consequences which had re­
sulted from "the blind obedience which the people have thought due to 
their Chiefs instead of to the Sovereign of the country...” the Proclam­
ation asserted a necessity for Government to perform fby its inherent 
right’ such functions as would not make the people lose sight of the
3
’Royal Government* or feel wholly dependent on the power of their Chiefs* 
The Proclamation then went on to determine the future form of Government 
in the Kandyan provinces.
The Kandyan provinces were to continue to be administered as a
Proclamation, 21 November 1818* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
acts of the Ceylon Govemment^pp* 223-229•
2Ibid.
3
Ibid.. Vol. I, p. 224.
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separate government distinct from that in the Maritime provinces*
It was declared that the "Sovereign Majesty of the King of Great 
Britain and Ireland, exercised by His representative the Governor 
of Ceylon and His Agents in the Kandyan provinces, is the source 
alone from which all power emanates, and to which obedience is due.**.” 
As it was considered desirable to continue the Kandyan concept 
that the supreme authority should not be excluded from the power of 
granting redress under any circumstances, the Governor assumed some 
of the powers which had been exercised by the former King. In the ad­
ministration of justice, he was to be the fined court of appeal in 
cases where the object in dispute was either land, or personal pro­
perty exceeding 150 rix-dollars in value, if the appeal was lodged 
within ten days of a decision. In addition, he was:, to have the power
to order an appeal either to the Judicial Commissioner’s court or to
2
himself, within one year of a decision. Again, no punishments exceed­
ing 100 lashes, imprisonment with or without chains or labour exceed­
ing four months, or fine exceeding 50 rix-dollars, could be carried out
3
without the confirmation cf the Governor. Appointments to the rank 
of superior Chief were to take place by written instruments signed by 
him. He also retained part of the former monarchical paraphernalia.
'‘Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, p. 224.
2Ibid.. p. 227.
5Ibid.
Thus the palanquin bearers, talpat bearers, and torch bearers, who
had been attached to the former King were to continue and serve the
Governor in their respective capacitiesWhen the Governor travelled
about the country he was to be attended by all persons in office in
the provinces, in the manner in which they had attended the former 
2Kings of Kandy. Certain forms of obeisance which were considered
inconsistent with a liberal administration* were however abolished.
Thus all prostrations from or to, any person including the Governor,
were positively abolished. The requirement that Chiefs coming into the
presence of the Sovereign authority should remain on their knees was 
3
also abrogated.
Apart from the exercise of these functions the general executive 
and Judicial authority in the Kandyan provinces was declared to be de­
legated to the Board of Commissioners, and under their superintendence
4
to the resident Agents of Government in the provinces. Subject to the 
control of the Governor the power to take all important executive and 
Judicial decisions was vested in the Board. It was given the power to 
issue orders to Chiefs and Headmen of all ranks, punish them by sus­
pension, dismissal, fine or imprisonment, subject to the ratification by
^"Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p. 226.
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the Governor in the case of Chiefs appointed under his warrant. It 
was to have the power to decide upon the number of attendants and 
services to which the Chiefs were entitled, command the services of 
the people, vary it according to need, order appeals from the Agents’ 
courts to the Judicial Commissioner’s court within one year of a de­
cision, and report dpon the cases submitted to the Governor for a final 
decision.^
The division of the Board of Commissioners into three main de­
partments, which we have noticed before, was continued. The Resident, 
who had the immediate charge of political affairs, was given a sort 
of supremacy over the others. In addition to the presidency of the 
Board of Commissioners, he was to have the power to preside over the 
court of the Judicial Commissioner whenever he considered it necessary,
and also to hold a court of his own, with two Kandyan Chiefs as Assessors,
2
and with the same jurisdiction assigned to the Judicial Commissioner.
He was also to be the final authority in all the appointments of Head- 
men not reserved for the Governor.
The Judicial Commissioner sitting alone was given the power to 
hear and determine civil cases where the object in dispute was not land, 
end which did not exceed 100 rix-dollars in value. He could also try
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. 1, p. 227.
2Ibid.
3rbid., p. 224.
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alone criminal cases of an inferior description, with the power of
punishment not exceeding a fine of 25 rix-dollars, corporal punishment
not exceeding 3 0  lashes, and imprisonment with or without labour not
exceeding two months.^* The Judicial Commissioner, with two or more
Kandyan Chiefs as Assessors, was to have the power to hear all other
cases, civil and criminal, excepting treason, murder, or homicide, with
power in criminal matters to award any punishment short of death or
2
mutilation, subject to the ultimate ratification of the Governor* If 
the opinion of a majority of the Assessors was different from that of 
the Judicial Commissioner the case was to be transferred to the board, 
and by them reported to the Governor for his final decision* In cases 
of treason, murder, or homicide, the trial was to be before the Court 
of the Resident or the Judicial Commissioner, with Kandyan Assessors, 
the Court merely reporting to the Governor, through the Board, for a 
verdict and sentence. All criminal and civil cases in which a superior 
Chief was defendant were to be instituted and heardbefore the Resident
4
or the Judicial Commissioner. The Judicial Commissioner’s Court was 
also made an appeal court for civil cases coming from the Agent’s Court, 
if the appeal was made within ten days, and if the object in dispute was 
either land, or personal property exceeding 150 rix-dollars in value. In
■^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. i, p. 227*
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid<
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addition where the opinion of a majority of Assessors in the Agent's 
court differed from that of the Agent, the proceedings of the court 
were to be transferred to that of the Judicial Commissioner. The 
latter could decide on it either on those proceedings, or after re­
hearing the case himself, or after ordering the Agnnt totake further 
evidence.1 Thus it is seen that the Board collectively, and the members 
separately, were given executive and judicial powers which had formerly 
been enjoyed by the principal Chiefs, the latter being now relegated 
to the positiorjof Assessors.
One principal means to establish a closer connection between the 
people and the Government, and to reduce the power and influence of the 
Chiefs, was to multiply the number of British Agents in the provinces, 
and to arm them with extensive executive and judicial powers. The Pro­
clamation vested in the Governor the power to place Agents of Government 
in such places as he considered fit and to vary their powers by instruct­
ions. An immediate arrangement that was made was to place a number of 
districts near the capital under the control of the Board of Commission­
ers, with two Agents of Government to be stationed in the Pour Korales 
and Matale to hear minor cases. Agents were also to be placed at Uva,
Seven Korales, Sabaragamuwa, and the Three Korales. The district of
2Tamankaduwa was to be brought under the Collector of Trincomalee*
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. i, p. 227.
2Ibid.. p. 228.
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Following the Kandyan practice both executive and judicial 
authority was to he combined in the hands of the Agent* In the exe­
cutive sphere the Proclamation conferred on them the powers, which 
had formerly been enjoyed by the Disavas, of giving orders for the 
collection of revenue : and the performance of public services, under 
the directions of the Board of Commissioners* Chiefs and Headmen of 
all ranks by whom these orders would be carried into effect were placed 
under the control of the Agent* They were empowered to punish them for 
disobeying orders etc*, subject to the ratification of the Resident 
and the Board of Commissioners*^
In the judicial branch the Agents were given the power to deter­
mine alone civil cases, where the object in dispute was not land, and 
which did not exceed 50 rix-dollars in value, and criminal cases of an 
inferior description such as common assaults, petty thefts, breaches 
of the peace, with power of awarding punishment not exceeding a fine of
25 rix-dollars, corporal punishment not exceeding 30 lashes, and im-
2
prisonment, with or without labour, not exceeding two months* In addi­
tion the Governor could empower any of the Agents to hold a court with 
two Assessors (either Disavas, Mohottalas, or Koralas) to try all other 
civil and criminal cases, excepting treason murder or homicide, and to 
assess any punishment short of death and mutilation of limb, subject to
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. I, p. 228.
plbid., 
pp. 226-227.
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the limitations noticed before
Attempts were made to secure to the British authority thus 
established on a new basis its due respect, and to obtain for the 
British officials the necessary social position, which Kandyan society 
was slow to recognize. It was laid down that on entering the Hall of 
Audience every person should make obeisance to the portrait of the King. 
All Chiefs and other persons coming before, meeting, or passing any 
Biitish officer of rank, civil or military, were required to give up 
the middle of the road, and if sitting rise up and make suitable obei­
sance. In a court of justice similar obeisance was to be made to the
2
presiding authority. When members of the Council, or the Commissioners,
or the Officer Commanding the Troops, travelled on duty they were to be
- 3attended in the same manner as the Disavas. The resident Agents and 
the officers commanding troops in the provinces were to be similarly
4
attended and to receive similar honours. Only the Chiefs who had war­
rants of appointment signed by the Governor, or those who had obtained a 
special license for the purpose were to be entitled to sii^n the Hall 
of Audience or in the presence of the Agents of Government. Of these 
only the two Adigars, or those having a letter of license, were to be 
permitted to sit in chairs. The rest were to sit on benches covered with 
mats, of various heights, according to their rank. In the courts of
Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. i, pp. 226-227.
2Ibid.. p. 224.
5Ibid.
4Ibid.
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the Agents of Government Assessors of the rank of Mohottalas or Koralas 
were to sit on mats laid on the ground.^
It is clear that all the above reforms involved a corresponding 
reduction of the powers and positions of the Chiefs. They were, as we 
have seen, subordinated to the British officials introduced into the 
administration. More control over their actions was aimed at in the 
stipulation that no person would be considered entitled to execute the 
office (either of the higher or the lower class) of Headman, unless ap­
pointed by a written instrument. No person who was not thus appointed
2
was to be entitled to obedience and respect. The Chiefs thus not only 
became more dependent on the Government’s goodwill, but also lost the 
power, which they had formerly enjoyed, of appointing inferior Headmen.
It was only in the villages allotted for the personal services of the
- 3Disavas that they retained the power of making such appointments. The
old practice of paying fees at the time of appointment was abolished,
4
the Government also relinquishing its right to receive them. The only 
exception to this was to be in the temple villages, where appointments 
were to be made by the Resident on the recommendation of the Diyavadana 
Nilame or the Basnayaka Nilame, the latter officials receiving the usual
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. 1, p. 225.
2rbi&. p. 224.
?Ibld.
^Ibid.. p. 225.
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fees.1 It was specifically laid down that the Adigars, Disavas,
and all other Chiefs, and inferior Headmen, were to perform duties to
the Government under the orders of the Board of Commissioners and the
2
Agents, and not otherwise*
The Chiefs lost much of their former Judicial powers* As we 
have seen, their main Judicial function became that of sitting as Assess­
ors in the courts of British officials. At the time the reforms were 
under discussion a fear was raised by the Board of Commissioners that 
a total removal of the Judicial powers of the Chiefs would leave them 
without the means of supporting their authority* The Commissioners also 
pointed out that a single Agent could not be expected to hear all the 
small cases which occur within an extensive territory. They therefore 
held that the Disavas, Mohottalas, and Koralas should be invested with 
limited powers of criminal Jurisdiction and punishment in such cases*
The Board also suggested that the Adigars should be vested with fairly
3
extensive civil and criminal Jurisdiction. Brownrigg considered the 
proposals objectionable on the ground that it would lead to the per-
4
petuation of the old system. But perhaps to satisfy the Board of Com­
missioners on this point, and in consideration of the loyalty of the
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government* Vol. 1, p. 225*
2Ibid.. p. 224.
3
Proceedings of the Board of Commissioners, 26 October 1818,.
C.O. 54, 73.
4
Brownrigg to Board of Commissioners, 26 October 1818. C.O. 54, 73.
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the first Adigar, the Proclamation of 1818 laid down that the first
and second Adigars might execute civil jurisdiction over all Katupulle
2
people and their property, and also over such other persons and pro­
perty as the Governor might by special warrant assign to them, subject 
to an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner* They were also to have the 
power to punish disobedience of their orders and petty offences by in­
flicting corporal punishment not exceeding 50 strokes with the open hand,
or 25 strokes with a rattan on the back, or by awarding imprisonment for
4
a term not exceeding 14 days. The Judicial Commissioner and the Agents
were also empowered to refer cases to Adigars, Disavas and Mohottalas
5 -for hearing, who were then to report to the courts. Disavas or Chiefs 
holding the Governor's commission were given tie power to punish offences 
by corporal punishment not exceeding 25 strokes with the open hand, and 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 days. The principal Mohotta­
las, liyanaralas and Koralas in office were given the power to inflict 
corporal punishment not exceeding 10 strokes with the open hand for of­
fences by persons over whom they might have exercised such jurisdiction
1
Brownrigg to Board of Commissioners, 26 October 1818. C.O. 54, 73*
2
Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government, Vol. i, pp. 227, 228.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
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under the former Government. They could also imprison for a term 
not exceeding 3 days.^ " Comparable changes were made in the tradi­
tional honours to which the Chiefs were entitled from their people.
They were to receive all their former honours only in so far as they 
were consistent with the abolition of the 1 degrading* forms noticed 
before. Besides, the Government assumed a control over the retainers 
and the attendants attached to the Adigars, Disavas and other Chiefs.
They were to be entitled to such attendance only in such numbers as 
would be decided by the Governor on the report of the Board of Commission 
ers. When such attendants did not belong to the villages allotted to 
the Chiefs, the application for attendance was to be made to the Eesi-
3
dent or the Agents of Government. Native inhabitants coming into 
the presence, meeting, or passing Disavas and other Chiefs were to make
4
a proper inclination of their body in acknowledgment of their rank.
The first and the second Adigars were to be the only Chiefs who were 
to be entitled to honours from British officials. They were to be re­
ceived by carriedarms by sentries whom they passed during the day, and 
by all soldiers off duty or by other Europeans by touching their caps
5
or taking off their hats. Native inhabitants, whether Kandyans or not1,'
^"Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, pp. 227, 228.
2Ibid.. p. 225.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.. p. 224.
5Ibid.
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were to rise from theirseats, leave the middle of the road, and how 
to the Adigars as they passed*^
As in the King’s time land provided a convenient weapon to con­
trol, divide, and humble a proud aristocracy. Lands of those in re­
volt or disobedience were to be confiscated. If their lands were re­
stored they would have to pay an increased tax of one fifth of the 
produce. The lands of certain Chiefs who were named as having been
loyal to the Government were to be exempted from duty during their lives
2
and that of their heirs.
Many of the reforms enumerated above involved also a loss of emolu­
ments and advantages to the Chiefs. As we have seen the principal Chiefs 
lost the right of levying fees when conferring appointments. The judi­
cial reforms led to the abolition of the fees received by the Chiefs on 
hearing cases. The provincial barriers were broken down thereby occasion­
ing the loss of tolls levied at them. The loss of their power to summon 
people for services also deprived them of many advantages. The Govern­
ment was conscious of a need to compensate them for such losses. It also 
seemed politic to transform the aristocracy into a paid agency employed 
to carry out the orders of the Government. A decision was therefore
made to pay the Adigars, Disavas, and other superior Chiefs, fixed monthly 
3
salaries. The inferior Chiefs and Headmen were to receive one twentieth
^"Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Cevlon Government. Vol. I, p. 224*
2Ibid.. pp. 225-226.
5Ibid., p. 226.
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part of the revenue collected by them from the people divided into 
portions by the Board of Commissioners.^" In addition lands belonging 
to Chiefs, both superior and inferior, were to be exempted from duty 
during the time they were in office. Though the Chiefs were perhaps 
adequately compensated by these provisions, the losses they had sus­
tained were not merely pecuniary. By the loss of the right to levy 
judicial fees and to impose fines the Chiefs lost some of the principal 
means which they had of keeping the lower classes under control.
The above reforms were accompanied by changes which overturned, 
though not totally, the economic and social order by which the Kandyan 
administrative machinery had been knit together. All contributions and 
gratuitous services were declared to be abolished, subject to ecertain 
reservations and exceptions, and a tax of one tenth of the produce on 
paddy land was imposed. The exceptions were to be in the villages al­
lotted to the Chiefs, temples, and certain duties which were specified. 
Service on the roads was declared to be a general gratuitous service 
falling on all the people. The Government also reserved the right to 
call for services according to custom, family, and tenure of land, in 
return for payment, and to substitute services which were now useless 
by those more beneficial.-^
^Proclamation, 21 November 1818. Skeen, A Collection of Legislative 
Acts of the Ceylon Government. Vol. I, p. 226.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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The system of Government thus established remained basically 
unchanged up to 1833* It represented, as we have seen, a mixture 
of the old and the new. In practice the new machinery became more 
and more important as the old faded and went through a process of 
transformation. By the end of this period the old and the new re­
sembled their counterparts in the Maritime provinces, both in form 
and their relations with one another.
At the beginning there was even less differentiation between 
legislative and executive action in the Kandyan provinces than was 
found in the Maritime provinces. Laws were promulgated by proclamations, 
minutes, or even by simple orders issued on the sole authority of the 
Governor.^ The practice however grew up of extending to the new pro­
vinces, after a consultation with the Board of Commissioners, regula­
tions that were passed by the Governor in Council to the Maritime pro­
vinces. On such occasions a declaratory proclamation was issued noti­
fying such extension. With the arrival of Wilmot Horton, with a new Royal
Commission and instructions, the Cnuncil assumed the position of a legis-
2
lative body for the whole of Ceylon.
The Board of Commissioners at Kandy continued its existence up to 
the end of this period. The Officer commanding the troops was appointed 
to the Board in 1819, and when the office of Resident was suppressed in 
1824, he began to function as its president. The Board acted collectively
1
Evidence of John Downing, the Judicial Commissioner, 1829# C.O. 416,19* 
^Horton to Goderich, 26 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
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in the more important judicial and revenue matters that arose in the 
provinces. Because of the programme of road building that was being 
carried out, the most important executive business that came before 
the Board concerned the exaction of services. Claims for exemption 
from services, and disputed points regarding them, were frequently 
discussed. Occasionally the Kandyan Chiefs were summoned to attend 
when it became desirable to obtain their opinion on points of dispute 
or doubt. Amidst the general tendency that was prevalent in the Colony 
to concentrate authority^ the hand of the Governor, the Board failed 
to develop into an organ exercising any great degree of independent 
authority. Its main function continued to be one of acting in an ad­
visory capacity to the Governor.'*'
The detailed day to day judicial and revenue work was carried 
only the Revenue and Judicial Commissioners in their respective de­
partments. The main duty of the Revenue Commissioner was to give dir­
ection to the district officers on matters connected with the collection
2
of the grain tax and the exaction of services. The details were ar­
ranged in correspondence with the Agents, the Chiefs and the Headmen.
The Judicial Commissioners1 court contained a mixture of the
old and the new. It assumed the form of an English court house that
3
was by now existent in the Maritime provinces. The presence of the
^The above conclusions are drawn from an analysis of the proceedings 
of the Board of Commissioners for the year 1829* See C.O. 416,21.
2
See Evidence of Downing, 15 September 1829* C.O. 416,20.
3
See Evidence of Downing, N.D. 1829. C.O. 416, 19.
?A%
Kandyan Chiefs as Assessors may however have created the impression, 
in the popular mind, of the continuity of the former Mahanaduva, 
or Great Court. The Assessors were also however beginning to resemble 
a jury with the difference tTcA they were being called upon to give 
their opinion, both on the facts of a case and the Kandyan law applic­
able to it. It became the usual practice for the Judicial Commissioner 
to sum up the evidence at the end of a trial, and to call upon the 
Assessors to pronounce a verdict on the accused.^
Important cases, civil and criminal, came up for trial before 
this court. Among them were the treason trials that occurred from time
to time, where sometimes as many as fifteen Kandyan Chiefs functioned 
2as Assessors. The Judicial Commissioner’s court was also given a
superintending power over the Agent’s court, and it was required to
bring to the notice of the Governor, through the Board of Commissioners,
any illegal or irregular exercise of authority. For this purpose the
Agents were required to forward periodically to the Commissioner their
3
civil and criminal diaries.
The powers and functions of the Commissioners, exercised both 
collectively and separately, removed much of the usefulness of the 
Adigars and other Chiefs of the King’s Government, who were at the seat
^-Observations of P.Anstruther, see Horton to Goderich 14 December,1831.CO. 53-»I12. 
See Barnes to Bathurst, 18 March 1821, for the proceedings of a trial 
£n the Judicial Commissioner’s Court. C.O. 54, 74.
4 .
2
Campbell to Bathurst, 16 August 1823. C.O. 54> 84.
3
Evidence of Downing. N.D.1829. C.O. 416,19.
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of power. They were however maintained and supported with fixed 
salaries in order to keep the class of Chiefs satisfied, and their 
main duty "became -one of functinning as advisers, and occasionally 
as Assessors in the court of the Judicial Commissioner. Both on 
account of their traditional positions and their new functions the 
Chiefs continued to wield a considerable amount of influence, both 
with the new rulers and the people, though this was unaccompanied 
with a sufficient sense of responsibility.
The number of British Agents was progressively increased till 
by the end of this period there were eight Agents stationed at Sahara- 
gamuva, Uva and Bintenna, Seven Korales, Three Korales, Pour Korales, 
Hatale, Harispattu and Tumpane, Lower Uva and Vellassa. In order 
to enforce services, the powers of an Agency were occasionally con­
ferred on military officers superintending the construction of roads, 
in places remote from the established Agencies. The Agencies at Sabara- 
gamuva and Seven Korales were considered superior by virtue of the fact 
that they were held by Civil Servants. As we shall see later, it was 
found impossible to expand the Civil Service in a manner which would 
enable the Government to appoint Civil Servants to the other Agencies. 
The expedient was therefore adopted of investing the military com­
mandments of the divisions with the civil powers of an Agent.
Combining executive, judicial, and often military power, the 
Agents assumed a prominent position in the districts. Generally speak­
ing they displaced the Disavas from their former position of eminence. 
Their main duties in the executive sphere concerned the revenue. The
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Agents were often the medium through which the orders of the Revenue 
Commissioner were communicated to the Headmen* though direct communi­
cations with the latter were also not infrequent. Generally the duty 
of the Agent* was the supervision of the Headmen who collected the re­
venue and enforced the services, rather than a detailed management of 
them by h i m s e l f T h e  Agent also acted as the chief police officer 
of his division.
The judicial functions of the Agent assumed more importance in 
practice. Almost all the Agents, except those temporarily created,
seem to have had the judicial powers which were enumerated in the Pro-
2
clamation of 1818, Their civil jurisdiction was extended to cover
cases where the sum in dispute did not exceed 100 rix-dollars in value.
This civil jurisdiction included revenue cases, which were instituted
by the direction of the Revenue Commissioner, or by the Headmen in
4charge of the collection, or by the Agent himself. There appears to 
have been no regular laws or instructions on the question whether lands 
could be sold for arrears of taxes* Some of the Agents considered them­
selves empowered or justified in the eyes of the Government in doing
so, while others held that they were not authorized. All were however
5agreed that such cases were not frequent,
^See Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829, Answers to
questions 2, C*0, 416,19,
2
Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829, Answers to question 5,
C.O. 416,19,
3Ibid.
4
Evidence of Agents of Government, 1829, Answers to question 71, C.0*416,19,
5
Ibid, Answers to questions 72, 74 and 75,
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The Agent’s court also displayed a mixture of the old and the 
new* In one view it resembled the English court house that had arisen 
in the Maritime provinces* Uniform hut simple procedures, based on 
the practices of an English court, were laid down* The proceedings 
of the court were generally conducted in the same manner as in the 
Magistrate’s court of the Maritime provinces* It resembled the latter 
in another respect* A knowledge of Sinhalese not being insisted upon 
from the Agent^ they were provided with interpreters, who were gener­
ally drawn from the Maritime provinces, with or without the rank of 
Mudaliyar or Muhandiram.'*’ The Agent had necessarily to depend much 
on them and, as in the Maritime provinces, they acquired a great deal 
of influencejover the revenue and judicial work of the Agent* From 1825 
Proctors, who were to be selected for their knowledge of the languages 
and respectability of character, were allowed in the Agent’s court. 
However, they made their appearance only in a few of the courts. Very 
often litigants pleaded their own case, sometimes assisted by friends,^ 
In spite of some degree of uniformity and regularity of form thus 
established, a great deal of loose procedure continued to prevail. It 
was perhaps partly on account of the fact that feudal concepts of just­
ice died but slowly in the popular mind. The experience of James Camp­
bell, one of the above Agents, was perhaps not singular. He found both
^"Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829* Answers to questions 2,
22 and 25. C.O. 416,19.
2
Ibid, Answers to question 7. C.O* 416,19,
parties to a dispute disposed to bring before him the customary pre­
sents, which used to be given to the former Chiefs, and they appeared 
dissatisfied if they were met with a refusal.1 It is also possible 
that the military men were even less suited temperamentally than the 
Civil Servants to bring about the atmosphere of a regular court house.
In practice the Agent*s court was also inadequately supervised by the 
Judicial Commissioner. Above all, as in the Maritime provinces, the 
collection of a land tax from numerous small landholders, in an at­
mosphere of mistrust, carried the Government towards authoritarianism.
Thus from 1820 to 1829 the Agents were empowered to imprison revenue
2
defaulters till the payment of the tax. There is no evidence that this 
power was frequently used, and whenever it was resorted to a few days 
imprisonment seems to have had the effect of satisfying government 
claims.^ Similarly the enforcement of compulsory services led to sum­
mary punishments by flogging.^ The diaries of the Agents did not gener­
ally indicate the extent to which this mode of punishment was resorted
5
to, as such offenders were not subjected to a judicial trial. Frequent
1 J. .... i bell, ^ , i iv o : j__1 Field._3 torts
Ceyl o .. X  )  v ri •  1_L? p
^Circular, 21 March 1820. See Return of the number of persons im­
prisoned under the above circular. C.O. 416,21.
3Ibid.
^Evidence of Doming, 1829. Answer to question 48, C.O. 416,19.
5
The Agent Matale for instance pointed out that in the diary of his pre­
decessor for 1828 the number punished by flogging was stated to be five,
while to his knowledge it was about ten times that number. No records 
were available at all of the punishments inflicted by Headmen. Forbes to 
Colebrooke, 22 September 1829. C.O. 416,19.
9 r. 1
^  O .1
enforcement became perhaps all the more necessary because of the 
changes that had taken place in the system of services# The road 
building programme involved much more heavy services than had been 
performed under the King’s Government# Complaints were heard that 
services were being exacted without much regard to the former rights 
and duties by which they had been regulated. As the Government Agent 
of Matale observed the alternatives before the Government were becom­
ing clearer. It had either to use stronger means of coercion to en­
force them, or to emancipate the people.^
The Disavas and the subordinate Headmen generally fell into a 
position similar to that of the Mudaliyars and the subordinate Head­
men of the Maritime provinces. They ceased to exercise any independent 
authority, but nevertheless continued to be indispensable not only 
to maintain social stability, but to execute the day to day activities 
of the Government. Headmen of all ranks acted as police officers and 
their traditional position of authority worked considerably towards the 
maintenance of law and order. In the case of the occurrence of a crime
the necessary preliminffy actions, such as those of arrest, were taken
2
by the Headmen, with or without the warrant of an Agent. In revenue 
administration some of them played a more vital part than in the Mari­
time provinces because of the existence of a system of direct collections. 
Headmen known as the Webadde Lekams, some of whom were drawn from ths
^Evidence of the Agent of Government Matale, 1829. Answer to question 
5 5 * C.O. 416, 19. Marshall, Ceylon. pp. 216-217. J. Forbes, Eleven 
Years in Ceylon, p.57.
2
Evidence of the Agents of Government, Answers to questions 91• 
C.O. 416,19.
low country, were employed in assessing the crops, collecting the
tax in grain, and disposing of it by sale or otherwise according to
instructions received from the Government.'*' The Registers were also
kept by them. It was perhaps this dependence on the Headmen which
tempted the Government to try out a commutation system in the Kandyan
provinces, although the Maritime provinces were in many ways suitable
2
for such a step.
Though the Proclamation of 1818 displayed an intention of con­
ferring some independent judicial powers to the superior Chiefs, in 
practice they seem not to have exercised any such independent authority. 
There is some evidence that occasionally they inflicted corporal punish­
ments, either to enforce their authority, or to enforce services. But 
the fact that people could now carry complaints against them to the 
British Agent, which in turn would lead to an inquiry disliked by them, 
may have perhaps tempted the superior Chiefs, in particular, to adopt 
the line of least difficulty, by referring a case to the Agent. More 
frequent use seems to have been made of the authority which was given
^See Returncf the duties performed by the public officers of Ceylon, 
C.O. 416,
^From 1829 a system was adopted in some of the districts closer to the 
capital where a settlement was reached with the proprietors of land 
to pay a fixed amount in cash or kind for a given number of years, 
whether the lands were cultivated or not, instead of the previous mode 
of paying a share of each crop. One principal advantage cited in 
favour of the new system was that it was less dependent on inferior1 
collectors. See George Turnour, the Revenue Commissioner, to Barnes,
3 October 1831* C.O. 54, 113. Barnes to Goderich, 11 October 1831* 
C.O. 54, 113.
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to the British judicial officers to direct Headmen to conduct in­
quiries of a judicial nature. Commissions were issued to the minor 
Headmen to inquire into small disputes, mainly concerning the bound­
aries of land. In such instances the Headmen assembled the inhabitants 
of the village, heard their opinions, and settled the boundaries to 
the satisfaction of the parties. In the case of the failure of such 
a settlement the matter was brought to the Agent*s Court.^ The Gansabha 
or Village Council also continued its existence. The inhabitants some­
times referred their small disputes to the Gansabha, convened by the 
mutual consent and the request of the parties. It was generally ad­
mitted by the British officials to be a beneficial system of adjudica-? 
tion, and it derived some government support from the fact that the
Judicial Commissioner, as well as the Agents, referred cases for arbi-
- 2tration by the Gansabha at the request of the parties. But the fail­
ure of the Government to confer, by its authority, the necessary powers, 
and thus give it a recognised legal existence, especially in view of 
the existence of the Agent’s Court, where there was more finality of
decision, brought about a tendency for people to resort more and more 
3
to the latter. Besides functioning in the above manner, the Headmen
“^Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829. Answers to question 89. 
C.O. 416,19.
2
Ibid., Answers to questions 85 and 89. C.O. 416, 19.
3
Ibid. Also Evidence of Downing, 1829. Answers to question 85.
C.O. 416, 19.
played a role in the new judicial institutions. They carried the
processes of the new courts into execution,^ and the Chiefs and
Headmen of superior rank functioned in them as assessors. In the
absence of written codes of Kandyan law in these courts, for purposes
of reference, the assessors had probably a greatcfeal of influence over
the decisions which touched on the laws and customs of the country.
However, as the Judicial Commissioner observed, some of these customs
were so certain, immutable and acknowledged that they could not be
2
perverted to suit the interests of the assessors. The Agent was not
bound to abide by the decisions of the Assessors and in case of a
difference of opinion, or a doubt which his own experience might sug­
gest, he could obtain the advics of the Judicial Commissioner, who was 
in a position to consult more authoritative Kandyan Chiefs.
The new positions held by the Chiefs and Headmen fell far short 
of the situations which they had occupied before* The new administrat­
ive machinery undoubtedly set in a tendency to overthrow the old 
social order. The Chiefs found it increasingly difficult to maintain 
their aristocratic appurtenances. They, and the inferior Headmen below
them, lost a part of their former authority over the people. The en­
forcement of unpopular services, without much regard to the customary
^Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829. Answers to question 90. 
C.O. 416, 19. Evidence of Downing, 1829. Answer to question 90.
C.O. 416, 19.
2
Evidence of H. Wright, 1829* Answer to question 121. C.O. 416,19.
3
Evidence of the Agents of Government, 1829. Answers to questions 4, 5 
and 14. C.O. 416,19.
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rights and duties, worked towards making the people and the Headmen 
fall moreapart. The system of divided allegiance gave the people 
more enlarged ideas of independence* The Kandyan chiefs in particular 
had much to regret* ”A1 though in other instances His Majesty Sri 
Vickrama was tyrannous and unjust, and invited the Chiefs to abandon 
him,” wrote a group of superior Chiefs when they heard of a decision 
in 1835 to cut down their retainers, ’’jet His Majesty did not deprive 
the Chiefs of any part of the honours and emoluments appropriate to 
their respective stations by ancient usages but he rather augmented 
them, and although the revolution in this country originated with 
the Chiefs, and not with the people, yet the petitioners render thanks 
to Government for having accorded relief to the people in the manner 
above alluded to..."'*' (by releasing some of the people from service to 
their Chiefs). The position occupied by the Civil Servants, and the 
military officers vested with civil power, under the new administrative 
arrangements, made them both by intention and otherwise agents of 
change. The winds of change began to blow across the Kandyan kingdom.
^Petitioncf the Kandyan Chiefs, N,D. 1833. C.O. 54, 128
Chapter IV
CONDITIONS OP SERVICE - I
The Civil Service of Ceylon originated with the establishment 
of Crown Colony rule in 1801* Though it is reasonable to expect that 
officials would have been sent from England to govern the new Colony 
it does not fully account for the establishment of the Civil Service 
on the lines on which it was organized* Certain circumstances in Ceylon, 
the experience of administration in India, and the desire for patronage 
felt at the Colonial Office, were the principal factors behind the for­
mation of the Service*
Prior to 1801, when Ceylon was administered by the East India 
Company, the principal officials required for its administration were 
drawn from among the Civil Servants of Kadras* This led to difficulties 
from about the year 1798, when North arrived as Governor with a dual 
responsibility to the Crown and the East India Company* Ee brought with 
him certain officials from England, some with specific appointments, 
and others without them* The Royal Instructions issued to him also re­
ferred to Crown appointments and defined the Governors powers whenever 
situations to which the Crown would appoint officers fell vacant* These
Hugh Cleghorn arrived with an appointment as Chief Secretary to Govern­
ment* Several others came with the permission of the Secretary of State, 
but without definite appointments* See Court of Directors to North, 25 
May 1798* G* C* Mendis (ed*), The Colebrooke-Cameron papers. Vol* II, 
pp* 89-90*
p
‘■Royal Instructions to North, 26 March 1798* Ibid*« p*76*
instructions did not also specifically require North to obtain his 
officials from Madras*
The Court of Direotors, perhaps viewing this as a threat to 
its patronage, issued instructions to North requiring him not to employ 
persons authorized to be taken out from England in situations other 
than those specifically mentioned, or as vacancies occurred in the Chief 
Secretary’s Office* The rest were to be selected from the Madras Civil­
ians on the spot, or those that would be sent out by the Company from 
time to time* All officers were however to be subject to the orders and 
directions of the Governor** The position thus created was no doubt a 
difficult one to execute, and partly accounts for the subsequent clashes 
that occurred*
Not surprisingly, North seems to have laboured under & disappoint­
ment over the absence of a greater latitude in the choice of his officials, 
and more particularly over the inability to promote as freely as he wished 
the Interests of those whom he had brought with him* The Madras Civili­
ans also seem to have considered North as an outsider, and disliked some 
of the administrative measures initiated by him* The conduct of the Mad­
ras Civilians, who seem to have shown a greater loyalty to the Madras Gov­
ernment, and the independent spirit which the Governor was able to show 
on account of the fact that he derived his Commission from the Crown, soon
Court of Directors to North, 25 May 1798. Mendis (ed*), Colebrooke- 
Cameron papers. Yol* II, pp. 89-90.
TIorth to Mornington, 5 June 1798, 3 October 1800, Vellesley KS 13866, 13867.
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brought about acute factionalism in Ceylon* North wrote of an ”in­
famous faction of Madras Civilians", led by Collector John MacDovall, 
who was described as the "primum mobile of the Civil or rather the 
civilian war***"'*' North also shoved a disposition to act against
certain Madras Civil Servants even before any charges against them
2
were framed and proved* His despatches to the Governor-General in
India, to the Court of Directors, and to the Secretary of State, were
full of complaints against^hem, in vhich he made various charges of
insubordination, dishonesty and factionalism* In the despatches to
the Court of Directors his language vas a little restrained, but in
those sent to the Governor-General he gave a full expression to his
3
feelings about them*
"hjorth to Mornington, 27 July 1799, 21 August 1799* Wellesley MS 13866.
2
See footnote belov*
3
Regarding the dismissal of a Collector named Garrov, North vrote to the 
Court of Directors that "the execution of what I esteemed my duty was 
extremely painful to me*.*" North to Court of Directors, 5 October 1799*
C*0* 34, 1* But in the letter to Mornington Garrow is described as 'a 
little pert black monkey*• "If I find," he had written, "the smallest 
impropriety provable, or indeed not disprovable, I shall undoubtedly send 
him off to the Coast*" North to Mornington, 27 July 1799* Wellesley MS 
13866* Again regarding Collector MacDowall he vrote to the Court of Dir­
ectors that his dismissal was "a subject of still greater surprise and 
affliction to me"* North to Court of Directors, 5 October 1799* C.O* 54, 1* 
To Mornington he had written that "whatever may be proved Collector Mac­
Dowall must be dismissed! • •" North to Mornington, 1 August 1799« Wellesley 
MS 13866*
A principal outcome of this conflict, about which we are con­
cerned, was that North made out a case against the employment of Mad­
ras Civilians in Ceylon* Firstly, he argued that since Ceylon had been 
long used to a Government entirely different from that which had for 
ages been established on the Coast, the official education at Hadras 
would not fit a man for a situation in Ceylon*^ Secondly, he argued 
that Ceylon would not hold out the same advantages to the Indian Civil 
Servants as service in India* The higher situations would be too few 
to attract men of experience, while to bring young men would be to re­
move them from the normal line of patronage and to sacrifice their in-
2terests and prospects in life* The only way of attracting good men,
he thought, was to pay them higher salaries than in India, a solution
3
which the revenues of Ceylon wou Id not permit*
By using such arguments North was not trying to safeguard the 
interests of the Hadras Civilians, but to establish that their connect­
ions with the establishments in India was detrimental to the interests 
of Ceylon, and that in practice Ceylon would be a refuge for officials 
unwanted at Madras* He wrote of the * danger of surrounding the Govern­
ment with principal officers entirely new to the island, and who have
no tie to him either of gratitude or expectation, whose conduct he cannot
^North to Court of Directors, 30 January 1800* C*0. 54, 2*
^orth to Court of Directors, 5 March 1799* C.O* 54* 1*
3
^North to Court of Directors, 30 January 1800. C*0* 54, 2.
easily correct, but whose confederacy he might probably purchase"
In effect he was making out a case for a separate Government and for
a separate Civil Service for Ceylon.
North's arguments had an important bearing not only on the
creation of a separate Civil Service, but also on the establishment
of Crown Colnny rule* They seem to have created an idea that it wss
desirable to have a set of officials, who would devote their entire
career to service in Ceylon* Dundas used North's arguments against
the employment of Madras Civilians aS an additional justification for
the establishment of Royal Government in Ceylon* Following North, he
argued that the moderate scale of establishments in Ceylon would not
holdout to the servants of the Company the same prospects that they
were led to expect in India*
"It is obvious therefore," he told the Court of Directors,
"that only those o^Lnferior capacity and inferior talents 
would be found disposed to remain in Ceylon, and I need not 
stop to prove to you that this is not exactly the descript­
ion of servants, which, with a view to the real interests of 
Ceylon, I should wish to see established in the island**2
The breakaway from India did not necessarily lead to the establish­
ment of a separate Civil Service* There was yet another possibility of
Ceylon forming a part of the Colonial Service under the control of the
3
Commissioners of the Treasury* This also may have been prevented by
1 ,
North to 6Mrt of Directors, 30 January 1800, C*0* 54, 2. Also, North
to Court of Directors, 5 October 1799* C*0* 54, 1*
^Dundas to Court of Directors, 30 December 1800* C*0# 55, 61*
^See Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61*
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the impression, which seems to have been created by North, that 
there existed peculiar conditions, which called for a separate set 
of officials. Though neither North nor Dundas examined what these 
conditions were, the idea of a separate Civil Service derived support 
from the experience in India, This experience convinced Dundas of 
the "necessity and advantage of adopting a line of policy far the 
Civil Service of Ceylon, similar in all its leading principles to that 
which prevails in the Civil Service of the Company on the continent 
of India”, ^ If Indian experience suggested the idea, the social and 
political conditions prevalent in England at the time reinforced it.
At a time when patronage was considered a necessary attribute of social 
and political power, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a desire on 
the part of the Secretary of State to create a sphere of influence played 
a part in the proposal for the establishment of a separate Civil Service 
for Ceylon*
The establishment of this Service was conveyed by the despatch
2
from Dundas to North dated 13 March 1801, This despatch laid down the 
principles on which the Service was to be organized. These principles 
were, except on matters of recruitment, enunciated not as specific in­
structions, but as the general ideas by which North was to be guided in 
the organization of the Service, The freedom which thus appears to have 
been granted to the Governor was soon either withdrawn or circumscribed,
^See Dundas to North, 13 March 1801, C,0, 55> 61,
and the Service that was finally established was very largely the 
creature of the Colonial Office* Both in laying down principles, 
and later in working out the details, Dundas, and his successor 
Hobart, were influenced by experience in India. The Ceylon Civil Ser­
vice, though smaller in numbers, was closely modelled on that of India.
Of the principles behind the Covenanted Service of the East
India Company Dundas was most convinced of the system of patronage,
which he thought had been very successful with regard to the former.^
As such, following the rule in the Indian Civil Service, recruitment
was to take place by nomination in England, but unlike the Company's
practice, the patronage being in the hands of the Secretary of State.
It was proposed to send out every year a certain number of 'gentlemen'
answering to the description of Writers in the Indian Service. As an
exceptional measure, Dundas proposed to send out a few persons, of
more mature age and greater experience, to hold the chief offices of
trust and importance. All future vacancies in the higher ranks,however,
including the office of Chief Secretary, which was to be the highest,
2were to be filled by promoting those in the junior ranks.
Dundas did not lay down minimum qualifications, or age limits, or 
any other rules, to be followed in the exercise of these powers of nomin­
ation. Indeed to have done so would have been to impose serious limita­
tions to the exercise of patronage. In the absence of fixed rules it
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
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would be too much to expect that & uniform practice was followed by
the different Secretaries of State. But the appointments made by
them reveal certain factors which were generally operative in the
exercise of the powers of nomination.
As regards age, the practice initiated by Dundas, and followed
by the others, was to send young men. The Writers nominated by him
were between sixteen and twenty years of age.* This was perhaps done
in the belief, which was shared by the East India Company, that young
recruits would be able more easily to adapt themselves to the conditions
of service in the East. North too shared this belief, for he reported
that after a few years experience they were more capable of conducting
the business of the Government than any persons of mature years less
2acquainted with the country.
Certain circumstances, however, of which we shall say more later,
which compelled the Governors to appoint the newly arrived recruits to
responsible situations, made them unhappy about the age of recruitment.
North, for instance, was unhappy over the fact that he had to confide
3
to young men offices too important for their age. Maitland experienced 
much difficulty on this account. "Those who have recently come out, 
and who naturally will be sent without great attention been paid to 
this point,n he wrote, "are generally boys totally uninformed. As a
*Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.0# 55, 61.
^North to Hobart, 24 September 1804* C.O. 54, 14.
3
North to Hobart, 24 September 1804* C.O. 54, 14.
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808* C.O. 54 , 28.
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remedy lie suggested that an invariable rule should be laid down at 
the Colonial Office that no person was eligible to the Civil Service 
under a certain period of life,1 While out of officehe expressed 
the opinion that between 22 and 26 years was the most suitable age 
of recruitment. But the silence of the Colonial Office concerning 
this proposal suggests that considerations of patronage predominated 
on questions of this nature, The 'boys' of the Service remained a matter 
of comment and complaint throughout the period of our study.
The recruits of the period do not appear to have possessed any 
common educational qualifications. Indeed, the age at which recruitment 
took place precluded the possibility cf their possessing advanced edu­
cational attainments. One would occasionally find a University graduate 
among them. But a large proportion appear to have been those just com­
ing out of schools, Educational qualifications, whatever their nature, 
perhaps only provided an added qualification for selection and could 
not be effective by themselves. They seldom entered into the correspond­
ence which preceded an appointment.
The factors which were frequently mentioned were family positions 
and connections. This brings us to the most important consideration pre­
sent in these appointments, A person could be nominated as a Writer only 
if he could secure the patronage of the Secretary of State, either dir­
ectly, or through an intermediary, who was able to exert sufficient in­
fluence with the former. Writers nominated to the Service would there­
fore either by -those directly under the patronage of the Secretary of
1 . ... .  ,  ,f_  , _  _  , r l  . "
i ii-vl - Lf 0 ,/ w^._ ^3.01*0 Jil J 1 /  , i.11. j'Llo't I COB • ./ • \J • j d o  •
_ai iluaJ to i'oe 1,17 Jet>03r , j, 54,41.
State on political or personal grounds, or those under the patronage 
of other men of influenc^n the social, administrative, or political 
fields. The number of places that were available imposed limits to 
patronage. Consequently, those selected would perhaps have been the 
closest to the Secretary of State, This was especially so in the later 
days of the Service, when the practice grew up of nominating Writers 
only when an occasional vacancy occurred. Besides, the benefits of the 
Ceylon Civil Service made appointments to it so very desirable that 
the Colonial Office was faced with numerous requests. Vacancies however 
were few and far between, partly because of the smallness of the Ser- 
vice, and partly on account of the fact that those who were eligible 
for retirement were continuing in it. Consequently, the candidates who 
were supported by the most influential patrons, some of whom were closely 
connected with the Colonial Office, were usually selected. The rest were 
usually informed that the claims upon the patronage of the Secretary of 
St^te were so numerous, and the occurrence of a vacancy so rare, that 
no expectation of an appointment could be held out. They enjoyed the 
privilege of having their names entered on a list which was maintained 
at the Colonial Office. Thus the Ceylon Civil Service formed an import­
ant part of the system of patronage in England, and was therefore sub­
ject to the increasing criticism that was being levelled against the 
latter from about the second decade of the 19th century.
The chief result of this system of recruitment was that the Ceylon 
Civil Service was usually drawn from men with influence end connections*
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They also appear to have been generally drawn from the higher rungs
of society* These factors had an important bearing not only on the
development of the Civil Service, but also on the evolution of the
administrative structure* North anticipated one tendency which it
brought about, when he heard that Dundas was busily engaged in filling
up the vacant offices in his gift*
"All that I have heard of most of the individuals,” he 
wrote, "is that they are in too high a situation at home 
to come out merely for change of air, and I scarcely 
think that they would like to go through the drudgery 
which is cheerfully submitted to at present by the prin­
cipal officers tinder me* The consequence will be an im­
moderate increase of the civil establishment, and a gentle­
men like style of proceeding in all the departments, which 
this island cannot support* Clerk upon Clerk, and Secret­
ary under Secretary, will be multiplied upon us without any 
consideration and the dignity of every situation will be ^ 
considered in the salary much more than the trouble of it*n
As we shall see later, this factor also had an important bearing on
certain practices which developed in the Service on such matters as 
promotions and disciplinary control* They may have also increased the 
exclusiveness which was displayed by the Civil Servants*
Closely connected with recruitment was the question of numbers 
in the Service* Indeed to prevent the establishment of an outgrown Ser­
vice, it was necessary that administrative arrangements should precede 
the appointment of Civil Servants* Dundas recognized that it was not 
possible to assess accurately in England the number of Civil Servants
TIorth to Mornington, 7 July 1801. Wellesley M5 13867.
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that would be required in Ceylon,1 They would depend on the arrange­
ments for the administration of the island, which would be made loc­
ally, He however mentioned the opinion that in the first instance six 
or eight experienced men to fill the higher and intermediate situations,
and eight or ten young men to fill the junior situations, would be suf- 
2ficient* This number was to be increased by appointing Writers ac­
cording to a statement of requirements to be sent by the Governor or 
as vacancies occurred. But the pressure of patronage, felt both at 
the Colonial Office, and by the Governor, resulted in a situation where 
the problem became not one of finding officers to fill vacancies, but 
rather one of finding suitable places for those appointed to the Ser­
vice, as well as to those in the Colony expecting State employment.
At the beginning too many Writers were sent out without a refer­
ence to actual needs. Dundas himself appointed thirteen Writers, though 
he considered eight or ten sufficient. Hobart, who followed him, nomin­
ated seventeen Writers, thereby breaking the rule that they would be 
sent out according to the Governor's requirements. These appointments 
in fact led Worth to request the Home authorities not to send any more 
Writers "as from the limited extent and scanty resources of the island 
some years must elapse before those aieady upon the establishment can
4
be provided for". Once they had been appointed Worth was fearful of
dundas to Worth, 15 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
2Ibid.
3Ibid,
4See Arbuthnot to J. Sullivan, 12 September 1802. C.O. 54, 7.
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being accused of retarding their progress*
North also could not avoid the temptation, even the necessity, 
to exercise a measure of local patronage* Before the decision to 
make Ceylon a Crown Colony was known, he lad, contrary to the instruct­
ions of the Court of Directors, ventured to recruit a number of Euro­
peans locally, and under his new plans for the collection of the re­
venue,^* he had made them function as Agents of Revenue and Commerce*
He was therefore reluctant to participate in a "sweeping act of spoilsa-
tion and disgrace" as the reward for what he considered as meritorious 
2service* He was also no doubt convinced that given the power he could 
recruit a number of servants locally, and much more economically.
The existence of the Dutch community was also a local circumstance 
of importance* At first the refusal of the Dutch to take the oath of 
allegiance, and the natural suspicions that came in the wake of con­
quest, precluded the possibility of their large scale employment, es­
pecially in positions of trust and importance* But these difficulties 
were fast disappearing, and prior to the establishment of the Civil Ser­
vice many of them were actively employed as Presidents or members of 
the Landraad and Civil Courts* The establishment of the Civil Service, 
and the judicial reforms which North carried out, displaced many of
le
See p^ Mb
^North to Hobart, 24 November 1802* C.O. 54,7*
■at
See p* \S
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the Dutchmen from their former positions, and brought about a clamour
for employment elsewhere or for pensions.* At first North took the
2step of paying pensions equal to half their former pay. This was 
however not sanctioned by the Colonial Office. Thereafter though 
North advised the Dutch to "turn their minds to some other method of
acquiring a subsistence", he was also conscious of the need to provide
3 -
them with employment. It was possible to absorb some of them as Clerks 
in the new departments presided over by the Civil Servants. The Colonial 
Office could not have any objection to such an arrangement. This was 
however not sufficient to provide for the former Dutch Civil Servants 
of rank, who had already functinned as Judges under the British, and 
who stayed behind and transferred their allegiance when it became known 
that Ceylon would not be restored to the Dutch East India Company.
Under all the above circumstances, a clash between Colonial Office 
and local patronage was unavoidable. The occasion for it was provided 
when North requested that some of his nominees should be appointed to 
the Civil Service. The Colonial Office, perhaps viewing this question 
as one affecting its patronage, was naturally not in a mood to relax 
its powers. It was also perhaps considered desirable to check any ideas 
which the Governor might have, that he too had the power of recruiiiig 
persons to the Civil Service. The Colonial Office also may have been
*See C.O. 54, 37 for instances of such applications.
2
Circular, 8 September 1802. C.O. 55, 37.
3
Order, 27 September 1802* C.O. 55, 37*
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conscious of the necessity of advancing the interests of those al­
ready sent out or to be sent out as Writers* When therefore the ap­
pointments made by North were known in England he was accused of an 
improper attention to the rights reserved to the Government at honie*^
In the ensuing struggle the principle of recruitment at home
became more rigidly fixed* At first North's request to appoint some
2
of his nominees was met with a refusal* Subsequently, the explanations 
given by him to the effect that the appointments originated not because 
of adesire on his part to exercise private patronage, but on account of 
the requirements of the Government Service felt long before the establish­
ment of the new system was known, was accepted, and some of the nominees
3
were absorbed into the Service* It was however followed by a warning 
that these were the last instances in which a deviation from the rule
4
of originating all appointments at home could be expected*
One result of this conflict was that it led to a definition of 
Civil Service posts* The Colonial Office, taking into consideration North's 
administrative arrangements, which were themselves partly motivated by 
a desire to provide for those sent out as Writers, went on in 1303 to 
draw up a list of offices which ought to be held by the Civil Servants*
Its chief feature was the provision of a Civil Service Assistant for al-
^Hobart to North, 1 May 1802* C*0* 55, 61*
^Hobart to Horth, 1 May 1802. C.O. 55, 61.
North to Hobart, 24 November 1802* C*0. 54* 7*
4Hobart to North, 7 May 1803* C*0. 55» 62*
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most every office.* The aim of this plan was largely to provide for 
the junior Civil Servants who kept on arriving in the Colony.
As is seen from Appendix A this list allocated to the Civil Ser­
vice the chief executive offices, both at the centre and at the provinces. 
It also finally decided a matter on which there had been some uncertainty. 
This was the question as to whether Civil Servants should be called upon 
to perform judicial functions. North was convinced of a desirability
of employing as judges men trained in the legal profession,whatever the
2judicial arrangements were finally going to be. Lord Hobart on the 
other hand was convinced of the feasibility of employing Civil Servants 
for judicial work. This conviction arose partly out of a belief in 
the success of similar arrangements in India. But it may have also co­
incided with a desire to provide an additional field of employment for 
Colonial Office nominees. Thus, Hobart laid down that whatever the form 
of judicial institutions, the Judges, the Fiscals and Registrars of
A
Courts should be taken from the Civil Service.
The cadre thus established for the Service appears to have been 
decided upon without much regard to the nature and extent of the revenue 
on which it would depend. This aspect of the matter in fact hardly derived
*Hobart to North, 7 May 1803* C.O. 55, 62. See Appendix 
^orth to Hobart, 16 March 1802. C.O. 54, &♦
3Hobart to North, 1 Mey 1802. C.O. 55, 61.
^Hobart to North, 7 May 1803. C.O. 55, 62.
the attention that it deserved. It was perhaps huilt on a pious hope 
that the revenue was or would become sufficient to defray the expen­
diture.
These factors led to a development of considerable future im­
portance. Perhaps because of a much greater awareness of the extent 
of the resources of the island, and also of the need to give employment 
for the local Europeans, North established certain offices, which were 
not considered as exclusively appropriated to the Civil Service. One 
such office was that of Custom Master. As the most junior Civil Servant 
could not be employed without a minimum salary of £300 per annum, it 
was not possible to employ them at all the ports at which the presence 
of such an official was considered necessary. It would not be justified 
by the total amount of the custom collections at these places. The most 
economical solution was to vest the duties in the hands of the Collector 
or an Assistant Collector. North was however interested in keeping them 
as separate offices. Apart from any desire he may have had to exercise 
a measure of local patronage, the office of Cus tom Master provided him 
with a situation in which the Dutchmen could be employed with benefit, 
economy and security. Thus whiie the custom offices at Colombo, Galle, 
and Jaffna, which were more important on account of the volume of trade 
passing through them, came to be recognized as Civil Service posts, the 
customs offices located at the smaller ports were placed in the hands 
of Custom Masters selected from among the Dutch community, on lower 
emoluments.* The same tendencies were noticeable in the creation of the
See schedules of the annual fixed establishments for this period
office of Register of lands* Though it was certainly passible to
create a land registration section under the provincial Collector,
North seems to have been anxious to have a separate office, perhaps
to provide for the Dutchmen displaced by his judicial reforms* This
was perhaps why he requested the Colonial Office not to regard these
posts as exclusively appropriated to the Civil Service* Most of the
persons appointed by him to be Registers of Land were in fact Dutchmen*
They were paid nominal salaries, and some none at all, and were therefore
expected to remunerate themselves out of the fees collected from the 
2
people* Similarly, not withstanding the instructions of the Secretary 
of State to select Judges, Fiscals and Registrars of Courts, from among 
the Civil Servants, North allotted only the post of Provincial Judg$ 
exclusively to the Civil Service* The high salaries which had to be paid 
to Civil Servants if they were employed in the lower judicial situations, 
the presence of the Dutch community who were displaced fromlheir former 
judicial positions, the willingness of the Dutch to serve on lower emolu­
ments, the desire to create a sphere of local patronage, seem to have
all combined to make North recruit many of the Sitting Magistrates and
3
Registrars or Secretaries of Courts from among the Dutch community*
It should also be noted that the offices of Master Attendant and of Civil 
Engineer and Surveyor General were kept out of the Civil Service as they
*North to Hobart, 25 September 1804* C*0* 54, 14*
^See p* 1*13.
3
See schedules of the annual fixed civil establishments for this period 
of study*
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were regarded as specialized posts, which could not fit into the 
general system. ^
The result of these developments was the creation of a 'species* 
of establishment distinguishable both from "the Civil and the Clerical 
services* It consisted mostly of local recruits performing civil 
functions, as important as those performed by the junior Civil Ser­
vants, but drawing lower emoluments and not considered as belonging 
to the Civil Service or as entitled to any of its privileges*
The final outcome of the administrative arrangements made by 
North was the creation of establishments in Ceylon out of proportion 
to its revenue* in expensive Civil Service at the top was followed by 
the second species of establishment already noticed. The Clerical Ser­
vice that was formedcalso tended to be unusually large, on account of 
the necessity to give employment to the Dutch, the tendencies set in 
by the arrival of Civil Servants of a particular type, and the freedom 
which was given to them during the early years to determine the require­
ments of their respective offices, and even to select the personnel sub-
2ject to the approval of the Governor* It should also be noted that
North undertook certain reforms in the Headman system which involved
3
additional expenses.
^See Hobart to North, 8 February 1803* C*0. 55> 61. The office of Surveyor 
was at first held by a Civil Servant. It was later combined with that 
of Civil Engineer and kept out of the Civil Service. See p*
2nFor instances see C.O. 55» 37*
3See p. n*.
It was therefor© not surprising that the establishments of
Ceylon presented the Government with a problem of reform so soon
after their formation* At first the tendency among the reformers
was to overlook the circumstances in which North was placed, and to
attribute the enlargement of the establishments purely to a desire
on his part for patronage* The instructions issued to Maitland, and
the despatches received by North himself, display such an attitude at
the Colonial Office*^ On account of a tendency to be over-critical
of North's administration, Maitland accused him of creating places
2for unworthy favourites* As regards the Civil Service he believed
that the number was much greater than could be employed either with
3benefit to the Civil Servants, or to the public service* Administrative 
reforms which involved the appointment of Revenue Commissioner in place 
of the Board of Revenue, the removal of the second Judge from tto Pro­
vincial Courts, the provision of Civil Service Assistants only to a 
few of the offices, the appointment of Collectors to function as Fis­
cals of Court, and the abolition of the separate existence of the Office 
of Accountant-General, enabled Maitland to reduce a few offices* He also 
checked the expansion of the Service* The only Civil Service post created
^See Hobart to North, 1 May 1802* C*0« 55, 61* Camden to Maitland,
21 February 1805. C.O. 55, 62*
^Maitland to Edward Cooke, 19 October 1805. 0*0. 54, 18*
^Maitland to Windham, 1 June 1806* 0*0* 54, 22*
n i-'-j r»
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during his time was that of Comptroller-General of Customs*!
At first, Maitland was even less sympathetic to the second
'species' of establishment that grew up during the period of North*
Administrative reforms such as the abolition of the land registration
department led to the discontinuance of some of the local employees
2
belonging to this establishment* In general he regarded them as hav-
3
ing "no claim upon the liberality of the Government"* Soon after how­
ever, Maitland turned the existence of the second species of establish­
ment into a virtue* "There are situations here," he wrote, "and these 
of a very great importance, which you can hardly get any regular Civil
Servant to fill, and which when he does fill you would hardly get any
4
service out of him*" He therefore recommended that this species of
5establishment should not be extinguished. The inability to expand 
the Civil Service without bringing about a large increase of expenditure, 
which the island could not afford, and the necessity to leave a field 
of employment for the Butch community, both combined to make Maitland 
continue with the Sitting Magistrates, Custom Masters (later Assistant 
Custom Masters) and the Registrars and Secretaries of couite which North
1
See p. uz.
2
See p* 11.5,
3
Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 94, 18*
4
faitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808* C*0* 94, 28*
5lbid.
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created. In fact the number of Dutch Sitting Magistrates was in­
creased. ^
During the second and third decades of the 19th century the 
need for reforms directed towards the reduction of establishments 
began to be more acutely felt in the Colony. Ceylon in fact shared 
in the general movement towards economy generated by the financial 
difficulties and social discontent visible in the politics of England 
towards the end of the Napoleonic wars and during the post-war years, 
and by the emphasis placed on it by radical opinion. Radical opinion 
stimulated a greater interest in the administration of the Colonies.
Acting under the influence of these forces, the Treasury and in turn 
the Colonial Office, faced a need to effect economy in colonial admini­
stration.
"The means of this country,” wrote Bathurst, * can now no 
longer be applicable to the relief of her several Colonies, 
and it is therefore absolutely necessary that the colonial 
civil and military establishments in all quarters of the 
world should undergo such a revision as may bring their 
expenditure within their respective means, or that the Col­
onies should be left to contend alone against the encumbrance 
which the excess of tiieir expenditure must occasion. "2
Following this policy the Colonial Office sent despatches year
after year urging economy in expenditure. The great objects placed
before the Ceylon Government, were, firstly, the equalisation of revenue
and expenditure, and secondly, the financial relief of the 'mother country'
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28. 
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 7 August 1816. C.O. 55 > 63*
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by taking over the military expenditure incurred for the maintenance
of the European regiments in Ceylon*^ With those objects in view
the Governors were repeatedly called upon to review the revenue and
expenditure of the Colony* Because of the end of the war in Europe,
the Colonial Office, quite understandably, placed greater emphasis on
the reduction of military expenditure* In 1815 after a review of the
finances of Ceylon, it held that military expenditure was susceptible
of great and immediate reductions, but was not prepared to recommend
2any material reductions in civil expenditure* It continued to stress 
the reduction of military expenditure throughout this period and ordered
specific measures such as the reduction of colonial allowances, and the
3
reduction and disbandment of regiments*
This exclusion of civil expenditure was abandoned in 1816, when 
the Governor was asked to make a minute inquiry into all public expenses, 
both civil and military, and to submit a full report detailing the nec­
essity of maintaining the salaries, fees and perquisites which then be­
longed to each office, and to recommend savings, **consistently with what 
may be due to individuals and becoming the character of the British Gov- 
ernment".4
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 29 March 1816. C.O. 55» 63. Bathurst to Edward
Paget, 21 August 1821* 0*0* 55» 66*
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 10 May 1815* C*0* 55» 65*
3Several despatches of this period too numerous to be referred to here 
displayed this emphasis on the reduction of military expenditure.
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 29 March 1816* C*0. 55* 65*
Though a need for reductions was thus recognized the Colonial
Office was tom between two worlds when it came to the adoption of
practical measures, especially those affecting the Civil Service*
On the one hand it had to recognize *the world of patronage, still lin­
gering on amidst much criticism, while on the other hand it had to move 
with the utilitarian and liberal emphasis on economy and efficiency, 
that was sweeping across England* Caught between such opposing forces, 
the Colonial Office found itself increasingly called upon to impose 
limits to the exercise of its patronage, without however totally aban­
doning the advantages that it gave*
The Governor was also caught between similar forces* Much more 
than the Colonial Office he saw the need for a reduction of the civil 
expenditure, and knew its possibilities. Brownrigg, for instance, found 
on his arrival that the establishment of public offices was disproportionate
to the resources of the country and the duties to be performed*^ The Gov­
ernor was also repeatedly pressed by the Colonial Office to reduce ex­
penditure, without however a definite indication from the latter as to 
whether such reductions were to include the Civil Service establishments*
But the Governor was also more immediately faced with the hopes and de­
sires of the Civil Servants, and therefore showed a reluctance to propose 
measures which would reduce their prospects in life*
All the above factors are visible in the difficulties that ,
^Memorandum, 31 March 1813* C.O. 54, 48. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April,
1813. C.O, 54, 47.
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were experienced whenever an attempt was made to reduce Civil 
Service posts* The enthusiasm which Brownrigg showed as he arrived 
in the Colony made him suggest, through a private memorandum, the 
combination of a few higher offices of the Civil Service*1 He re­
commended the combination of the office of Revenue Commissioner with 
that of the Comptroller of Customs, the Auditor-General with that of 
Accountant-General, the Paymaster-General with that of Vice-Treasurer*
He found these combinations practicable as well as desirable not only 
because of a similarity in their duties but also because they did not 
involve any checks on each other* He also proposed to abolish the of­
fice of Chief Secretary as it had become a sinecure under its then in- 
2
cumbent* After proposing these reductions Brownrigg began to show
second thoughts on them, and he expressed doubts about the policy of
reducing the number of chief offices of the Service to which the Civil
3
Servants would look forward in promotions*
These proposals were unnoticed by the Colonial Office till Brownrigg, 
who was again pressed by the former to reduce the expenditure of the Colony, 
revived them again in 1816, withdrawing however the proposal to abolish 
the office of Chief Secretary out of personal consideration for its in-
^Memorandum, 31 March 1813* C*0. 54, 48*
2
Ibid* Also, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 August 1813* 0*0* 54, 48*
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 August 1813. C.O. 54, 48.
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cumbent.'*' On this occasion the Colonial Office took notice of them 
and instructed Brownrigg to carry them out whenever vacancies occurred 
in these offices stating that "whatever objections might have then pre­
sented themselves to the consolidation of the higher offices, must
2
now yield to the necessity of the case"* No vacancies occurred till 
1821 when, with the death of the Paymaster-General, Barnes combined 
his office with that of the Vice-Treasurer. He however brought in fresh 
objections to Brownrigg's plans of consolidation arguing that since the 
acquisition of the Kandyan provinces the duties of these offices had in­
creased in volume* Consequently, he submitted certain modified plans 
of consolidation* He proposed that the offices of Paymaster-General and 
Vice-Treasurer should once again be separated, adding the offices of 
Accountant-General and Auditor-General to the former, and the Stamp De­
partment to the latter* The office of Bevenue Commissioner was to be
abolished, transferring its duties to the Chief Secretary's office* In
3
the latter office one of the two deputies was to be removed* These 
modified plans were approved by the Secretary of State, and carried
4
out in part when one of the two offices of Deputy Secretary was abolished*
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 7 November 1816* C.O* 54, 62.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 5 July 1817* C.O. 63.
3
Barnes to Bathurst, 10 February, and 14 March 1821. C.O. 54, 79.
4
Bathurst to Paget, 10 September 1821. C*0. 55, 66.
The rest of the plan underwent further modifications before being
implemented by Edward Paget in 1822. The offices of Paymaster-
General and Vice-Treasurer were separated and the stamp department
was attached to the latter* The Office of Accountant-General was
combined with that of Auditor-General, while the office of Revenue
1
Commissioner was combined with that of Comptroller of Customs*
The hesitation that was shown in undertaking the above reforms 
serves to show the difficulties that were experienced in carrying 
out retrenchments in the Civil Service* They also reflected a reluct­
ance to disturb the established cadre of the Service* Similar diffi­
culties were experienced in other branches of the Service too* For 
instance Paget arrived with instructions to attempt a reduction of
the number of Collectorates and Provincial Courts, by 'judiciously*
2
enlarging the districts* He was only able to announce the consolida­
tion of two Collectorates* He entered into a detailed account of the 
duties performed by the several Civil Servants to show that no more re­
ductions were possitfe. In fact he dwelt on a need to enlarge the junior 
branch of the Service, so that Assistant Collectors could be sent out 
to the Collectorates*
^Minute, 7 February 1822* C*0* 54, 82*
2
Bathurst to Paget, 21 August 1821* C.O. 55, 66*
*5
Paget to Bathurst, 7 September 1822* C.O. 54, 82*
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The reductions that were carried out were not of much consequence
by way of economy* Nor did they affect very much the cadre fixed by
Maitland* The abolition of the office of Comptroller of Customs meant
a reduction of a post allotted to the first class of the Service under
Maitland*s classification*1 The office of Deputy Secretary that was
abolished was one created above the established cadre during the time
2of Lt* Governor Wilson* Besides, with the acquisition of the Kandyan
provinces the offices of Resident, Revenue Commissioner, Judicial Com-
3missioner, and Agents of the Seven Koralee and Sabaragamuva, had been 
allocated to the Service with the result that the total number of Civil 
Service posts was not very much disturbed* Generally speaking, however, 
the need for economy felt during this period prevented the expansion of 
the Service, even where such an expansion was desirable, and as we shall 
see later, led to the adoptionjof expedients such as the employment of 
military men in the administration of the Kandyan provinces*
The development of the salary structure of the Service revolved 
round the aspirations of the men setting out from England as Civil Ser­
vants* Once it was determined that the Civil Service would consist of 
recruits sent from England it became a binding necessity to remunerate them 
in such a manner as wouldenable them, after a few years service, to come
^ e e  Appendix B 
^See p* ^ *1 *
^See
back with what was termed a fair 'competence*•
The despatch of Dundas detailing the formation of the Service 
did not lay down in detail the salaries to be attached to the dif­
ferent offices* Indeed, with his inadequate acquaintance with North's 
administrative arrangements such a task was virtually impossible* All 
that Dundas attempted to do was to lay down the main considerations 
to be borne in mind in fixing salaries, leaving the rest in the hands 
of North* One consideration stressed by him was the need for economy, 
a need which made him lay down that salaries should be fixed not so 
much by a reference to similar establishments in India, but by a due 
regard to the very limited resources from which they were to be paid*^ 
It was pexhaps Indian experience which made Dundas also lay down that 
all persons in Government employment should be paid salaries and not
left to the inconveniences involved in payment by fees, commissions
2
and other such methods* While there was thus a conscious desire to 
deviate from the salary scales of the Indian Civil Service, yet having 
formed the Ceylon Civil Service along the same lines it was difficult 
to overlook the considerations which had brought about high salaries 
in India* It was therefore a constant factor influencing Dundas and 
his successors* This is reflected in the upper and lower limits of the 
salary structure that was fixed by Dundas. The highest salary, which 
was to be that attached to the office of Chief Secretary, was to be £3 000
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801* C.O. 55> 61.
per annum, while the Writers were to draw £300 per annum* Salaries 
between these two limits were left to the discretion and judgment 
of the Governor, who was to be guided not only by the general con­
siderations above noticed, but also by the importance of the trust 
and the degree of labour and talents requisite in each respective 
situation.^
The difficult task of fixing intermediate salaries thus rested 
on the shoulders of North* On the one hand he had to pay heed to the 
need for economy, while on the other he had to bear'the actual press­
ure of individual claims based on the general aspirations of those 
going out of England, or formed by a comparison with India* He ex­
pressed this difficulty when he wrote home of the unpleasant predica­
ment in which he was placed by the opinion entertained by persons coming
out on the Ceylon establishment "that because they are to serve in the
2Indian ocean they have a right to Indian emoluments" • "Tour Lordship
will on the other hand," he added, "be rather inclined to blame me for
3
not having more vigorously enforced the ecnnomical orders*"
Though North was himself well aware of the propriety of not forming 
the civil establishment on so expensive a scale as in India, he was in­
clined to sympathize with the aspirations of the Civil Servants* This
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801* C*0. 55, 61* 
^North to Camden, 4 March 1805. C.O* 54, 17*
was because he was convinced that "many of the causes which have
rendered necessary the expensiveness of those establishments must,
to a certain degree, operate on those formed in Ceylon".^"
H3y a necessity of a liberal remuneration to the public 
servants who pass their lives at a distance from their 
native country,” he wrote, "I apprehend that it is meant 
that persons sent out to the Civil Service in Ceylon, 
should be sure, after twenty or five and twenty years of 
effective labour, to return to England with a fortune 
sufficient to enable them to live in a manner comfort­
able to the honourable situations in life. ”2
Drawing perhaps from the experience of the administrators in India,
North also believed that if the aspirations of those coming out of
England were not satisfied by wayjof salaries, it would be difficult
to maintain the purity of the Service. "Care must be taken," he wrote,
"not to introduce concealed receipts of thousands of rix-dollars by
3
the harsh amputation of salaries of hundreds".
North was therefore liberal in fixing salaries. He did not ex­
ceed the upper limit laid down by Dundas, though he recommended an 
addition of £500 per annum to the salary of the Chief Secretary. As 
regards the loweityimit, he wanted to pay £100 per annum to Writers and
to hold out £300 as an object to obtain as soon as possible by employ-
4ment at the outstations. This was however overruled by the Colonial
^North to Hobart, 16 March 1802. C.O. 54, t>.
2Ibid.
^North to Hobart, 24 November 1802. C.O. 54, 7.
4
North to Hobart, 1 January 1804. C.O. 54, 13.
Office, which instructed that all Writers should be paid £300 
per annum. ^ The other salaries were fixed at points in between 
these two limits, sometimes with reference to the person holding 
the situation*
The fact that North was not satisfied with the salaries he 
had assigned, or that he was underpressure to give more, is seen 
from certain tendencies which he allowed to develop, and certain 
practices which he adopted* As we shall see later he made no attempts 
to prevent the Civil Servants from engaging in private trade* He also 
permitted several individuals to hold more than one office, and draw 
separate allowances for each* He adopted modes of payment which were 
partly intended to benefit the civil and military servants* Though 
their salaries were fixed in sterling they were paid in rix-dollars, 
which were current in Ceylon* The exchange rate for the rix-dollar was 
fixed at 9 3/8 rix-dollars a £, or 2s* 1 3/5d a rix-dollar. On account 
of the fluctuations in the market rate of exchange there was usually a 
difference in the nominal and the real value of the rix-dollar, result­
ing in a reduction of the real salaries enjoyed by the Civil Servants* 
Partly to offset the difficulties created by this situation, and partly 
to find the money required to finance Government expenditure, North ini­
tiated the practice of receiving the private savings of the civil and 
military servants, and issuing to them Government debentures at nine per
^Hobart to North, 7 May 1803* C*0. 55 > 62.
cent interest, payable by bills on the British Treasury.^* Along
with it he also started the practice of issuing, for part of the
2
salary, accommodation bills at the fixed rate of exchange. Not­
withstanding the instructions of Dundas to refrah from payment by 
fees and commissions, and in spite of his own awareness of the ad­
ministrative and other difficulties arising out of such modes of 
payment, North continued a practice which had been prevalent in Dutch 
times, and which had been continued under the administration of the 
East India Company, of paying Civil Servants engaged in revenue work 
partly by a fixed salary and partly by a percentage on the revenue 
collectinns. The Collectors were allowed a commission of 1 l/2 per 
cent on 1be net amount of the collections in their districts* The 
justification for the continuance of this practice was a supposed need 
to encourage their exertions in order to increase the revenue. This 
was perhaps not a valid reason for the Government was in a position to 
command it as a duty as from Civil Servants in the other branches. 
Besides, the system of collection by farming made the revenue farmers 
more important in the matter of actual collections. He allowed the 
Custom Masters to draw a commission on the custom collections, and the 
Registers of Land to charge fees from the people. In the judicial
sphere, however, he imposed a positive prohibition on exacting fees 
2and commissions.
^See Castlereagh to Maitland, 16 June 1807* C.O. 55, 62. Also, Maitland 
to Castlereagh, 21 May 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
%ee D’Oyly to Arbuthnot, 31 August 1802. C.O. 55# 37 •
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Lard Hobart, who succeeded Dundas, was very much in agreement 
with the sentiments expressed by North* He believed that it was es­
sential to the public interests to offer fair prospects to retiring 
Civil Servants to return with the means of living comfortably at home.^ 
Basing himself generally on the arrangements that had been made by 
North, he drew up a salary scale for the Civil Service* This was fol­
lowed by instructions, which were repeated to the later Governors, not
to deviate from these salaries without the previous consent of the Gov-
2
eminent at home*
The general awareness that the resources of the country were limited 
may have prevented the Governor and the Secretary of State from giving 
full scope to their inclinations* The salaries fixed by Hobart were 
therefore stated to be on a lower footing than those of the Indian Civil 
Service* They were however still high, and disproportion ate in comparison 
with the salaries that were paid to the local employees* While the salaries 
of the latter were fixed purely with reference to local conditions such 
as the cost of living and the extent of competition for employment, the 
salaries of the Civil Service were fixed more with reference to external 
considerations* fjThe salaries of the Civil Service showed an upward trend 
during the period after North* Like North, the Governors who followed him 
could not have been unsympathetic to the aspirations of the men of their 
age who had gone such a distance from their native country* Certain social
^Hobart to North, 6 August 1802* C*0* 55, 61.
^See Hobart to North, 7 May 1805* C.O. 55, 61* Castlereagh to Maitland,
11 June 1807* C.O. 55, 62.
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forces began to operate in the country which took them in the same 
direction* Placed in the situation of an exclusive and superior 
class of rulers, and in a society highly sensitive to distinctions, 
it became both a social and ad administrative necessity to maintain 
a superior status at a considerable cost*^ Consequently, forms and 
modes of living had to be maintained to display this superiority and 
to command respect not only from the native inhabitants, but also from 
the other Europeans resident in the Colony* As a social group the 
Civil Servants and their families seem to have felt the need to maintain 
an expensive social life*
MaiHand, who was the first Governor after North to feel the im­
pact of these forces, was also faced with a situation which called his 
more immediate attention to a general increase of salaries* It stemmed 
from some of the reforms that he initiated. At first he was determined 
to carry out the instructions he had received to reduce the expenditure 
of the Colony by doing away with the additional emoluments that North 
had provided by various means* One of the principal reforms that he 
enforced was the abolition of offices which he considered superfluous 
and the consolidation of others* By such means he hoped to remove the 
double pay which certain Civil Servants had enjoyed by holding more than 
one office* Generally he aimed at reducing emoluments to the level
Slaitland, for instance, was deeply conscious of the necessity for Civil 
Servants to maintain a suitable status in the society of the colony*
In fact he ordered the reduction of a salary of a Civil Servant on the 
ground that he had failed to keep up the necessary appearance* Maitland 
to Edward Cooke, 28 August 1808. C.O. 54. 29.
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determined by Hobart in 1803.^ As we shall see later Maitland also
imposed a prohibition on private trading.
These reforms perhaps involved him in difficulties, for he told
the Colonial Office that all orders for reductinn ”must have some
reference to the situation in which the island stood on my arrival,
to the antecedent conduct of my predecessor, and to the general view
2
of combing economical retrenchment with general satisfaction”. He
was aware that if he attempted to undo all the claims founded upon
North* s arrangements it would have been ”merely governing by the iron
hand of authority and power instead of carrying with me cordiality and
3support in the Civil Service”. Thus though he abolished certain 
offices he was obliged to place some of the individuals exactly where
4
he found them in point of emoluments. At this stage however no idea
of a general increase of salaries entered his mind. The great fear he
seems to have entertained was that the Colonial Office would interfere
to favour individuals, and thereby upset his general plans.
”In a general plan of economy and retrenchment,” he wrote,
”all must be included and all must suffer, and here I beg 
leave to state to your Lordship that the whole footing on 
which the island will stand with regard to me, and the 
whole tenor of my subsequent Government, must rest on the 
generality of the principle I have adopted, I own it would
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 9 March 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805. C.O. 54* 18.
5lbid.
4Ibid.
be most galling to my feelings if after the severe responsi­
bility I have taken, aid the great risk of odium I have in­
curred, any distinction was to be made at home from what­
ever interest, setting aside that principle^upon which the 
whole of this measure has entirely turned*"
It did not however require Colonial Office interference, either 
in a particular or in a general way, to bring about a more positive 
desire in him to increase Civil Service salaries* A feeling of dis­
satisfaction which would have naturally arisen in the Service with 
the abolition of private trading, and extra emoluments, began to have 
its effects over him* By March 1806 he had formed the view that In 
general the Civil Servants were underpaid, and expressed the hope that
if the island should pay for itself it might enable him to make an addi-
2
tion to their salaries* This was followed by concrete proposals when
he submitted a schedule of the establishments and the salaries which
3he proposed*
A comparison between this schedule and the one drawn up by Hobart 
show that a substantial increase of salaries was recommended* The sal­
aries of the Assistants were in Hobart's schedule generally fixed at 
£320 per annum* Maitland proposed to increase them to £512 per annum* 
The higher offices to which a salary of £1500 or £1600 per annum were 
attached in Hobart's schedule, were now to be given a salary of £2000
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C*0* 54, 18*
^Maitland to Windham, 1 March 1806* C.O. 54, 22*
■5
Maitland to Windham, 1 June 1806* C.O. 54, 22*
per annum* The Collectors who were allowed a fixed salary of £512
per anmim and a commission of 1 l/2 per cent on the net amount of
the revenue collected were now to have £650 per annum as fixed salary
and a commission of 2 per cent*^
Perhaps on account ofthe frequent changes at the Colonial Office
no decision was taken on these recommendations till June 1807* During
this period Maitland seems to have been quite uneasy for he spoke of
2
an 'unpleasant suspense' caused by the delay* The Secretary of State 
noticed an apparent contradiction between the earlier talk of reduction s
3
and the later recommendation of increases* This compelled Maitland 
to explain himself further by saying that it had never been his intention 
to reduce salaries beyond those fixed by Lord Hobart in 1803 and that
4
his reforms were confined to cutting down those above it* The peculiar 
feature of the despatch of the Secretary of State is the vague terms in 
which it was framed* Having stated that it was not possible to give 
a decision on the recommendations without being furnished with the de­
tails of the reduction of some contingent expenditure which Maitland had 
promised, the despatch concluded with a statement which Maitland con­
structed as a sanction of his plans. "When however you have carried it 
into execution," wrote Castlereagh, "I must recommend to you not to
^Maitland to Windham, 1 June 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
^Maitland to George Shee Bart, 27 May 1807* C.O. 54, 25*
^Castlereagh to Maitland, 11 June 1807* C*0* 55, 62*
Maitland to Castlereagh, 9 March 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
make any further alterations without previous communication with 
Government at home.”^
It was not surprising that Maitland did not wait for further 
clarification* He considered it as a latitude liberally1 given to
2him by the Secretary of State and proceeded to carry out the increases. 
They were now incorporated into other plans which he had in the meantime 
formulated, of which we shall see more later, to divide the Civil Ser­
vice into three classes. The first class of the Service was to have 
salaries varying from £200 to £300 per annum. The salaries of the second 
class were fixed between £1800 and £600 per annum. The salaries of the 
third class were not to exceed £550 per annum. Mewly arrived recruits 
were not to belong to any class and were not to draw salaries exceeding
3
£300 per annum. The salaries to be attached to the different offices 
were to be fixed at some point between the maximum and the minimum limits 
laid down for each class. These increases were carried out by regulation 
IV of 1808.4
The salary structure established by Maitland remained basically 
unchanged till the end of our period of study. The upward trend however 
continued to be felt during the second decade of the 19th century, in 
spite of the prevailing atmosphere of financial difficulty which we have
^Castlereagh to Maitland, 11 June 1807. C.O. 55, 62.
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 9 March 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
3
General regulations of the Civil Service, ND 1808. C.O. 54, 28. 
^Regulation 17, of 1808. C.O. 54,
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already noticed. Though perhaps on account of these difficulties 
a general claim for an increase of salaries did not occur, the aspira­
tions of the Civil Servants, which were denied an;outlet by the prohi­
bition of private trading, manifested themselves in various particular 
claims for increases. CSaims for increases, supported by the Governor
sometimes on such grounds as an increas^pf duties or an inability to
1
promote to higher situations, went before the Secretary of Siste. The 
Governor being, on the spot was naturally more sympathetic to the#. But 
the prevailing need for economy placed the Colonial Office in a more de­
termined mood to resist any further increases. In the two instances 
cited above the Colonial Office also took objection to the grounds on 
which they were recommended. The first assumed that an addition of labour
to a particular department entitled its holder to an augmentation of
2 /■* salary. The second implied that every Civil Servant, who found his
claim to promotion unattended, had a title to receive an additional salary
3
as compensation for his disappointment. Though occasionally particular 
additions to salaries were effected, the attitude maintained by the Col­
onial Office prevented such changes becoming too general.
The aspirations of the Civil Servants were however too strongly
felt by the Governor and the Colonial Office to bring about the possi-
1 There are several such applications dispersed among the despatches of 
this period. For a few instances see Brownrigg to Bathurst, 10 November 
1815. C.O. 54, 59. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 November 1816. C.O. 54, 61.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 20 Karch 1820. C.O* 55, 65.
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 8 August 1816. C.O. 55, 63.
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bility of a reduction of salaries, which the situation in Ceylon 
perhaps called for* Thus, though the Colonial Office sent despatches 
year after year urging economy in expenditure and called upon the 
Governors to undertake a review of the civil and military expenditure 
of the Colony, it appears that it was not intended that this review 
should also embrace Civil Service salaries* "In recommending however 
a review of the civil establishments," wrote Bathurst, to Edward Paget 
who arrived with instructions to reduce expenditure, "it is not my 
object to suggest to you any general reduction of the salaries enjoyed 
by the Civil Servants of the Colony* As far as their salaries are con­
cerned I do not consider them overpaid for the station in which they 
are placed*Indeed there was much difficulty in resisting the tempta­
tion to sanction measures which granted advantages in an indirect manner* 
These various factors were visible in the problems that cropped up 
regarding the mode of payment and the decisions that were taken regard­
ing them* The practice initiated by North of granting to the civil and 
military servants accommodation bills at the fixed rate of exchange 
became a valuable privilege enjoyed by them, when Maitland discontinued 
the practice of issuing bills of exchange at that rate to others, and
auctioned them instead, thus making the salejpf bills profitable to Govem- 
2
ment* The practice of issuing debentures was however discontinued on
^Bathurst to Paget, 21 August 1821* C.O* 55, 66.
^Bertolacci, Agricultural Commercial and Financial interests of Ceylon. 
p. 89.
the instructions of the Secretary of State, who condemned it on the 
ground tlsb it prevented the investment of capital in the island and
also that the interest was excessive.^ Maitland was no dnbt consider­
ably embarrassed and on his representations the Secretary of State per-
2
mitted its revival* Subsequently, the Colonial Office decided to fix 
the rate of exchange at 11 3/7 rix-dollars a £ or Is* 9d* a rix-dollar* 
The salaries of the civil and military servants, fixed by the Home 
Government in sterling, were to be paid at the new rate* This concession
was not to extend to those who held offices which were described as
'inland appointments', or to the allowances, commissions, and perquisites 
paid in rix-dollars* In view of the establishment of the new rate, 
which in effect brought about an increase of real salaries, the Secret­
ary of State gave instructions to discontinue the practice of issuing
3
accommodation bills and debentures* Though the latter measures were 
carried out, Brownrigg reported that they brought about prbblems of re­
mittance, as bills of exchange could not be obtained at the fixed rate
4
of exchange or within thirty per cent of it in the open market. Conse-
^Castlereagh to Maitland, 16 June 1807. C.O. 55» 62.
2
Liverpool to Maitland, 5 June 1810. C.O. 55, 62.
3
Liverpool to Brownrigg, 5 November 1811. Bathurst to Brownrigg, 23 
January 1813* C.O. 55, 62. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April 1813*
C.O. 54, 47.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 27 November 1813* C.O. 54, 48.
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quently, he revived the practice of issuing accommodation bills at 
par, instead of at the current exchange, for one half of the salaries 
of civil and military servants. In addition, as a means of finding 
the money required for Government expenditure, and as a concession 
to the civil and military servants, he opened, with the approval of 
the Secretary of State, a Government loan which would receive their sav­
ings in return for debentures payable at six per cent interest. The in­
terest was to be paid in Ceylon while the principal was to be paid in 
England.^ These measures, in addition to providing an easy means of 
remittance also opened a field for speculation during times of a favour­
able market rate of exchange. Thus, for instance, in 1817 the possessors 
of Government bills were able to sell them above the price paid for them. 
Therefore in effect it could have brought about an increase of salaries
as the sale of bills appears to have been practiced by the civil and
2
military servants.
In 1817, under the pressure of reducing Government expenditure, 
Brownrigg fixed the rate of exchange for accommodation billSat 12 l/2 
rix-dollars a £ instead of 11 3/7 rix-dollars. He thought that it gave 
no serious ground for complaint though it reduced real salaries, and
3
would not have been adopted except under the pressure of public exigency.
1
Advertisement, 28 October 1815. C.O. 54, 59*
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817» 29 May 1817. C.O. 54» 65.
J. Steuart, Notes on the monetary system, pp. 3-4* 9.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54* 65.
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He was However immediately faced with the dissatisfaction of the 
civil and military servants* Consequently, in 1819 he had to adopt 
the measure of issuing one half of the salaries in accommodation bills 
at par and two thirds in debentures*^ Brownrigg's measures were sup­
ported by Barnes, who questioned the justice of paying civil and mili­
tary servants in a depreciated paper currency, when salaries were fixed 
2
in sterlmg. The Colonial Office saw some justice in adopting these 
measures with regard to the military, as they were entitled to receive 
the 'King1s pay' on the same terms as in other foreign possessions*
But it was not prepared to admit the principle with regard to the Civil 
Servants* nThey are," observed Bathurst, "servants of the island, and 
ought to receive their salaries in colonial currency without reference
3
to foreign exchange." Considering,however, that circumstances might 
warrant a temporary increase of salaries, Brownrigg's measures were sanc­
tioned*
The matter did not end there* In 1821 with the intention of putting 
an end to a variety of complaints and discussions which had arisen on the 
subject of paying salaries in a depreciated paper currency, the Colonial 
Office adopted the measure of sending to the Colony silver rix-dollars.^
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 19 November 1819. C*0. 54, 74*
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 13 November 1819* C.O. 54, 74.
3
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 18 June 1820* C.O* 55, 63.
4
Goulburn to G. Harrison, 18 September 1820. C.O. 55, 65.
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The Governor was instructed to pay the civil and military servants
in this coin and to withdraw the practice of granting accommodation
bills* Though these instructions were carried out, Paget gave the
civil and military servants the option of having three fourths of
their pay in debentures at four per cent interest, if the interest
was paid in England and six per cent if it waspaid in Ceylon* In
addition, those who bona fide required the means of remittance were
to be granted accommodation bills instead of debentures equal to one
half of their pay and allowances for three months
The several measures thus adopted show that the Civil Servants
formed an important group who had to be takeninto account in deciding
2
upon financial policy* Not surprisingly, the problems that were 
involved regarding the mode of payment were settled only with the 
introduction of British currency into the island in 1825* Prom this 
year the pay and allowances of the civil and military servants were 
issued and accounted for in this currency* The practice of issuing 
debentures and accommodation bills had no longer any justification and 
was discontinued* Bills were to be granted to all alike at the rate of 
one hundred pounds to every one hundred and three pounds paid into 
.Treasury in Ceylon* The rix-dollar was to continue to be current for
^Paget to Bathurst, 22 August 1822* C.O. 54, 82* Minute, 29 August 1822.
C.O. 54, 82.
2
There were undoubtedly other aspects involved in this complicated problem. 
For details of some of these aspects see Be Silva, Ceylon under the 
British Occupation. Vol. II, Chapter XVII.
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other purposes at the new r&te of 13 l/3 rix-dollars a £ or Is* 6d* 
a rix-dollar*^
Closely connected with the salary structure of the Civil Service 
was the question whether Civil Servants were to be allowed to engage 
in private trade* *1 shall inculcate upon all those who may be sent 
out to supply the places of the Company's servants," wrote Dundas at 
the time of the formation of the Civil Service, wthat they are not to 
go out with the ideas of pecuniary prospects such as are too often in­
stilled into the minds of those who at an early period of life are sent
2
to pursue their fortunes in India*** Despite this determination, and 
the possible awareness of the difficulties that had arisen in India by 
allowing the right of private trading, bfith North and the Colonial Office 
adopted an indifferent attitude towards the problem* The general feel­
ing that salaries were inadequate, and a desire to be liberal towards 
the 'gentlemen* of the Service, may have tempted North and the Colonial 
Office to allow the concession* There was indeed nothing in the Colon­
ial Office attitude to indicate that it had any objection* Though Dundas 
prohibited the civil and military servants from purchasing land, this 
was not because of a belief that agricultural pursuits would interfere 
with public duties, but rather because of the policy of the tim^ which 
sought to prevent all approaches towards European colonization in Ceylon*^
^Regulation VIII, 4 July 1825* Barnes to Bathurst, 26 July 1825* C.O* 
5489# Bathurst to Barnes, 14 March 1825* C.O. 55, 66*
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801* C.O* 55, 61.
3rbid.
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As regards trading it appears that the Colonial Office in fact gave 
it definite encouragement. Thus it sought to provide the capital which 
the Civil Servants would require by recommending the utilization of 
the pension fund established for the Service, for commercial specula­
tions which would nyield a fair profit to the servants of the public 
engaged in the speculation”
Because of this latitude the Civil Servants in Ceylon soon began
to indulge in private trading, which, if not countenanced by North,
2
was at least tacitly admitted by him. Once begun it spread quickly 
among all ranks of the Service and the Civil Servants became not only 
administrators, but also a set of speculators. Inevitable bad conse­
quences soon followed. Three cases of abuse of authority, which came
to light not because of any extra vigilance on the part of North, but
3
almost by accident, served to show the risks that were involved.
^Hobart to North, 7 May 1803* C.O. 55# 62.
^See Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 54# 18.
3
The first case was that of Garvin Hamilton, a Deputy Paymaster whose 
sudden death necessitated the examination of his accounts. A deficit 
of £19,675 was detected* the money had been used for private trade.
North to Hobart, 1 January 1804. C.O. 54# 13* The second case was 
that of Alex Johnston, a Store Keeper and Deputy Paymaster. His con­
nections with Messrs Neil and Gibbon, and abuse of authority in con­
nection with this firm came to light at an inquiry which North reluct­
antly conducted at the insistence of the military. North to Camden,
10 July 1805* C.O. 54# 18. Also, Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1807. 
Co. 54# 25* The third case was that of George Melville Leslie, the Pay­
master-General, who was detected with a large cash deficit. Though in­
quiries were not pursued# he was suspected of having speculated. See 
Maitland to Windham, 28 February 1807. C.O. 54# 25*
By the time Maitland arrived the attitude of the Colonial Office
appears to have undergone some change probably because of the cases
that had already gone before it. In the instructions that were issued
to Maitland he was required to examine the sources of profit made by
the Civil Servants. He was given the option of permitting those which
did hot interfere with the prosperity and revenue of the island, or
which did not increase its general charges.*** These instructions did
not convey a positive desire to prohibit private trading. The Colonial
Office had no objections to the government officers gaining 'honourable
advantages', independent of their allowances from the State, provided
2
they were consistent with its interest and economy.
Maitland was compelled to take a more rigid view of the matter,
for soon after his arrival, he found th± the Civil Service was not only
inefficient but to an extent corrupt.
"The nature of my predecessor 's character," he wrote,
"had been attended with prejudicial effects to His 
Majesty's interests in the island by enabling many of 
the Civil Servants to follow the bent of their natural 
indolence, when in others it had enabled them to direct 
their natural activity to purposes more connected with 
their own immediate emolument than with the advantages 
of His Majesty's Government ... In some instances a 
total inactivity prevailed, in others, the most pernicious 
violation of every principle that ought to actuate the 
servants of the Crown."
^Camden to Maitland, 21 February 1805* C.O. 55# 62. 
2Ibid.
3
Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 20.
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However, an exact picture of the state of the Service cannot
be obtained because of the fact that Maitland consciously avoided a
retrospective inquiry* He felt that such an inquiry was neither
’prudent or advisable*But the inquiries which originated in the
time of North, and which were continued by Maitland, into the conduct
2
of Alex Johnston, and Melville Leslie, and an inquiry which Maitland 
himself originated into the conduct of G. Lusignaft, the Collector of
*5
Jaffna, undoubtedly gave him an insight into the state of the Civil 
Service and the degeneration to which it had fallen* The inquiry at 
Jaffna in particular resulted in the revelation, as Maitland somewhat
exaggeratedly said, "of a scene of petty floggings, peculation, and
4villainy as great ••• as was ever heard in the annals of India11* He
stated that had inquiries similar to those at Jaffna been instituted
5in the different districts, similar results would have followed* In 
fact, looking round for an explanation as to why the measures adopted
^Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C*0. 54, 20.
2
See footnote on p.
3
During this inquiry it came to light that the Collector had been in 
league with some European merchants, helping them in their trading 
transactions by advancing Government money without interest, and fav­
ouring them in obtaining Government contracts. It was also revealed 
that the Collector had himself carried on trading transactions, using 
the Headmen for the purpose. Inquiry proceedings are found in C.O* 
54, 20.
4
Maitland to Camden, 25 December 1805# C.O. 54, 20.
5
Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 22.
by b-tm have been taken without a protest he <&me to the conclusion
that "their natural consciousness that their conduct could not
bear the test, led to their being perfectly satisfied with any new
regulation provided their former conduct was not to be too closely
investigated"♦1
Maitland quickly perceived that an immediate cause for this
state of affairs was the latitude which North had shown towards Civil
Servants engaging in trade* Here again the extent to which trading
rights affected the Service as a whole, or had led to an abuse of
authority, cannot be measured since Maitland avoided a retrospective
inquiry* There is however no reason to doubt his assertion that nearly
all the Civil Servants, irrespective of the situation they held, were
engaged in trade, either as principals, or as agents for one another,
2or for commercial houses in Ceylon and India* He found most of them
*5
acting as agents for the house of Lautour and Company*
Maitland perhaps drew inferences from actualities when he reasoned 
out some of the possibilities* Firstly, he said that it amounted to 
"giving a latitude to the servants of Government ••• to employ Govern­
ment money, and the power of Government placed in their hands, for the 
sole purpose of cheating the Government itself".^ Secondly, he argued
"^Maitland to Edward Cooke, 10March 1806. C.O. 54* 22.
2
In a letter to Edward Cooke Maitland wrote: "I have only stated my 
reasons generally to Lord Camden, for so doing, because I do not wish 
to enter into instances where I must have named individuals, who I 
trust may yet be brought to a true sense of their past Imprudence*" 
Maitland to Edward Cooke, 19 October 1805. C*0. 54, 18.
3
This was a Madras commercial firm. Maitland to Edward Cooke 10 March 
1806. C.O. 54, 22.
4Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C*0. 54* 18. Maitland was perhaps
that it tended to wean away the public servants from their duties and
thereby affected the administration.
"Can any man suppose," he asked, "that a Garrison Store­
keeper will do his duty to the public, where he is the 
private agent o£ the merchant who supplies the stores of 
that garrison."
Thirdly, he argued that it would affect the general commercial interests 
of the island and Government plans to improve them, by giving unfair 
advantages to Government servants engaged in trade. He pointed out that 
a Collector, whose power in a district was nearly co-extensive with that 
of the Government, would be able, as a merchant, to secure to himself 
monopolies of all the staples of his district, and at times even to se­
cure them at the prices he chose. Thereby "he not only drives off all 
chances of a fair commercial enterprise, and competition, but shuts the 
eyes of Government completely to the real state of the commerce of the
district, and renders null and void every attempt on the part of Govera-
2
ment at any system of general improvement and financial arrangement". 
Lastly, he pointed out that it would affect the Civil Servants themselves 
by bringing about a general looseness of thinking and acting. As the 
Civil Servants were generally young men without firm principles, they 
would, he thought, be unable "to entertain a distinct comprehension of
(cont.) having in mind what was revealed in Jaffna. See footnote on p.
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1809. C.O. 54> 18. He had perhaps in mind 
the case of A. Bertolacci, whom heibund in this position.
2Ibid.
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what is honourable and dishonourable in the complex transactions of 
public life”.^
wIf then, Bhe continued, win their youth, and at their 
first setting off as public men, they are for a moment 
permitted to confound every principle of right and wrong, 
and to suppose the species of public swindling above al­
luded to, to be fair and honourable transactions it must 
ultimately lead to a similar confusion of principle in 
every other point, and render them totally unfit in the 
end to be either good public servants or useful members 
of society.”
Maitland thus made out a strong case against Civil Servants en­
gaging in private trade. The fact that he thought it necdssary to 
make out such a strong case indicates the climate in which he worked. 
When they originally set out, the Civil Servants may have formed as­
pirations of creating fortunes, and during North's period they had 
been led to form the expectation that they would be able to do so by 
engaging in speculations. The arguments put forward by Maitland may 
have been partly meant to overcome the opposition that was likely to 
arise from their disappointments. They may have also been intended to 
convince the Colonial Office of the need for a prohibition.
The difficult circumstances under which he acted are also to be 
seen from the manner in which he imposed the prohibition. Having de­
cided that a general prohibition was preferable to taking disciplinary 
action against those who were found to be abusing their authority, he
“^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805« C.O. 54, 18.
2Ibid.
issued a minute in which he directed that no Civil Servant was in 
future to embark on any mercantile speculation, and that where they 
were already engaged in such concerns, they should close them with all 
possible expedition* Those who felt that the situations which they 
held might be exempted from the rule were required to state their case 
specifically in writing to the Board of Revenue.'*’ This Board was made 
the tribunal which would decide who was to have a latitude to trade*
In the instructions to this Board, Maitland stated that no public ser­
vant who was employed in any department connected with the collection
of the revenue, or was a Storekeeper, or was entrusted with the secrets
2of the Government, ought to be permitted to trade* The Board was re­
quired to reject applications from such persons and to allow only those 
from persons whose duties did not indicate the impropriety of their be- 
ing permitted to do so. Since most of the situations during this time 
were of such a nature that the collection of revdnue was involved at 
some point, these instructions suggest a disposition to achieve the ef­
fects of a total prohibition giving at the same time the appearance of 
flexibility* Besides, it should be noted that the orders were conveyed 
by a minute of the Governor which did not have the force of a law* Nor 
were fehy.penalties prescribed for violating these orders. Maitland
1
Minute, 27 August 1805. C*0* 54, 18.
Maitland to Board of Revenue, 1 September 1805. C.O. 54, 18.
3It>id.
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seems to have considered it necessary to give the Colonial Office a 
still greater impression of flexibility, for he informed the Secretary 
of State that, though the instructions were specific, it was not his 
intention that they should be pertinaciously adhered to, where the 
character of the individual was fixed and established, and where the 
species of commerce was fair, avowed and ascertained.^ It should also 
be noted that the Colonial Office did not commit itself on this issue 
by conveying either a favourable or an unfavourable opinion. It 
treated Maitland’s rules with silence, and left the Governor to think 
for himself whether silence meant approval or disapproval.
Though it appears that the order prohibiting private trade was gen­
erally enforced during Maitland’s period several circumstances suggest 
that it was not completely enforced. Those who held civil situations, 
but who were not cnnsidered as regular Civil Servants, were allowed to
continue their trading transactions, perhaps as compensation for the
2
non-enjoyment of the privileges of the Service. In the instance of a 
regular Civil Servant, who wished to continue in trade, Maitland took the
extra-ordinary step of making him an 'unemployed’ Civil Servant, drawing
3
an allowance of £300 per annum, and performing some nominal duties.
^Maitland to Camden, 19 October 1805* C.O. 54, 18.
2
See Bathurst to Brownrigg* 23 January 1813• C.O. 55# 62.
3
See Bertolacci to Lord Glenbervie, 30 September 1809* C.O. 54# 38*
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It was perhaps this incompleteness that tempted Maitland's suc­
cessor, Brownrigg, to bring forward regulation IV of 1813* Thereby 
he enacted a rule which had the advantage of having the force of law*
It was laid down that no person holding an office of trust could engage 
in trade, as principal, partner, agent, or factor, unless expressly 
authorized by a license under the signature of the Government. For 
the proper enforcement of this regulation, these officers were required 
to take an oath against having any concern in trade* Though it is 
difficult to determine to what extent, if any, direct trading trans­
actions gave way to indirect ones, it appears tksfc prohibition was en-
2
forced in a more effectual and comprehensive manner* It helped to 
reduce the speculative spirit among the Civil Servants, removed a strong 
temptation to diverge from a strict line of duty, and generally brought 
about better standards of conduct in the Service*
The prohibition on trading may not have been popular in the Ser­
vice and was perhaps disadvantageous from the point of view of trade* 
Bertolacci perhaps expressed a feeling that was general, when, while 
admitting its evil effects, he argued that it did injury to the ’greater 
interests1 of the island, as the Civil Servants were the 'only persons' 
who possessed the means to call labour into action, to encourage culti-
3
vation, manufacture and trade* Nevertheless, the good effects of the
^■Regulation IV, 8 May 1813* Skeen, A Collection of Legislative Acts of 
the Ceylon Government* Vol* I, pp. 148-149♦
^Brownrigg to Liverpool, 29 May 1812. C.O* 54, 43*
3
Bertolacci, . Agricultural, Commercial and Financial interests of
Ceylon, p. 434.
3 11
prohibition seem to have been too lcear and visible to permit a 
relaxation of the rules.
This prohibition did not cover agricultural pursuits. The 
Civil Servants were not excluded from the benefits brought about 
by the relaxationHpf the rules regarding the acquisition of lands 
by Europeans. From 1809 they were allowed to acquire land up to 
4,000 acres.^ Though they were even encouraged to take advantage 
of this, neither the good nor the bad effects of it were visible 
because very few of them took to agriculture. Bertolacci perhaps 
provided an adequate explanation for this, when he argued that Civil 
Servants arrived too young to turn their minds to agriculture, and 
that by the time they had acquired ’more solid and enlarged' views,
as well as a knowledge of the country, they were then too near the
2
time of their departure to attempt it. However, as Colebrooke noted 
later, it was also likely that the system of compulsory services and 
monopolies tended to discourage agricultural pursuits even among the 
Civil Servants. Whatever may be the reason the Colony was spared the 
planter Civil Servants, who in later times became a source of consider­
able difficulty.
5 c r  \'o  iac. c l  t
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One aspect of the organizationof the Service which derived 
little attention right from the "beginning was a scheme of training 
for the Civil Servants, Though the smallness of numbers certainly 
precluded the possibility of grand ideas such as those that led to the 
establishment of Haileybury, occurring in the minds of those concerned 
with the Ceylon Civil Service, the very fact that the problem was not 
discussed at all showed that the Colonial Office, as well as the Gov­
ernors of the Colony,were not sufficiently alive to its importance.
Both Dundas and Worth appear to have acted in the belief that in a 
career devoted to Ceylon the Civil Servants would soon acquire suffi­
cient experience and a knowledge of the country in the junior ranks 
before being called upon to perform the functions of higher and respon­
sible offices. For this purpose they created the office of Assistant 
and appointed the junior Civil Servants to function as Assistants at 
several offices. As we have seen Hobart provided an Assistant to almost 
every office.'*'
Though the creation of such Assistant offices was perhaps un­
necessary, when the amount of work available for them was taken into 
consideration, they would have certainly provided a training ground
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where the juniors could have acquired a familiarity with the country, 
its laws and customs, and where they could have adapted themselves to 
the unfamiliar conditions of service. But as we have already noticed, 
the limited finances of the Colony, as well as the high salary scale 
of the Civil Service, prevented its expansion to the extent hoped for. 
Thus Assistants were not appointed to all the Civil Service offices. 
Besides, the growth of another species of establishment led to a situ­
ation where certah important offices, which were generally acknowledged 
to be the most suitable to obtain an insight into the character of the 
people, were kept out of the Civil Service. Thus for instance many of 
the inferior judicial offices such as Sitting Magistrates, Registrars 
and Secretaries of Courts, were held by local Europeans, who had no 
chances of entering the Civil Service.'*'
Even where Assistant offices were provided they failed to become 
a useful training ground. The existence of anotherspecies of establish­
ment for the performance of functions which could be allotted to a Civil 
Service Assistant gradually reduced the need for them. North also failed 
to arrange the remaining duties in such a manner as would tend to edu­
cate the Assistants. With the prohibition on outside recruitment for 
Civil Service posts, and with the Colonial Office maintaining a watchful 
eye on his actions, North was perhaps anxious to avoid the charge that he 
was unmindful of the interests of those sent out as Writers. He had
^See pp, *2jiil- 2-T3*
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therefore been compelled to appoint juniors with two or three years 
service to important and responsible offices. Thus any intention which 
had prevailed of making the office of Assistant a training ground re­
mained unfulfilled, and this aspect of the usefulness of the office 
soon lost its significance.
It was not surprising that Maitland saw the office of Assistant 
in a far less useful light. "All Assistants here,” he wrote, "do 
nothing. The business of the office is carried on by the principal,
and the establishment of the office, and the Assistant, unless in the
absence of the principal, neither does, or has anything to do."^
As we have seen the fault partly lay in the failure of North to 
attend to a proper distribution of work. The remedy was therefore to 
make the office more useful. In fact Chief Justice Carrington, from 
whom Maitland obtained a report on the reform of the judicial system, 
made a recommendation along these lines,
"The Assistants to the Agent of Revenue and Commerce," 
he observed, "are in general appointed shortly after 
their arrival, a period when, while their time of life 
facilitates the acquisition, they are particularly en­
forced to acquire the languages of the country.••• By
dividing the course of their labour between the duties
of revenue and the administration of justice in inferior 
cases, it may reasonably be expected that they will speed­
ily become masters of the Sinhalese and Malabar languages, 
and be equally qualified to each department of the Ser­
vice to which they may be called.
^Maitland to Windham, 1 June 1806, C.O. 54, 22.
^Carrington to Maitland, 5 October 1805. C.O.54, 18.
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He therefore recommended increasing the number of Assistants, and 
their appointment to perform magisterial duties. Behind this pro­
posal there was a recognition of several facts connected with the 
Civil Service. It was recognized that the office of Assistant to a 
provincial Collector, to which magisterial duties were attached, was 
a good training ground for the junior Civil Servants, because such 
duties were likely to bring them more in touch with the people. It 
was also recognized that in a small service it was not possible to 
have speciiized offices for judicial and revenue work, and that the 
whole Service should be equally qualified for both.
As we have seen Maitland adopted the measure of vesting in the
Assistants to the Collector, wherever they existed, the powers of
Magistracy. ' Instead of increasing the number, however, he reduced
them. He assigned one to each of the central offices, where he thought
it was necessary to get some of the Civil Servants trained in their 
1
work. i. fixed Assistant was not sent to every Collectorate. Only 
the Collectorates of Colombo, Galle and Jaffna were provided with Assist­
ants. After Maitland’s period of government the Assistants began to dis­
appear even from the central offices other than that of Chief Secretary. 
Of the Collectorates only Colombo and Jaffna were regularly provided 
with Assistants. Though from time to time Assistants were appointed to
1
Maitland to 'Jindham, 1 June 1806. C.O. 54> 22.
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other Collectorates and offices they depended entirely on the exi­
gencies of the Service.^
One reason for the gradual diminution of the number of Assistants 
was the fact that the Civil Service could not be expanded in view of 
the salary scale attached to it. The Assistant offices were the first 
to suffer from the pressure for economy. Besides, in spite of some 
efforts on the part of Maitland, the Assistants, especially those sent 
to the provinces, failed to become useful. The presence of the Dutch 
Sitting Magistrates removed almost entirely the need for Civil Service 
judicial assistants, while the amount of revenue work in a province 
could not alone justify their existence. Also, after a few years, the 
existence of the Civil Service side by side with another inferior estab­
lishment, brought about barriers between them. The Civil Servants, who 
considered themselves superior, appear to have shown some dislike for
the performance of magisterial duties, perhaps because they did not
2
wish to be associated with an inferior group of officials.
As a means of giving some sort of training to newly arrived recruits, 
Maitland initiated the practice of attaching them to the Chief Secretary’s 
Office, either as Assistants or as unemployed Civil Servants. He hoped
^See schedules of the annual fixed civil establishments for the period.
2
Brownrigg noticed a reluctance among the Civil Servants to attend to 
the details of custom house duties such as the examination of packages. 
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65. Barnes, taking, 
a partial view of the case, attributed the disinclination to function 
as Magistrates to the interference of the Supreme Court. See p.
317
that here the young men would derive a knowledge of office business 
as well as of the languages of the country. ”* This manner of employing 
a new recruit was perhaps preferable to investing him with an office, 
however, inferior, which involved a certain amount of power and re­
sponsibility - provided it was accompanied by a definite scheme of 
training. But such a scheme did not arise. Some experience was un­
doubtedly gained. But it was more in office routine than in the pecu­
liarities of the revenue and judicial administration of the country, 
or in the languages, customs or character of the people.
One particular aspect of the training of the Civil Servants at­
tracted the attention of Dundas, as well as of the Governors of the 
Colony. They considered it necessary that the Civil Servants should 
be equipped with a knowledge of the languages of the country. Dundas 
instructed North to endeavour to induce the young Civil Servants of 
the government to apply themselves to a study ofihe languages, and to
make them understand that promotions would depend not only on general
2
good conduct, but also on their linguistic proficiency. Though North 
was also convinced that Civil Servants should have a perfect command 
of the languages, he failed to draw any rules for the purpose. The Ci^il 
Servants were liberally provided with interpreters, thereby removing the 
sense of urgency which would have been otherwise present. It was there­
fore not surprising that at the end of North’s period only two of the
^Maitland to Windham, 20 September 1806, C.O. 54, 22.
2
Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
3 1 8
Civil Servants were adequately proficient in a native language.
Maitland naturally found that due attention had not been paid 
to what he described as an "irksome but very important part of their 
duty”.^  The only change that he made however was to offer some en­
couragement by stipulating that when Civil Servants offered themselves 
to be examined in the Sinhalese and Portuguese languages, and were
found to be proficient in them, the number of years required for pro-
2
motion from' one class to another would be reduced. He also made the
office of Chief Translator to Government open to anyone qualified by
3
a knowledge of the languages to hold it.
These measures, though steps in the right direction, failed to 
overcome the antipathy which the Civil Servants appear to have shown 
towards the study of the native languages. This is seen from the fact 
that up to 1819 no examinations were held by the Government in order 
to determine the proficiency of the Civil Servants in the languages 
and to confer to them the above benefits. Meanwhile, a knowledge of 
the languages became more important with the acquisition of the Kandyan 
kingdom, which had never before been subject to European rule. Brown­
rigg therefore recognized the necessity of adopting some plan of en- 
couragement for this purpose. But all that he did was to arrange to
■^General Regulations of the Civil Service, N.D.1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2
Ibid. Portuguese was considered as a language that ought to be studied per­
haps because a large number of Clerks w:ere proficient in it. On the in­
structions of the Secretary of State, in 1823, it was withdrawn. Bathurst 
to Barnes, 25 July 1823- C.O. 55, 66. Tamil was a surprising omission in 180% 
It was rectified in 1813. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 10 July 1813. C.O. 54, 47.
^General Regulations of the Civil Service, H.D.1808. G.O. 54, 28.
4Brownrigg to Bathurst, 15 March 1815. C.O. 54, 55. At this time only two
Civil Servants, John D’Oyly, and lilliam Tolfrey, were proficient in the
Sinhalese language.See also Brownrigg to Bathurst,6Pebruary 1817.C.O.54, 65.
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hold an examination and to offer four monetary premiums to the success­
ful candidates. The most successful of them was, in addition, to be 
given the post of Chief Translator.^ This scheme underwent some modi­
fication, when the post of Chief Translator was abolished shortly after­
wards. But Brownrigg went ahead with the re£t of the plan increasing
2
the amount of the total premium. He also urged on the Secretary of 
State the idea of awarding two premiums annually to the two most success­
ful candidates at an examination confined to junior Civil Servants with
3
less than three years resident service.
After some postponements the first examination was eventually held 
with two Civil Servants appearing as candidates, the aaminers being John 
D’Oyly and the second and third Kaha Mudaliyars. The examiners reported 
that both candidates had attained a considerable proficiency in Sin­
halese, but that they had not become such ’complete masters' of it as
4to be no longer in need of assistance. Brownrigg divided the total mone­
tary premiums between the two, but failed to give these half successful 
Civil Servants, and others who watched them, the necessary encouragement
^Minute, 11 January 1817* C.O. 54f 65* The accumulated salary of the 
Chief Translator to Government, which had been vacant for some time,was 
divided into four premiums of £200, £150, £100 adn £50.
TIinute, 24 June 1819. C.O. 54, 74.
3
Ibid. Also, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 July 1819. C.O. 54> 74.
4
The examination consisted of two written translations from English Into 
Sinhalese, three from Sinhalese into English, a viva voce translations 
of a Sinhalese ola into English, and the examination of two Sinhalese 
parties in a complaint. Report of the examiners, 17 December 1819. C.O. 
54, 76.
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by decidedly preferring them in the Service, In fact, the most 
successful of the two complained that in his case even seniority 
which, as we shall see later, generally regulated promotions, was 
overlooked. Besides no more examinations were held till 1822.
The arrangements in this sphere generally suffered from the 
failure of the local Government and the Colonial Office to take a 
more realistic attitude. The local Government left too much option in 
the hands of the Civil Servants, perhaps out of consideration for them.
It failed to adopt an element of compulsion, by insisting on qualifi­
cations in the languages as a necessary condition for promotions. The 
Government also did not provide sufficient facilities for a study of 
the languages, nor did it make arrangements to hold regular examinations. 
The Colonial Office broke a long silence on the subject by taking a 
more unrealistic attitude. It held that honorary rewards in the manner 
of University degrees would provide better incentives than monetary 
premiums.^ It was only during the time of Barnes that a more realistic 
approach emerged. He stated that the only way to get the desired effect 
was to make the absence of a tolerable proficiency in the languages a
disqualification for employment in situations higher than that of Assist- 
2
ant. This view was accepted by the Secretary of State, on whose in­
struction Paget issued a minute in which there was a positive declar-
1Bathurst to Brownrigg, 10 March 1820. C.O. 55, 63.
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 23 November 1821. C.O. 54, 80.
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1
ation to the above effect* Though effectually stated this rule 
was, as we shall see later, not very effectually implemented.
The failure to promote the study of the native languages was 
partly the result of developments which took place with regard to 
promotions in the Service* Once the decision was taken that recruit­
ment to the Service would always be to the rank of Uriter it followed 
that future vacancies in the higher ranks would be filled by promotion 
from the lower. Dundas possessed decided opinions on the question of 
the exercise of the powers of promotion. He believed that the patrorgge 
of the Home Government should cease with the first appointment, and that
thereafter it should rest with the Governor on the spot, who was to act
2
according to his own discretion, judgment and responsibility* "Nothing
can be more unjust and heart-breaking to young men going to so great a
distance from their native country," he wrote, "than to labour under
the apprehension of having their service superceded by favour and in-
terest at home." Dundas only wished to keep the power of ratification
in the hands of the Secretary of State. But even with regard to this he
assured North that unless in case of manifest injustice, or abuse, it
4would seldom be exercised.
Hlinute, 23 September 1822. C.O. 54, 82.
2Dundas to North, 13 March 1801* C.O* 55, 61.
3Ibid.
4
Ibid.
Several factors appear to have led Dundas to this opinion.
Firstly, there was a belief in the success of a similar system in
India, where the Governors were allowed freedom in internal changes.^
Secondly, it was thought necessary in the interests of the efficiency
of the Service, as well as to maintain the authority of the Governor,
that the servants of the Government should look up to him with respect,
and that they should be made to feel that their rise would depend not
upon interest and solicitation at home, but upon ability and industry
2
which would be noticed by the Governor on the spot. A large scale 
interference with the internal arrangements made by the Governor, or 
a frequent reversal of his decisions, would certainly have embarrassed 
him, and affected his authority. In this matter the Colonial Office 
appears to have acted in the belief that it was necessary to suppress 
the natural desires of patronage in the interests of good government 
and security. Lastly, the most important factor was the difficulty of 
exercising this power from England. At a time when it took nearly 
six or seven months for a despatch from Ceylon to reach England, and a 
similar time for a reply to reach Ceylon, it was perhaps unavoidable 
that the representative on the spot would have to be given a discretionary 
power in such appointments. The same factor would have perhaps created 
a reluctance to reverse a Governor's decision, which was bound to occasion
1Dundas to North, 15 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
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much disappointment to individuals and even to complications in 
the administration*
The position laid down by Dundas was nn the whole maintained*
His determination not to appoint Civil Servants directly to a rank 
above that of Writer became virtually an unwritten law* Only two such 
appointments appear on the official records of this period and they 
occurred during the formative years ofthe Service*^ Though the Colonial 
Office required the Governor to submit for its ratification all the in­
ternal changes he bad made in the Service, it did not attempt any large
scale interference with them. It became the usual practice to confirm
2
all the changes. Only one case appears on record, where the Colonial 
Office exerted official pressure to reverse adecision made by the Gov- 
ernor. It is of course difficult to determine whether private communi­
cations played a part in the decisions taken by the Governor. It is 
likely that owing to the growing importance of seniority, of which we 
shall say more later, even such communications had little effect.
In spite of all this, however, fears of Colonial Office inter­
ference were not entirely absent. They arose partly from the fact that 
the Civil Servants who arrived in the Colony were well connected at home.
^The two appointments were: Saumarez appointed Vice-Treasurer in 3802 and
John Rodney appointed to the same office in 1804. See Hobart to North, 10 
August 1802. C.O. 55,61. North to Hobart, 25 September 1804. C.O. 54,14.
p
^This conclusion is drawn from examination of the official despatches of 
this period.
^The case was that of H,A.Marshall who had been under suspension for some 
time. Brownrigg showed a reluctance to appoint him as Comptroller-General 
of Customs, to which he laid claims on grounds of seniority. Marshall there­
upon made^direct^representations to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office 
ordered his appointment. For details of the case see Brownrigg to Liverpool
(cont.)
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These connections may have been -well known In the Colony. The C61on-
ial Office also sometimes made its interest in a Writer felt by issuing
a letter of recommendation, in which the Governor was merely asked to
show whatever 1 civilityT in his power whenever an opportunity afforded
it.'*' The climate of uncertainty created by these factors was perhaps
accentuated by the practice, which appears to have been prevalent among
the Civil Servants, of communicating privately either with their patrons
in England or with other persons of authority, stating supposed ii&istices 
2
or grievances. Although from the beginning the practice grew up for 
Civil Servants to make official representations to the Secretary of 
State through the Governor, and though the Colonial Office discouraged 
direct communications, attempts to lodge direct protests against a Gov­
ernor* s decision, or to ask for favours direct from the Colonial Office,
3
were not entirely absent. Such attempts were usually made when the 
Civil Servants were on leave of absence in England.
These factors undoubtedly made the grounds on which the Governor
stood somewhat uncertain. North perhaps dwelt amidst such uncertainty 
when he wrote home that Mit is impossible to employ the peculiar talents 
and to encourage the labours of the various Civil Servants, if they are
(cont.) 22 August 1812. C.O. 54, 44, and 1 August 1813. C.O. 54, 48.
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 5 April 1813, 30 July 1814 and 10 February 1815*
C.O. 55, 63.
**Tor one instance see Hobart to North, 14 March 1804* C.O. 55, 62.
2
The C.O. 54 Miscellaneous volumes, usually one volume for each year, 
contain many indications of such activity.
5Ibid.
chopped down or stretched out at home.*.1^  It is also seen by the
fact that Maitland sometimes considered it necessary to employ means
other than sending a public despatch to explain some of the changes
2
he had made or proposed in the Civil Service,
Some of the same factors appear to have made the Colonial Office
sensitive to a feeling that the Governors were susceptible to favouritism,
A certain amount of scepticism was indeed pardonable when there were
known cases where the Governors advanced the interests of friends and
relatives in the Colony. The private letters of North show that he was
maintaining a correspondence with friends and relatives in England,
especially his brother in law Lord Glenbervie, in which he reported the
progress of certain officials in whom they were interested. The latter
appears to have constantly been approached by persons appointed to Ceylon,
3
for letters of introduction to North. North undoubtedly had an inner
4
circle of favourites on whom benefits were bestowed whenever possible.
■^ North to Camden, 10 September 1805* C.O. 54, 17» and, 12 February 1805. 
C.O. 54, 17.
^Maitland made use of persons of influence returning to England, to ex­
plain to the Secretary of State certain changes that he had proposed 
in the personnel of the Civil Service. See Maitland to Arbuthnot, 50 
December 1806. C.O. 54, 23*
3
For such correspondence see North MS U471 C45*
4
”He is surrounded by a set of excellent men too viz Boyd, Blair, Garvin 
Hamilton, Jonville, Bertolacci, and then come his two sons Sylvester and 
George..* I think Robert and I stand a good change of being admitted into 
the cotteree above named; we are of it at present ex domiciles.M 
George Arbuthnot to Glenbervie 6 October 1801. North MS U71 C43*
u  I *  II
Maitland was known to have advanced some of his friends and relatives 
into higher positions, especially in the military services. Thus the 
Governors could not entirely escape from suspicions of favouritism, 
rightly or wrongly felt "both in England and in the Colony.
Another factor was that up to 1808 there were no rules at all 
to guide the Governor in the exercise of his powers. Though Dundas 
certainly expected North to draw up a set of rules by which he would 
be guided in making selections, his instructions on the subject were 
vague. It was stated that the Governor should select the officers most 
deserving and best qualified to discharge the duties of the several of­
fices "following as much as possible and with a due consideration and 
allowance for the different circumstances of Ceylon, the rules and re­
gulations established in Bengal...*"^ In Bengal the principle of senior­
ity had been established by the Charter Act of 1793 > and was intended to 
check favouritism. It was perhaps intended by Dundas that merit .as well 
as seniority should be weighed together in promotions. North however 
failed to draw any rules on the subject.
On account of all these factors the stage was set for a greater 
recognition of the principle of seniority in promotions. With varied in­
terests to satisfy, the Governor would have tended to fall back on senior­
ity as the safest mode of action, and as the one likefer to bring the least 
amount of dissatisfaction. The Civil Servants themselves, especially those
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
who considered themselves to he overlooked, were becoming seniority- 
conscious. The Colonial Office may have also beeninclined to favour 
this principle to avoid favouritism by the Governor, real or imaginary.
By the end of North's period, seniority had already begun to be 
the more important consideration in promotions. This perhaps accounted 
for the reforming mood in which Maitland claimed that at the very begin­
ning of his administration he explained to the Civil Servants that the 
nature of their advancement depended solely upon themselves. "Where 
they showed zeal and energy," he said, "they should be proportionately 
advanced, where they were indolent and inactive they should have no 
countenance under my Government."^" He asserted that "resting any kind
of weight upon mere seniority is a principle that never ought to be
2
admitted in the island of Ceylon."
The environment was however unsuitable for a reformer. A frequent 
disregard of seniority could only have brought about charges of favour­
itism, and would in fact have weakened the position of the Governor. Be­
sides, by drawing a list of Civil Servants according to their rank,
which was forwarded to the Governor for his information in 1507, the
3
Colonial Office laid more emphasis on seniority. As it appeared from 
this list that the standing of some of the Civil Servants was different 
from what it was hitherto understood to be in the Colony, Maitland
Hlaitland to Camden, 19 October 1805. C.O. 54, 18.
Slaitland to Robert Peel, 16 October 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
3
Bdward Cooke to Maitland, 11 June 1807. C.O. 54, 27.
328
circulated it among them and invited representations from those 
who conceived that a mistake had been made with regard to their 
rank.^ There was thus a considerable amount of discussion about 
the rank of Civil Servants, with the result that the Governor, as 
well eb the Civil Servants, became more seniority conscious than 
ever before.
These difficulties in making changes of personnel in the Ser­
vice appear to have tempted Maitland to rectify North's omission to 
draw rules for the guidance of the Governor in arranging promotions.
He divided the Civil Service into three classes and fixed rules of 
promotion from one class to another. The first class of the Service 
was to consist of the five highest offices, which were to be the 
final objects of ambition of the whole Service. The offices placed 
in this class were the Chief Secretary, the Revenue Commissioner,
Vice-Treasurer and Accountant-General, Civil Auditor General, and Civil
2
and Military-Paymaster-General. Later the offices of Comptroller- 
General of Customs and the Resident at Kandy were added to this class. 
The second class of the Service was to consist of twehty five offices. 
All the Collectors and Provincial Judges, the Superintendent of the
^"Circular, ND 1807. C.O. 54, 29. It appears from the replies received 
that in the Colonial Office seniority list, those appointed at the 
time of the establishment of the Civil Service were given rank above 
those in employment from 1798 and subsequently absorbed into it. See 
memorials of ; Marshall, Bertolacci, and Lusignan. C.O. 54, 29.
2
General Regulations of the Civil Service, ND. 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
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cinnamon department, the Deputy Secretary, Commissioner of stamps, 
the Custom Master of Colombo, the Sitting Magistrates of Colombo and 
Jaffna, the first Assistant in the Chief Secretary’s office and the 
Assistant in the Revenue Commissioner’s office were placed in this 
class. Later the Judicial and Revenue Commissioners in Kandy and 
the Agents at Sabaragamuwa and Seven Morales were added on to it. The 
third class of the Service was to consist of twelve junior offices, 
mostly the Assistant offices wherever they were retained.^"
No Civil Servant was to be eligible for promotion to the first 
class unless he had served over seven of eight years in the island.
To hold an office in the second class it was necessary to have three 
years service in the island. The term of service was to be calculated 
from the time of arrival in the island, and leave of absence in Europe 
was not to be considered as being part of this period. As an encourage­
ment to study the native languages, it was stipulated that an cfficer 
of the third class, who had attained proficiency in them, would be 
eligible for promotion to the second class in two years, while an officer
of the second class, who had attained higher proficiency, was to be eli-
2
gible for promotion to the first class in six years. It should be 
noted that this scheme placed revenue and judicial officers on one scale 
of promotions, thus putting an end to any idea of a separate judicial 
service.
General Regulations of the Civil Service, ND 1808. C.O. 54, 28.
2Ibid.
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Maitland1s rules have the appearance of making a fair balance 
between the claims of seniority and those of merit. They positively 
recognized seniority and also provided for merit promotions in the case 
of proficiency in the native languages. Besides, when it was know 
that a good number in the second class, who had completed seven years 
service, would compete with each other for the few posts in the first 
class, and that those in the third class, who had completed three years, 
would compete for each vacancy in the second class, the rules appear 
to have left considerable freedom of choice to the Governor, It should 
also be noted that there were variations of salaries and other advant­
ages among offices belonging to the same class, so that here too the 
Governor was left with much freedom to favour or disfavour particular 
individuals,
Maitland7s rules, however, failed to arrest the tendency for senior­
ity to predominate in promotions. It was accentuated when during the 
second decade of the 19th century the Civil Servants became more con­
scious of the advantages to be derived from the Service, As we have seen, 
the prohibition of private trading had the effect of making the Civil 
Servants look to the Service alone for the realization of their aspira­
tions. ^ One significant result of this was that a competition developed 
among them to secure the higher places in the Service. This competition 
instead of taking the very desirable and healthy form of trying to display
■^ See p. 2.1
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superior merit, turned into a very inconvenient discussionfsf each 
others claims based on seniority*
The extent to which seniority became important is reflected in 
the discussions that took place as to what constituted seniority.
Such points as whether leave of absence in England or temporary suspen­
sion involved loss of seniority, and whether the arrival of one Civil 
Servant before the other, when both were appointed by the same despatch, 
or even whether the occurrence of one name before the other in the des­
patch conveying the appointment, gave one seniority over another were 
disputed, urged as claims for promotion, and were taken into considera­
tion by the Governor.^ It was no small wonder that Brownrigg could cry 
in despair, ”1 have ever found it a hopeless and thankless task,” he 
wrote, "to endeavour to reconcile the claims of contending candidates
and quite endless to attempt solving the ingenious arguments by which
2
each would prefer himself to his competitor,”
To asroid some of these discussions, Barnes drew up a new list of
Civil Servants in the order in which they were nominated and urged that
3
they be ranked accordingly. This was approved by the Colonial Office 
which ruled that when more than one appointment took place by the same 
despatch, they should take rank according to the time of their arrival
For some details of such discussion see Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 
1817. C.O. 54, 65. There were several instances which showed that the 
above factors were weighed in arranging promotions. See Brownrigg to 
Bathurst, 5 February 1814. C.O. 54, 51. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 November 
1817. C.O. 54, 66.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 November 1817. C.O, 54, 66.
-^ Barnes to Bathurst, 25 November 1821. C.O. 54, 80.
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and the commencement of duties, and that if they arrived together 
by their respective ages.^ Though these steps removed the inconvenience 
and embarrassment involved in the discussion of the relative seniority 
of Civil Servants, they led to a stricter compliance with it in pro­
motions.
The Governor naturally found himself almost helplessly placed amidst 
the claims and counter-claims of this privileged group of public servants# 
It was only in A; few appointments to the ICandyan country, and that too 
after much hesitation and explanations, which stressed the needto be 
more careful in selecting officers to serve there, that Brownrigg and
2
Barnes were able to exercise some discretion, and overlook seniority.
The weakness of their position is seen by the fact that they considered 
it necessary to give the reasons for their selections by way of minutes 
addressed to tie Civil Servants. Barnes went to the extent of asserting 
that "he recognizes no obligation ... to promote Civil Servants with
Zf
reference alone to their seniority..."' He was however not seriously 
disposed to overturn it, for he informed the Secretary of State tlat he 
had exercised a discretion in favour of the Civil Servants appointed to 
the Kandyan county, on the understanding that they were not to look for-
5
ward to any further superior offices in precedence to their seniors.
1Bathurst to Paget, 16 July 1822. C.O. 55, 66.
2See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 5 June 1816. C.O. 54, 61. Also, Barnes to 
Bathurst, 7 September 1821 C.O. 54, 80.
■^ See Brownrigg to Bathurst,28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65. Also, Barnes 
to Bathurst, 7 September 1821. C.O. 54, 80.
4I'linute, 13 August 1821. C.O. 54,80.
r “
-^ Barnes to Bathurst,7 September 1821. C.O. 54,80.
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While the Governor was thus subjected to the rule of seniority, 
it became the duty of the Colonial Office to resist it, however feebly
and ineffectively. nI desire that it may be distinctly understood by
the Civil Servants,” wrote Bathurst, "that I can never allow seniority 
alone to be an irresistible claim to promotions. The Governor of the 
Colony, being responsible for the due execution of the public service, 
he must necessarily in his selection of the Civil Servants, be guided 
not merely by their relative seniority, but by his own sense of their 
qualifications for particular employments or by their general aptitude 
for public business.”^  It was however too late to arrest the tendencies 
that had set in.
At the time of the formation of the Civil Service, the gift of
the Colonial Office to what it considered an inadequate salaries was
a favourable retirement and pensions scheme. Dundas,who originated the 
idea, specifically stated that considering the small scale on which it 
was proposdd to regulate the salaries of Civil Servants, some arrange­
ment ought to be made with a view to making a provision for their re- 
2
treat. He also thought that to induce Civil Servants to look forward 
to a ’certain and competent independence’ after a given number of years 
service, was the best security against abuse. Pensions were to be
■^ Bathurst to Barnes, 25 July 1823. C.O. 55, 66.
2
Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61. 
?ma.
i
ij
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proportionate to the duration and importance of the services rendered.
As regards duration, Dundas thought that it should neither be too 
short nor too long. The former defect, he thought, would not only 
expose the State to great expense, but would also deprive it of ex­
perienced Civil Servants, while the latter would expose the Civil Ser- 
| vants to ’great severity', and ’’extinguish those feelings of expecta­
tion, which are the best incentives to integrity, and zeal, and lead 
them either to indifference in the discharge of their duties, or to 
acquire the means of returning to Europe by less honourable pursuits”.^
2The Colonial Office drew up a plan in accordance with these ideas. 
According to this it was proposed to create a Civil Fund, which was to 
be managed by a committee of trustees, consisting of the Chief Secret­
ary, the President of the Board of Revenue, and three other persons to 
be named by the Governor. An annual payment was to be made to this fund 
from the revenues of Ceylon, equal in amount to ten per cent of the ag­
gregate of all the salaries paid to the Civil Servants, the Government 
reserving the right to discontinue such payment. A similar amount was 
to be credited to the fund out of the deductions from the salaries of 
the Civil Servants. As a means of augmenting the fundthe committee was 
empowered to lend its money at interest not exceeding twelve per cent. 
The pensions to be paid from the fund were to be proportioned according 
to the length of service and the rank ofthe office. After twelve years
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61.
2
Hobart to North, 8 February 1803. C.O. 55, 61.
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of service Civil Servants holding offices bringing salaries of £3000
per annum were to be entitled to a pension of £700 per annum, those
with salaries of £2000 per annum were to have £600 per annum, and those
with salaries of £1500 per annum were to have £500 per annum. Juniors
who rare appointed Writers in the first instance were to have the option
of retiring after twelve years of service with a pension of £400 per
annum. This was to be advanced to the amount of the pension attached
to the highest office they may have attained at the time of retirement.
Another means of increasing the amount of the pension was by prolonging
the duration of service. Those who completed fifteen years of service
were to be entitled to a pension of £500 per annum irrespective of the
situation which they held. This was to increase to £600 per annum by
a further three years' service.^
Closely related to the pension scheme was a system of furlough.
Though the climate of Ceylon was recognized to be less prejudicial to
Europeans, and though the short term of service required from the Civil
Servants perhaps removed the need for such a provision, it was thought
necessary, as in India, to give the Civil Servants an opportunity of
returning to England on leave of absence. It was therefore provided
that they would be allowed a furlough for two years at any time within
the twelve years, with the facility of drawing during this period an
2
allowance of £300 per annum from the civil fund.
^Hobart to North, 8 February 1803* C.O. 55, 61.
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801. C.O. 55, 61. Also, Hobart to North,
8 February 1803. C.O. 55, 61.
The pension scheme was naturally well received by the Civil 
Servants and the Governor. North, who had earlier stated the opinion 
that twenty to twenty five years' service shouldbe required from the 
Civil Servants, raised no objections to the new scheme.^ Instead he 
thanked Lord Hobart for the attention he had shown to the Civil Ser­
vants of his government, and expressed the hope that it would not fail
to animate them with "the most ardent zeal in the performance of their 
2
duty". The Civil Servants considered it a 'liberal' measure, and when
North gave them the option of deciding whether to contribute to the fund
3
or not, nearly all of them opted to contribute. The only significant 
change which took place in the implementation of the schene during the 
time of North concerned the management of the fund. Basing himself on 
•the ground that the money belonging to the fund could not be invested in 
the Colony, and that sufficient security cannot be obtained when it is 
lent out, North initiated the practice of receiving it in the Government 
Treasury, and issuing debentures at nine per cent interest. As we shall 
see later this practice had an important effect on the development of 
the fund.
^North to Hobart, 16 March 1802. C.O. 54, {>•
^North to Hobart, 1 January 1804, C.O. 54, 1 3 • 
3
The expectations of some of them were not satisfied even by such a 
favourable scheme. They asked for the privilege of retiring after five 
years. Memorial of Arbuthnot and others, C.O. 54, 13.
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The prominent feature of the pension scheme thus established 
was the facility given for early retirement* The inducements that 
were held out for the prolongation of services covered adequately 
only those who failed to reach situations of £1500 and above within 
the first twelve years of service. Such persons would perhaps be in­
duced to stay, either in expectation of a higher situation and its 
accompanyingpension, or purely for the sake of a higher pension*
Those who reached situations of £1500 within the first twelve years 
would be induced to prolong their stay only by the expectation of 
situations of £2000,which were so few in number. The only means of 
augmenting their pension left to those who reached the latter situations 
was to be appointed to the office of Chief Secretary in the Colony.
This was indeed a far more remote hope. By facilitating early re­
tirements the pension scheme thus tended to destroy the main purpose 
for which a separate Civil Service was desired - that is specialization 
in "the conditions of Ceylon. One can peihaps detect here a concealed 
desire at the Colonial Office for the early retirement of seniors so as 
to ensure the quicker promotion of juniors.
This aspect of the scheme naturally attracted the attention of 
Ilaitland, when he was in a reforming mood. As the period when the Civil 
Servants would be retiring had not yet arrived, he did not actually ex­
perience the difficulties that he anticipated. However, he expressed 
his views quite frankly and fearlessly when he discussed the probable 
combined effects of the system of recruitment and retirement.
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•’My objections arise,” he wrote, ”on the one hand 
out of the Civil Servant’s youth originally, but still 
more out of his youth when his service is over. The 
first naturally renders him useless for the first years 
of his service, the last leads him to consider his whole 
service here not as a completion of a life of business 
by gaining a moderate independence, but as a kind of dis­
gusting but necessary prelude to deciding what line of 
life he will adopt. For the first six years we naturally 
have not much to look for from him; in the last six years 
he looks at nothing, and thinks of nothing, but when his 
time will be up, and just at the period oflife when his 
services are most valuable, when the idleness and dissi­
pation of youth have subsided, when we have a right to ex­
pect, and he the power of rendering essential service to 
Government, just at that period he is in fact enticed to 
quit the service and to look elsewhere.
The most certain remedy was to lengthen the period of service,
with or without an increase of the amount'; of penion. This was sug-
«*'•
gested by Maitland, and later by A. Bertolacci, a retired Civil Ser- 
vant. Maitland pointed out tlxt it could be carried out without any 
difficulty in the instance of all new appointments. Perhaps because 
of an awareness that the proposal would not be acceptable to the Col­
onial Office, he also suggested an alternative. He said that the Gov­
ernor should be armed with the power to retain the services of a Civil 
Servant for a period of two or three years or till the end of his term
"^Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54» 28.
2
Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54» 28. Bertolacci 
suggested that the Civil Servants should be enabled to lengthen their 
services up to twenty one years, and that those who had become entitled 
to pensions of £400 and £500, should be enabled to increase them by £100 
for every three years of protracted service. Those entitled to pensions 
of £600 and £700 were to be enabled to increase them by £125 and £150 
for every three years. Bertolacci, Agricultural, Commercial and Financial 
interests of Ceylon, pp. 406-454.
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as Governor by paying him both pension and salary.^ He argued that 
this proposal did not involve additional expenses because with the 
retirement of a Civil Servant another would have to take his place.
The only difference would be that the wame amount of money that 
would be paid to two persons would in such instances be paid to one.
He was aware that it would temporarily stop the advancement of the 
juniors, but believed that it was a minor consideration when compared 
with the benefits that would be gained by retaining experienced offi­
cers. I-Ie thought that by making it an optional power the risk of this 
benefit falling into the hands of unsuitable persons would be avoided,
while all the Civil Servants would be made to look to the Governor
2
as the medium through which it could be obtained.
The Colonial Office was not faced with alternatives that would 
have been equally beneficial. One was the most certain remedy for the 
problem, while the other could have brought about only temporary bene­
fits at the risk of granting the Governor powers difficult to exercise 
and liable to abuse. However it decided on the latter, and give Mait- 
land's successor the power to adopt it. The reason given for this 
decision was that it did not impose additional 'obligations' on the
4
Civil Servants, and that it did not involve further expenses. As the
1
Maitland to Castlereagh,17 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28. Also, Maitland 
to Robert Peel, 17 October 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
2
Maitland to Castlereagh, 17 August 1808. C.O. 54, 28. Also, Maitland 
to Robert Peel, 17 October 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
^Liverpool to Brownrigg, 5 November 1811. C.O. 55, 62.
4Ibid.
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period of service required for retirement could also have been 
lengthened without incurring additional expenses, it must be sup­
posed that the real difficulty was the unwillingness to impose addi­
tional obligation s on the Civil Servants.
The worst fears of Maitland that the Civil Service would become 
a prelude to another career did not however materialise in practice* 
V/hen the time at which Civil Servants were eligible for retirement 
arrived in the second decade of the 19th century, most of them dis­
played an unwillingness to retire early. Several factors accounted 
for this reluctance. Firstly, there was the tendency already noticed 
for the Civil Servants to turn towards the Service for the realization 
of their aspirations.'*’ Secondly, there seem to have been little pros­
pects for retired Civil Servants to build careers elsewhere. A few
attempts were indeed made in this direction. One Civil Servant for
2
instance unsuccessfully applied for re-employment elsewhere. Some ap­
plied to draw their pensions, while residing in Ceylon or at the Cape
of Good Hope as speculators. Though originally refused this was sub- 
sequently allowed. There were however almost none to follow them.
On the whole those who wished to retire early seem to have been faced 
with the prospect of idleness at too early a period of life. This is
■*"See pj 2.R5, 330-
2
Bertolacci to Huskisson, 15 July 1814* C.O. 54, 54*
3
For some instances see Bathurst to Barnes, 16 May 1825. C.O. 55, 66.
Goulburn to Tolfrey, 31 July 1817. C.O. 54, 64.
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seen from the unsuccessful attempts of two retired Civil Servants 
to re-join the Service. Thirdly, there was the fact that inost.
Civil Servants failed to make the much desired fortunes. This should 
be viewed with the desire that must have been prevalent at the time 
to live up to the social status demanded by family connections, or 
to that of a retired colonial servant. Besides, such factors as the 
cost of living in England may have entered into their calculations.
The attempts to secure additional advantages from the Service, 
as well as the reluctance to retire early, were well marked in the 
numerous claims that were put forward by the Civil Servant^ and ii 
certain practices - which developed. These claims were usually made in­
dividually because the means of success was still thought to be found 
in the ability to win the favour of the Governor and the Secretary of 
State. It was only towards the end of this period that a successful 
collective effort was made.
The discussion of these claims took place amidst the general 
need for economy which we have already noticed. This need was all the 
most important with regard to claims on the pension fund because of 
a change that had occurred in its nature. North’s measure of accepting 
the money belonging to the fund in the Government Treasury paved the 
way for the destruction of its real and independent existence. Mait­
land discontinued the practice of issuing debentures for the funds 
deposited with the Government, but failed to make alternative arrange­
ments to maintain a separate fund or to devise other means of augmentin
it. By 1815 the Government had even ceased to contribute the dona­
tions fixed by the original constitution of the fund, when the future 
of the fund came up for discussion in this year, Brownrigg did not 
recommend its reversion to its original footing. Instead he urged 
a logical step further in the direction in which developments had taken 
place by recommending that an account of the fund should be kept by 
the Government, which merely showed on one side the amount of donations 
and stoppages, and on the other the amount of the pension paid.^- The 
Colonial Office rightly viewed the question as one affecting the ori­
ginal principles of the fund and the interests of its subscribers.
"It was important to them,” wrote Bathurst, "to have a constant record 
of the principles on which their pensions rested, and not to receive
a pension for which they had paid the price of a reduced salary, as
2
a pure gratuity from the Government." However the Colonial Office as 
well as the local Government failed to make the fund once more real 
and independent. The money belonging to it continued to remain with 
the Government, the civil fund committee maintaining paper accounts of 
them. The committee ceased to interest itself in finding ways and means 
of augmenting the fund, resting on the guarantee given by the Government 
for the payment of the pensions. Thus pensions virtually became a Gov­
ernment responsibility.
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 August 1814. C.O. 54, 52.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 10 Hay 1815. C.O. 55, 63.
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The claims that were put forward by the Civil Servants oc­
casioned much discussion in the Colony. Brownrigg found, much to 
his annoyance, that the civil fund committee consisting of Civil Ser­
vants, was inclined to consider itself as vested with original deliber­
ative power as regards claims on the fund.'*' He found that without his 
knowledge the committee had answered in writing questions submitted by 
the Civil Servants on the construction of various clauses in Lord Hob­
art1 s despatch, thereby sometimes bringing about a premature discussion
of points which could finally be settled only by a reference to the
2
Home Government, In the course of giving opinions on the questions 
that were deliberated, some members had made remarks on the merits of 
o.ther Civil Servants thereby bringing about illwill between individuals. 
On account of these difficulties, and tailing into consideration the 
fact that the civil fund had ceased to have an independent existence, 
Brownrigg suggested that the committee should be requested to lodge
4
its correspondence in the Chief Secretary's office. But the Colonial
Office still held to the original principles of the fund and regarded
the committee as a body of ’private individuals' wTho had the duty of
5superintending its accumulation. It instructed the Governor to submit
1Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 August 1814. C.O. 54, 52.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 18 ITovember 1816, C.O. 54, 62.
Tbid.
4Ibid.
53athurst to Brownrigg, 10 Kay 1815. C.O. 55, 63.
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all claims on the fund to the committee before they were forwarded
to the Secretary of State*^ Some of the difficulties experienced
by the Governor were removed by making its proceedings secret, and
by laying down the rule that its decisions should be communicated by
2
the Governor's authority.
Though the Governor thus felt the full force of the claims made 
by the Civil Servants, and consequently much anxiety and embarrassment, 
he had the comparatively easy mode open to him of recommending a claim 
and sending it to the Colonial Office for a final decision* The Colonial 
Office, as in other matters concerning the Civil Service, was torn be­
tween two worlds. On the one hand it could not entirely avoid consider­
ing the cases that came for decision, as matters of patronage. When it 
is known tb£t some of the applications were supported by persons of in­
fluence the temptations were indeed very great. Some of them were based 
on precedents which had occurred at a time when the Colonial Office had 
been too free with its patronage. On the other hand the Colonial Office 
had to pay sufficient heed to the new forces working towards economy 
and efficiency. Though the claims were made individually they could no 
longer be viewed in that manner. Experience showed that the sanction 
given to a particular claim gave rise to others or to the adoption of a 
general practice. Concessions which had been allowed earlier as personal
"^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 30 August 1815. C.O. 55, 63.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 23 January 1817. 0.0. 55, 63. Also, Brownrigg
to Civil Ikmd Committee, 5 April 1818, C.O. 54, 71.
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favours were not being "cited, as rules for future decision1' "Re­
quests of this nature," wrote Bathurst, on one occasion, "only prove 
the impropriety of ever having admitted a deviation from the rules
of the pension fund and indicate more strongly the necessity of adhering
2
literally to them." Besides, some of the questions that cropped up in­
volved a choice between favouring those already in the Service by en­
couraging them to stay longer, or creating the opportunity of making 
new appointments. Some of them also involved choosing between the sen­
iors and the juniors already in the Service.
One question that was discussed arose from the fact that the ori­
ginal scheme had not provided for an augmentation of pension, purely
on account of protracted service, to those who had become entitled to
3
pensions of £500, £600 and £700, at the end of twelve years. The un­
willingness of those who had reached the first class to retire early, 
and the consequent poor prospects of promotion experienced by those in 
the second class, raised the questinn whether a Civil Servant who was 
entitled to a pension of £500 per annum at the end of twelve years, could
extend his service by another three years and become entitled to one of 
_ 4
£600 per annum. The civil fund committee ruled that the original scheme
"^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 8 August 1816. C.O. 55, 63.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 30 August 1815. C.O. 55, 65.
'’See p. >31.
4
Memorial of Richardson, 9 October 1817. C.O. 54, 66.
gave this "benefit only to those who had become entitled to a pension 
of £400 per annum at the end of twelve years’^ This ruling prevailed 
throughout this period. Though this was an important matter which 
called for reform, and though certam proposals were placed before the 
Colonial Office by a retired Civil Servant, it took no notice of them.
The above decision led to the question whether a Civil Servant 
could cease to contribute to the civil fund after the expiration of 
txv~elve years while still remaining in the Service. The civil fund com­
mittee, in spite of its responsibility to see to the augmentation of 
the fund, ruled that a Civil Servant had the option of stopping his 
contribution on the understanding that by doing so he would be ex­
cluded from acquiring a higher pension should he succeed to a higher 
3
office. This seems to have been accepted for it became the general
practice for Civil Servants to exercise this option after twelve years
service. It became a calculation especially among those who had reached
situations of £1500 and £2000, who had very little prospects of further
promotion, and who had also to contribute on larger salaries for un-
4certain periods, to cease their contributions.' One effect of this 
was that the civil fund ceased to draw its best subscriptions and this
■^Proceedings-.of the Civil Fund Committee, 6 March 1811. C.O. 54, 62.
2
See footnote on p. 33 £*
3
Proceedings of the Civil Fund Committee, 6 March 1816. C.O. 54, 62.
4 •Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 August 1814. C.O, 54, 52.
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eventually made its paper accounts look poorer. But it strengthened 
the tendency for senior Civil Servants to prolong their service in 
the Colony.
The power given to the Governor to retain Civil Servants hy
paying both pension and salary became a subject of controvery. Though
this was meant to bo a discretionary power in the hands of the Governor,
the Civil Servants were turning it into a right, as is evident from the
memorials that were sent claiming this privilege. The Colonial Office was
at first inclined to confirm it. It even approved the claims of two Civil
Servants without a definite recommendation from the Governor in their 
1
favour. Subsequently, it decided to apply to Ceylon the rule adopted 
for England by Parliament that one half of the pension to which a per­
son was entitled would abate if such a person held an office under Gov-
2
eminent of equal or greater emoluments. Brownrigg, on the other hand,
was for a time undecided whether to exercise this power or not. Ee was
at first contemplating ways and means of deriving its benefits "without
adopting a distinction liable to be thought invidious to the Service in 
3
general". But finally he decided to resign the discretionary power
vested in him and did not even carry out the two cases already sanctioned
4by the Colonial Office. In the face of objections from the Governor,
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 8 August 1816. C.O. 5 5 , 65.
2
Bathurst to.Brownrigg, 9 November 1819* C.O. 5 5, 65.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 August 1813. C.O. 54, 48.
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
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it was clearly not possible for the Colonial .^Office to abide by its
earlier decision, even if it had wished. Accordingly instructions
were issued that no pensions should in future be paid till a Civil
Servant had actually retired from the Service, though there was to be
no objection to those entitled to retirement continuing in it.^
The attitude of the Governor is partly explained by the need for
economy which he faced, and which was so often pressed upon him by
the Colonial Office. Brownrigg was also conscious that pensions were
now not paid from an actual fund, but had become a charge nn the revenue,
2which had little to spare. It also reflected the fact that it was no
longer necessary to adopt: such expedients to retain Civil Servants.
The more important reason however was the difficulty of exercising this
power in a small Service consisting of well connected Civil Servants.
However justly and impartially it might be used, it would always be much
3
open to tie accusation of favour. Besides, however much it afforded the
chance of retaining the services of experienced men, yet it would have
made the Service less desirable to the juniors, by diminishing their
4
chances of promotion. On this question both the Governor and the Col­
onial Office had to choose between favouring the seniors or the juniors
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 17 April 1819. C.O. 55, 63.
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 August 1813. C.O. 54, 48.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 16 July 1818. C.O. 54, 71.
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in the Service, and the choice fell upon "the latter,
Brownrigg was however much in favour of other connected claims.
For a long time it was generally understood in the Colony that Civil
1
Servants were eligible for leave in terms of Lord Hobart’s rule,
2
only within the first twelve years of service. But on the strength 
of the sanction given by the Colonial Office to a leave application 
from a person who had completed twelve years’ service, it became a 
general practice for Civil Servants to obtain leave either before or
3
after the completion of this period of service. This development had 
the effect of encouraging the seniors to return to the Service,
It immediately led to another claim as it appearsthat the Civil 
Servants who were entitled to retirement considered the furious allow­
ance of £300 per annum insufficient. Brownrigg sanctioned the payment 
of the amount of pension to such a Civil servant going on leave of ab­
sence,^- (£600 per annum). In effect this amounted to his retirement 
with the option of returning to the Service in two years. This particular
payment was approved by the Colonial Office. Brownrigg then signified
his intention of making it a general rule stating that it was 'just and 
reasonable’ to allow it.^ The Colonial Office gave the subject more
1See p, 33*i 
2
Proceedings of the Civil Fund Committee, 6 March 1816. C.O. 54, 62.
3
Bee Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 March 1815* C.O, 54, 55. Also, Bathurst
to Brownrigg, 10 October 1815. C.O. 55, 63.
4Brownrigg to Bathurst, 6 February 1816. C.O. 54, 59*
5Bathurst to Brownrigg, 5 August 1816, C.O. 55, 63.
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 February 1817. C.O. 54, 65.
'mature’ deliberation and finally withheld its sanction from the 
proposal. Apart from considering the payment of pensions till the 
date of actual retirement improper, the Colonial Office once again 
faced the need for economy as well as the task of choosing between 
the seniors and the juniors in the Service.
An entirely new benefit that was conferred on the Service after 
the first successful collective effort by the Civil Servants was the 
establishment of the widow's fund. From the time of North, when the 
Colonial Office was more free with its patronage, it became the prac­
tice for tie Governor to recommend, and the Colonial Office to sanction, 
the payment of pensions to widows of Civil Servants who had died in the 
Service.^ The first payment became a precedent for others until Brown­
rigg, who was faced with a need for economy, asked for instructions for
his future guidance, pointing outihat it was a burden which was becoming
2
more serious every year. The Colonial Office hesitated for a while be­
cause it found it difficult to resist claims that were strengthened 
by precedents, and perhaps by actual distress. It noted that it was a 
matter too serious to be adopted without absolute necessity, but failed 
to give definite instructions. Subsequently, it expressed itself 
against the adoption of a general rule that the family of every Civil
^See Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April 1813. 0.0. 54, 47.
2Ibid.
3
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 18 February 1814. C.O. 55, 63.
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Servant was entitled to a permanent provision at the expense of the
Colony, and instructed that in no case was the Governor in future to
1
grant such a pension for a longer period than two years. By 1819,
the financial factor was too important even for such a concession.
As such, on the occasion of another claim, Bathurst stated that it
was ’’absolutely necessary to make a stand against perpetuating a charge
of this nature”, and he saw no better mode of making that determination
2
known to the Civil Servants, than by refusing it.
The attitude taken by the Colonial Office seems to have led 
the Civil Servants to think in terms of establishing a widow's pension 
fund. The idea originated with Bertolacci who claimed that he had urged 
it on Brownrigg while all the others were indifferent to it. Subse­
quently, he drew up a detailed plan and incorporated it in his book
3
which was published about this time. Attempts to draw the attention 
of the Colonial Office to this plan did not succeed, and the matter re­
mained in abeyance till it was revived in 1820. A day before his depart­
ure from Ceylon, Brownrigg forwarded a plan drawn by the Civil Servants
to establish a widow’s pension fund. It was perhaps Brownrigg’s part­
ing gift to the Civil Service, and he urged it on the ground that the 
salaries of the Civil Servants, especially those who did not have the
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 20 August 1817. C.O. 55, 65.
^Bathurst to Brownrigg, 20 March 1820. C.O. 55, 65.
3
Bertolacci, A. Agricultural, Commercial, and Financial interests of 
I Ceylon, p.425.
1
i
1
i
chance of rising to higher situations, were too small to enable them
1to make provision for their families. He also stated that this was a 
means of avoiding frequent applications for relief. This plan was ap­
proved by the Colonial Office with slight modifications thus adding 
another privilege to the Service,
’’Although the plan if carried into effect most produce
an annual increase of the expenditure,0 wrote Bathurst,
”... yet I am not disposed on that account to object 
to it, or to deny that the augmentation of expense is 
compensated by the advantages which will accrue from 
its establishment both to the comfort of the Civil Ser­
vants and to the credit of the Government,”
As finally adopted the plan provided for the establishment of a 
fund from the subscriptions of the Civil Servants and Government don­
ations. Harried subscribers were to pay an annual subscription of £24 
per annum during the period of their 'natural lives’, while unmarried
subscribers were to pay £10 per annum during the same period. In addi
tion married subscribers on becoming members, or unmarried subscribers 
on getting married, or widowers on getting re-married, were to pay a 
fine fixed by a table calculated according to the difference in ages 
between the husband and wife. Pensions of Z J G Q  per annum were to be 
paid from the sixth year of the inauguration of the fund. Only widows 
of those who had paid six years subscription were to be entitled to 
pensions. But married subscribers on becoming members, and unmarried
■^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 1 November 1820. C.O. 55» 66. 
2
Bathurst to Barney 1 November 1820. C.O. 55, 66,
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subscribers on getting married, were to have the option of paying 
six years subscription all at once to ensure pensions for their 
widows. Those above sixty years of age were not to be allowed to be­
come members. If the death of a Civil Servant was to take place within 
the first six years,the widow was to be paid an allowance of £150 per 
annum till the sixth year. But in the case of such an event the mem­
bers were to pay additional subscriptions.^ The above system of sub­
scriptions shows that much greater care was taken to see that the new 
fund would not become as great a financial burden as the former one.
For the same reason the Colonial Office insisted that the subscriptions 
should be paid with such additional amounts as would enable the money 
to be remitted to the Agent in London at the prevailing rate of ex­
change. The latter was to ensure the accumulation of the fund by in-
2
vesting the money in England.
The chief feature of the Service thus established was its ex­
clusive character. Thile the manner of recruitment and promotions dir­
ectly led to the establishment of the exclusive principle, the other 
privileges attached to the Service recognized its existence and in turn 
strengthened it. It became accepted that only a person who had secured 
an appointment from the Secretary of State belonged to the Civil Service.. 
The prohibition against local recruitment to offices considered as be-
1See Bathurst to Paget, 17 July 1822. C.O. 55, 66.
2
Bathurst to Paget, 1 November 1820 and 17 July 1822. C.O. 55, 66.
354
longing to the Civil Service almost invariably established the rule 
that vacancies would be filled from among those in the Service.
The salary structure was based on the assumption that only persons 
sent from England would be found in the Service. It brought about so 
wide a gap between Civil Service salaries and those of other local 
employees that it added a strong reason to safeguard the privileged 
and exclusive character of the Service. Similarly the pension scheme 
not only became a highly valued privilege attached to the Service, 
but also a mark which distinguished a Civil Servant from any other 
employee. Xji appointment from the Secretary of State, the enjpyment 
of a comparatively high salary, promotions to the higher offices of 
the State which carried with them superior powers, the exclusive right 
of contributing to the civil fund, and as we shall see later, a privi­
leged position in society became the chief attributes of a Civil Servant.
The rules that brought about an exclusive Service were put to 
several tests. The rule of recruitment in England underwent a test on 
account of the desire on the part of the Governors to secure employment 
to certain Englishmen who accompanied them to the Colony in expectation 
of it.^ The usual mode of action was to give them employment in a lower 
situation and thus establish a claim for absorption in the Civil Ser­
vice. The pressure on patronage in England occasionally compelled the 
Colonial Office also to send some without regular appointments to the
■^ See Kaitland to Robert Peel, 16 October 1811. C.O. 54, 41. Liverpool
to Brownrigg, 5 November 1811. C.O. 55, 62, for some instances.
Civil Service, but with letters of recommendation introducing them to
the Governor’s favourable attention. The distinction between a Civil
Service and a non-Civil Service appointment was too clear for such
persons not to aspire to the former. The rules of the Civil Service
prevented their promotion to situations which carried with them higher
salaries, power and status in the Colony. They seem to have felt the
exclusion in other ways too. J. ¥. Bennett, one of those sent by the
Secretary of State without a regular appointment found that it affected
his social life in the Colony.
"Being one of the few gentlewomen by birth and education 
in Ceylon," he wrote, "my wife’s society was courted by 
everyone, and by many who pretended to feel honoured by 
her acquaintance. But no sooner had your Lordship’s des­
patch reached Ceylon, and it became known that I was not 
confirmed to general service, but to the lowest of all 
colonial appointments, and inferior to the many held by
the lowest class of society in the Colony, than the man­
ners of people assumed a different complexion, and my 
wife was, with myself, condemned to feel the degrading dif-  ^
ference between the Civil Service and a colonial appointment."
Ee therefore asked Bathurst "to restore my wife to her proper station
in the limited society of Colombo, by appointing me to tie Civil Ser-
• ». 2 vice".
On account of the above factors local appointments were usually 
accompanied, or followed, by requestsfor their absorption in the 
Civil Service, carefully denying motives of interference with the patron-
"^ Bennett to Bathurst, 6 October 1819. C.O. 54> 75.
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age of the Secretary of State, Apart from the undesirability of
excluding them from the society of the Civil Servants various other
local circumstances, such as a knowledge of the local languages or
suitability for a particular post,were usually urged to strengthen 
1
such claims. The Colonial Office naturally viewed such recommenda­
tions coming fromthe Governor as a threat to its powers. Maitland 
was told on one occasion "that if the principle that the Governor's 
recommendation for the time being of those young men in his immediate 
confidence and family to be employed was thus extensively acceded to,
the patronage would at once be transferred from the Government at home
,l 2to the Governor abroad. It was after repeated requests, accompanied 
perhaps by an exertion of influence at home, that come of them were 
appointed to the Civil Service. Those appointed in this manner were 
few in number andthey did not lead to any disturbance of the principle 
of recruitment.
ifone of the persons recommended for appointment in the above manner 
belonged to the second species of establishment consisting mainly of 
local Europeans. The privileges of the Civil Service were too exclusive, 
and the gap between it and the other Services too wide, to permit a per­
son who had functioned in the lower offices, however creditably it may 
have been, to rise to the Civil Service, Prom the point of view of
For some instances see Brownrigg to Bathurst, 26 July 1816. C.O. 54, 60. 
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 Aprill813. C.O. 54, 47.
2
Castlereagh to Maitland, 11 June 1807* C.O* 55, 62.
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emoluments the gap thinned out occasionally in a particular case, 
when through some circumstances a local European was able to enjoy 
a salary of over £300 per annum.^ But such persons were not recommended 
to be absorbed to the Civil Service, perhaps on account of the fear that 
if appointed to the lowest of Civil Service offices they could not be 
kept back from promotions like the rest in the Service because of the 
rules governing them. Besides the privileged^position of the Civil Ser­
vant brought about strong social barriers. The Civil Servants kept up 
a separate society from which the local Europeans were necessarily ex­
cluded. admittance of local men into the Service would have also meaa t 
their admittance into the exclusive social group, which under the cir­
cumstance of the time the Governors would be reluctant to recommend dnd 
the Civil Servants unwilling to accept.
The attitude of the Government towards the local European community 
is seen from the fate of an application from a local person for appoint­
ment to the Civil Service, It came from Jacob Bemand, one of the former 
Butch Civil Servants, who applied to be placed in the Civil Service "not 
with a view to his aspiring to a lucrative employ, but only to be re-
The Supreme Court, when it was presided over by Alexander Jcjjiston-:, 
favoured the local Europeans in certain appointments over which it 
had control. Thus the Registrars of the Supreme and Admiralty Courts 
were Dutchmen who enjoyed salaries over £300 per annum. It was clear 
that this was much disliked by the Governor. For instance Barnes ob­
jected to a Court order requiring the Fiscals (Collectors) arriving in 
Colombo to attend at the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court, 
on the ground that it was degrading to the Civil Servants. See Barnes 
to Bathurst, 20 July 1825. C.O. 54, 39.
2Memorial of Bernand, I\f.D. 1812. C.O. 54, 42,
instated in the rank he formerly held in the /sic/ Colonie11.^  The Governor
1
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in Council, through whom it was forwarded, failed to make a positive 
recommendation in his favour* It merely resolved to request the 
Secretary of State to authorize the payment of an allowance equal to 
what is granted on the coast to the Civil Servants of the late Dutch 
Government.1 Vihen the matter was referred to Maitland, who was by then 
out of office, he acknowledged that Bernand was by far the ablest man in 
the island among the Dutch, and that he lad been of 'infinite utility' 
to the Government. He was therefore inclined to recommend his appoint­
ment to the Civil Service, but on conditinn that he was not allowed fro
2
rise. To recommend in such terms was to deny the slightest chance of 
success at the Colonial Office, and the application was eventually re­
fused. Only one person of Dutch origin was absorbed into the Civil Ser­
vice and special circumstances certainly made it an exceptional case.
He was described as one who had received a ' liberal’ education in England,
3and was ’’perfectly an Englishman in feeling and language".
The exclusive employment of Civil Servants in situations normally
reserved for them was also put to several tests. The existence of the
army brought about a situation where there were military officers of rank 
stationed in the different provinces. Prior to the establishment of the 
Civil Service, North had appointed a number of them to function as Magi-
1Council resolution of 24 February 1812. C.O. 54, 42.
2Ilaitland to Chapman, 21 August 1812. C.O. 54, 45*
^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April 1813. C.O. 54, 47.
strates and J gents of Government, He was satisfied with their work,
especially in remote areas. They were also less expensive,*^ With
the establishment of the Civil Service the Colonial Office laid down
the rule that no military officer could hold a civil office unless
2
specially appointed by the King's command. It brought forward many
arguments against the employment of military men in civilian duties.
Such appointments were considered to be always productive of jealousy
3
and dissatisfaction. They were thought to interfere with the military
4
duties of these officers. The real objection was perhaps conveyed
by the argument that such appointments were against "a principle of
justice towards those gentlemen, who have embarked in the Service with
the expectation of arriving progressively at . situations of increased 
5
emolument". In fact the Colonial Office showed an undue desire to see 
that offices held by military men with advantage, which could also be 
carried on by civilians, were handed over to the latter.^
See p. l£>fe,
^Hobart to Worth, 8 February 1803. C.O, 55, 62.
Ebid.
4
Ibid.
'’ibid.
^Thus for instance prior to 1803 the duty of supplying provisions for 
the army was carried out by a Commissary of Grain, whowas a military 
officer. Eobart instructed Worth to suppress this office and establish 
instead the office of Garrison-Storekeeper, to be held by a Civil Ser­
vant. Eobart to Worth, 7 May 1803. C.O. 55, 62.
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This attitude of the Colonial Office was put to a test during
the time of Maitland, when he appointed a military officer as Collector
of Batticaloa uniting in him both civil and military power. He was
perhaps attempting to test the mood of the Colonial Office for he called
it an 'experiment1.*'" However, to justify this step he argued that on
looking round him he found no Civil Servant who had sufficient talents
or steadiness to perform the arduous duties connected with the agri-
2
cultural development of the Batticaloa district. He also assured the
Colonial Office that he would not have adopted this measure if it threw
z
out of employment any one of the regular Civil Servants.' The Colonial 
Office was as yet not inclined to accept such a change. Maitland was 
therefore reminded of the principles on which the Civil service was 
formed.
"The principles on which the establishment of Ceylon is 
formed,1 wrote Castlereagh, "is that the Civil Servants 
shall rise in gradation, and that no person shall be 
placed on the civil establishment, who has not commenced 
as a lowest Writer. If this principle be allowed to be 
broken in upon in one instance, there can be no security 
that it -will not be intrenched upon in another, and the 
whole system which has been established may gradually 
fall to pieces."
Hlaitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 20.
2Ibid.
‘'ibid.
4
Castlereagh to Maitland, 11 June 1807. C.O. 55, 62.
361
Maitland expressed his dissatisfaction with this decision in no un­
certain terms,
"When I saw the richest district in a state of ruin and 
destruction,” he wrote, ,rand when I looked round me and 
found no Civil Servant who could be placed there ... I 
did deem it a case where I thought I might make an. ex­
ception.
The exclusive principle was put to a further test during the 
time of Brownrigg when the Kandyan kingdom was added to the British 
dominions. Vhen tiis happened, instead of calling for the enlargement 
of the Civil Service, Brownrigg adopted the expedient of appointing 
military officers stationed in the different provinces as civilian 
agents, giving them a small addition to their military pay for perform­
ing the new duties. This was partly because he felt the need to keep 
the persons appointed to the Kandyan provinces for longer periods in 
their posts. He was aware that unlike in the Maritime Provinces frequent
changes would involve the difficulty of introducing a succession of new
2
people to the Chiefs and inhabitants. The rules of the Civil Service 
governing promotions did not permit such a long term in a particular
office. Brownrigg also saw a need to guard against a difference of op-
3
inion between the civil and military authorities in the new provinces.
The main consideration however was the fact that the Civil Service as it
^Maitland to Castlereagh, 25 February 1809. C.O. 54, 31# 
2
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 26 July 1816. C.O. 54, 60.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 19 February 1818. C.O. 54# 70.
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was then formed was not capable of expansion, without involving a
considerable increase of expenditure which the Colony could not
afford.'*' Because of the prevailing need for economy the Colonial
Office had no alternative but to sanction the measures adopted by
Brownrigg, and to allow the opportunity of making a number of new
2
appointments to slip away. It displayed an intention of re-con- 
sidering the matter when more information was available on the state 
of the revenue in the new provinces. But it was soon found that they 
did not add very much to the resources of the state to permit such a 
re-consideration. Thus the justification for the existence of an ex­
clusive Civil Service was much weakened. It began to enjoy a right 
to certain offices of the State which were not separated from the rest 
according to any consistent principle,
fa more limited attempt to break through the rules of an exclusive 
Bervice occurred when Englishmen holding certain offices which were ex­
cluded from it mainly on account of the fact that they were regarded 
as special posts which could not fit into the general scheme of things, 
applied to contribute to the Civil Service pension scheme. These claims 
were made individually and were treated as such during the time when the 
Colonial Office was more free with its patronage. Accordingly, those who
■^Brownrigg to Bathurst, 8 January 1819. C.O. 54 > 73.
2
Bathurst to Brownrigg, 10 November 1819. C.O. 55, 63.
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held the office of Master Attendant, Civil Engineer and Surveyor- 
General, Superintendent of the Botanic Gardens, and Superintendent 
of Delft, were permitted to contribute to the fund and become entitled 
to the lowest rate of pension (£400 per annum). They were not entitled
to any of the other privileges of the Service, However, when those to
whom this concession was granted retired and others took their place 
it was withdrawn. The Colonial Office refused to permit those outside 
the Civil Service to contribute to the fund on the ground that such an 
indulgence would give rise to others and result in much inconvenience.
The claims of some of those outside the Service to contribute to the 
newly established widow's fund ware similarly refused.^ The only out­
side group which laid a successful claim to participate in both schemes,
on the grounds of a sanction given by Lord Hobart inB03» were the Col-
2
onial Chaplains,
The exclusive character of the Civil Service, which was accompanied
by a privileged and exclusive position in society, placed obstacles in
the way of exercising disciplinary control over it. The consciousness 
that Civil Servants were well connected at home, and the uncertainty of 
the Colonial Office attitude was in any case unfavourable to the emergence
3
of a stricter approach towards matters of disciplinary control. Besides
■^Bathurst to Barnes, 3 October 1823* C.O. 5 5, 66.
2
Proceedings of the Civil Eund Committee, 29 August 1821. C.O. 55, 66. 
Bathurst to Paget, 24 August 1821. 17 July 1822. C.O, 55, 66.
3
There is one case on record where the Colonial Office intervened to re­
store an erring Civil Servant to a high position much against the wishes 
of the local Government. See case of H. Marshall in C.O. 55, 44. Also, 
Brownrigg to Liverpool, 22 August 1812. C.O. 54, 44; Brownrigg to Goulburn, 
14 August 1813. C.O. 54, 48.
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the smallness of the Colony, as well as of the Civil Service, helped 
to bring about personal relationships between the Governor and the 
Civil Servants, which could hardly be entirely ignored. In this situ­
ation a tendency to favour individuals,as well as a temptation to show 
a concern for the welfare of the Civil Service as a whole were to some 
extent unavoidable. The conflict between the judiciary and the executive 
brought about a tendency to bring the Governor and the Civil Servants 
together, hhile the Civil Servants looked to the Governor for protection, 
the Governor must have been conscious of the fact that too strict an 
attitude towards the Civil Service would affect his position in the 
Colony.
The above factors were undoubtedly present to a greater or lesser 
degree in the cases that cropped up during this period. But a general 
factor which was present throughout in matters of disciplinary control was 
the need to preserve the prestige of the Civil Service. It arose out of 
a general feeling at the time, which was well stated by Kaitland, that 
the empire in India rested on "the most cautious maintenance and the 
most scrupulous attention to the superiority of Europeans over the natives".^ 
The exclusive character of the Civil Service made this supposition and 
that of the maintenance of the prestige of the Civil Service very largely 
identical.
■^Memorandum, 30 August 1811. C.O. 54, 41.
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As we have already seen Maitland showed a general reluctance
to inquire into the conduct of Civil Servants.1 Even where inquiries
were conducted there appears to have been a desire to avoid too much
publicity about them. Too open an inquiry into the conduct of a Civil
Servant would have indeed destroyed his exalted position. "Although
it is common custom in this country when suspicions are entertained
against individuals possessing power and influence ," wrote Hood who
was called upon by Maitland to inquire into the conduct of the Collector 
2
of Jaffna, "to publish by beat of tom tom that all complaints would be 
heard against them, I yet conceive that such publicity regarding the 
servants of Government might be attended with injustice, as in the 
first place it proclaimed the suspicion, and in the second gives en­
couragement to the querulous habits of the natives to which they are 
sufficiently addicted already." He declared his intention of avoiding
the introduction of the Collector's name in the papers that might become 
4public. Maitland, who on account of his early enthusiasm had taken the 
preliminary step of removing the Collector before commencing inquiries 
from a belief that proper inquiries would not be possible with the offend­
ing officer residing in the district because the inhabitants were afraid
^See p. 3°4-*
2
See p.
3
*;ood to Maitland, 30 November 1805. C.O. 54, 20*
^Ibid.
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to state anything against the persons under whose immediate control 
they lived,^ seems to have later accepted the position advocated hy 
Hood.
The same considerations limited the choice of punishments. Thus
for instance there was nothing to prevent the Government instituting
legal proceedings against an erring Civil Servant either as a punishment
or to recover money due to the Government. But "the better mode”,
said Maitland, "is to get rid of them from the island than to allow
them to rot in jail here to the discredit and disrepute of His Majesty’s
2
Civil Service at large I* Then assessing punishments the fact whether
a case had received publicit}^ or not became important. This is seen from
Brownrigg’s attitude to two cases that occurred during his time. One
involved Lusignan, who was then Collector of Trincomalee, in whose Kach-
cheri a cash deficit of 81,000 rix-dollars was detected. The other
involved M. J. Smyth, the Collector of Galle, in whose office a deficit
4
of 30,000 rix-dollars was detected. The first case was undoubtedly the 
more serious especially because it happened to be the second offence of 
this particular officer. But Brownrigg did' not even hold an inquiry into 
it. He failed to bring it under the notice of the Colonial Office until
■^Maitland to Camden, 28 February 1806. C.O. 54, 20.
^Maitland to Tindham, 28 February 1807. C.O. 54, 25.
3
Gee Brownrigg to Bathurst, 29 January 1820. C.O. 54, 76.
4
Gee Brownrigg to B&thurst, 24 October 1818. C.O. 54, 71; and, 31 January
1820. C.O. 54, 76.
367
the time of his departure when he entered a strong plea on his
behalf.^ The second case was viewed more seriously because the
Collector had held the shroff responsible for the deficit and sued
him before the Provincial Court. The trial resulted in the shroff
being held responsible for part of the amount, while it also revealed
that the Collector had kept a private account with the shroff and that
he had made use of some cash derived from the sale of paddy rents to
2
liquidate some private debts with him. In dealing with these two 
cases Brownrigg was no doubt influenced by a personal attachment to 
Lusignan, who had been very useful to him during his period of admini- 
stration. But the difference in treatment reveals another factor.
"The publicity which was given to this very improper transaction,M 
wrote Brownrigg, about the case of Smyth, has rendered it wholly im­
possible for me to treat his case with that lenity which I should other' 
wise feel inclined to do, purely in consideration of his family. For I 
consider his character so much degraded in the eyes of the natives that
it is not consistent with the honour of the Government that he should
4
again be employed". bliile the sensitivity to society in Ceylon thus
^"Brownrigg to Bathurst, 29 January 1820. C.O. 54, 76.
2
Brownrigg t5 Bathurst, 31 January 1820. C.O. 54, 76.
3
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 29 January 1820. C.O. 54, 76.
4
Brownrigg to Bathurst, 31 January 1820. C.O. 54, 76.
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worked, towards a desire to avoid publicity in Civil Service disciplinary 
matters it may have also made the Civil Servants cnnscious of the need 
to preserve some form of incorruptibility in the eyes of the people.
Patronage in England, the need to satisfy the aspirations of those 
setting out as Civil Servants, and the policy of exclusiveness, not 
only prevented the best organisation of the Service, but also led to its 
development along lines which raised a doubt about its utility. That 
doubt was expressed by its inclusion among the subjects assigned to the
Q.X I
Commissions of Eastern inquiry appointed in 1823*
Instructions to the Commissioners of inquiry, 18 January 1823. C.O, 49? 8*
Chapter VI
PRELUDE TO REFORMS
By the third decade of the nineteenthcentury the development 
of the administrative machinery and more particularly thht of the 
Civil Service was fairly complete. Few changes took place after this 
till the implementation of the Colebrooke-Cameron recommendations. 
During this period the emphasis shifted to a discussion of reforms.
The background to this discussion was not wholly favourable to the 
Civil Service as it was then constituted. The exclusive principle had 
failed to place the efficiency and utility of the Service beyond doubt. 
The growing liberal atmosphere made the need to preserve this principle 
no longer identical, at least among some persons, with the maintenance 
of British power. The emphasis on economy and efficiency, now felt with 
greater intensity, placed the Colonial Office and the local Government 
on the defensive, and led to the emergence of the first proposals for 
reform.
As regards recruitment, the practice of nomination in England, 
which was by now fixed, had not provided a sufficient guarantee of 
competency among the recruits, because of the system of patronage with 
which it was connected. Sufficient care had not been taken to ensure 
ability, and t'oo much had been left to personal inclinations, chance 
and accident. Barnes, for instance, cited several instances where mili­
tary officers who had resigned their commissions-had been appointed to
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the Service,'1' Besides, nine out of ten appointed to the Service, he
2
said, were "boys who had just left school". Horton found in 1831
that out of the 36 Civil Servants, there were 11 'decidedly incompetent',
9 'just within the pale of competency', 14 ’decidedly competent', and 2 '
3
'whose merits and demerits were not yet known1.
Recruitment in England also prevented the possible emergence of 
a policy of admitting local men, who functioned in the lower services, 
to higher situations, though it is a matter of doubt whether even if 
the local government had been given the power of recruitment the nec­
essary environment for such a change would have been prevalent.
The disadvantages arising out of the mode of recruitment were 
accentuated by the non-emergence of a scheme of training. The only ap­
prenticeship which the recruits had was a few years’ experience as an 
Assistant. This experience was also of a limited nature on account of 
the shortness of the period during which a Civil Servant functioned as 
an Assistant. As we have seen, though from time to time it was con­
sidered desirable to have a larger number of Assistants, the Civil Ser-
4
vice as it was then constituted seems to have offered no solution* The 
Government was in fact faced with a dilemma. lAbile on the one hand the
^Barnes to Euskisson, 6 December 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
2Ibid.
■^ Horton to Goderich, 2 2 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114*
4See pp. 314 - * ‘ .
37.1
efficiency of the Service could not be materially improved without 
having a training ground in the form of Assistant offices, such 
offices could not also be created without overburdening the limited 
finances of the Colony.
In spite of the determination expressed by Bathurst, the rule 
that emerged with regard to promotions wTac that of seniority.'1' After 
1822 more frequent examinations were held in the native languages to 
enable Civil Servants to acquire merit on that account. The order of 
1822 was partially enforced on the new-comers as is seen by the fact 
that two newly arrived Civil Servants, though promoted to higher situ­
ations, were placed In an acting capacity and on lower emoluments on
account of the fact that they had not acquired a knowledge of the lan- 
2
guages. This element of compulsion made the few new recruits take up
the study of the languages more seriously. It however failed to excite
the old Civil Servants, who formed a large proportion of the Service,
and who therefore continued to be generally ignorant of the languages.
3
Besides, the examinations were not conducted in a systematic manner,
and as the Deputy Secretary to the Government observed, the tendency was
4to make a 'mockery' of them. In any case qualifications in the native
1
See p. yy*.
2 -
J. Price and J. Barnett, who were appointed acting agent Seven Korales
and acting Collector Batticaloa respectively. Barnes to Bathurst, 4 
February 1825. C.O. 54, 88.
3
The examinations were usually conducted by a senior Civil Servant of the 
area assisted by the Mudaliyars, and did not differ very much from what 
has already been noticed in p.
4
Observations of p. Anstruther, see Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831.
C.O. 54, 114.
languages appears to have interfered very little with promotion by 
seniority, as is seen by the fact that those who acquired a knowledge 
of Sinhalese were sent to the Tamil provinces and vice-versa accord­
ing to their normal standing in the Service,^
Such a situation arose mainly because of the existence of a line 
of promotions, which was rightly termed a line of succession. Quite 
apart from the classes that had been fixed by Maitland, each office ap­
pears to have acquired a relative position in an ascending scale. The 
offices at the centre, which belonged to the first class of the Ser­
vice each acquired a position according to variations in salaries and 
importance such as membership of Council. Similarly the offices of Col­
lector and Provincial Judge assumed positions in this scale according 
to variations in salaries, and other advantages such as the amount of 
the Commissions and locality. The lowest position in the scale were 
the offices of Assistant, which though, few in number had also variations 
of importance.
A Writer arriving in the island ascended from one position to an­
other in this scale. On arrival he first functioned as an extra- 
Assistant in the Chief Secretary's office, and then ascended to the 
position of 2nd Assistant and 1st Assistant in the same office. If he 
was not called upon, through the exigencies of the Service (as sometimes 
happened) to assume the position of a Collector or Provincial Judge, he
Observations of P. Anstruther, see Horton to Coderich, 14 December 1831.
C.O. 54, 114.
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was usually made to functinn as an Assistant to the Collector of 
Jaffna or Colombo. The small number of Assistant offices did not 
keep him long as an Assistant and he then moved on to one of the 
inferior Collectorates or Provincial Courts. Here he was shuttled 
between districts and between revenue and judicial work till called 
to one of the superior Collectorates or Provincial Courts. Here too 
he was shuttled between districts, and between judicial and revenue 
work, and if fortunate enough ended in a situation of the first class. 
The limited places in this class, and the reluctance of those who had 
reached them to retire early, limited the progress of many of the
1
Civil Servants to the situation of Collector and Provincial Judge.
One result of the emergence of this line of promotion was that 
the Governor lost the power to retain the most suitable individual in 
a particular office. It was not always likely that a good Collector 
was an equally good Judge, or vice versa, and that a successful Collector 
or Judge would be equally successful as Vice-Treasurer, Auditor-General, 
and so on. Many a time the Governor, noticing the suitability of a 
Civil Servant for a particular post, desired to retain him for a longer 
period in that situation. However, the system of promotions was such 
that if he persisted he would have made the very merit of the Civil 
Servant a detriment to his advancement.
The above conclusions are drawn from an analysis of the names appearing 
in the annual fixed establishments.
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This difficulty sometimes led to the adoption of such ex­
pedients as the granting of a temporary increase of salary to make 
the position in which a Civil Servant was retained equal in point 
of emoluments to that to which a promotion was due, proportionately 
reducing this amount from the salary of the junior person appointed 
to the latter.**’ On one occasion the most unusual expedient was ad­
opted of nominally promoting a Civil Servant to the office due to
him and then making him exchange duties with another, both retaining
2
the salaries attached to their real positions.
Another result of conforming to a line of promotions was the oc­
currence of frequent changes. The retirement, death, or leave of ab­
sence of a Civil Servant usually brought about a whole line of changes
3
as each Civil Servant almost automatically moved one step up the ladder. 
The frequency of changes was more marked during the Governorship of
Thus for instance in 1830 when the office of Deputy Secretary fell 
vacant J. Walbeoff who was entitled to it was granted an additional 
salary of £320 per annum in order to retain him as Superintendent of 
Cinnamon, This amount was reduced from the salary of P. Anstruther 
who was appointed as Deputy Secretary. Barnes to Murray, 4 October 
1830, C.O. 54, 107.
2
Blair Anderson was nominally promoted as Provincial Judge Batticaloa, 
but was retained as an Assistant in the Chief Secretary’s office, 
while another person was sent as Provincial Judge on lower emoluments. 
Baimes to Goderich, 18 January 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
3
On obtaining leave of absencs it was the practice for Civil Servants to 
vacate their positions. The next in point of seniority then succeeded. 
See Horton to Goderich, 31 January 1832. C.O. 54, 117.
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Brownrigg than at any time Before or after. After 1822 the necessity 
for each changes lessened on account of the fact that many of those 
who were entitled to retirement were continuing in the Service, and 
consequently only a few Writers were coming in. But generally speaking, 
it was usual for a Civil Servant to change positions eight to ten times 
during the first twelve years of service, though most of them only in­
volved moving from one district to another, or from the Provincial Court 
to the Kachcheri or vice versa.^
Certain offices were more affected than others hy the frequency of 
changes. Generally speaking the offices that were least affected were 
those at the centre, belonging to the first class, because of the ten­
dency of those who had acquired them to remain in office, some of them
being even unwilling to obtain leave of absence for fear of losing their 
2
positions. One office most materially affected was that of Collector.
A Civil Servant was rarely able to remain as the Collector of a parti­
cular district for more than two or three years. Of the Collectorates 
those remotely situated, and comprising generally of the more backward 
areas of the island, had the added misfortune of haying as Collector 
a person who was also new to the island. Frequent changes had of course 
the advantage of giving the Civil Servants a fleeting experience of al-
The above conclusion is drawn from the names appearing in fixed estab­
lishments prepared in February or March each year, and does not take 
into account the changes that took place between the preparation of 
these returns.
%.A. Marshall for instance unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an assur­
ance that he would be allowed to return to his post of Auditor-General. 
Memorial, of Marshall, 17 November 1825. C.O. 54, 92.
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most every district in the island. But their stay was not suffi­
ciently prolonged, either to give them a more thorough knowledge 
of the variations in the customs, habits and people of the different 
districts, or to make use of whatever experience they had gained in 
a particular district. However, it sometimes happened that a Civil 
Servant would return to the same district in which he had been sta­
tioned before, though in a different capacity. In such instances the 
previous experience would have undoubtedly been of much benefit. The 
picture that Peter Gordon, a liberal critic, of whom we shall say 
more later, drew of a Collector, was that of a man ignorant of the 
languages, place and people, not a man of business or in health, even 
absent on leave, with a heavy burden of office work, and called upon 
to levy petty and complicated taxes, to manage ’vile’ monopolies, to 
enforce payments and to conduct actions in court.^ 11 The whole detail
of course," he said, "falls to the native servants of the revenue de- 
2
partment.” Though this picture may have been slightly overdrawn, 
it is indeed true that the frequency of changes and the other connected 
factors weakened district administration. In fact material inconvenience 
was avoided through the existence of Clerks in the offices who were 
generally more fixed, and to whom important duties appear to have been 
delegated, and in revenue administration through the existence of the 
Mudaliyars. The ICachcheri and Korale Mudaliyars in particular, func-
Gordon, paper on ’the actual political condition of Ceylon1. C.O. 54, 112. 
2Ibid.
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tioned as an effective assistants to the Collector in fact though 
not in name.
Frequent changes also adversely affected the office of Provincial 
Judge. It prevented specialization, which was perhaps more desirable 
in judicial than in revenue work, especially in view of the variety 
of the law administered in Ceylon# The fact that the judges were not 
bred to the law, nor acquainted with the laws of Ceylon, naturally 
evoked the criticism of the liberals.^* In fact here too material in­
convenience seems to have been avoided by the existence of Secretaries 
and Interpreters of courts, who thereby acquired a degree of importance 
and power, which would n<ht have been prevalent with a more permanent 
judge.
As regards the retirement and pension scheme only one change of 
significance occurred between 1822 and 1833. This was the withdrawal 
of the Colonial Office sanction to a practice which had developed for 
Civil Servants who were entitled to retire, to obtain two years’ leave 
of absence with the option of deciding at the end of it whether to retire 
or return to the Service, and in the event of the former decision to 
obtain the difference between the amount of the pension and the fur­
lough allowance from the time of their departure from the island. This 
practice had encouraged Civil Servants to leave Ceylon without coming 
to a final decision regarding retirement, and caused inconvenience by
1Gordon, paper on ’the actual political condition of Ceylon’. C.O. 54, 112.
2
Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831* C.O. 54, 112.
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compelling the Colonial Office to postpone the filling of the 
vacancy."^ Barnes was therefore directed to inform the Civil Ser­
vants that in future they would "be entitled to pensions only from
2
the date on which they declared their intention to retire* Barnes
attempted to obtain a 'reasonable and fair1 indulgence of giving
six months time to decide on it without prejudice to the right of
3
drawing pensions from the date of departure. He urged this on the
ground that Civil Servants who had resided in the island for many
years were unacquainted with the expense of living and other cir-
4
cumstancss which may have occurred during a lengthened absence.
5
The Colonial Office however declined to alter the decision.
The Colonial Office attitude perhaps reflected a concealed anxiety 
caused by the fact that so many who were entitled to retire were con­
tinuing in the service. Thus for instance in 1826, 13 out of about 36 
Civil Servants in the Service were those entitled to retire, most of 
them holding the highest offices. This development had the advantage 
of removing the fear that Civil Service would be deprived of valuable
^Colonial Office minute, 10 October 1828. C.O. 34, 102.
^Goderich to Barnes, 30 May 1827. C.O. 35, 69.
3
Barnes to Goderich, 27 December 1827. C.O. 34, 98.
4
Earnes to Goderich, 27 December 1827. C.O. 34, 98.
5Euskisson to Barnes, 13 May 1828. C.O. 35, 63.
6
Commissioners of Colonial Audit to Commissioners of the Treasury,
16 April 1829. C.O. 54, 106.
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experience "by early retirements. However, as Bertolacci pointed out,
tlie decision to remain in the Service was perhaps the result of mere
.procrastination from year to year without a plan, and without the ad -
vantage that could he derived from a more settled mind.'*' Besides,
the fact that those who were thus continuing in the Service held the
highest offices brought about the tendency to dishearten the juniors,
who naturally saw little prospect of reaching higher situations, and
to drive them out of the Service without giving them a fair chance of
proving their worth.
These developments must be viewed against the background of the
declining state of the Civil Fund, As the Commissioners of Colonial
Audit pointed out, the original calculations of the fund had rested
on the assumption that pensions would in all instances be claimed as
they became due and that subscriptions would therefore always amount
2
to 10 per cent of the whole of the Civil Service salaries. But as 
we have seen the practive had developed for Civil Servants, especially 
those who drew higher salaries, to discontinue subscriptions. This, 
together with the fact that junior Civil Servants, who became entitled 
to pensions after paying comparatively small subscriptions, were being 
induced to leave the Service, set in a tendency to weaken the fund.^
^Bertolacci, Agricultural, Commercial, and Financial interests of Ceylon, 
p. 434.
^Commissioners of Colonial Audit to Commissioners of the Treasury,
16 April 1829. C.O. 54, 106.
3
Civil Servants who held situations of £1500, £200 and £300 paid to the 
fund by way of subscriptions, £150, £200, and £300 per annum respectively, 
while those who held situatinns of less than £1500 paid £70 or £80 per 
annum. Memorandum of Bertolacci, 26 March 1829. C.O. 54,106.
Ibid.
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Thus in this sphere too the Government was faced with a difficult 
situation. To enforce the rules in such a manner as to induce all 
the Civil Servants to retire as they became entitled to do so, would 
not only have deprived the Government of their services, but would 
also have brought upon the pension list many healthy lives, and made 
the fund insufficient to meet claims. On the other hand, the pract­
ices t M  had developed not only weakened the fund, but also induced 
the juniors to quit just at a time when their experience would be of 
most value. Thus it was clear that a revision of the rules was the 
only solution.
The above analysis of the various aspects of the Civil Service 
tend to show some of the difficulties brought about by the exclusive 
principle* With a policy of excluding local men from higher office, it 
was believed that the exclusive principle would produce the specialists 
required in the civil administration of Ceylon, at the same time bene- 
fitting the persons sent out as Civil Servants. It certainly would have 
been a justifiable principle V'f the Civil Servants had been carefully 
selected, properly trained, and exclusively eligible to offices which 
were considered to require special knowledge and experience. But the 
absence of proper schemes of recrui tment and training, which we have 
noticed, very largely removed this justification* The exclusive prin­
ciple also failed to produce the desired results in the administration. 
The rules on which the Service was formed, and the practices which 
they occasioned in such matters as promotions and retirement, together
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with the fact that they were in operation in a small service, 
very largely destroyed the potentialities which the exclusive prin­
ciple undoubtedly possessed.
By closing the higher offices to those in the lesser services, 
the exclusive principle tended to perpetuate social barriers in the 
colony. The Civil Service fell in line with the tendency in Ceylon 
to associate different groups, either racial or caste, with different 
occupations. The public service as it was~found towards the end of 
this period was divided into three almost monopolistic groups, with 
considerable social barriers between them, and with very little move- 
ability from one to another. Within these groups there were also fairly 
rigid subdivisions. At the top were ihe Englishmen, both in and ooit of 
the Civil Service, who had very little social intercourse with the 
rest of the community. Among them the gentlemen of the Civil Service 
occupied a more privileged position, both in the administration, and 
in the society of the Colony. They formed an exclusive group of rulers, 
almost a specisl caste, with its own peculiar exclusiveness, privileges 
and prejudices. Below them were certain other Englishmen’, who func­
tioned as heads in certain departments, but who were excluded from the 
benefits of the Civil Service, though not always from the society of the 
Civil Servants. Below these groups there was the local European community, 
from whose ranks the Sitting Magistrates, Clerks of public offices, 
Postholders, Secretaries of Courts, were almost exclusively selected.^
This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of the names appearing 
in a return of the fixed establishments submitted to the Colebrooke- 
Cameron Commission, See C.O. 416, 7.
There appear to have been at least two groups within this community.
The higher situations were conferred on families reputed to be of
higher social status, while the lower situations were held by the
rest of the community. The recurrence of family names leads one to
the conclusion that certain families were well represented in the
public service.^
The predominance of the local European community in the above
situations may have been partly the result of a preferential treatment
by the Government both in imparting English education, and in selecting
personnel. It certainly shows thht the native inhabitants of whatever
race or caste, were given very little encouragement to compete for the
above posts. This is seen by the fact that even where they acquired a
knowledge of English, they seldom went beyond the situations of Inter-
2prexer, and Schoolmaster. Even where they wrere employed in office work 
as translators, they bore the traditional title of Liyane Aratchi and 
were separate from the rest of the clerical establishment. It should 
also be noted that the local European community would have been more 
anxious to secure Government employment as a means of living, and con­
sequently more anxious to make use of the limited facilities provided
1. ..anml^nxs -ofA the names appearing in a return of the fixed establishments 
submitted to the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission, See C.O. 416, 7.
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at the few English educational institutions.
Throughout the period of our study the employment of the Sin­
halese and Tamils was mainly confined to their traditional office of 
Headmen of varying ranks and castes. The more wealthy and influential 
families among the different castes continued to occupy the important
and influential positions of Kachcheri and Korale Mudaliyar?, though
1
occasionally persons from other families had also been brought in.
The less influential families among the different castes occupied the 
office of Muhandiram, Aratchchi and Vidane. The poorer people belong­
ing to the different castes supplied the Government offices with its 
numerous Lascarins.
The exclusive character of the Civil Service naturally placed 
limits to the aspirations of the men in these lower services. As re­
gards the local European community the long period of exclusion from 
superior offices, and the poor salaries which a majority of them re­
ceived, had brought them down from the position of affluence which they 
had enjoyed as the former rulers of the island, and resulted in the 
loss of social status especially in the eyes of the native people.
The picture that J. A. W. Bennett drew of the community at Galle, though 
not perhaps applicable to every burgher family, and to every district, 
may have nevertheless been a true picture of the declining state of the 
community as a whole.
1See p?, m  - n?.
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"Of the few remaining families/* he wrote, "scarcely 
a trace remains of that independence and wealth by 
which the Dutch gentry of Pt de Galle was distinguished, 
antecedent, and for a long time subsequently to the 
cession of the island to the British arms; for these 
families, which, during the dominion of the East India 
Company of the Netherlands, lived in the best style, 
and in a manner suitable to their opulent circumstances, 
are, from their sudden privation of emoluments, and con­
sequent changes, reduced to a condition of considerable 
embarrassment, living by the sale of their jewels and 
other valuables that may remain from the wreck of better 
days.
A majority of this community appear to have been reconciled to the 
idea of exclusion from higher office. But a few higher families 
continued to entertain the hope of an appointment to the Civil Ser­
vice. This is reflected in the feeling that appears to have been 
prevalent that those educated in England stood a chance of securing 
a Civil Service appointment. Consequently two influential and com­
paratively prosperous families were tempted to educate two sons in 
England with a view to getting them appointed to the Civil Service. 
The first of these attempts was made by S. C. Vanderstraaten, a son 
of the Registrar of the Supeme Court of Ceylon. Havin^received his
education in England, and being just about to return to Ceylon, he
2
applied to the Colonial Office for a Civil Service appointment.
B^ennetfc Ceylon and its Capabilities, p. 550.
2
Memorial, 5 July 1826. C.O, 54, 96. This application was supported 
by Sir Alexander Johnston, who, while noticing that his knowledge of 
the English, Sinhalese, Portuguese and Tamil languages, would alone 
have induced him to recommend him, also dwelt upon the services of 
his father who had functioned as the Registrar of the Supreme Court 
for twenty years. Johnston to Bathurst, 5 July 1826. C.O. 54, 96.
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Though the Colonial Office appears to have placed his name in
the list of candidates no appointment took placed The second
application came from Van Lynden, a son of Baron Van Lynden, the
latter being a person entitled to special consideration from the
British, on account of the fact that he was one of the first Dutch-
2
men to have taken the oath of allegiance. The argument put forward
in this application is worthy of note. After stating that his father's
endeavours to enter the Civil Service had failed because of the fact
that he was not a bom ilnglishman, he argued that this difficulty did
not exist with regard to him as he was born in the island under the
British flag.''* This shows that a generation had grown up to whom the
old political objections did not apply. The Colonial Office decided
to bring the Lyndens under the favourable consideration of the local
government, but declined to depart from the established rule in their 
4
favour.
As regards the native population, any aspirations of entering 
higher office could naturally only be expected among the Mudaliyar 
families. Such aspirations were not entirely wanting. The Mudaliyars, 
and those belonging to their families, had a well marked disposition
■^Colonial Office Minute, N.D. 1826. C.O. 54, 96.
^Memorial, 50 November 1827. C.O. 54, 106*
Van Lynden to Charles Bagot, 26 November 1829. C.O. 54, 106.
4The application was made through Charles Bagot, the British ximbassador 
in the Netherlands, who reported that he belonged to ’the very first' 
family in Holland. Bagot to Murray, 5 December 1829. C.O. 54, 106.
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to acquire a knowledge of the English language, and improve their
position through that means. In fact during the time of Maitland
two sons of Mudaliyars were sent to England for their education
at the expense of the Colony. After having been under private tutors
for some time the two youths followed courses of study at Oxford and 
1
Cambridge* Both appear to have been trained to become preachers 
of the gospel. One in fact entered the priesthood and on arrival in 
the Colony was made a Sinhalese Colonial Chaplain. But the other 
created a problem for Barnes, for he returned without a profession or 
appointment. Nor did he receive any instructions from the Secretary 
of State as to his future. Barnes felt it incumbent on the Govern­
ment to do something for him, as otherwise he would be worse off than 
2
when he left. He therefore re-created the post of Chief Translator,
3
and appointed him to it with a salary of £400 per annum.
The experience of this youth in entering a type of occupation 
different from the traditional ones was not encouraging. Barnes re­
ported that in spite of a European education and ’introduction with 
good society' in England he was not received by the gentlemen of the 
civil and military establishments, and that the mortifying feeling which
^Henrique de Saram and Balthazar de Saram. The former was at Oxford and 
the latter at Cambridge. There is an interesting correspondence between 
these two youths and the Colonial Office, during the period 1315-1820 
in the volumes marked 'offices and individuals’ in the C.O. 54 series.
^Barnes to Hay, 18 June 1827. C.O. 54, 98.
hbid.
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this excited in his mind is generally supposed to have caused
his death.1 He expressed the decided opinion that a person of
colour would feel himself placed in a very embarrassing situation
in the Civil Service, as he was sure that it would not be agreeable
2
to the Civil Servants to see such a person come among them.
On the other hand the inability to rise to a higher social 
position acknowledged by the rulers, and consequently respected by 
the inhabitants, appears to have made the Mudaliyars cling all the 
more to the traditional position which they occupied, and the tradi­
tional offices which they held, and placed obstacles to change. This 
is reflected in a statement reported to have been made by the second 
Maha Mudaliyar in reply to a question that had been put to him by 
the Commissioners of inquiry, as to why he did not adopt the European 
dress. “Nature has given us two different colours,” he had replied,
if I adopt the European dress I shall be among the last of the Euro-
—  3peans. If l retain my own dress I am among the first of my own race.”
|| Ideas of reform were stimulated by the liberal and utilitarian environ­
ment that was growing in England, and more particularly by the attacks 
on the abuse of all forms of patronage, and the demand for economy and 
efficiency. Liberal and utilitarian concepts, and the cry for retrench- 
.ment, had a more immediate relevance to the stage of social and economic
1Barnes to Hay, 18 June 1827. C.O. 54, 98.
2i u a .
3
Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
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development at which England had arrived. Yet they not only provided 
a standard by which to judge institutions, policies and actions in 
other places, but also came to be regarded as ideals that could and 
should be striven after everywhere.
The Colonies naturally attracted the attentinn of the liberals 
and utilitarians as they formed a significant branch of English poli­
tical and economic life, and an important sphere of patronage. This 
is evident from the greater Parliamentary interest that was shorn 
with regard to the administration of ihe Colonies, and which mani­
fested itself in motions and orders callingfor various returns, parti­
cularly revenue and expenditure returns, and the consequent appointment 
of many committees and commissions of inquiry.
Underlying this interest was the disappointment, in the words of 
Joseph Hume, "that Colonies instead of being an addition to the strength 
of the country increased its weakness".^ "The drain which was caused 
by the Colonies" was an illustration of the harmful effects of the ap­
plication of erroneous policies, and the maintenance of institutions
2
which placed obstacles to the free development of the individual All 
questions of expenditure incurred in the administration of the Colonies 
were indiscriminately viewed as illustrative of the abuses of patronage.
Speech of Joseph Hume, on a motion calling for separate accounts of 
the revenue and expenditure, civil and military, of Ceylon, Mauritius, 
Trinidad, Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. Hansard’s Parliamentary 
Debates, new series, Vol. VIII, pp. 147-254.
2See Debate on Ceylon, 27 May 1830. Ibid.. Vol. XXIV, pp. 1155-1170.
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As Vilmot Horton disapprovingly not6d-, it was a situation where
"public virtue and administrative capacity exclusively hinged upon
retrenchment, and diminution of expenditure in the abstract..."'*'
Several individuals falling within this broad group were more
particularly interested in the affairs of Ceylon, A liberal of
smaller stature let loose by the enthusiasm of the more powerful
ones was Peter Gordon. He was described as a renter or an agent of
a renter, who had lost all the capital that had been invested through
2
disagreements with the functionaries of the Madras Government. He 
complained bitterly of the oppressive treatment he had suffered, and 
of his inability to secure redress through a Court in which decisions 
were not left to a jury. The ’love of freedom and the natural rights 
of man’ made Gordon perform a self-appointed mission of inquiry into 
the affairs of Ceylon, travelling about the country, meeting people, 
and collecting information for the purpose. His story entitled ’The 
actual political condition of Ceylon’ made its appearance in Indian
A
newspapers and evoked considerable interest in Ceylon.
"4-Iorton to Goderich, 14 December 1821* C.O. 54, 114*
2
Introduction by an unknown writer to Gordon’s paper on 'The actual 
political condition of Ceylon’, C.O. 54, 112.
Hbid.
4
Gordon also gave evidence before the Committee inquiring into the 
affairs of the East India Company. More particulars regarding his 
career could be obtained from this evidencs. See Third report and 
Minutes of Evidence from the Select Committee of the House of Commons 
on the Affairs of the East India Company.
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A liberal in a more influential position, and who carried
about him far greater weight, was Sir Alexander Johnston, a retired
Chief Justice of Ceylon. His liberal instincts were deeprooted and
were considerably sharpened as a result of the.recurring clashes
that had occurred between him and the local executive. They manifested
themselves very early in his career as is seen from the proposals he
submitted as early as 1806 to James Pox on Indian reforms,^- and the
proposals he submitted to the marquis of Londonderry in 1809 on re-
2
forms in Ceylon. Among the liberals he performed a more constructive 
role and pioneered certain successful measures of reform, while several 
others came very near success. Among the successful measures, of which
3
he was the prime mover, were the gradual abolition of slavery, the
4
removal of the restrictions on European colonization, and the intro-
5
duction of the trial by jury in the Suprmme Court. As we have seen 
he came very near success, but eventually failed, in creating a more 
independent Judicial Department, and increasing the powers of the 
Council.^
^See documents submitted by Johnston to the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company, Vol. IV, 
Judicial.
2
Proposals submitted by Johnston to the Marquis of Londonderry, N.D.1809. 
Mendis (ed.) Colebrooke-Cameron Papers. Vol. II, pp. 221-226.
3
The abolition of slavery was first recommended by the De Meuron Committee 
of inquiry. The first regulations on the subject were made by North and 
Maitland. It was, however, Johnston who gave vitality to the movement 
by persuading a number of slave proprietors, chiefly Burghers, to volun­
teer to emancipate the children born of their slaves. This was followed 
by more regulations on the subject. For details see C. R. de Silva, 
Ceylon under the British Occupation, Vol.I, p. 223 and pp. 272-279.
^See p.3ii* It appears that Johnston was the chief adviser to Maitland on 
this subject. r
■^ See pp.fco-si. See p.TS.
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The parliamentary group of radicals interested in Ceylon 
were led by John Stewart, who was almost always supported by 
Joseph Hume. They were generally less informed about local condi­
tions, sometimes factually incorrect, and always in the role of 
destructive critics. Their eyes were immediately fixed on the politics 
of England, and consequently their appeal was mainly directly towards 
the prospective European capitalist, whose enterprising spirit was 
held back by restraints.^
The liberals naturally found many matters in Ceylon which called 
loudly for reform. A detailed analysis of their views on social and 
economic affairs does not fall within the purview of this study. It 
should however be noted that their criticisms were generally directed 
against the maintenance of a monopolistic economy and the institutions 
of a feudal society. As early as 1809, Johnston had urged the abolition 
of monopolies and compulsory services, and the removal of the restrictions
on the free disposal of property both to Europeans and the native in- 
2
habitants. The demand for a select committee to inquire into the af­
fairs of Ceylon made by the radical group in Parliament in 1830 was 
particularly directed to draw the attention of the House to the injur­
ious system of carrying on trade, and to the means of extending coloni- 
zation. The system of compulsory services escaped their attention
^See Debate on Ceylon, 27 May 1830. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 
new series, Vol. XXIV, pp. 1155-1170.
2
Proposals submitted by Johnston to the Marquis of Londnderry, N.D.1809* 
Mendis (ed.) Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Vol. II, pp. 201-205.
3
Speech of Stewart, 27 May 1830. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, new serie
Vol. XXIV, pp. 1155-1162. Also evidence of Stewart, 21 April 1831. Third
Report and Minutes of evidence from the Select Committee of the House of 
Commons on the affairs of the East India Company.
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probably because they were less informed about the subject. Gordon 
found the maintenance of monopolies, compulsory services and feudal 
concepts of property, the penalties inflicted and the coercive powers 
exercised to enforce them, prejudicial to industry and enterprise.
They were to him 'a disgrace to the age’, and "an offspring of un­
checked power, which reflected upon the degree of liberty enjoyed
by the subjects”.^  If free how much more can these men and these acres
2produce was a question posed by Gordon and common to all liberals.
The administrative structure was viewed by Gordon as the mach­
inery which organised and sustained the above social and economic 
sy s t em•
"Before considering the revenue system of Ceylon,” he 
wrote, "it may be remarked that her Civil Service can 
be regarded as the civil department of the army of 
occupation, her revenue system collection of the Jaghire, 
and I regret to say it her legislature, and the whole of 
the colonial judicial department, is but the finer network, 
the save-all of the revenue system. "3
He noted that the Magistrate, the Judge, the Fiscal and the Collector, 
all regarded revenue as the chief object of Government.^
The adjustment of the governmental machinery to suit the con­
templated social and economic reforms naturally became part of the 
liberal programme. Hence the absolute nature of the Governor's legis-
^Gordon, 'The actual political conditionc£ Ceylon'. C.O. 54, 112.
2Ibid.
hbid.
4 l b i d .
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lative and executive powers came in for sharp liberal criticism.
"A whim becomes a law instantly,” alleged Gordon. "It is law for
the Governor to arrest, refuse Eabeaus Corpus, and to transport
without showing cause or granting t r i a l . H e  asserted that the
laws which the Supreme Court was bound to' observe were nothing but
2
the mandates of the executive officer. It was, however, Johnston
who played the more constructive role. His early attempts to reform
3
the existing Council have already been noted. The proposals he
first made in 1809, and repeated later, went much further. He urged
the adoption of a constitution similar in principle to the British
constitution, but modified to suit the religious and moral feelings
4of the people, and the circumstances of the country. He went as far 
as to suggest the creation of a legislative assembly consisting of 
representatives sent fiom the different provinces of the country.
He also urged the removal of the Governor's powers to banish individuals 
without trial.^
■^ Gordon, 'The actual political condition of Ceylon'. C.O. 54, 112.
^Ibid.
3
See p. ^ 6.
4
Proposals submitted by Johnston to the Marquis of Londonderry, Ho. 1809. 
Mendis (ed.) Colebrooke-Cameron Papers. Vol. II, pp. 221-226.
^Ibid.
6Ibid.
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This liberal approach to such matters was a sharp contrast
to the attitudes maintained by all the executive heads in Ceylon
from the time of North, but was more in line with the stand which
had usually been taken by the Supreme Court, Barnes once again
appealed to the usual need to preserve the strength of the executive.
He took his stand on two grounds. Firstly, he maintained that there
was no inconvenience resulting from the existing form of Government.^
He pointed out that the Governor’s powers to banish individuals were
seldom exercised except in the case of vagrants from the continent who,
2
if not immediately sent away, would ’inundate' the island. He also
3
regarded the existing Council well suited to the needs of the island. 
Secondly, he raised doubts as to whether the necessary material ex­
isted for the formation of a new form of government. A government in 
which the people had a share was for him completely out of the question.
m.vhatever utopian ideas theorists may cherish of univer­
sal fraternity without regard to colour, religion or 
civilization,” he. wrote, "or whatever notion levellers 
may wish to see ado£tdd, I am decidedly of opinion that 
this people cannot, or ought not to have under existing 
circumstances any greater share in the government, than 
they have at present.”^
^Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112.
2 r b i d .
3Ibid.
hbid.
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As to whether there were other elements in the population who could 
provide the material for a new government, he went on to point out 
that the land was almost wholly possessed hy the native inhabitants, 
and that there was only one European agriculturalist who had settled 
in the island, though there were one or two others making experiments 
He therefore argued that until they increased in number, had an inter­
est in the soil, and formed an important, intelligent, and wealthy
portion of society, it would not be expedient to change the form of 
2
government. Thus while the liberals generally believed that only 
a more liberal form of government could attract Europeans into the 
country, Barnes held that their settlement should precede the formation 
of a new government. Having thus ruled out representative government, 
he argued that the only way to form another type of government was either 
to vest the officials appointed to the Council with more power, such as 
the right of deciding measures proposed by the Governor, and of ori­
ginating measures, or to have an official Council independent of the
Governor, which had no power to originate measures, but to which all
3
laws must be submitted in the first instance. He decidedly objected 
to the former as it would involve the executive head in discussion, 
while the latter he said would produce dissention and schism among
^Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112. In making this 
estimate Barnes did not take into consideration the large number of 
Portuguese and Dutch settlers in the island.
2^ , .  ,
±bia.
3
Ibid.
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officers, and bring the Governor, as well as the Government, into 
contempt in the eyes of the governed.
Horton was less uncompromising than Barnes. Before he became 
Governor he expressed in Parliament his view that in ceded Colonies 
where there was only an executive head, there should be a Council with 
the power, to remonstrate against the acts of the Governor where they
p
differed. But he too was opposed to any form of representative govern­
ment.
"There is but one plan in my opinion to be acted upon in 
any Asiatic dependency such as Ceylon," he wrote, "and 
that is for the Secretary of State to advise His Majesty 
to send out a Governor whom he ought to trust, and whom 
he does trust, and to support that Governor as long as 
his conduct justifies it...."3
The independence of the judiciary, its separation from executive
authority, and the appointment of men bred to the law as judges, were
important aims in the liberal programme. They were generally treated
as indispensable preliminaries to fostering individual enterprise and
initiative. Stewart argued that the absence of a proper administration
4of justice had deterred settlers from going out to Ceylon. "Could it 
expected," asked Hume, "that any individual should go to settle under
^Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112.
2
Speech of Wilmot Horton, 11 June 1830. Hansards Parliamentary Debates, 
new series, Vol. XXV, 296.
^Horton to Goderich, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
4
Speech of Stewart, 27 May 1830. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, new
series, Vol. XXIV, pp. 1155-1162.
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such an arbitrary government,They held that the judges should 
be made completely independent of the Government. Gordon deplored 
the lack of an adequate separation of powers. He found the Collectors 
exercising' the'veiledf powers of a revenue judge, the Magistrate acting 
as 'the concubine* of the Collector, and the Provincial Judge ignorant 
and unsettled. Here too it was Johnston who was the far more im­
portant reformer* His early attempts at judicial reform have already 
•5
been noted. Supported by John Stewart in Parliament, he again urged 
the abolition of the Provincial Courts, and the extension of the juris­
diction of the Supreme Court over the whole island.
The liberal approach in the above matters was again a contrast 
to the attitude of the local Government. The concept of judicial in­
dependence was too strong to be openly opposed. Barnes therefore only
denied that he had ever interfered in the administration of justice
4
except in the capacity of a member of the High Court of Appeal. Both 
Barnes and Horton were however opposed to a complete separation of the 
executive and the judiciary. Perhaps having the interests of the exe­
cutive in mind Barnes believed that any such attempt would be 'highly 
5
injurious', while Horton thought that society in Ceylon had not reached
■^Speech of Joseph Hume, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, new series,
Vol. XXIV, pp. 1165-1170.
2
Gordon, 'The actual political condition of Ceylon', C.O. 54, 112.
3
See p.19.
4
Barnes to Bathurst, 6 April 1828. C.O. 54.
5
Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1850. C.O. 54, 112.
the stage of development where a rigid demarcation was desirable.
Both Barnes and Korton therefore only gave a qualified assent to
the proposal to abolish the Provincial Courts. As early as 1821
Barnes had expressed his willingness to it provided there was a local
2
appeal from the decisions to the Governor in Council. Horton agreed
to the proposal of his Deputy Secretary that the extension should be
carried out first in the Colombo district, and thereafter extended to
3
the other districts if found to be beneficial. In case the Provincial 
Courts were to remain as they were both Barnes and Horton were opposed 
to the appcantment of barristers to preside over them. Barnes pointed 
out that though professional judges would be supposed to be better 
qualified in the law, they would not be very different from the Civil 
Service judges, since they would also have to learn everything anew, 
the laws administered in Ceylon being not the same as the laws of Eng­
land. In fact he believed that an experienced senior Civil Servant 
would be better fitted for it than a total stranger coming from England.^
'*'Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831* C.O. 54, 114.
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 12 March 1821. C.O. 54, 79# Also Barnes to 
Bathurst, 4 March 1825* C.O. 54, 88.
3
Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114#
4
Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112.
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Horton joined with his Deputy Secretary in arguing that even under 
the imperfect state of the Civil Service the Provincial Courts had 
functioned well, and that much more could therefore be expected with 
Civil Servants more carefully selected, trained, and more continuously 
employed in judicial work.^ *
The constitution of the Civil Service was another important sphere 
which attracted liberal attention. The only aspect which concerned the 
radicals in Parliament was the expensiveness of the civil establishments. 
It gave them an opportunity, in which they delighted, of making another 
attack on patronage. They deplored the fact that the revenue of the is­
land was not adequate to meet its expenditure, and pointed an accusing 
finger at patronage. Iiume alleged that the salaries allotted to offi­
cers were not according to the duties that they performed, but accord­
ing to their rank and connections, and to the importance of those through
2
whose interests they get their appointment. "Good God," he exclaimed 
after presenting a series of inaccurate facts about the salaries of cer­
tain officers, "was it not desirable that such a subject should be re­
ferred to a committee which might inquire who all those persons were
3
and what duties they performed.” The question of patronage did not 
interest Gordon. He laid emphasis on the inefficiency of the Service,
^Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
2
Speech of Hume, 27 Kay 18y0. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, new 
series, Vol. XXIV, pp. 1165-1170.
hbid.
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and, more particularly on the imperfect position of the Collector
and the Provincial Judge. To him the expensiveness of the civil
establishments, especially in the judicial sphere, was because the
Mu&aliyars were not trusted with power.^ In this sphere too Johnston
was the far more important reformer. He was the first to have come
forward with the radical proposal of abolishing the Civil Service ,
and throwing open the higher situations to qualified natives as well
as Europeans. This proposal was first made as early as 1809* tut the
principle was repeated in 1830, though more specifically with refer- 
2
ence to India.
It is necessary to examine the attitude of mind in which John­
ston approached the question. One feature that was noticeable through­
out his career in Ceylon was his attachment to the local European com­
munity. With the limited patronage at his disposal he broke through 
many obstacles and appointed local Europeans to high situations. It 
seems therefore likely that Johnston had fairer deal to this community 
in mind when he made his proposals. In any case he appears to have 
been free from the prejudices generally prevalent during the time against 
local Europeans, or half-castes as they were commonly called, and be­
lieved that they should have the same privileges of a British bom
3
European. Other factors also took Johnston in the same direction.
1 ~
Gordon, 'The actual political condition of Ceylon', C.O. 54, 112.
2
Proposals submitted by Johnston to the Marquis of Londonderry, N.D.1809* 
Mendis (ed.) Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Vol. II, pp. 221-226. Also, Evi­
dence of Johnston, 9 July 1832. Minutes of evidence taken before the Sel­
ect Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India 
Company, Vol. IV, judicial.
3Svidence of Johnston, 9 July 1832. Minutes of evidence taken before the 
select committee of the House of Commons of the affairs of the East India 
Company, Vol. IV, Judicial.
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tfhile in the Colony he took a great interest in oriental culture 
and achievements, which interest he pursued even after retirement,1 
This naturally gave him a more balanced view of the Asians than was 
possessed by most Englishmen of the time* "Natives are just as com­
petent as Europeans can be," he told the committee inquiring into the
affairs of the East India Company, "to legislate for their own wants
2
and their own country," Above all Johnston showed the liberal search 
for a colonial policy applicable to the East, which while being more 
equitable, would, it was believed, Strengthen rather than weaken the 
attachment of the Colony, "I felt it to be my duty to state it offi­
cially as my opinion," he said, "that the surest way of retaining Cey­
lon, and the rest of our Indian possessions, was to admit the natives
of the country to a share in the Government of the country, and to allow
3
them to administer justice to their countrymen," He believed that the 
native inhabitants of the upper classes, both in India and in Ceylon, 
if made eligible to higher offices of state and given a feeling that 
the offices and the honours which they held depended upon the continu­
ance of Britishsupremacy, were more likely to support it with all their 
influence in the country, than if they felt that they had no such offices
^He brought with him to England certain manuscripts of Ceylon chronicles, 
and was instrumental in making the arrangements to have them translated 
and published. See Edward tTpham to Huskisson, 10 October 1827* C.0, 54,100.
^Evidence of Johnston, 9 July 1852. Minutes of evidence taken before the 
select committee of the House of Commons onthe affairs of the East India 
Company, Vol. IV, Judicial.
Ibid.
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or honours to lose by the overthrow of tJsfc supremacy#^" The liberal 
view on this question was also at variance with the attitude prevail­
ing in the Colony* Though the opinions expressed by Barnes and Horton 
were immediately occasioned by a proposal made by the Colebrooke- 
Cameron Commission, to throw open the Service, it is convenient to 
note them here, especially in view of the fact that these opinions were 
before the Commissioners before they finalized their recommendations, 
Barnes raised the fear of losing the Colony.
"As to the propriety of gradually introducing natives 
into those situations at present held by Europeans," 
he wrote, "I wish to know where you propose to draw 
the line. Admitted to one situation they would have 
an equal claim to another, so that unless your contem­
plate the supercession of all the European authorities 
not excepting the Governor, I could not see where you 
could stop. My opinion is that the line is now well 
defined, that the natives are perfectly content, and 
that it ought not to be invaded# ”2-
Besides, Barnes was in complete disagreement with the liberal idea
of equality. "I have no hesitation in saying," he wrote, "that black
faces and white never can be so amalgamated together in society as to
be upon an equal footing - the one or the other must predominate.
Horton was less uncompromising. He was prepared to assent to
the proposition subject to the condition thet. thejadmission should take
place whenever they possessed the necessary qualifications.^ However
■^Evidence of Johnston, 9 July 1832. Minutes of evidence taken before the 
Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India 
Company, Vol. IV, Judicial.
2
Barnes to Colebrooke, 10 September 1830. C.O. 54, 112.
"'Ibid.
4Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O.54,114.
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he went on to specify qualifications difficult to expect in the social
context of the time. Identifying, perhaps correctly, one direction in
which liberal thinking germinated, he pointed out that to compare the
exclusion of the Catholics in England from office with the exclusion
of the Mudalyars and other higher classes of natives from office in
Ceylon was not the same.
”The strength of the catholic question,” he wrote, ”con- 
sisted in the fact that the Catholics were not to be dis­
tinguished from the Protestants in their habits, con­
nections, information and civil character, except so far 
as the exclusive law did distinguish them. The higher 
classes of the natives here if admitted into civil office 
tomorrow, would neither in their habits, connections, 
information, or civil character be identical with the Euro­
peans.
Horton in fact thus posed the question as to whether ’Anglicization' 
should precede a policy of admitting the native inhabitants to high 
office, or vice cersa. Though Horton created the impression that it 
should precede, the Mudaliyars were in fact not likely to change un­
less they saw it as a means to improve their social position. Many 
of the Mudaliyar families had in fact changed their religion on account
of the insistence of the Dutch, and were seen to be imitating European
2
customs on occasion. They also showed no dislike for an English edu­
cation, Perhaps they might have been tempted to a further change in 
their ways of life if they saw a prospect of social improvement. As it
■^Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114*
2
J. Cordiner, A description of Ceylon, Vol. I, p.109. R. Percival,
An Account of the island of Ceylon, pp. 240-241.
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was however the Mudaliyars did not wish to become the last among 
the Europeans,
The other factor to which Horton drew attention was the pre­
valence of caste. He pointed out that the higher caste Headmen were 
too much under the prejudice of caste to allow the ranks subordinate 
to them to emerge from their ’regulated inferiority1, and maintained 
they must dispossess themselves of it before they could be admitted 
into an equal eligibility to office with Europeans.^" Ee recorded two 
circumstances connected with the second Maha Mudaliyar to prove that 
the Kudaliyars were not prepared to give up their superior caste posi­
tion, The first related to an invitation extended by the Chief Justice 
to this Mudaliyar to serve in a Grand Jury in the event of the estab­
lishment of such an institution. The Mudaliyar had replied that if 
he is likely to meet any Burgher who had a ’taint of low caste blood
in him' as a fellow juryman, he wished to decline as he could not make
2
up his mind to such a degradation, Horton also referred to a conver­
sation which he had with the same Mudaliyar where he had asked him 
whether he would sit at his table if he had as his guest a man of talent, 
and education, but who had a taint of low caste blood in him. He had 
replied that he would not, unless it was considered an act of discourtesy 
towards the Governor, The Mudaliyar had also expressed his preference
"^ Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O, 54, 114.
2Ibld.
''ibid.
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for continued ineligibility to office rather than give up his caste 
position if such was the nature of the bargain''How can the local 
Government refuse employment to a Burgher of C^vracter or talent, or 
to an educated native," he asked after narrating these instances, "be-
2
cause a Mudaliyar Civil Servant would not sit in the same room with him*" 
Horton also recorded the experience of a Wesleyan Missionary, who 
had appointed a low caste man as a School Master in a school where the 
rest were high caste men. The School Masters had refused to work, un­
less a distinction was made by seat or position. The Missionary had suc­
cessfully resisted in this instance, though, it was stated, in others 
he was obliged to make lower benches.
"Mr. Clough as an individual, and founding his conduct on 
religion," wrote Horton, "might make an experiment of 
resistance with success. But if the Governor were to dis­
gust the natives of the higher caste by forcing a man of
inferior caste among them, and compelling them to give up
their employment unless they would associate with him, it 
is not too much to say that the Colony would be thrown 
into a state of all but rebellion."3
Horton was correct in his assessment of the attitude of the higher
caste people towards the lower. Like Barnes, they were indeed not 
levellers. The Vellales (farmers) often lamented the tendency to dis­
regard the distinctions of superiority and inferiority among castes.^"
^Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114*
2Ibid.
hbid.
4
Petition of 33 inhabitants of Bentote, 20 June 1829. No. 115, C.O.416, 19.
Also Petitinn of 713 inhabitants of Colombo, 2 July 1829. No. 126,
C.O. 416, 29. Similar petitions are found in C.O. 416, 29-32.
I
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"Although men are all of one make," wrote Anthony Fernando, a 
fisher-caste inhabitant of the Maritime provinces, "still as the 
workmanship of a gold chain is formed of different particles, so 
the casts /sic/are introduced to distinguish them, and this distinc­
tion of /sic/ "casV has been for many ages preserved under Kings and 
other personages.Though Horton ins correct m  has assessment of 
the situation yet, by expecting the higher castes to give up volun­
tarily their privileged position, he was as we shall see later look­
ing for social change at the wrong end.
The liberal atmosphere that thus grew around problems in Ceylon, 
placed both the Colonial Office and the local Government on the defen­
sive and forced both into more activity. The radicals in England com­
pelled the Colonial Office to submit to Parliament various returns of 
revenue and expenditure and papers relating to the administration of 
justice. They embarrassed the Colonial Office by involving it in a 
debate on Ceylon, and occasionally by asking questions on the floor 
of the House. The local Government was also forced into more activity.
It had to submit various returns required from time to time, to correct 
erroneous facts presented by the radicals in Parliament, to correct
^Petition of Anthony Fernando on the grievances of the people of the 
Maritime provinces, 9 May 1829. C.O. 145, C.O. 416, 29.
2
5^ This debate was occasioned by the demand for a Select Committee 
of the House of Commons to inquire in the affairs of Ceylon.
iJee Hansard1s-Parliamentary Debates, new series, Vol. XXV,p.27.
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false impressions created by newspaper reports on the financial situ­
ation in Ceylon. It took great pains to show that Ceylon was not a 
burden to the 'mother country'.^ Above all, it had to meet the liberal 
criticism that was being levelled against the policies and institutions 
of the Government. The extent to which the local Government was sensi­
tive to liberal criticism is seen from the care that was taken by Barnes 
to submit his comments on the latter. The comments made by Barnes were
generally limited to admitting or contradicting particular facts and
2
contained no thoughtful defence of the old system. He was inclined 
to dismiss the liberals as unworthy of attention. The comments sent by 
Horton were drawn up at his request by his Deputy Secretary, Anstruther. 
This contained by far the best defence of the existing system, for it at­
tempted at a historical explanation for the existence of certain factors,
explaln5.ng why reforms were delayed, what reforms were practicable, and 
3
what not. He thereby drew attention to factors which the liberals gen­
erally tended to overlook.
"If I were called upon for any defence of the system on 
which the Government had been administered," wrote An­
struther, "I would compare the present with that which we 
found in operation thirty years ago when the Government 
came into our hands. The important and obvious changes
Gee Campbell to Bathurst, 28 February 1825. C.O. 54, 84* Barnes to 
Euskisson, 19 December 1828. C.O. 54, 101. Barnes to Bathurst, 8 
November 1824. C.O. 54, 86. Barnes to Bathurst, 8 April and 28 April 
1827. C.O. 54, 97.
2
Observations of Barnes. See Barnes to Hay, 22 January 1851. C.O.54,112.
3
Observations of P. Anstruther, See Horton to Goderich 14 December 1851.
C.O. 54, 114.
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now practicable, nay almost inevitable, even were the 
Government to discourage improvement were then im­
practicable.”^
Anstruther1s thinking shows that in spite of the many dis­
agreements with liberal ideas noticed before, the liberal environ­
ment had given an impetus to reforms. This is seen from the several 
measures that were adopted or contemplated. A change in the Constitu­
tion took place with the appointment of Horton as Governor. The power
that had been given to former Governors to banish individuals without
2
trial was withdrawn. The Constitution and powers of the Council 
were stipulated in the Royal Instructions issued to Horton, and not 
left, as before, to be regulated by ordinary instructions. Though no 
changed was made in the composition of the Council, considerable changes 
were made in its powers. The Council could not as yet meet unless sum­
moned by the Governor, and members could not originate a legislative 
enactment, or a debate on a question, unless it was proposed by the 
Governor. But if a member considered a law fit to be enacted, or a 
subject fit to be debated, he was given the right to transmit a written 
statement to the Governor and to have it inserted in the minutes of the 
Council. The Governor was also now required to consult the Council, 
and to obtain its advice, in the exercise of all his powers, unless 
the question was of so urgent and pressing a nature as not to admit of 
delay. On such occasions, however, the miter was to be speedily brought
■^Observations of P. Anstruther, See Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. 
C.O. 54, 114.
2
The clause conferring this power was omitted from the Royal Instructions 
issued to Horton. Mendis (ed.) See Royal Instructions to Governor Horton, 
30 April 1831. Colebrooke-Cameron papers. Vol. II, pp. 142-153.
before the Council for revision and sanction. The members of the 
Council were given the freedom of debate and vote. The Governor could 
still act on his opinions, and against the wishes of the Council, or 
a majority in it. But in such instances the members dissenting were 
to be allowed, as before, to record their dissent on the minutes of 
the Council, which were to be submitted to the Home Government at the 
earliest opportunity. Besides, the minutes of all the proceedings of 
the Council were to be regularly kept and transmitted home every six 
months.x These changes resulted in the transfer of the responsibility 
for the administration of the Colony from the Governor in Council to 
the Governor and Council. The new Council had a good start when Goder­
ich chided the Councillors for being mere passive instruments of the 
2
Governor. Horton, who was the bearer of a measure of constitutional 
reform also brought with him a new spirit, when he declared soon after 
his arrival that "the vital principle of the financial administration 
of the Colony should be uncompromising publicity, nothing kept back 
or even obscured by complexity or bad arrangement;1. In order to se-
Royal Instructions to Horton, 30 April 1831. Iiendis (ed.), The Colebrooke- 
Cameron papers. Vol. II, pp. 142-53.
2
In reply to a d.espatch in which Horton had statdd that he had the unani­
mous consent of the Council to the principles of his government, Gode­
rich stated that such consent was of no particular value as indicating 
a genuine accordance of opinion as the Council had also acquiesced in 
the principles of the former Governor which were in some important points 
different. This remark excited the Councillors who had functioned under 
both regimes. Horton took offence over the insinuation that he was dis­
posed to discourage free expression. Horton to Goderich, 1 October 
1832. C.O. 54, 118.
^Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
410
cure a discussion of legislative measures, both inside and outside
the Council, he laid down the rule that the Council could not pass
legislative enactments until they were read at two different meetings.
Immediately after the first reading, a draft of the proposed law was
to be published in the Government Gazette and any objections to it
1
were to be laid before the Council and filed in the minutes. Horton
2
also took steps to start a newspaper which was named the Colombo Journal. 
Though it was under Government control its very establishment undoubtedly 
marked a change of political climate. For the first; time in the history 
of British legislation in Ceylon, regulations of the Government were 
disallowed, and on such grounds as the severity of the laws, and their 
incompatibility with judicial independence. At about the same time 
the administration of justice in Ceylon was considered so defective and 
inconvenient that judicial reforms which had long been postponed were 
treated as a matter of urgency which could not await the report of the
4
commission of inquiry. Soon after his arrival Horton directed the
discontinuance of the custom of erecting arches and ornamenting the roads,
whenever the Governor and the Supreme Court Judges travelled about the 
5
country. A direction by the Colonial Office to discontinue the practice
■^Horton to Goderich, 19 January 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
^For the first issues of the Colombo Journal see C.O. 59, 1-2.
^See Bathurst to Paget, 19 September 1821. C.O. 55, 66. Barnes to Huski- 
sson, 1 April 1828. C.O. 54, 101. Barnes to Murray, 17 February 1830. C.O. 
54, 107. Barnes to Goderich, 7 June 1831. C.O. 54, 115.
^Murray to Barnes, 21 October 1828. C.O. 55, 69.
5
Horton to Goderich, 3 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
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of having Lascarins as attendants, though not well received’, by the 
Governor and the Civil Servants, was nevertheless partially carried 
out.^ Horton issued a minute in which the Government servants were 
informed that in future Lascarins employed as a mark of honourary dis­
tinction* or those called upon to execute any duty which could be re­
garded as private, must be paid out of the salaries of the employers
2
as their retentionwas considered unnecessary for public purposes.
Though convinced that the system of compulsory services was objectionable 
only in theory, Barnes found it necessary, in the face of liberal oppo­
sition, to initiate certain reforms. Without abandoning the rights 
of the Government with regard to the services of the people, he adopted
3
the measure of hiring voluntary labourers for the cinnamond department.
He also exempted the 'Moormen', who were described as the most ’industrious'
4
class of people, from personal services or taxes in lieu of them. Horton
5
also committed himself to a gradual abolition of compulsory services.
Thus it is seen that the balance between authoritarian and liberal forms 
of Government, which had been prevalent in the Colony, was tilted in 
favour of more liberal institutions even before the Colebrooke-Cameron
See p? m -
2
Minute, 1 October 1832. Horton to Goderich, 2 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118. 
3,.Barnes to Goderich, 11 October 1831. C.O. 54, 113.
4
Regulation V, 28 June 1830. Barnes to Murray 12 June 1830. C.O. 54, 107. 
"'Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
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Commission submitted its recommendations for administrative reform
in Ceylon, The cry for economy compelled both the Colonial Office
and the local Government to pay more attention to retrenchments.
The Treasury in England repeatedly drew the serious attentiozjlbf the
Colonial Office to the excess of expenditure over revenue in the
Colony and urged retrenchments.'1' The Colonial Office in turn continued
to emphasise the need for economy. Barnes received several despatches,
2some of which seem to have even annoyed him, urging reductions. Horton, 
too, was briefed before his departure, and consequently arrived with 
the determination, which was common to all the Governors as they ar­
rived, to do so much at least as would raise the value of the Colony 
in the opinion of the British nation.
There was indeed nothing less doubtful than the fact that the ex­
penditure incurred on civil establishments in Ceylon, was out of pro­
portion to its revenue. Thus taking the expenditure statements of 1829 
into consideration it could be seen that out of a total revenue of 
£361,791 approximately £120,088 was spent on fixed establishments.^
The fixed contingent charges, amounting approximately to £85,450, were 
also mainly incurred on establishments, or perquisites connected with
^Commissioners of the Treasury to Hay, 5 August 1826. C.O. 54, 95. 
Commissioners of the Treasury to Colonial Secretary, 22 December 1827, 
C.O. 54, 99.
2
See Bathurst to Barnes, 1 September 1826, and Goderich to Barnes,
21 August 1827 for two such instances* C.O. 55, 69.
3
Horton to Goderich, 9 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
4
Heturn of the fixed establishments for 1829. See C.O. 416, 7. The figures
for 1829 are taken for purposes of illustration on account of the fact
that the Colebrooke—Cameron Commissioners based their recommendations on 
them.
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them.1 It should also be noted that some of the unpaid Headmen en­
joyed tax exemptions, thus occasioning a loss of revenue.
One feature of this expenditure was the disproportion occasioned 
by the Civil Service salary structure. Thus, for instance, in 1829 
out of the above total expenditure approximately £39#765 was spent
p
on 35 Civil Servants. The clerical establishment consisting of about
%
244 Clerks, and Secretaries of Courts, cost approximately £13,588.
The local Magistracy consisting of about 15 individuals cost approxi­
mately £3,072.^ The Headmen on the fixed establishment consisting of
-5about 79 individuals cost approximately £3,235.
The Colonial Office, when it urged reductions, had in mind mainly 
the large number of persons employed in inferior situations, "whose 
salaries though small in the abstract, swell the establishment to an 
extent unprecedented in any of the colonial possessions of the Crown."
It was indeed that branch of the establishment that immediately attracted 
the attention of the local Government too. Thus Paget announced a re­
duction of the salaries of the Clerks, though it was to take effect only
€with new appointees. The number of Headmen on the fixed establishment
7
were to be gradually reduced as vacancies occurred. A reduction of the
Return of the fixed establishments for 1829# See C.O. 416,7. The figures 
for 1829 are taken for purposed of illustration on account of the fact that 
the Colebrooke-Cameron Commissioners based their recommendations on them*
5^iie above figure is extracted from the salaries appearing in the fixed 
establishments for 1829# See Return of fixed establishments for 1829.
C.O. 416,7#
^Ibid.
4
ibid.
^Memorandum showing the amount of pay and allowances drawn monthly by
(cont.)
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allowances of the Headmen of the Cinnamonl Department was announced in
1825.^ Two pension funds that had been established for the superannuation
of the Clerks and Magistrates, were discontinued on the instructions of
the Secretary of State, when they were brought before his notice by 
2Barnes* Reductions were also made in the salaries of the Chief Justice,
3
Puisne Justice, and Advocate Fiscal. The guarantee of a pension on re-
4
tir eiuent, which these Judges had hitherto enjoyed was withdrawn.
But all these measures only touched the fringe of the problem.
V,:hile the Colonial Office continued to keep its eye on local patronage, 
the local Government was faced with considerable difficulties. As was 
pointed out both by Barnes and Horton, local patronage involved the social
(cont.) the several district Headmen in the Maritime provinces, 4 February 
1830, C.O. 416, 8,
£
Paget to Bathurst, 21 October 1822. C.O. 54, 82.
7
Horton to Goderich, 9 November 1831. C.O, 54, 114*
^Barnes to Bathurst, 5 March 1825. C.O. 54, 88.
2
These pension funds had been established by Paget in 1822. He had how­
ever failed to obtain the sanction of the Secretary of State. Consequently, 
Barnes reported this omission, pointing out at the same time that the funds 
having been erroneously calculated, would result in the Government having 
to bear part of the expenditure. He however stressed the necessity of 
establishing some sort of scheme. In fact he did not carry out the first 
order to abolish these funds, until he was found fault with for failing 
to carry out instructions. See Barnes to Bathurst, 22 September 1826.
C.O. 54, 93. Barnes to Euskisson, 29 March 1829. C.O. 54, 101. Also 
Murray to Barnes, 14 November 1828. C.O. 55, 69. and Goderich to Barnes,
22 July 1827. C.O. 55, 69.
^Goderich to Barnes, 5 August 1827. C.O. 55, 69.
4
Ibid, Also, Murray to Barnes, 21 October 1828. C.O. 55, 69.
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and politicsl stability of the country. Barnes already experienced
considerable embarrassment from the dissatisfaction which prevailed
among the Clerks consequent to the abolition of the pension fund.'*'
"To deny the people all participation in their own concerns,M he wrote,
about: the Headmen, ’’would be the most effective measure that could be
2
adopted to alienate their attachment to the existing Government."
II0rton, too, pointed out that these appointments and distinctions sup- 
plied a cheap means of sustaining the influence of the Government.
He therefore requested that if further reductions were considered nec­
essary such changes should appear to emanate exclusively from the Home
4
Government, to mitigate the loss of influence of the local Government.
The most expensive part of the establishment, which was the Civil 
Service, continued to present its own difficulties in affecting reductions. 
The new environment naturally held back any idea of further increase of 
salary. But the social forces which we have observed in previous chap­
ters continued to operate to maintain its salary structure at the exist­
ing level. This is seen from the care that was taken to rectify a drop
in the real salaries of the Collectors consequent on the withdrawal of
5the practice of issuing debentures and accommodation bills in 1825.
^Memorial, of 144 Clerks of Colombo. See Barnes to Huskisson, 29 March 1829. 
C.O. 54, 101. Also Horton to Goderich, 29 September 1852. C.O. 54, 118.
2
Barnes to Bathurst, 8 April 1827. C.O. 54, 97.
^Horton to Goderich, 21 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
4
Ibid.
Kinute of 4 July 1825, and Regulation VIII, 4 July 1825. C.O. 54, 89.
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The emoluments of the Collectors were more immediately affected by 
this change as they lad previously been able to convert their commissions 
issued in rix dollars into sterling at Is. 9d. a rix-dollar by applying 
for a debenture issued at that rate.^ Thus the Collectors experienced 
a loss of actual income in proportion to the largeness of their com­
missions. Apart from the need which Barnes would have certainly felt 
of maintaining the existing salary structure of the Civil Service, he 
also feared that it would affect the value of the office of Collector,
and also diminish the incentives in the Service by reducing the number
2
of situations which entitled Civil Servants to higher pensions. He 
therefore increased the fixed salaries of Collectors from £650 to £750 
per annum, and urged its adoption on the ground that the increase was 
more than counter-balanced by the saving on the commission.^ Besides 
this he implemented, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, 
a plan which he said would stimulate the Collectors to greater exertion. 
T|iey were given an additional commission of three per cent on the net 
revenue they collected in a district beyond the average receipts of the 
three preceding years. This could only be claimed by a Collector who 
did not vacate his office by promotion or otherwise, within three years.^
^Barnes to Bathurst, 26 July 1825. C.O. 54, 89.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
Kinute, 29 June 1825. C.O. 54, 89.
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It is difficult to imagine what benefits Barnes expected from this 
scheme, for as he himself pointed out, a Collector would seldom remain 
three years in a particular district. This in turn could have only 
meant that a Collector would seldom regard it as an incentive for 
greater exertion. His scheme in fact only reflected the anxiety of 
the local Government to maintain existing salaries of the Civil Service.
In fact both Barnes and Horton made a strong case for the maintenance 
of the existing salary structure of the Service. Barnes viewed it from 
two interconnected angles. Firstly, there were the usual aspirations of 
the Civil Servants to be taken into consideration. Besides pointing 
out the fact thd no gentleman entering the Service had retired with what 
* deserved the name of a fortune1, he stated his conviction that Civil 
Servants should be well remunerated especially in view of the fact that 
a person entering the Service sacrificed the bestportion of his life in 
a country so distant from home.^ Secondly, he held that whatever the 
salary structure of the Civil Service was it would continue to attract 
men from England, and that the effect of lower salaries would be that 
instead of attracting efficient men it would bring in less efficient men. 
Horton viewed it more from the second angle, though the former would 
have also undoubtedly affected him. He had little sympathy for the radi­
cal cry for economy, though he very much believed in their demand for 
efficiency. Consequently he tried to show that they were incompatible
^Barnes to Huskisson, 6 December 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
2
Barnes to Huskisson, 5 August, 1825. C.O. 54, 101.
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with one another. He considered the reduction of the salaries of 
the Civil Servants an economy of a doubtful nature. To induce candi­
dates to come forward under the stimulus of an adequate remuneration 
was for him a pervading principle of a Civil Service. In a distant 
Colony that adequacy was determined by the prospects held out of 
revisiting the native country with a ’competency1, after the discharge 
of their public duties. He held that otherwise it would be impossible 
to attract efficient men. Hence he considered it to be the ’truest 
economy' to pay a higher price if first rate qualifications could 
thereby be secured.^
Like the Governors before them, both Barnes and Horton therefore 
believed that the only savings that could be affected in the Civil Ser­
vice were by a reduction of offices and by a consolidation of duties, 
is we have seen, by 1822 Barnes had already carried out certain reductions 
and consolidations. Further steps were taken in the same direction after 
1822. The office of Resident at Handy was abolished with the death of
9
D ’Oyly**- The Provincial Courts at Calpentyn and Batticaloa were abolished 
and the duties were entrusted to the Collectors, who were paid additional 
emoluments for the purpose, thereby abandoning the principle so long main-
3
tained of keeping the offices of Collector and Provincial Judge separate.
^Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114. Also Horton to Goderich, 14 December, 
1831. C.O. 54, 114.
2Barnes to Huskisson, 5 August 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
Ibid.
OrX*)
The reduction of offices which had thus been carried out from 
time to time had ii fact reduced the total number of offices belonging 
to the Civil Service, It was generally felt in the Service that it 
had in fact been too much mutilated and that no more changes were 
possible.^ Cnnsequently though Horton arrived with the determination 
of reducing the number of offices he looked around and found it no 
more possible. He directed a map to be prepared pointing out the usual 
places of residence of the members of the Civil Service, and the esti­
mates of revenue and of population in the districts, and concluded that 
far from admitting reduction or consolidation the Civil Service must
in fact progressively increase in proportion to the increase of popu- 
2
lation. Thus it is seen that the essential difficulty which faced 
British administration in Ceylon was the problem of providing out of 
meagre local resources for an establishment of highly paid European 
officials. The development of the administrative structure along the 
lines which we have noticed in previous chapters had superadded an ex­
pensive European civil and judicial establishment to a native establishment, 
which had not fundamentally changed in character or in numbers, from 
that which had existed under former governments. Only a radical ap­
proach to increase the revenue, or to reduce expenditure by an overall 
change of the administrative structure, could have really solved the 
problem,
^Evidence of R. Boyd, 2 November 1830. C.O. 416, 7*
^Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54,114.
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Without such an approach the desire to reduce expenditure, hut 
the inability to do so within the established framework, only led to 
much illfeeling between the local Government and the Colonial Office*
The occasion for the outburst was the creation of certain Assistant 
offices, mainly to accommodate certain Writers who had been sent out 
from England. Though the total cadre in the Service had been reduced by 
the abolition of offices, the Colonial Office had continued to send 
Writers even above the vacancies occasioned by death or retirement.
This, combined with the fact thet those entitled to retire were contin­
uing in the Service, brought about a situation where some Writers were 
continuing as Assistants in the Secretary's office above the usual per­
iod. The choice before Barnes was to keep them in the Secretary's 
office, or to send them out into the districts. He chose the latter, 
though it involved an increase of their salary from £p00 per annum to 
£512 per annum, which was the amount usually paid to Assistants in the 
districts.
Goderich, by whom this news was received, wrote a despatch which 
amounted to a censure of the Governor's conduct, blaming him for dis­
regarding the frequent injunctions sent by his predecessor tobring about
a diminution of expense and for adding more to an 'already overcharged 
2
establishment’. This compelled Barnes to defend himself, and the general 
feeling against patronage perhaps made him bold in his defence. Besides
^Barnes to Huskisson, 5 August 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
2
Goderich to Barnes, 22 July 1827. C.O. 55, 69.
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pointing out that all he did was to employ Writers, who had been 
sent out, more usefully in the districts, he harped on the diffi­
culties of his situation created by the uncertainties of the Colonial 
Office attitude*
MI cannot here refrain, from observing," he wrote, after 
mentioning certain reductions that he had carried out,
"that in no instance in reporting these diminutions in 
the charges of the civil establishment have I received 
the smallest expression of approbation, so that I feel 
all the embarrassment of my situation, for whilst on 
the one hand I am positively censured for any increase 
of expenditure, I am on the other applauded only by in­
ference in making reductions."
Pressed by frequent orders to effect economy, Barnes was also
led to make a remark that were it in his power to remodel the European
establishments, vast sums might be saved, and equal if not superior
2
efficiency attained. This remark came within the notice of the Trea­
sury in England, which directed the attention of the Colonial Office 
3
to it. The latter showed its annoyance by commenting upon the ’unusual
style' adopted by the Governor, and also by expressing thehope that
the remark had not been made without a careful examination of the
subject. It nevertheless directed Barnes to submit his recommendation 
4
for reform.
■^ Barnes to Huskisson, 5 August 1828. C.O. 54, 1C1.
^Barnes to Bathurst, 8 April 1827. C.O. 54, 97.
^Commissioner of the Treasury to Colonial Secretary, 22 December 1827, 
C.O. 54, 99.
A
^Huskisson to Barnes, 21 March 1828. C.O. 55, 69.
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Barnes was thus compelled to draw up proposals for reform in 
order to show that there was nothing ’chimerical’ in his statement.
His efforts, however, produced a scheme wholly unsuitable to the 
times. His scheme was based on three premises, Firstly, he believed 
that the reduction of the salaries of the Civil Service as it was then 
constituted was impracticable. Secondly, he showed that there was nothing 
peculiar in the education or qualifications of the Civil Servants which 
made them exclusively fitted for the performance of their duties. Thirdly, 
he noted the existence of military officers in the island who were "men 
of matured minds and settled habits, and perfectly qualified to execute 
civilian duties without the slightest interference with their military 
avocations”*^
Arguing on these premises he proposed the gradual abolition of 
the Civil Service, and the recruitment of military officers to perform 
its duties. Field officers of the army were thus to be appointed to the 
chief offices which v:ere held by Civil Servants, both at the centre of 
Government, and at the Provincial Courts and Collectorates, The Command­
ants of garrisons, who were to be called ’civil and military admini­
strators', were to combined both functions in the districts, while half 
pay officers were to be appointed as Provincial Judges, purely to func­
tion in that capacity. The Assistants that would be required were to be
2
i selected from among Captains and Subalterns.
; ^Barnes to Huskisson, 6 December 1828. C.O. 54» 101.
: 2;ud. .
I
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Barnes saw an objection in principle or practice to the appoint­
ment of military officers to perform civilian functions. He thought 
that far from leading to inconvenience, district administration would 
in fact be strengthened, both in time of war and peace, by the whole 
energies of a district being centred on one individual. He countered 
a possible objection to the employment of military men as Judges by 
pointing out th£ the Civil Service Judges were also not professional 
men, nor continuously employed in it, but those taken out promiscuously* 
from the Civil Sertice. To him the only security which the Civil Ser­
vice provided was respectability of character, and forfeiture of ad­
vantages, if removed. He beliared that equal respectability could be 
found in the military officers and that equal security could be looked 
for in their professional hopes and expectations. He was also able to 
show a considerable reduction of expenditure as one advantage of his 
scheme, for in addition to military pay, the new officers were to be given 
less than half the amount paid to Civil Servants.’*'
Despite certain advantages which Barnes:.was able to show in favour 
of his scheme, it was unnoticed by the Cdonial Office. Besides affect­
ing the patronage of the Secretary of State, which the Colonial Office
2
had no intention of totally abandoning, his scheme was unsuitable to
^Barnes to Huskisson, 6 December 1828. C.O. 54, 101.
2
See Bathurst to Barnes, 10 May 1825. C.O. 55, 66.
the age. Being a military man he was naturally biassed towards
his profession, A conservative by temperament, he viewed the
problem as purely one of reducing expenditure, and maintaining
existing standards, and was undisturbed or unconcerned by the ideals
growing around him. But ideals were disturbing other men in other
places. The movement for economy in England was not just one of
chopping down expenditure by any expedient, but was a much larger
movement which involved forms of Government, About the time that
Barnes was formulating his proposals a lament was heard in the British
Parliament about the fate of Ceylon which was presided over by a
military Governor.1 Besides, the appointment of military officers
on full pay or on half pay, to civilian posts, was a form of patronage
2
which was under much criticism at the time.
Vilmot Eorton who succeeded Bsrnes, and who was the first civil­
ian Governor after a succession of miliiary men, naturally brought with 
him a civilian approach to the problem of reform. He was reading Berto- 
lacci’s book on Ceylon during his voyage, and was consequently very 
much influenced by the ideas which had been put forward by him nearly 
fifteen years before. In any case he quoted extensively from Bertolacci 
to guard against a notion thst he was recommending alterations ill suited 
to the local circumstances of the Colony, without sufficient experience
^"Speech of Stewart, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXIV, 
pp. 1155-1162.
^Motion of X. Gordon, 26 April 1850. Hansard’s Parliamentary Bebates,
Vol. XXIV, p.65.
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of it. As former Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, Korton 
also had a personal knowledge of the feelings and interests of the 
Colonial Office on this matter, and may have been motivated by a 
desire to put forward a scheme which did not unduly disturb its in­
terests. Above all he also had the advantage of having had recently 
experienced the trend of events in England, both in and out of Parlia­
ment, though not always in sympathy with what was said and done. He 
showed this awareness when he declared soon after his arrival that 
"His Majesty1s Government and the English nation have the right to 
expect that the Civil Service of this, or any other Colony,■should 
be accurately proportioned to the real duties to be executed by the 
members of that Service11. "It is not only necessary,” he added, 1 that 
those duties should be real, but that they should not be created by 
the operation of a system which unnecessarily multiplies them."^
Horton however did not visualise any radical change in the con­
stitution of the Civil Service. As we have seen he was totally opposed 
to any change in the salary structure. The only change that he was 
prepared to recommend was the lengthening of the period of service re­
quired of the Civil Servants. Even here he failed to formulate con­
crete proposals. He therefore only aimed at making the Civil Service, 
as it was then constituted, a more efficient instrument of Government. 
He was well aware that in the new environment liberal salaries could 
only be justified by a guarantee that those receiving them were men
■^ Minute, 10 November 1831 . C.O. 54,114.
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previously prepared for their duties, who were determined to gain, 
an intimate acquaintance with the laws, customs and character of 
the inhabitants, and the agricultural and commercial state of the 
Colony, With an eye on the manner in which recruitment took place 
in England, with the knowledge that little attention had been paid 
to qualifications, he urged that the Home Government should institute 
an adequate examination as an 'indispensable preliminary' to any 
appointment to the Service, He believed that such an examination, 
if properly conducted, would ascertain the competency that he had in 
mind. Candidates were to be not more than 20 and not less than 18 
years of age. In addition to a liberal education they would only be 
required to have a practical knowledge of Arithmetic'* and a general 
knowledge of the principles of English Law and the rules of evidence.
On arrival in the Colony they were to be made to turn their immediate 
attention to the study of the native languages, Colonial history and 
laws. Before appointment to any office they were to pass a rigid 
examination in the languages spoken in that part of the country where 
they were to eiecute their civil functions. They were then to obtain 
a knowledge of the forms of business and the system of colonial accounts 
in one of the Assistant's offices, previous., to receiving an actual 
appointment of responsibility.^
While recognizing that seniority was a convenient rule to regulate 
promotions he wanted the right to appoint competent persons to particular
"^ Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54> 114. Also Horton to Goderich,
14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
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situations although in such instances seniority would he contra­
vened, He also hoped to discontinue the practice of promoting 
Civil Servants who had acquired a knowledge of the Sinhalese language 
into Tamil provinces and vice versa, observing that those who looked 
for promotions indiscriminately should take the trouble of acquiring 
a knowledge of both languages. As far as was practicable Collectors 
were also not to be removed from districts with which they had ac­
quired a familiarity.^
These ideas of reformexpressed by Horton contained nothing new. 
Similar ideas had been held by almost all the Governors from the time 
of North. But Horton failed to examine why they had not taken effect 
before. Besides, Horton, like Barnes, failed to view Civil Service 
reforms inihe much larger context of administrative and social reform 
in Ceylon. The reform of the Service besides, being tied to the inter­
ests of a powerful group of Englishmen:, to whom both Barnes and Horton 
were sympathetic, also involved the consideration of social problems 
to which by inclination they were not attracted. It was amidst the 
existence of such a situation that the most important among the liberals 
set their minds on the problems of administrative reform in Ceylon.
^Minute, 10 November 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
Chapter X L !
THE REFORMS OF COLEBROOKE AND CAMERON
The most important among the liberals who were concerned with
1 2 Ceylon were W. M. G. Colebrooke and C. H. Cameron, who came out to
investigate the administration of its affairs. They had the advant­
age of bringing to bear on the inquiry new ideas, which were absent 
or suppressed among the officials sent to govern the Colony, and .'a 
first hand knowledge of the country, which their position as official 
inquirers gave them. The rather urgent prblem which faced them was to 
make the Colony prosperous in the eyes of the British people. Through 
the influence of the prevailing new ideas they were undoubtedly con­
vinced, even before their arrival, that such prosperity could be looked 
for only by fostering private enterprise. They therefore set themselves 
the task of creating a suitable environment which would attract men with 
capital into the country, and which would also encourage greater exer­
tion among its inhabitants. The practical task was to devise institu­
tions which would foster the above development, avoiding at the same 
time any discrimination between races and classes. The work of the
"^William Macbean George Colebrooke, 1783-1870. He was educated at 
Woolwich military college primarily for a military career. He served 
in the army in various parts of the Empire, including Ceylon - 
1805-1809 and India. After the work of the Commission was over he 
served as Governor of a number of West Indian islands*
2
Charles Hay Cameron, 1795-1880. He was called to the bar in 1820.
After the work of the Commission in Ceylon he went to India in 1835
as a member of the Law Commission. In 1843 he became fourth member of
the Supreme Council of Bengal. In 1875 returned to Ceylon as a coffee 
planter.
Commission in fact marked the first real attempt to examine the 
feasibility of the application of liberal ideas to the situation 
in Ceylon. Colebrooke and Cameron elevated the isolated liberal 
cries, in and out of the Colony, into a unified programme of action.
The Commission to inquire into the affairs of Ceylon and certain 
other colonies was appointed in 1823* "Such a commission might indeed 
be less necessary in the island of Ceylon”, said Robert Wilmot, Under­
secretary for colonies," but Government had no hesitation to extend it
to that island likewise, to satisfy the public on the manner in which
1
its resources were managed." The Royal Commission of 18 January 
1823 appointed W* M, G. Colebrooke, J. T. Bigge, and W. Blair as com­
missioners. Bigge and Blair were compelled to return to England be­
fore the Commission reached Ceylon. Colebrooke was joined in Ceylon 
by D. Riddell, but his stay was also shortlived, as he left in a few 
months to take up the post of Colonial Treasurer in New South Wales.
C. H. Cameron was then appointed to the Commission and he worked with 
Colebrooke to finalise its recommendations.
As far as Ceylon was concerned, therefore, Colebrooke and Cameron 
were the two Commissioners with whom we are mainly interested. Cole­
brooke, though a military officer, was an economist, who had come under
p
the influence of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and the Radicals. 
Cameron was an accomplished scholar and lawyer, and a disciple of Bentham.
^Hansard’s Parliamentary debates. New series, Vol. vii, p. 1, 801. 
Slendis, (ed.) The Colebrooke-Oameron Papers. Vol. 1, p. xxxiii 
3Ibid.
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Colebrooke arrived in the island in April 1829, having spent 
over five years at the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius. Cameron 
arrived in March 1830 and left Ceylon with Colebrooke in 1831*
Under these circumstances it was Colebrooke who conducted the in­
quiry. Though Cameron was sent specially to inquire into judicial 
affairs, even in that branch Colebrooke had conducted the inquiry 
nearly to a close by the time the former arrived. In fact Cameron 
returned to England on the assurance of Colebrooke that the evidence 
he had collected was sufficient.'1’ The reports were drafted in England 
amidst the general enthusiasm created by the reform act of 1832, 
and a strong consciousness that they would be laid before the British 
Parliament. For convenience they reported on separate subjects; Cole­
brooke on general administration, revenue, establishments and expendi­
ture, and Cameron on judicial institutions and procedure. It was 
rarely that they offered separate comments on each other's field.
2
The inquiry was conducted mainly through a series of questionnaires, 
which were addressed to the revenue and judicial officials. But when 
the commission was published in Ceylon, Colebrooke received a large 
number of petitions from the inhabitants, most of them containing 
particular grievances, which the Commissioners were not empowered to 
inquire into if they had wished. Some of the petitions however con-
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, 24 December 1831. C.O.54,122.
For the questionnaires sent to the Collectors, Provincial Judges, 
Agents of Government, and Magistrates, see C.O. 416, 13.
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tained complaints of a general nature, which, gave the Commissioners 
an insight into the lines on which the people were thinking and 
may have suggested some of the questions which were put to the offi­
cials. In addition both Colebrooke and Cameron travelled about the 
country occasionally hearing verbal representations. But the body 
of evidence collected in this manner was comparatively small.
The questionnaires also display the strong liberal concepts 
with which Colebrooke was imbued. Many of the questions were dir­
ected at finding out to what extent the institutions and policies in 
Ceylon were compatible with those which the Commissioners assumed to 
be very necessary for free economic development.
An understanding of the local environment in which the Com­
missioners worked is also important as it may have encouraged them 
further in recommending liberal institutions. Barnes appears to have 
disliked the very idea of a Commission of inquiry. He was convinced 
of the 'staggering effect' that it would produce in the minds of the 
people, who, he thought, were incapable of understanding the nature of 
an inquiry without complaint.^" Indeed the very occurrence of such 
an inquiry was a threat to the exalted position which the executive 
had enjoyed in the Colony. This dislike of the Commission was accen­
tuated by the Colonial Office decision requiring him to send his answers 
to certain charges that had been laid against him by Bennett, through
"^ Barnes to Bathurst, 2 October 1825* C.O. 54, 89*
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the Commissioners.'*' He was also much annoyed when certain proposals
which he had submitted to drain a tract of land for cultivation were
referred to the Commissioners for their opinion, and he regretted that
his ’first essay’ for the public improvement should have been given
2
over to the decision of ’strangers*.
The above circumstances reduced the co-operation between Barnes
and the Commission to a bare minimum* A request made by Colebrooke for
copies of despatches was made by Barnes a matter of reference to the
3
Home Government. He refused to answer a query made by the Commissioners 
as to the reasons for the continued existence of regulation 1 of 1824,
4
in spite of its disallowal by the Home Government. When the Commission­
ers requested him to give his opinion on some of the subjects on which 
they were inquiring, he did so under protest, arguing that it was not 
intended to make the ’King’s representative1 subordinate to ’His Maj-
5
esty’s Commissioner1. Finally, when before his departure Colebrooke 
submitted some of the opinions he had formed and requested his comments
^Perhaps because of the disappointment occasioned by the inability to 
secure a Civil Service appointment, Bennett laid several charges 
against Barnes at the Colonial Office. Barnes submitted his answers 
through the Commissioners, who did not attempt to hold an enquiry of 
their own into them. They merely reported thefc the answers given by 
Barnes were satisfactory. See p. For details of the charges made 
by Bennett and of the answers given by Barnes see C.O. 54, 108, 110.
2
See Bathurst to Barnes, 2 February, 1825, C.O. 55, 66. Also, Barnes 
to Bathurst, 2 October 1825, C.O. 54, 69.
3
Barnes to Murray, 16 July 1829* C.O. 54, 105«
4
Barnes to Commissioners, 24 January 1850. C.O. 54, 112. See p.
5
Barnes to Commissioners, 10 September1830. C.O. 54, 112.
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on them he again entered into the discussions only under protest.'*'
"The continued state of jealousy and misunderstanding with the chief ■
authorities, in which the Commissioners lived in the island,” wrote
Horton, ”made them, I fear, disposed to construe any sort of cordial
2understanding as a proof of unworthy compliance*” This observation, 
though intended to ridicule the Commissioners, was not without an ele­
ment of truth*
A special report drawing the immediate attention of the Colonial 
Office to the "state of the laws for the protection of personal liberty
in the island”, showed very early, in which direction the Commissioners
3were moving* In this they recommended the immediate repeal of regu-
4
lation i of 1824 and the fourth section of regulation xii of 1806*
They also dwelt on the uncertain foundations in which the general right
of the Supreme Court to issue mandates in the nature of writs of Habeaus
Corpus rested, and recommended that it should be expressly granted the
same powers of protecting the liberty of the subject, as was exercised
5by the Court of KingTs Bench in England* Because of the reluctance 
of the Governor to relinquish the right of imprisoning without control 
or supervision they regarded an Order in Council as the most decisive
"^Marginal comments by Barnes on Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831* 
C*0. 54, 112.
^Horton to Goderich, 1 October 1832* C*0. 54, 118*
3
Commissioners to Murray, 30 April 1830* C*0* 54, 121.
4
Ibid., see pp.lx-i*'
Ibid.
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and approppiate mode of setting the question at rest.
The instructions issued to the Commissioners enabled them to
2
take a wide view of the problems of Ceylon. They were to inquire 
into the general administration of the Government, the extent of 
the Governor's powers, and the control exercised by him over the 
departments, the effectiveness of the Council, the state of all public 
offices and the extent and sources of their pay, emoluments and pen­
sions, the state of religion, education, commerce and finance, and 
on the state of the civil and criminaljLaw and procedure and police.
With regard to Ceylon special attention was drawn to land tenure, 
land grants, land tax, forced labour, slavery, pearl fishery, the 
working of the Charter of Justice, the judicial establishments of 
the Kandyan provinces, and the system of the Civil Service with special 
reference to pensions.
The Commissioners soon found that the subjects which they had 
to inquire into in Ceylon presented a series of interconnected problems. 
The ability to view these connected problems as a whole, and the general 
liberal and utilitarian standpoints on which the Commissioners judged, 
gave the recommendations which they submitted a large degree of unity.
The key to the understanding of Colebrooke's proposals for ad­
ministrative reform is provided by his recommendations for the reform
■^Commissioners to Murray, 30 April 1830, C.O. 54, 121.
2
Bathurst to Colebrooke and Bigge,18 January 1823. C.O. 49> 8.
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of the economic and social system which, as we have seen, had taken 
the Government towards authoritarianism, A detailed analysis of 
his views on these subjects does not fall within the purview of 
this study. The main recommendations should however be briefly 
noted, in order to clarify the nature of their connection with ad­
ministrative reform. Colebrooke brought with him to the inqu iry of 
these subjects an immense dislike, on principle, of the interference 
of the State as a producer and merchant. Though this principle decided 
his approach towards the problems, Colebrooke also found much public 
dissatisfaction against the old system. It will suffice for the pur­
poses of this study to note in brief four important measures which he 
recommended. Firstly, he strongly objected to the Government mono­
polies of production and commerce which had been maintained in Ceylon. 
Apart from the fascination for free trade which he brought with him, 
and which was popular with the commercial interests in England, the 
petitions which he received were a clear indication of the practical 
hardships which those monopolies had occasioned to the people and the 
dissatisfaction which they created.^ Although they had been a source 
of profit to the Government, Colebrooke believed that it was in no de­
gree proportionate to the injury which they did to the inhabitants,
2
and generally to the resources of the country. He therefore recom-
^There are a number of petitions protesting against monopolies, taxes, 
and compulsory services in C.O. 416, 29-32.
2 *Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C.O. 54t 112. Also Colebrooke,
Report upon the revenues of Ceylon. C.O. 54f 122.
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mended the abandonment of the Government plantations in cinnamon, 
and the abolition of its monopoly in trade, which was the most im­
portant of the Government monopolies."^ Though the state of the re­
venue would not permit the abolition of the salt monopoly, which
ranked next, he recommended the immediate reduction ofihe monopoly
2
price of salt, and the ultimate abandonment of the monopoly* Again,
the Government was also to abandon its coffee and pepper plantations,
3
and all similar interference in a productive role. Secondly, Cole­
brooke objected to the system of compulsory services in Ceylon, which 
as we have seen, was vitally connected with the old social, economic 
and administrative order, and which, as Cameron observed, "obtrudes
4
itself at every step upon an inquirer into the conditions of Ceylon". 
Here too, apart from the desire in principle to allow a free labour 
market, he found the people much dissatisfied, especially in view 
of the enforcement of the system without regard to its former rights
5
and usages. He regarded the system as an oppressive interference 
with the occupations of the people, retarding every little project of 
improvement, and limiting their industry to the cultivation of only
g
what is requisite to satisfy their actual wants. The system had been
"^C o 1 ebr o oke, iRep brt upoii -the * re Vende a "of Ceylon, C.O. 54, 122.
2
Ibid. After writing the above report Colebrooke wrote a special 
memorandum in which he urged the abolition of the salt monopoly.
. Colebrooke.to Stanley, 20 November 1855. C.O. 54, 145.
^Colebrooke,Report upon the establishments and expenditure, 28 May 1852.
C.O. 54, 122.
^Cameron, Report on the judicial establishments and procedure, 51 January
1852. C.O. 54, 122.
^Colebrooke, Report upon the cumpulsory services, 16 March 1852. C.O. 54,
^145. For petitions see C.O. 416. 29-52.
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much abused in practice, especially by the Headmen who enforced it.^
It had led to the maintenance of the caste system by keeping the
2
people tied down to caste occupations, and had deterred settlers 
from coming in. Supported by a body of official and unofficial 
opinion Colebrooke therefore recommended its abolition* In fact he 
believed that the further maintenance of the system would disturb the
4
tranquility of the country. The third important recommendation which 
he made concerned the grain tax. He objected to a tax collected only 
on the grain crops throughout the island, and not on any other articles 
of colonial produce, because of its undue pressure on one branch of 
agriculture, of the first importance to encourage. Its collection, he 
thought, resulted in the vexatious interference of the revenue farmers 
"As nine-tenths of the rural population are engaged in this branchjDf 
agriculture," he wrote, "their indigence under the present system of 
labour and contribution may be sufficiently inferred. The policy there­
fore of encouraging the application of capital to land by relieving it 
from those burthens will need no further illustration.Colebrooke
7
therefore recommended the redemption of the grain tax.
^Colebrooke, Report upon the compulsory services, 16 March 1832. C.O.54
2rbid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5-, .
^Colebrooke, Report upon the revenues, 31 January 1832. C.O. 54, 122. 
ibid.
7Ibid.
5
145.
438
Colebrooke1s plan for increasing the revenue was thus a long 
term one which was based on private enterprise. He expected that 
the above measures would not only lead to greater exertion and capital 
accumulation among the native inhabitants, but would also bring in 
settlers both from' India and from Europe ., either as capitalists or 
as labourers.^" Their settlement was to be further encouraged by a 
more free system of land grants without discrimination on racial grounds. 
The only criterion was to be the possession of capital to develop the 
land taken.
Colebrooke saw no objectionto European colonization. He also 
saw no necessity for taking any special precautions in admitting col­
onists. But he objected to an exclusive and privileged class of sett­
lers, assisted by Government, for while being unjust to others, it would
be unfavourable to the settlers themselves, by the jealousy it would
2
excite among the native landholders.
"If European colonization in Ceylon should be effectu­
ally promoted," he wrote, ,Tthe benefits to be expected 
from it would depend in a greater degree on the im­
partial spirit of the Government, and the discontinuance 
cf those distinctions in society which have hitherto led 
the natives to regard Europeans as a caste imbued with 
many of their own^rejudices, and entitled to certain privi­
leges from which they are systematically excluded."3
^Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C.O. 54, 112.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration,24 Dec. 183V!.0. 54, 122.
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Having thus envisaged the development of a more competitive 
economy and society, without reference to race or caste, the recom­
mendations in the administrative sphere logically followed, Colebrooke 
found the position held by the Governor incompatible with a free econo­
mic development.
"After a careful review of the system," he wrote, "I am
bound to report my opinion that while it is free from some 
of the prominent objections to those which have besn ad­
opted on the continent of India, the general spirit and 
tendency of it has been unfavourable to the improvement 
of the country. Some beneficial measures have from time 
to time been adopted, but no regular control has been exer­
cised over the acts and proceedings of the Governor, nor has 
his recognized responsibility for the measures adopted by 
him, on his own judgment been rendered practically efficient.
Prom the remoteness of the Settlement, the nature of the Gov­
ernment, and the absence of all open discussion of public 
affairs, the Garemor has been almost the exclusive organ 
through whom authentic information has been derived, and 
with whom any measure of improvement has originated. With­
out his co-operation no beneficial change could be effected, 
and the inhabitants have been accustomed to regard his author­
ity as absolute.”1
Similarly the power of banishing individuals without trial was con­
sidered "incompatible with the interests of the country, in the en­
couragement which it is desirable to hold out to the settlement of 
2
Europeans".
Not surprisingly therefore, Colebrooke recommended measures 
which were intended to reduce the powers of the Governor. In future 
he was not to be allowed to exercise the power of banishing individuals 
except in cases where the tranquillity of the country might be en-
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration,
2Ibid.
C.O. 54, 122.
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dangered.^ Having found the existing Council too subservient to 
the Governor, he recommended in its place the creation of two 
Councils. To assist the Governor in all details relative to the 
revenue and disbursements of the island, and to supercede the appoint­
ment of committees for such matters, an Executive Council was tojae 
formed, composed of Civil Servants holding the offices of Chief Secret­
ary, Treasurer, Auditor-General, Collector of Customs Colombo, and the
2
Government Agent for the Colombo district. Returns of revenue and
disbursements were to be laid before this Council and the opinions
of the members were to be recorded. The Council was to have authority
to call for information when required and the minutes of its proceed-
•3
ings were to be transmitted to the Secretary of State. One object in 
creating such a Council was to pave the way for a future legislature
4
separated from the duties of an executive nature. By this means it 
was also intended to introduce a greater regularity and a stricter con-
5
trol over public expenditure, than was found under the former system.
Horton opposed the creation of this Council as he was in doubt of 
its practical utility. He held that the Governor was sufficiently con-
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54» 122.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
5
Memorandum of Colebrooke in reply to Horton's objectinns, 25 February 1833* 
C.O. 54, 121.
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trolled by the former practice of referring to the Council estimates
over £75. Besides, after pointing out that the practice had been
for the Governor to give written decisions on estimates, petitions
etc., he argued that the submission of such small items to a Council
would impede the course of public business by unnecessary checks and 
£
refinements. There was much to be said in favour of Horton's view 
as the Colony already suffered from over centralized financial con­
trol, and the interposition of a Council could have perhaps increased 
the difficulties. Horton however overlooked Colebrooke's desire to 
pave the way for a gradual separation of the legislature from the 
executive, without giving the Governor an exclusive control over the 
latter.
Par more important were Colebrooke's proposals for the creation 
of a Legislative Council. The main lines of reform were no doubt sug­
gested by the defects and ineffectiveness of the old Council, which 
had failed to become a material and effective branch of the Government. 
But the underlying aim seems to have been the'creation of a more suitable 
environment for individual development avoiding at the same time dis­
crimination on racial grounds. The Council was to be composed of a 
larger number of Civil Servants than was found in the former, among 
whom were to be included the Heads of general departments at the seat 
of government, the Attorney-General, and the Government Agent of the 
Colombo district. Provision was also to be made for the admission of 
respectable inhabitants, both European and Native.^" The enlargement of
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122.
2 rortxa Go-io rich, 1 OeiVcer . G . G.
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the official element in the Council was not a matter for surprise 
and evoked no protests• But the idea of the people of the country 
participating in the Government at Council level was a radical depart­
ure from the tradition of government under foreign rule in Ceylon#
It did not arise out of a demand for Representative Government by 
either the Europeans or native inhabitants in Ceylon. The absence 
of any such demand is easily understood. There wer§,as we have seen, 
only a few English Agriculturists in the island,^ while as Horton ob­
served, the few English merchants did not have much property interests 
2
in the island. Besides, Horton observed that they were not merchants 
in the real sense of the word but mere agents between native and Euro­
pean and Coast merchants, and were doing business for commissions.
Horton believed that men so circumscribed could not be willingly tempted 
to give time and pains to administrative duties, for they knew that the
benefits of any improvement would not necessarily fall on them or their 
3
children. The local Europeans, though more numerous, had not been led 
to expect such a change at the centre of government. As they were not 
consulted it is difficult to determine their reaction to the proposal. 
The same was true of the rest of the native community. In short, as 
Auckland, one of the merchants observed, there was no 'public1 in the
^ee p.
2
Horton to Goderich, 23 January 1833. C.O. 54, 127.
^Horton to Stanley, 25 October 1833. C.O. 54, 130.
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English acceptance of the term.^
This of course did not mean that the various groups did not 
have their particular interests to display. The European agents or 
merchants had questions of trade which affected them and on which they 
occasionally held meetings and adopted resolutions. But perhaps be­
cause of the smallness of numbers a semi-official approach to the Gov­
ernor, or an official communication through the means of a petition, 
appear to have been considered sufficient to safeguard their interests. 
The Ceylonese similarly had common interests, as well as particular 
communal and caste iiterests. A long tradition of governmental pract­
ice had taught them to seek redress whenever such interests were af­
fected by petitioning the Governor or the officials. If the petitions 
were particular complaints they were inquired into through the local 
authorities. Where general representations had been made against laws
and regulations they were noticed or not according to the views which
2
the Governor held nn the subject. To Colebrooke these petitions were
an indication of the existence of a community attentive to the changes 
3
in the law. His liberal instincts made him feel that these people were 
entitled to expect that their interests and wishes would be respected. 
"Although the ignorance and prejudice which still prevail generally
^See Horton to Goderich, 1 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
3Ibid.
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throughout the country," he wrote, "may preclude the adoption of
their views upon all subjects, it would be consistent with the
policy of a liberal government that they should have an opportunity
of freely communicating their opinions on the effect of the legis-
1
lative changes that may be proposed*'1 Colebrooke did not share
the fear that such consultations would weaken the Governments hold
on the people. Instead, he believed that it would give weight, sup-
2
port and stability to the Government.
The views of Colebrooke and those who were opposed to him dis­
played two fundamentally different approaches. The attitude of Barnes 
and Horton to the idea of broadening the Council have already been 
noted. Horton now attempted to prevent the acceptance of these sug­
gestions. The main stand which henow took was that the changes which 
he had carried out were sufficient and that any further steps were pre­
mature.^" All the Civil Servants whom hejconsulted, in order to build
5
up a climate of opinion against the reforms, agreed with him. "The 
natives from their ignorance and inability to form correct opinions 
on political subjects," wrote D. J. Gogerly, the missionary who was
^■Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122*
2Ibid.
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^Horton to Goderich, 1 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118*
5Ibid-
consulted, "require to be under a strong government in reality and
in appearance."^ Auckland, described as one of the most intelligent
and important among the merchants, considered the European society
2outside the government service too small to render it advisable.
C. E. Layard, one of the above Civil Servants, was however not un­
mindful of another factor. "I have no doubt," he wrote, "that the 
measures lately adopted, and in contemplation are of a nature not only 
to make the inhabitants begin to feel their independence, but to seek 
opportunities of shewing it : and if once taught their rights the Cey­
lonese would be as anxious to support them as any of His Majesty’s 
3
subjects." This view appears to be close to the attitude in which 
Colebrooke seems to have approached the question. Underlying his pro­
posals there seems to have been a belief that the establishment of 
more liberal institutions was an essential preliminary not only to 
attract European settlers into the country, but also to stimulate a 
spirit of greater exertion among the native inhabitants. "Such a Counci)., 
he wrote, "is not proposed as an institution calculated in itself to pro­
vide effectually for the legislation of the island at a more advanced 
stage of its progress. It will however tend to remcve some of the ob­
stacles which have retarded the improvement of a settlement possessed
4
of great natural resources." With such an approach the existence ot
^Horton to Goderich, 1 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
2Ibid.
3lbid.
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122
446
or not of a demand for admission was of no consequence. Colebrooke*s 
approach was certainly more realistic with regard to the native popu­
lation, who as Cameron noted*,1, were brought up in a tradition of servility 
to Europeans,^ and who had not been brought up in a tradition of parlia­
mentary government. Under such conditions it was certainly necessary 
that the Government should give the lead, if it was considered desirable 
to establish more liberal institutions. Besides, the proposal to admit 
native inhabitants into the Council along with Europeans falls into line 
with the need which Colebrooke saw to avoid discrimination.
To give the legislature thus created as much independence as poss­
ible, and to obviate the objections urged against involving the Governor
2
in public discussions, Colebrooke proposed that the latter should take 
no part in its deliberations, and that the members should take an oath 
of secrecy not to divulge the opinions of each other. This proposal 
was no doubt a reflection in the dominating position which the Governor 
had occupied under the former system and the subservience of the Civil 
Servants who had functioned in the former Council.
Since these proposals involved the position of the Governor in 
the colony, they naturally evoked strong opposition from Horton, who 
gathered both official and unofficial opinion in his support. It was
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2
See p. 3*1
3
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described as a recommendation founded on a feeling of jealousy and
mistrust of the Governor's authority,1 The fear was raised that it
would weaken the Government, especially in the eyes of the native
population, by making the Governor na political puppet possessed of
o
a name but destitute of authority". It was also argued that if
strictly applied, it would leave the Governor without a spokesman in
Council to explain the principles nn which laws were recommended, and
3
to meet any objections that might be raised. But on the other hand,
as the Governor would continue to possess a power to appoint at least
some of the Civil Servants to the offices which entitled1, them to
membership of both Councils, it was feared that he would continue to
wield considerable private influence, withthe result that a more arbi-
4
trary power would be substituted for direct official control. Besides, 
if the Governor was to be given the power to ratify legislation, it was 
thought inconsistent that he should not have knowledge of the opinions
of those opposed to him, so that he could present his own views on
5them to the Secretary of State. On this point it appears from the 
reply given by Colebrooke that it had not been intended to exclude the
1See Horton to Goderich, 1 October 1832. C.O. 54 > 118.
2Ibid.
^Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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Governor from a full knowledge of the proceedings, and a power to 
reject the proposals of the Council.1 Finally, Colebrooke was also 
blamed for overlookhg a factor of ’first importance1 in modern legis­
lation. ’’Even in an Asiatic Colony like this, imbued with all the 
prejudices of caste and prescription”, wrote Horton, ”it would be 
ten thousand times better that the Legislative Council should carry
on their deliberations in public, than that this jealous system of
2
sworn secrecy and concealment should be adopted."
Thus Colebrooke*s proposals were subjected to a series of ob­
jections grounded both on theoretical and practical considerations.
It was certainly true that the proposals very much affected the posi­
tion which the Governor had enjpyed in the Colony. It was also true 
that with the tradition of government prevalent in the Colony, it was 
likely that the officials would in practice be controlled by the 
Governor. By recommending secret proceedings of which the Governor 
was later to obtain a knowledge, Colebrooke also fell into a somewhat 
inconsistent position. The fact was that in trying to modify the in­
stitution, which was still to be largely official, in a way which would 
avoid subservience to the Governor, and in trying to meet the objection 
raised by Barnes to involving the Governor in public discussions, Cole­
brooke fell into inconsistent positions, and also laid himself open to 
objections on theoretical grounds. But the inconsistent positions taken
Memorandum of Colebrooke in reply to Horton’s objections, 25 February 1853. 
C.O. 54, 121.
Morton to Goderich, 1 October 1832, C.O. 54, 118.
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by Horton and Barnes show that the real objection may have been a 
reluctance to part with power*
The rules proposed for the functioning of the Council showed a 
desire to adapt it to suit the needs of the country. Each member of 
the Council, as well as the Governor was to have the power of pro­
posing measures for deliberation. When approved by a majority bills 
founded upon them were to be drafted and printed for general informa­
tion. Petitions of the inhabitants when presented by the members were 
to be discussed and recorded in Council. The reports of the Govern­
ment Agents after circuit were similarly to be laid before the Council.
It was also to have the authority to call for public papers, to take 
evidence, and direct the Government Agents to hold inquiries and sup­
ply information.^ These measures seem to have been generally aimed 
at creating a well informed legislature. The Supreme Court Judges were 
given the power of certifying that the legislative acts were not re­
pugnant to the Acts of Parliament or Order in Council applicable to 
Ceylon. The recommendation to create the above Council marked the 
first real attempt to establish a political organ over what had hitherto 
been a pure Civil Service administration. It is evident from the 
questions that were put to some of those who gave evidence, and the re­
commendations that followed, that in other branches of the administrative 
machinery Colebrooke faced the same problem of creating a system which 
would foster individual enterprise, and which would be acceptable if
“^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
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1
European colonization were to take place to any great extent, but 
which would at the same time avoid discrimination between races and 
castes*
The immediate problem that had to be faced, and which the Home 
Government expected much from the Commission, was a reduction of ex­
penditure. The necessity for such reductions became clear when Cole- 
brooke saw the large expenses incurred for civil establishments, which 
had hitherto been maintained mainly for the collection of the revenue* 
Although the greater part of the land and internal rents were collected 
by tax farmers, who bound themselves to pay regularly to Government 
the charges of collection, including the establishments of the Com­
missioner of Revenue, and Kachcheries, were estimated at more than 22
2
per cent of the collection on that head* The expenses of the Cinnamon 
Department, including the charges of collection and sale, in other words 
the management of the monopoly, were moderately estimated at 28 per
cent of the collection* The customs revenue was raised at a much
3lesser expense, being about 7 per cent of the collection* It became
therefore clear during the very early stages of the inquiry that general
a
reductions would have to be carried out in the civil establishments.
^A question that was put to R. Boyd, the Revenue Commissioner, was:
”Do you conceive that the present arrangement for the civil admini­
stration of the district would be efficient or otherwise If European 
colonization were to obtain to any extent?” Evidence of Boyd, 2 Novem­
ber 1830. C.O. 416, 7*
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the revenues. C.O. 54, 122.
5Itid.
4-Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C*0. 54, 122.
451
The need became more real when it was realised that these estab­
lishments were sustained by a revenue system, which Colebrooke con­
sidered objectionable, and which he believed ought to be altered.
The cinnamon and the salt monopolies, both of which ware found to be 
objectionable in principle and practice, accounted for approximately 
£166,000 of a total gross revenue of £330,000.^ When Colebrooke there­
fore decided that in the interests of the development of the island 
it was necessary to break through monopolies, and recommended the abo­
lition of the cinnamon monopoly, the necessity for reductions became 
obvious. As a fall of revenue was immediately to be expected, the im­
plementation of "the most indispensable reforms in the revenue system"
2
exclusively hinged upon a reduction of the civil establishments.
These establishments were so connected with the revenue system that 
it had in fact given the Governor and the Civil Servants, who decided 
upon policy, an interest in maintaining it. As Colebrooke noted, the 
Government had delayed the measures of retrenchment by which alone it
3
could have effected a reform in the system of revenue.
Having thus decided that reductions were necessary, it became a 
matter of deciding in which spheres suGh reductions could be carried 
out. The Clerical establishment, though perhaps capable of a reduction
Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure. Also, 
Report upon the Revenues. C.O. 54, 122.
2Ibid.
5Ibid.
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in numbers, was already too poorly paid. It was in fact its dis­
couraging prospects which attracted the attention of Colebrooke.^
In any case it formed only a small proportion of the total expendi­
ture, and entered very little into his calculations. Though Colebrooke 
considered the ultimate reduction of the number of Headmen desirable, 
as we shall see later, he did not consider such a measure expedient 
until other avenues were opened up for them. Here too, it was more 
a matter of making the offices that would be retained more respectable 
than of carrying out a reduction of emoluments. The lesser services 
were thus incapable of yielding the money that would be required to 
balance revenue and expenditure under the new situation. It therdbre 
became clear that the necessary reductions would have to be carried out 
in the European superstructure that had been built.
In this sphere also the general disposition in the Colony was,
as we have seen, to retain the existing structure and emoluments and
2
to carry out a reduction of offices. But the local Government had also
reached a point where it was also unwilling or unable to point out any
%
such effective reductions. Colebrooke turned his attention to the 
matter. The abolition of the cinnamon monopoly enabled him to recom­
mend the abolition of the Cinnamon Department, and the transfer of
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
2See pp lv n  - u-1?
See p. 4 \<\.
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whatever duties that would be left over to the Agents of Government,
and the Collector of Customs,"*' The office of Deputy Secretary was to
be abolished and the duties of the Chief Secretary were in future to
2
be performed by the Secretary himself. The offices of Commissioner 
of Revenue and Paymaster-General were to be abolished, the duties being 
transferred to the departments of the Auditor-General and Vice-Treasurer 
respectively. This would make these departments responsible for check­
ing and superintending both receipts and expenditure. Having considered 
the maintenance of separate and independent Governments of the Kandyan 
and Maritime provinces to have been ‘impolitic1, since it had checked 
the assimilation which it was considered desirable to promote between 
various classes, and led to the maintenance of the influence of the 
Kandyan Chiefs, sometimes of the prejudice of the people, Colebrooke re-
4
commended the union of the Kandyan and Maritime Governments, This 
proposal, as well as the fact that he considered that the island was 
divided into too many Collectorates, prompted him to recommend a re­
duction of the number of main provincial administrative units. Such a 
step was considered all the more practicable in view of the reduction 
of duties that would be brought about by the simplification of the revenue 
system, the abolition of compulsory services, and the appointment of a
Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4
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responsible department for the direction of public works, which 1© 
elsewhere recommended.^ Parts of the Kandyan provinces below the 
mountains, which were thought to have a nearer and a more natural con­
nection with those of the Maritime provinces, were to be joined together,
and the whole island formed into five main provinces, the five principal
2stations being at Colombo, Galle, Jaffna, Trincomalee and Kandy*
A senior officer to be called "Government Agent" was to be placed at 
each of these stations to be in charge of the revenue administration in 
all its branches* Assistants subordinate to them were to be placed at 
other stations within the provinces according to their needs* It ap­
pears from Lord Goderich's despatch of 1833 that the creation of fif- 
teen such Assistant Agencies had been proposed. Though the chief 
authority was to be vested in the Government Agent of the province, the
inhabitants were to be required to refer to the Assistants in the first 
4
instance. It was hoped that this plan for the provincial administration 
of the country, while enabling a substantial reduction of establishments, 
would give the junior officers a practical knowledge of the country, and 
the nature of their duties than under the former system.
Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure,
C.O* 54, 122.
2
Ibid. Also Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C.O. 54, 112.
3
See Goderich to Horton, 23 March 1833* C.O* 55, 74.
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Besides these reductions, however, Colebrooke had to take into 
account certain increases which he considered necessary. With the 
hope prevailing in his mind that the new environment would attract 
men with capital into the island, the office of Civil Engineer and 
Surveyor-General assumed a new importance. Colebrooke considered 
the former department inadequate and recommended the appointment of 
a qualified Civil Engineer to be the head of it with five district 
surveyors to be stationed in the provinces. The direction and exe­
cution of public works in the island, which had hitherto devolved on 
the Collectors, were in future to be performed by this department.^ 
The Civil Engineer was also to survey the country and mark the bound­
aries of the disposable waste lands, also giving their nature and 
description. He was to ascertain where tanks, canals and embankmehts, 
might be repaired and constructed, and where roads and communications 
might be advantageously opened. The publication of such reports, he
believed, would be calculated to attract persons possessing capital
2
to settle in the island.
All the above recommendations found no objection with the local 
Government. The abolition of the office of Revenue Commissioner had 
in fact been in contemplation for some time as it was of dohbtful 
utility. The existence of the office of Deputy Secretary could have 
been justified only so long as the Chief Secretary happened to be a
^Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2Ibid.
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nonentity.^ Events and forces had strongly worked towards a 
unification of the Kandyan and Maritime Governments and its final 
fruition had only been a matter of time. The reduction of the number 
of Collectorates, under the pressure of retrenchment, was not en­
tirely unexpected. Horton considered the new plan for the provincial
2
administration preferable to the former system. The expansion of 
the Civil Engineer* s Department was also much welcomed.
When these reductions, and some others unconnected with the 
Civil Service, and the amount of revenue which was expected to be 
lost, were weighed together Colebrooke would have been still faced 
with the problem of balancing the new budget. The main problem of 
reform therefore began to revolve round the future of the Civil Ser­
vice as it was then constituted. Colebrooke did not hold a detailed 
inquiry into the working of the Civil Service, or the state of its 
efficiency, probably because it was a subject too connected with Col­
onial Office administration. It is however clear froft the questions
that were put to witnesses, and the scattered remarks in the reports,
4that he was aware of the manifold defects of the Service. The re­
latively young age of recruitment, which did not ensure the recruit
^"Horton to Goderich, 3 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
^Horton to Stanley, 22 November 1833* C.O. 54, 130.
"^ Horton to Goderich. 16 February 1833* C.O. 54, 127.
4See Evidence of Boyd, 2 November 1830. C.O. 416, 7* Evidence of Eden, 
26 October 1829* C.O. 416, 8. Colebrooke to Hay, 15 June 1832.
C.O. 54, 121. Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831* C.O. 54, 112.
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a proper education in England, the absence of a knowledge of the 
local languages, the predominance of the rule of seniority in pro­
motions, the frequent removals which injured the public interests, 
the constant interchange of revenue and judicial work, seem to have 
all entered into the consideration of the problem.
With the need which prevailed for economy in expenditure, the 
salary structure of the Service naturally became a more immediate 
object of reform. We have seen in former chapters the circumstances 
under which the Civil Service salary structure originated and remained 
intact. Colebrooke was not unaware of the fact that it was necessary 
to keep up these high salaries if the policy was to encourage men from 
England to occupy these situations. But as we shall see later, he 
was contemplating an alteration in this policy. Alterations in the 
Civil Service salary structure were therefore not only no matter of 
regret, but perhaps a necessary step to initiate a different policy. 
Appendix C shows the salaries which were attached to the different 
situations in 1833 and those recommended by Colebrooke. It will be 
seen from this statement that a very drastic reduction of salaries 
was recommended. Horton estimated that they brought about a 40 per 
cent reduction in the emoluments of the Civil Servants.^*
These salary reductions were not unconnected to the objections 
which Colebrooke took to the exclusive principle of the Civil Service. 
Apart from limiting the choice to a few individuals whenever a situation
"^ Horton to Stanley, 31 August 1833* C.O. 54, 129.
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fell vacant, Colebrooke found that it involved the maintenance of
distinctions, which he thought did not conduce to development. . "The
maintenance of such distinctions by the European Governments in Ceylon,**
he wrote, **appears to me to lave had a very injurious effect upon the
people and have retarded the improvement of the country....1*^  It
appears from the advice tendered to Goderich, that Colebrooke quite
rightly considered the higher offices of a State the *natural objects
of ambition' among its people, and that to close the door againstthem
was to deprive them of a 'fair share' of the advantages derived from
2
public employment. Besides, having envisaged the emergence of a 
more competitive economy and society, it was but natural that Cole­
brooke should object to the monopolies in the public service and de­
sire a much more free movement within it, according to ability and
3
qualifications, and without reference to caste or race. Above all, 
Colebrooke realised the difficulty of providing out of the local re­
venues for a Civil Service based on an exclusive principle, and which 
had to be paid not according to the usual factors operating to deter­
mine wages, but according to the aspirations of those setting out from 
England. In judging this question he had to take into consideration 
not merely the existing numbers in the Service, but those who would 
be required in an expanding economy. A Service organized on such prin­
ciples could only have been maintained at the expense of keeping the
■^Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C.O. 54, 112.
2
See Goderich to Horton, 14 September 1832. C.O. 55, 74.
^Colebrooke, Keport upon the establlishments and expenditure,
C.O. 54, 122.
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rest of the public service under-paid and open to corruption and 
abuse.
"The reductions have pressed heavily on the public 
functionaries," he wrote, in reply to criticisms against 
them, "and while they are complained of, it is still 
apparent that they must be carried further, and the ad­
ministration of the Government must henceforth be provided 
for on a different principle. The attempt to provide for 
the public service exclusively by means of a stipendiary 
establishment involves the employment of a body of Euro­
pean functionaries who expect high remuneration and a vast 
number of petty native officers, who receive allowances 
inadequate to their support. These persons who really 
govern the country without any responsibility to the people 
are too often corrupt...."1
Colebrooke therefore believed that the Government would derive much
advantage from the acquirement of a competent class of local men, who
would unite local information with a general knowledge, and who would
eventually be capable of holding responsible situations upon reduced 
2
salaries. There was also the expectation of a class of colonists 
from whose ranks public servants could be drawn at much lesser ex- 
pense. As we shall see later, Colebrooke was also faced with the 
problem of compensating the class of Headmen and ^andyan Chiefs, who 
were expected to lose many privileges by the abolition of the com­
pulsory services. As the employment of military men in civilian duties 
in the Kandyan provinces had been attended with much success, Cole­
brooke considered it economic and advantageous to provide for their 
continued employment. He saw no objection to uniting civil duties
^Memorandum drawn in reply to criticisms, 18‘> July 1834* C.O. 54, 145* 
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure,
C.O. 54, 122.
^Memorandum, 18 July 1834* C.O. 54, 145.
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with the military command.^
All the above reasons seem to have combined to prompt Colebrooke
to recommend the radical poli.cy of relaxing the exclusive principle
of the Civil Service and opening it to competition without reference
2
to race and caste. Such a policy, he believed, would not only hold 
out a strong incitement for improvement, but would also strengthen
3
the attachment of the people to the British Government.
The Civil Service was involved with the interests of too many 
individuals for these recommendations to pass unopposed. Horton, who 
acted as the spokesman for these interests, protested at the Appall­
ing reductions1 and raised the usual fear of having as Civil Servants
4a "mortified and disgruntled set, in whose mind hope is extinguished". 
Some of the grounds on which Barnes and Horton based their objections
5
to throwing open the Civil Service have already been noted. Horton 
now attempted to bring the argument to a different level by challeng­
ing the Commissioner to give the names of the native inhabitants to 
whom the situations held by members of the Civil Service were objects 
of ambition. He was also unaware of any person capable of executing
^Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2
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such duties.1 He therefore concluded that the recommendations were 
premature* It is certainly true that Colebrooke1s recommendation did 
not arise out of a pressing demand, either by the native inhabitants, 
or by the local European community, for admission into "the Civil Ser­
vice, though as we have seen, members of the latter group had occasion­
ally ventured to apply for them. It should however be noted that when
the abolition of the system of compulsory services was known the Kand-
2
yan Chiefs made a strong claim for judicial and revenue employment.
The absence of a widespread demand for admission was however not an in­
dication of the absence of a desire to hold higher situations, but 
rather the lack of a suitable environment in which it could arise and 
find expression. The Kudaliyars of the Maritime provinces, as we have 
seen, derived satisfaction from the traditional positions which they
3
occupied because of the want of something better. The local European 
community which had suffered many disappointments were naturally not 
led to expect such a change. It is worthy of note that the strongest 
claim for higher employment came from the Kandyan Chiefs, who still 
remembered the taste of power and position.^" Here, as in the|case of
Norton to Goderich, 23 January 1833 > C.O. 54 > 127.
^Petition of the Kandyan Chiefs, ND 1833- C.O. 54, 128.
3
See p.
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the Council, Horton and Colebrooke approached the question differ­
ently. While the existence of a demand for admission was for Hofton 
indicative of a time for change* Colebrooke seems to have rightly be­
lieved that changes of this nature had to be Government sponsored in 
Ceylon. He may have had indeed little doubt that given the necessary 
encouragement there could be any number of local recruits. He noted 
how the establishment of schools even on a limited scale had enabled 
the native inhabitants to qualify themselves for lower situations.'1’
The Archdeacon, who was at the head of the schools establishment during 
this time, referring to the English schools at Jaffna and Kotte, noted
that "there will in a few years be more educated young men amongst the
2
Malabar and Sinhalese than Government can employ". "The opinion I
entertain," he added,"is that they will be too well educated for the
station they will fill, and surpass in knowledge not a few of the Euro-
peans who will have the local rule over them." It is in the light of
this approach to the problem that Colebrooke's recommendation that the
intention of the Government to throw open the Civil Service to the native
4
inhabitants should be publicly declared assumes special importance.
It is also in this connection that his proposal for more direct State
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
^J.M.S. Glenie to Horton, 50 March 1835* C.O, 54, 128.
3Ibid.
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control and participation in imparting English education appears
significa. nt.^ By extending English education he wished to hold
out the means hy which the native inhabitants could qualify them-
2
selves for some of the higher appointments. The practicability of 
the plan rested on the question whether the officials who would be 
sent to govern the country would, like Colebrooke, regard it as com­
patible with security, and whether in the light of the past develop­
ment of the Civil Service, and the nature of the Government, the rulers 
sent to the colony would be able to divest themselves of the feeling 
of being an exclusive and superior class.
One part of the plan on which, as we have seen, Horton grounded
one objection was the difficulty of making appointments without refer- 
3
ence to caste. There was undoubtedly the difficulty of making the 
higher castes, the Vellales in particular, consent to the appointment 
of men of inferix* castes to function in areas where they predominated. 
But in expecting such a willing consent the Government was perhaps 
overlooking an important social change that was taking place, more 
particularly in the Maritime provinces of Ceylon. The British Govern­
ment in Ceylon had not followed a consistent policy on the question of 
caste. The fact that the caste system was closely bound to the revenue
^He recommended that the Government Schools which had hitherto been 
under the charge of the Missionaries, should be placed under a Com­
mission composed of Missionaries as well as Government officials. He 
also recommended the founding of a College in charge of a Professor 
appointed from England. Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, 
C.O. 54, 122. Also, Report upon the establishments and expenditure, 
C.O. 54, 122.
2
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system had tempted the Government to enforce it whenever its own 
rights were affected.^ At the same time it had "been less disposed 
to use State authority in order to maintain social laws or customs 
which did not affect Government interests hut which were equally 
vital to the preservation of the old order. Under the uncertainty 
thus created, the old order became unhinged. Though petitions from 
castes very low in the social scale asking for benefits are signi­
ficantly absent among the petitions that were received by Colebrooke, 
it appears from the petitions sent by the farmer and the fisher castes 
in particular, that the castes lower to them were no longer inclined
to accept all the rules and customs which had bound them to a parti-
2
cular position in society. These petitions in general complained of
the irregularity in the observance of the former customs by the low
caste people, who had "became proud and /sic/ gaining from time to time
3
the advantages of one particular thing after another11* They stated 
that the low caste people were assuming the privileges belonging to the 
higher, such as riding in palanquins at marriage ceremonies, white 
washing houses, and adorning in jewels of gold and silver, with the 
result that no distinctions of superiority or inferiority appeared to 
exist. It appears from these petitions that this sense of emancipation
^All the Proclamations and the Regulations concerning the system of 
Compulsory services for instance safeguarded the right of the Govern­
ment to enforce them according to caste.
^For a few instances see petition of 40 Vellale inhabitants of Matara,
NO. 101, 12 June 1829. Petition of 713 inhabitants of the villages of 
Colombo, No. 126, 2 July 1829* Petition of 13 Inhabitants of Galle,
No. 116, 12 June 1829* Petition of Anthony Fernando and others, No. 145 
9 May 1829. C.O. 416, 29*
•^Petition of 13 inhabitants of Galle, No. 116, 12 June 1829. C.O. 416,29.
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had pervaded almost all the lower castes# Colebrooke noted that
the rivalry between the inferior castes was as great as the jealousy
of the higher towards the lower# He noticed with satisfaction the
contest between the barber and the washer castes where the former had
2
contested the right of the latter to demand their services* One
group of petitioners stated that as a result of all this endless
scuffles had taken place and the public peace and tranquillity had 
•3
been disturbed. It should also be noted that a certain disposition 
to change caste occupations had existed even during Dutch times, and 
was seen again when Barnes called in voluntary labourers for the
4
Cinnamon Department.
As against all this was the tendency of the Government, which 
Colebrooke also noticed, to favour the pretensinns of the farmer caste
5
in state appointments* Under the policy initiated by North* ? and 
carried forward by successive Governors, the Headmen of castes other 
than farmers had been gradually reduced as vacancies occurred and the 
people brought under the district Headmen who belonged to the farmer
lThe above petition is particularly instructive# It stated that Gold­
smiths, Washers, Barbers, Chunam burners, Jaggoriors, Tom Tom Beaters, 
and Olyas had assumed privileges prohibited to them •
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration (marginal note). C.O. 54, 122.
Petition of 713 inhabitants of the villages of Colombo, No. 126, 2 July 
1829. C.O. 416, 29.
4
Barnes adopted a measure of hiring voluntary labourers for the Cinnamon 
Department instead of compulsorily recruiting them and he found people 
of all castes including the higher ones coming forward as volunteers. 
Barnes to Goderich, 11 October 1831. C.O# 54, 113#
5
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
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caste. Most of the lower castes were perhaps too small in numbers, 
dispersed in different areas, and weak, to be inclined to protest 
against it. Two castes least affected by the above reductions, be­
cause of the existence of the fish tax, the pearl fisheries, and the 
cinnamon monopoly which kept alive their usefulness, were however, 
sufficiently numerous and powerful to complain against the injustice 
of their subjection to the power and control of the farmer Headmen,
The fisher caste was the most active in protesting. They attributed 
the suppression of their Headmen to the influence which the farmer
Headmen exercised over Civil Servants and other officials and to
1
their advice that these appointments were unnecessary. After com­
plaining that they had been pressed to serve the Government in spheres 
other than those which they were accustomed to, they again attributed
it to the mis-representations, injustice and influencs, of the farmer 
2Headmen. They complained that because of the position which these 
Headmen occupied in the sitting Magistrate’s and Provincial Courts, 
Kachcheries, and Morales, all channels of communication with the Govern
3
ment were closed to them. The immediate purpose of these petitions
^Petition of 30 fisher caste inhabitants of Weligama, No. 138, NN 1829, 
C.O, 416, 29. Petition of 427 Fisher caste inhabitants of Tangalle, 
Matara, Weligama, Galle, Panadura, Alutkuru Morale, and Negombo.
C.O. 54, 131* There are other such petitions in C.O. 54, 29-32.
2
Petition of 30 fisher caste inhabitants of Weligama, No. 138, ND. 1829 
C.O. 416, 29. Also, Petition of 427 fisher caste inhabitants of Tan­
galle, Matara, Weligama, Galle, Panadura, Alutkuru Korale, and Negombo 
C.O.54, 131.
3Ibid.
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was to get back lost positions, and may have been initiated by 
interested persons# * Yet they also show that unlike other castes, 
the fishers and the cinnamon peelers, who had many wealthy persons 
among them, were no longer inclined to regard the farmers as superiors, 
and to accept what one group of fishers described as "slavery to Vell- 
ale Headmen"
Under these circumstances Colebrookefs proposal for the gradual
elimination of caste considerations in state appointments was not as
impractical as it appears to have been at first sght. It was certainly
more practicable in a new class of appointments in which the Govern-
2
ment was at liberty to lay down its conditions. In view of the aban­
donment of the system of compulsory services and the caste rivalries 
that existed, and also in justice to the castes who had lost their own 
Headmen such a step was also perhaps necessary. The practicability seems 
to have hinged upon the ability and willingness of the local Government 
to disentangle itself from a close partnership it had formed with the 
numerically strong, and more powerful, farmer caste.
The reform of the Headman system was closely connected with all 
the above. Colebrooke found this system closely tied to the old social 
and economic order, which he wished to see superceded.
"The employment of the Native Headmen on their 
present footing in the civil administration of
1
Petition of 427 fisher caste inhabitants of Tangalle, Matara, Weligama, 
Galle, Panadura, Alutkuru Korale, and Negombo. C.O. 54, 131*
2
The fact that changes were easierin a new class of appointments is seen 
from the promotion of the Mudaliyar of the washer caste to be the cashier 
of the Treasury. Colebrooke, Report upon the administration (marginal 
note). C.O. 54, 122.
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the country,” he wrote, "has tended to foster the preju­
dices of caste, and to favour the abuses of authority, 
which however generally complained of, it must be diffi­
cult to prevent• Their inadequate remuneration, where 
they are paid at all, must dispose them to avail them­
selves unduly of the ancient customs, and the influence 
of their stations and the duties they discharge in call­
ing out the people for the Government service gives them 
a control over the productive classes.” -^
Itfhen Colebrooke arrived in the island he was met with a body of
2
official opinion loudly complaining of the abuses of the Headmen.
Official opinion while recognising this was not less unmindful of the
fact that the Headmen played an indispensable role in the system of
Government. ”These abuses are now acknowledged,” wrote Colebrooke,
"and the Government had endeavoured to suppress them... The importance
of their functions to society is however not less conspicuously not-
3
iced than the perversion and abuse of their power...” Official opin­
ion therefore on the whole tended to regard the system as a necessary 
evil. Even with the dependence of the people on the Headmen, and the 
general fear which seems to have been prevalent to make complaints 
against them, Colebrooke also received a large number of petitions
setting forth complaints against particular Headmen, as well as com-
4
plaints of a general nature. These complaints may have been partly 
occasioned by the peculiar forms of competition for these posts. The 
petitions received from the Tamil provinces certainly show some such
^Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831. C.O. 54» 122.
2
Evidence of Collectors, Answers to questions 62-65. C.O. 416,26-28.
3
Memorandum, 18 July 1834. C.O. 54, 145.
4
These petitions are dispersed in the volumes marked C.O. 416, 29-32.
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factionalism.^" Some of them may have been sent by the low caste 
people, who had lost their Headmen, and who as a result had both 
genuine and imaginary grievances against the high caste Headmen.
In any event the petitions were a clear indication that the Headman 
system, like the rest of society of which it formed a vital $art, 
was unhinged.
The fact that a majority of the Headmen depended for their 
influence among the people, and for their remuneration, on the direct 
and indirect advantages which they had derived from the old social 
and economic system, made them also aninterested group in preserving 
it. Thus for instance Colebrooke found that one reason for the fail­
ure of an attempt that had been made in 1820 and 1827, to license fish­
ing boats instead of collecting from the fishermen a tax on the quantity
2of fish caught by them, was the secret opposition of the Headmen to it.
By this measure some of them, who had been in the habit of farming the 
collection of the tax, lost certain advantages, while all of them lost 
the right to collect adaare of the fish for themselves as a perquisite.
A group of fishermen also stated in a petition that the opposition of
3
the Headmen was one reason for the failure of the experiment. Similarly 
when Barnes carried out a partial measure to abolish compulsory services 
in the Cinnamon Department, he found the Headmen joining with the people
1See p. \<\q.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the revenue. C.O. 54, 122.
3
Petition of 49 fishermen, 29 December 1850. C.O. 54, 131.
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in acclaiming it, while secretly discouraging it.1 This opposition 
was understandable since by that measure the Headmen of this caste 
lost the principal source of their emoluments. The Headmen, espe­
cially those in the Kandyan provinces, objected to the extent to which 
the Government had exacted the services of the people and contrary
7
to ancient usages and customs. Colebrooke referred to an incident
where four Headmen, also of the Kandyan provinces, were tried for
disobedience of orders, in refusing to work, and in inciting the people
to do the same* This dissatisfaction may have arisen out of the fact
that much of the odium of unpopular services fell on the Headmen, who
had to enforce the Government orders. Besides, the Headmen were also
liable for punishment for the non-attendance of the people. In spite
of all this , however, the Headmen as a body were in no mood to welcome
a complete change of the system on which their ascendancy rested.
Colebrooke therefore saw the importance of winning over the
support of these Headmen for a change of system.
"The co-operation of the Headmen in effecting any change 
of system,” he wrote, ”ean however only be expected where 
advantages are held out to them equivalent to the loss of 
influence or profit they may sustain, and this advantage 
will necessarily consist in the prospect of advancement
Barnes to Goderich, 11 October 1831. C.O. 54, 113.
f
£
Colebrooke, Report upon the compulsory services. C.O. 54, 145.
Ibid.
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in the public service for themselves or their families, 
or in the means of establishing themselves as may suit  ^
their habits by attention to agriculture and commerce.n
He believed that by such liberal encouragement it would be possible
to divert the influence which these Headmen wielded, in support of
2the views of the Government for the improvement of the country.
Besides, he noticed that by encouraging the principal families in
the island to become competitors for petty employments, they had
neglected other pursuits by which they might have improved their
3
resources, and benefitted the country by their exertion. Colebrooke 
was also conscious of the need to make the Headmen acceptable to all 
castes and classes, especially in view of caste rivalries, and the
4
expected arrival of a class of European colonists*
All the above factors were present in the suggestions which 
Colebrooke made for the improvement of the system. It was clear at 
the outset that though the abolition of compulsory services would lead 
to a reduction of duties, a large body of Headmen would still be re­
quired in the civil administration, especially for police duties, in 
the apprehension of criminals. A reduction of numbers was therefore
^Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831* C.O. 54, 112.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54, 122.
3Ibid.
4
See evidence of Boyd, 2 November 1830. C.O. 417, 7.
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not possible to an extent which would enable the Government to pay 
adequate salaries to those astained. The payment of regular and ade­
quate salaries, which only could have transformed the Headman into 
a different type of state official, being thus impossible, Colebrooke 
proposed that at the village level there should be a return to those 
economical arrangements by which the inhabitants of each village or 
community elected their own Municipal officers.^ This was not a novel
principle, for a form of electing Headmen prevailed in the Tamil dis- 
2
tricts. What Colebrooke therefore proposed was the extension of the 
practice throughout the island, giving it at the same time a more 
regular form. The Headmen were to be elected by the inhabitants of 
each village, who were proprietors of land or houses, the Government 
Agent or his Assistant collecting the votes for the purpose, and decid­
ing by majority vote. The qualification for the office was to be the
possession of property in the village, and the appointments were to
3
be subject to renewal every three years. To complete the plan Cole­
brooke proposed to resurrect and extend the old system of the Gamsabha, 
or Village Council, which still survived in the Kandyan provinces, and
which, with a Headman presiding over it, would decide upon small disputes 
4in the village.
^Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122.
Also, Memorandum, 18 July 1834. C.O. 54, 145*
2
See p. i«n,
3
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122. Also, 
Memorandum, 18 July 1834. C.O. 54, 145.
4
Memorandum, 18 July 1834. C.O. 54, 145.
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Colebrooke thus suggested, a very practical scheme, which he
believed had many advantages, Firstly, he was of opinion that by
this means the internal revenue of the country might be collected
with less expense to the Government, and with greater satisfaction
to the people, than by an appointed agency.^* Secondly, it would
give the people greater satisfaction by enabling those attached to
a caste, trade or religion, to select their own Headmen until habits
2and customs changed. Thirdly, by giving to officials responsible 
to the people the management of a variety of minor details the stip­
endiary European and native establishments could be limited, and their
3
functions reduced to that of exercising a general control. He be­
lieved that this would not only enable the Government to interpose 
its authority with greater effect, but would also strengthen the
4
attachment of the people to the Government. Lastly, he believed
that it would obviate the objections that might be raised to the settle
ment of Europeans in the country.
"The formation of European colonies or settlements in
favourable situations, with the same privilege of pre­
serving their'own customs, and of managing their inter­
nal affairs by persons freely chosen by themselves," he 
wrote, "would be a powerful means of promoting the suc­
cess of such undertakings, and of diffusing a better system 
throughout the country."^
^Memorandum, 18 July 1834. C.O. 54, 145 •
2Ibid.
3rbid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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At the district and provincial level Colebrooke sought to
create a different category of Headmen* Since they were to serve
all classes and castes, they were to he appointed without reference
to caste, and were to be adequately remunerated by fixed salaries.^"
Though Colebrooke at first favoured monetary payments, while writing
the report he recommended the extension of the Kandyan practice of
granting tax exemptions cn the lands held by them equal to a part
2
or whole of the salary fixed* In addition the Headmen were to be
encouraged by land granted with the same privilege of holding them
3
tax free as a part of the salary. A knowledge of the English language
was to be made compulsory for the native Headmen of this category,
and they were to be freely promoted to higher offices according to
4
ability and qualifications. It was here that Colebrooke*s proposals 
for the reform of the Headmen system merged with the Civil Service 
reforms. He thereby created an opening through which the proposal 
to throw open the higher offices to the native inhabitants could be 
realised, while also linking the Headmen with the rest of the admini­
strative machinery, instead of leaving them isolated as before.
1
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration. C.O. 54» 122.
2
Colebrooke, Report upon the establishments and expenditure, C.O. 54, 122. 
5Ibid.
4
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122.
Colebrooke’s proposals found little favour with the local
Government. The tendency was to dismiss them rather unreasonably.
Barnes regarded the proposals as coming from a person totally un-
aquainted with the relations between the European Governors and the
native governed.^- ’Does he think,” he asked,’’the more power that
2
is given to them, the less they will abuse it.” Horton also called
3
it a 1 speculative view1 of the question, probably because he con­
sidered the advancement of the native inhabitants to higher offices 
as impracticable. The attitude of Barnes and Horton showed that here, 
as in other spheres of reform, the practicability of the plan rested 
on the willingness of the local Government to give it a fair trial.
The reform of the Judicial branch of the Civil Service fell 
more particularly into the hands of Cameron. His approach towards 
problems was similar to that of Colebrooke. Travelling through the 
wilderness that surrounded a good part of the country he noticed the 
remnants of a past glory in the shape of ruined tanks, temples etc. 
which made him wonder about ”the former populuusness and civilization 
of the island,” and reflect on the means by which it might be revived.^ 
”1 do believe,” he wrote, after noting the importance of the restoration
^Marginal comments by Barnes. See Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831 
C.O. 54, 112.
2Ibid.
3
Horton to Goderich, 14 December 1831. C.O. 54, 114.
4
Cameron to Hay, 3 November 1830. C.O. 54, 131.
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of the tanks, "that if the administration of the affairs of the island 
were such as to encourage the settlement of European capitalists, 
such an enterprise might and would be successfully carried on by 
private speculators".^
His subject of investigation was in a sense more important than 
the others not only because it was, as we have seen, one which had oc­
casioned many conflicts and controversies among the British, but also 
because it was a field which created a much wider interest among the
people* As Riddell observed, the Commissioners were 1 inundated1 with
2
petitions protesting against the. decisions in the courts* Many of 
them contained particular grievances, and seem to have been made in the 
hope of getting a decision of a court reversed* But there were also 
petitions containing general complaints on the different aspects of the
3
administration of justice*
The most important issue which had disturbed the British was the 
nature of the relationship between the ezecutive and the judiciary. On 
this issue Cameron brought with him a convinced desire for judicial 
independence, which became apparent from the special report which the
4
Commissioners submitted. Hot surprisingly therefore he disliked the
Cameron to Hay, 3 November 1830. C.O. 54, 131*
^Riddell to Horton, 21 March 1832. C.O* 54, 118*
3
There are several such petitions dispersed in the volumes marked 
C.O. 416, 29-32.
4See p. 1^3-
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role which the Governor played in the judiciary. He found the re­
lations subsisting between the local judges and the executive govern­
ment ’’incompatible with judicial independence”.^  He deplored the de­
pendence of the judges on the Governor’s pleasure, and objected to
2
the mode in which they obtained advice in matters of doubt.
Cameron also brought with him a strong dislike for the mainten­
ance of separate and independent jurisdictions over distinct classes
of persons or territories subject to the same Government, and desired
3
uniformity in judicial institutions and procedure. When deciding 
upon these uniform institutions and modes, Cameron naturally brought 
to bear on the recommendations a preference for British institutions, 
which he brought with him. Apart from the need to make the Courts 
acceptable to all classes he saw Ceylon as the ’’fittest spot on our 
Eastern dominions in which toplant the germ of European civilization...”^* 
It also presented a fairly open field for such preferences as the judi­
cial institutions already in existence were those established by the 
5British. Unlike others, who while desiring such uniformity were 
nevertheless inclined to have a separate jurisdiction for the Europeans,
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, 
C.O. 54, 122.
2Ibid.
5Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5Ibid.
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Cameron favoured no such distinctions on grounds of race. He re­
garded the separate jurisdiction which had been given to the Supreme 
Court over Europeans as ”an unf&ir and invidious” distinction, espe­
cially since there was not the same ground for it in Ceylon as in 
India - the law administered to both Europeans and natives being the 
Roman Dut6h Law.^
"The very first thing that struck me when I began to 
examine the judicial institutions of Ceylon,” he wrote,
"was the abundance and even luxury of judicature in 
which the European population was revelling »••« The 
Europeans in Ceylon have in fact something like a mono­
poly of the finer|sorts of justice; my object is to de­
stroy that monopoly; to throw open the most efficient 
courts in the island to all the King's subjects.
The petitions that were received by the Commissioners enabled 
Cameron to determine on some of the defects inthe administration of 
justice in which the people were interested. One complaint that was 
made was about the excessive stamp duties which, it was stated by 
some petitioners, sometimes amounted to almost the sum in litigation. 
Cameron could not but agree that if the protection of the law was to 
be granted to the great mass of the native population it must be 
granted gratuitously. He stated that nn account of the general pov­
erty of the people fees and stamps which, from their small amount would 
seem to place scarcely any obstacle to the attainment of justice by the
^Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2
Observations of Cameron, in reply to criticisms, 4 August 1832. C.O.54,
3
Petition of Anthony Fernando and others, No. 145, 9 May 1829. Petition 
of 713 inhabitants of the villages of Colombo, No. 126, 2 July 1829. 
Petitions of 14 persons of Colombo, No. 103, 10 May 1829. C.O.416,29.
120.
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poor in England, must frequently operate as a complete denial of 
it in Ceylon, by indiscriminately repressing litigation.1 Cameron 
disapprovingly noted how insignificant an object a large class of 
people who could not pay for justice had been in the eyes of the 
local Government. "The community being thus divided into those 
who can afford to pay for justice, and those who cannot," he wrote 
after referring to Brownrigg's minute of 15 October 1816, "the 
inconvenience of the former class, as distinguished from the latter, 
is openly designated as the public inconvenience; and the poor are 
plainly told thht the Government will only distribute justice gratuitously 
at the seasons when the sale of it is slack."
Another matter for complaint was the distance of the courts and 
the delays in obtaining judgment. One group of petitioners stated 
that as the courts were situated at a distance of 24 to 25 miles, and 
as suits were being deferred for a long time, they were compelled to
3
walk many a time in order to obtain justice. ‘ They stated that persons 
did not dare to take small cases before the courts, but bore them with 
patience. Cameron recognized that "the condition of the native inhabitants 
of the island imposes upon a Government which has their improvement at 
heart the necessity ... of providing a cheap and accessible judicature.
1Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
Se® p*
^Report upnn the judicial establishments and procedure, C.O. 54, 122.
Petition of 53 inhabitants of Bentota No. 115, 20 June 1829. Petition of 
713 inhabitants of the villages of Colombo, No. 126, 2 July 1829.0.0.416,29.
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.0.54, 122.
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One matter which interested a group of petitioners was the
fact that unlike the Dutch Landraad Courts, the Courts established
by the British had no Mudaliyars and Muhandirams in thenu' Cameron
recognized that the fact that the European judges were insufficiently
controlled by public opinion was a defect in the constitution for the
Provincial and Sitting Magistrate Courts.
"The audience who frequent their courts,fl he wrote,
"consists of natives, with whom the judge does not 
associate, and whose good opinion is of little or no 
importance to him. There is no bar in his court; 
there is no person present to whom, either officially, 
or from motives of respect, he is called upon to sum 
up the evidence, and to state his view of the law 
applicable to the state of facts the evidence estab­
lishes. "2
He argued that under such circumstances the judges would only 
take pains over cases from the motive of satisfying their own "con­
scientious love of justice", or from the apprehension of an appeal 
•3
court.
"It is contrary to all our experience of human nature", 
he wrote regarding the former, "that they should find 
in the recesses of their own minds a sufficient motive 
for the exertion of that unremitting attention, which 
is necessary for the investigation and decision of the 
matters which come before them, and of their imperturb­
able patience which can alone control the movements of 
indignation, which the importunity, folly, impertinence, 
and knavery of Indian suitors and Indian witnesses are 
calculated to excite."4
^Petition of 13 inhabitants of Galle, No. 116, 12 June 1829. C.O.416,29. 
2
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
3rbid.
4Ibid.
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As regards the latter Cameron found that the proceedings of the
local judges had beemery insufficiently controlled by the appeal
Courts. He found the constitution of the Minor Courts of appeal
more defective than that of the courts of original jurisdiction.
The judges who presided over them, like those whose decisions they
were appdnted to correct, had no education adapted to their functions.
They too sat without juries or assessors, and their proceedings
attracted even less attention.^ Some members of these courts were
those from whose decision an appeal was made. Cameron also criticized
the limitations that had been imposed on the right of appealing to these
courts on the alleged ground that appeals in cases of trifling value
serve only to encourage petty litigation. He ridiculed the assumption
underlying this, that all petty litigation was an evil.
"A suit for a sum under £1.13sh. 6d.H, he wrote, "may 
indeed seem an object of contempt to an European Judge.
Considering any individual case by itself, he would 
probably rather pay the amount claimed than be at the 
trouble of examining and deciding the question between 
the parties. But in the eyes of a native of Ceylon, of 
the lower class, such a sum appears, and with great reas­
on, an object of very high importance, an object the un­
just detention of which is calculated to excite in his 
mind the most violent animosity against the person who 
commits the wrong, and the Government which fails to re­
dress it.” ^
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, 
C.O. 54, 122.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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Cameron found the High Court of appeal better constituted because 
of the existence of the Supreme Court Judges in it. But he con­
sidered the Governor and the Civil Service members who had sat on 
it superfluous for any "legitimate purposes of judicature".^ As the 
Court always sat in Colombo its judgments were in general founded
upon only such matters as appeared in the records transmit ted by the 
2
original court. As iihis Court entertained only cases in which the 
sum in litigation exceeded £30 only a small portion of the suitors 
in the Provincial Courts had the benefit of an appeal to it. Hone 
of the suitors in the Sitting Magistrates Courts, which tried the far 
greater number of cases, had the benefit of such an appeal. Thus Cameron 
found that 19 out of 20 suitors were excluded from the benefit of ac- 
cess to this Court.
One other feature which attracted the attention of Cameron, 
and of which the petitions were also an indication, was the 'litigous- 
ness1 of the people, and the fact that court houses and legal proceed­
ings were being made use of by means of perjuries, conspiracies, and
4
forged documents. Cameron, supported by the Law Officers of Ceylon, 
was inclined to attribute it to 'lack of moral principle' among the
^Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.0.54» 122.
Ibid.
5Ibid.
4Ibid.
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people.^" Behind that however was the general uncertainty of the 
times in such matters as land tenures and social laws. It was an­
other sign of the disintegration of the traditional society which we 
have noticed before. It was perhaps also an indication of the failure 
of the former system of justice and the ignorance of the judges, which
left the Court houses at the mercy of interested parties, especially
2
those Headmen placed in positions of power without responsibility.
Cameron recognized that in any new system it was necessary to guard
against the danger that the judicatures themselves would be employed
as a means of perpetrating the injustice which it is the object of
their establishment to prevent. Assuming also the role of a moral
reformer he expressed the hope that a well constituted judicial system
4would be an efficient means of establishing better morals.
Thus Cameron set himself the formidable task of creating a system 
of judicature, which while retaining its uniformity, would cater to the 
widely different interests of the rich and the poor, European and native. 
This in fact meant tlrib in the judicial sphere he wished to assert the 
idea of individual liberty without reference to race, class or caste.
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.O. 54, 
122. Also opinions of J. Perring, the Advocate Fiscal, and ¥. Morris, 
the Deputy Advocate Fiscal, 13 October 1852, C.O. 54, 118.
20See p.
3
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
4
Ibid.
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The first task was no doubt to break down existing distinctions.
To break down the special privilege s enjoyed by the Europeans he re­
commended the withdrawal of the special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.^ 
This proposal naturally aroused the greatest opposition among the others 
who expressed opinions on Cameron's recommendations. Writing admittedly 
on behalf of the interests and inclinations of those who had been under 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Justice Charles Marshall questioned 
the “expediency and justice of withdrawing an extensive and important 
branbh of the population of Ceylon, including all the Mercantile Houses 
of Colombo and other ports, and the numerous firms in India, which are
represented by these Houses, from a jurisdiction with which ... they are
2perfectly satisfied." The Law Officers of the Ceylon Government stated
that this measure would be productive of great discontent and dissatis-
3
faction among the European population. Both Justice Marshall and the
Chief Justice, Richard Ottley, urged that the Supreme Court should be
4given original civil jurisdiction over the district of Colombo. Be­
cause the greater number of cases in which the Europeans were involved 
occurred in Colombo, and because the greater number of the persons then 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Supeme Court resided within this
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, 
C.O. 54, 122.
^Observations of Marshall, HI). 1832. C.O. 54, 120.
3
Opinions of Norris and Perring, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
4
Observations of Marshall, ND 1832. C.O. 54, 120. Also, Ottley to
Goderich, 3 November 1832. C.O. 54, 120.
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district, they thus hoped to protect the special interests which 
they had in mind, avoiding at the same time objections on grounds 
of discrimination based on colour, Cameron however strongly op­
posed it. He objected to the attempt to divide causes as important 
or unimportant by means of an external characteristic, "It leads,” 
he wrote, "to the impolitic invidious, and irritating distinctions, 
which array the community in hostile ranks, crying out on theone hand 
for rights withheld, and on the other forprivileges invaded."^ Besides, 
Cameron saw a positive advantage in mixing up cases in the inferior 
courts. He thought that it would compel the Judges to be more active
than whnn they were only given the cases arising between the native
2inhabitants, who in their eyes were 'comparatively insignificant1,
A judge forced to inquire carefully into the more difficult cases, 
which attracted public notice from the great amounts they involved, 
or from the distinguishing rank of the litigating parties, would, he 
thought, have the strongest motive to use diligence and acquire learning. 
By force of habit or otherwise, he would not then grudgethe exercise 
of that skill in deciding such causes "as are interesting only to the 
obscure and friendless litigants". In the liberal climate of 1852 
the reasons given by Cameron did not, as James Stephen observed, admit
■^Observations of Cameron, 4 August 1852. C.O. 54, 120.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
486
of any valid answer.
Amidst general concurrence, judicial uniformity was also as­
serted when Cameron recommended the replacement of the various juris­
dictions then existing, by one uniform system of District Courts,
2
acting under a uniform set of rules and procedure. The number was
not indicated in the report, but it appears from the instructions sent
3
by Goderich that twenty divisions had been decided upon his advice.
This in fact meant a reduction in the total number of judicial units 
in Ceylon. The compelling reason for having a lesser number is not 
difficult to find. Though Cameron criticised the lack of training and 
consequent weaknesses of the Civil Service judges, and recognized the 
necessity of remedying it, his whole scheme of reform was based on the 
assumption that the Civil Servants would continue to preside over these 
courts. Besides a lack of faith in the native character, which Cameron 
strongly displayed, he may have had in mind the need to make the courts 
acceptable also to the European population. A court constituted with 
a European as a Judge would naturally be more expensive than one in 
which a native inhabitant presided. Consequently the need to keep the 
judicial expenses at the existing level, of which Cameron was conscious, 
may have prevented a recommendation to establish a greater number of units.
Observations of James Stephen, 7 August 1832. C.O. 54, 120.
2
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
3
See schedules attached to despatch from Horton to Goderich 23 March 1833.
C.O. 55. 74.
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A number of measures were conceived to make the Courts thus
constituted more suitable to the native inhabitants of all classes.
One important measure that was recommended was the extension oftbe
practice which prevailed in the Kandyan provinces of associating
with the Judge a panel of three Assessors. They were to be chosen
1
in the same manner as the Jurymen of the Maritime provinces. Any
two Assessors were to be empowered to give a verdict after the judge
2had summed up the evidence and stated his opinion of the law. The
judge was however to have the power of giving a contrary decision if
he was so inclined. Cameron believed that such an institution would
be a legal organ for the effectual expression of public opinion on
judicial matters. Besides, he thought that an institution like a
Jury was the !best school* to discipline the minds of the people for
4the discharge of public duties. These proposals were generally wel­
comed in principle. No great obstacles to their implementation were 
foreseen. Justide Marshall however raised the doubt, which in fact
would apply to any system, whether Judges and Assessors could be found
5
equal to the respective duties assigned to them.
Another measure that was recommended for the benefit of all
classes was that these Courts should try all cases occurring within
6the locality, irrespective of the value of the matter in dispute. With 
^•Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,C.O.54, 122. 
albid.
^Ibid.
4Ibid.
^Observations of C. Marshall, 16 June 1832. C.O. 54, 120.g
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.O.54, 122.
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the same object in view Cameron recommended the extension of the 
practice of investing the Courts with both civil and criminal juris­
diction.^ Supported by the opinion of Justice Marshall as to the 
practical success of uniting such jurisdictions in the former Sitting 
Magistrate's Court, Cameron hoped that it would save the people the 
trouble and expense of finding out which Court was competent to try
their cases, and that it would also enable them to refer all their
2
little grievances to the same arbitrator. To facilitate the poorer
classes Cameron recommended the abolition of all fees of court and
3
stamps, and the payment of the witnesses on both sides. There was 
no objection in principle to the above proposals. The Law Officers 
however raised the fear that it would result in a 'flood of litigation1
4
and that it might bring a heavy burden on the finances of the country.
To deter those who would use the courts for purposes of fraud and op­
pression, Cameron proposed to invest the judge with the power of fining 
and imprisoning, with or without the concurrence of the Assessors, those
who in his opinion had attempted to pervert or obstruct the course of 
5justice. The Law Officers, undoubtedly drawing upon the experience
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.O.54, 122. 
^Ibid.
5Ibid.
^Opinions of ;-Jforris and ^erring, 13 October 1852. C.O. 54, 118.
5
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure, C.O.54, 122.
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of the former Civil Service judges, called it a ’large and fearful 
discretionary power* for offences of a doubtful and undefined character* 
Besides pointing out thd; this recommendation went counter to the prin­
ciples involved in proposing assessors, they raised the doubt whether 
the necessary qualities could reasonably be expected from Civil Ser­
vants, in view of their previous studies and employment, and the sudden 
and unexpected manner in which they were frequently called upon to pre­
side over a Court, as a result of the system of promotion by seniority.^* 
Another recommendation which was made, which Cameron thought would 
also benefit poor litigants was the adoption of a more summary mode of 
proceeding in the District Courts. Pleadings were to take the form of 
an oral altercation between the parties under the superintendence of 
the judge. They were to be subject to cross examination, with or without 
the assistance of lawyers* Cameron believed that this mode of pleading 
would prevent conspiracies to a great extent by bringing the whole suit 
from beginning to end before the European judge. He also thought that 
in the state of society in Ceylon the European judge who had to dis­
tribute justice could only do so effectually by the exercise of some-
2thing like a paternal authority. The Law Officers agreed that in the 
majority of cases that occurred among the lower classes this method was 
necessary to secure justice* They however pointed out that too rigid a
Opinions of Norris and Perring, 13 October 1832. C.O, 54, 118.
2
Cameron, Report upon tie judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
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rule would affect the cases arising amongst Europeans, Merchants,
and the higher classes of the native inhabitants, to whom the argument
did not apply, and who in consequence would be much inconvenienced.
They therefore urged that there should be an option to plead in writing.^
Judicial independence, a more regular control over the local
judges, and the preservation of the unity of the law, which would be
impaired by the decisions of a number of independent judges, were aimed
at in the proposal to transform the Supreme Court into an Appeal Court
2
of the mast comprehensive kind. Cameron also believed that this was
the only wayjbf making a Court consisting of distinguished judges avail-
3
able to all the litigants. It was to have original jurisdiction only in 
the higher criminal offences. To give the inhabitants a cheap and easy 
access to the Court, Cameron proposed the division of the island into 
three circuits and the establishment of periodical circuits. The cir­
cuit judges were to hear all appeals for redressagainst the decision of 
the lower courts and were to have the power to re-hear a case either in 
part or wholy. While on circuit the judges were to perform the functions 
which were formerly carried out by the Advocate Fiscal under the dir­
ection of the Governor, of examining the records of the courts of ori­
ginal jurisdiction, and of advising the local judges on all matters of
“^Opinions of Norris and Perring, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54> 118.
2
Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
3
Observations of Cameron, 4 August 1832. C.O. 54120.
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law and practice. The control over the judges was to be transferred 
to the Supreme Court, the Governor only retaining a power to suspend 
a judge.’*' These proposals were generally well received and there was 
a recognition of the advantages likely to result from the superintend­
ing control of the Supreme Court. The Law Officers however raised the 
fear that in practice it would increase litigation, undermine the 
District Courts, and in fact throw the entire judicial business of the 
Colony into the hands of the Supreme Court. They argued that it would 
weaken the authority of the District Judge in the eyes of the native
people and that the beneficial effect of a local Judge residing amongst
2
them would be lost.
After submitting his report Cameron seems to have undoubtedly 
felt that his scheme fell far short of that of his colleague in one 
important respect. Apart from the honorary and unpaid duty of function­
ing as Assessors, it held out little prospect of employment to the native 
inhabitants. Cameron therefore later suggested a slight modification 
of the scheme to achieve “the very important and beneficial purpose of
giving to a class of native functionaries the skill and integrity to
3
render them fit for becoming judges of original jurisdiction”. Though 
convinced of the lack of moral principle among the native inhabitants, 
he recognized that the best way to strengthen it was to employ them in
^Cameron, Report upon the judicial establishments and procedure,
C.O. 54, 122.
2
Opinions of Norris and Perring, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
3
Cameron to Goderich, 18 August 1832. C.O. 54, 121.
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the solution of real and practical questions* Supported by Colebrooke,
who however suggested a modification, Cameron recommended that one ofthe
assessors should be made a paid permanent assessor who would have the
2prospect of promotion to the office of judge.
"By such an appointment," he wrote, "4/5 of the salary 
necessary for a European Judge will be saved, the honour­
able ambitions of the upper classes of natives will be
safely gratified, and the great mass of people will be
bound by ties of affection to a Government which ceases 
to withhold offices of power and emoluments from its native 
subjects as soon as they become qualified to fill them with 
advantage to the native community."5
The modification that was suggested by Colebrooke was that instead of
having a permanent assessor a certain number should be registered and
4paid according to the services to which they were summoned.
Thus in the judicial sphere Cameron undoubtedly $ade a bold attempt 
to achieve several objects under one system. The most important question 
was whether the attempt to secure the interests of the large proportion 
of the poor classes under this system was practicable. Colebrooke was 
perhaps more realistic, when while desiring judicial uniformity, he 
also stated the wish of the native inhabitants that a means might be 
afforded to them for a summary decision of the numerous petty cases which 
arose, for it was extremely inconvenient to them to be obliged to refer to
^Cameron to Goderich, 18 August 1832. C.O. 54, 121.
Ibid.
3Ibid.
4
Observations of Colebrooke, 24 September 1832. C.O. 54, 122.
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the regular courts. He therefore urged the establishment of
2
Village Councils for the settlement of such disputes.
The recommendations of Colebrooke and Cameron aroused much dis­
cussion and also hostility in the colony. The irony of it was that 
Horton, who announced the appointment of the Commission in Parliament, 
should be at the head of the opposition which aimed at preventing the 
implementation of its recommendations. Apart from writing despatches 
and private letters refuting the arguments of Colebrooke and Cameron, 
and pointing out difficulties in the implementation of their recom­
mendations, he attempted to create the impression that public opinion 
in the colony was hostile to them. To refute the assertinn of Colebrooke 
that he was supported in his views by the most intelligent public ser-
3
vants and other persons long resident in the island he obtained the 
views of certain Civil Servants and unofficials, arbitrarily selected
4
for the purpose, and forwarded them to the Secretary of State. Much 
against the wish of the Law officers of Ceylon, who feared that any 
expression of opinion by them would be considered 1 impertinent and ob-
5
tiusive’ he required them officially to send in their views and for-
^Colebrooke to Barnes, 12 January 1831* C.O, 54, 112. Also, 
Observations of 24 September 1832. C.O. 54, 122.
2m a ; : :
3
Colebrooke, Report upon the administration, C.O. 54, 122,
4
See Horton to Goderich, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
5
Norris and Perring to Anstruther, 13 October 1832. C.O. 54, 118.
warded them to the Secretary of State,1 The Colombo Journal, which 
was under his control, also indulged in criticisms and attacks on 
the Commissioners,
The extent, and the manner in which the Colebrooke-Cameron 
recommendations were implemented, and the direction which they took 
in practice under the influence of the local Government could well be 
the subj ect of a fascinating study. Space permits us only to note that 
the main principles of reform enunciated by Colebrooke and Cameron, 
and the chief measures which grew out of them, were accepted by Gode­
rich, the Secretary of State, The abolition of the system of compulsory
services was carried out at the suggestion of the Commissioners by an
2
Order in Council, The other revenue reforms were directed to be car-
3
ried out by the despatch of 23 March 1833* The recommendations for the 
establishment of Councils was carried out with some modifications by
4
the additional Royal Instructions issued to Horton dated 20 March 1833*
It was considered a ’measure of first importance1 to break through the
5
principle of an exclusive Civil Service. The Civil Service reforms were
1  ^  t g  l } o r  I’ Oh |-o Co J t f i  O t l ’o l t f  IJ?3X. C - O *  11?,
2
Order in Council, 12 April 1832. See Goderich to Horton, 3 May 1832. 
C.O. 55, 72.
3
Goderich to Horton, 23 March 1833* C.O. 55, 74. Also Goderich to 
Horton, 12 October 1832. C.O. 55, 74.
A / \
Additional Royal instructions to Horton, 20 March 1833* Mendis, (ed.J 
The Colebrooke-Cameron papers, Vol. I, pp. 305-319.
5
See Goderich to Horton, 14 September 1832. C.O. 55, 74. Also, Goderich
to Horton, 4 May 1832. C.O. 55, 74.
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therefore ordered by a despatch of 23 March 1833*1 The Judicial
reforms were incorporated into a new Charter of Justice dated
2
18 February 1833* It appeared undoubted':that the ’liberals’ had 
won the day. ’’The struggle is over,” wrote Horton privately to
3
Stanley, ’’the Commissioner has triumphed over me.”
^Goderich to Horton, 23 March 1833. C.O. 55, 74.
2
Charter of Justice, 18 February 1833. Mendis, (ed.) The Colebrooke- 
Cameron Papers. Vol. I, pp. 320-349. Also Goderich to Horton, 23 March 
1833. C.O. 55, 74.
3
Horton to Stanley, 25 October 1833* C.O. 54, 130
C O N C L U S I O N
When the British occupied the Maritime Provinces of Ceylon 
they found, much to their dislike, that it vas necessary to maintain 
the Headmen in a share of power* This necessitated the establishment 
of another European structure over whatever that remained of the Head­
man system*
The administrative super-structure established by the British 
had necessarily a British character about it* There was an irresistible 
tendency to think in terms of offices and institutions familiar to 
them in England, or those suggested by the experience of colonial ad­
ministration, especially that of India* The duties assigned to them were 
such that they resulted in the maintenance of the old social and econo­
mic order in Ceylon*
In a sense the structure and authority established by the British 
in the Maritime Provinces were more effective and the transfer of power 
vas more complete than during Portuguese and Butch times, on account of 
the greater number of executive and judicial officers that were sent to 
the provinces, and the concentration of original authority in their hands* 
The Headmen changed further from the position which they had occupied at 
the advent of British rule* As before, however, they were associatedvith 
European officials at all levels, where they continued to exercise much 
influence both on the Government and the people, with a still lesser 
sense of responsibility*
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In the Kandyan country, after a short lived attempt, on the 
grounds of policy, to govern through a greater part of the former 
administrative machinery, a European structure vas superimposed on 
a part of the former feudal organization, which was retained though 
greatly changed in character* The Kandyan Chiefs were naturally ad­
mitted to a greater share of power than the Headmen of the Maritime 
Provinces* They also wielded great influence by virtue of the fact 
that more than the Maritime Headmen they were acknowledged as 'the 
natural leaders' of society* Generally speaking, however, the former 
feudal organization broke down and the Chiefs and Headmen fell into 
the position of their counter-parts in the Maritime Provinces*
One of the main motivating factors behind the establishment of 
the European structure was the desire to transfer effective power and 
authority into British hands* But when creating institutions, in defin­
ing and dividing their powers, and in running the administrative mach­
inery, the new rulers could not avoid a duality of thought and action 
with regard to the form and purpose of Government* Apart from an ir­
resistible fondness for the principles supposed to be founddn the Brit­
ish Constitution, and apart from the need to take into account the in­
terests of the European residents in Ceylon, the new rulers were nat­
urally influenced by the rapid political, social and economic changes 
taking place in Europe, accompanied by a clash of ideas and the emer­
gence of new ideals* As against the forces and tendencies generated by 
these factors was the consciousness that institutions were being devised
I
i
i
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for a country recently conquered, where the allegiance of the people 
was not as yet cert ah, and where British supremacy had to be established* 
The people were different from the rulers in very many respects and they 
were living under a different social and economic order* While the forces 
coming from outside, and from the more developed society, carried them 
towards more liberal institutions, those coming from within took them to­
wards authoritarianism* This pull in opposite directions was one of the 
main threads which ran through the development of the administrative 
structure in Ceylon*
The main body of men through whom the transfer of power and author­
ity to British hands was carried out was organized into a Civil Service 
on the lines of the Covenanted Service of the East India Company* In 
their respective positions they were the 'eyes and ears' of the Governor* 
Following the Dutch, and in accordance with the belief at the time that 
the empire in India rested on the cautious maintenance of the superiority 
of the Europeans over the natives, the Service was kept exclusively Euro­
pean* It was composed of men recruited under the system of patronage in 
England* Patronage combined with the general belief of the time that ad­
ministrative authority could be entrusted only to those whose social 
status was such that its exercise would be instinctive with them, resulted 
in the arrival in Ceylon of a group of well connected Civil Servants*
These men who came from such a distance naturally had the aspiration of 
returning to England with sufficient means to live in comfort* Some of 
them may have had the intention of creating fortunes and returning like
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the 'Nabobs' of India, The need to satisfy these aspirations prevented 
the best organization of the Service, It also made it expensive* and 
this expensiveness prevented its expansion. This factor combined with 
the need that was felt to give employment to the Butch led to the emer­
gence of another 'species' of establishment. The public service was di­
vided into three distinct groups with very little mobility from one to 
another. The position which the Englishmen occupied made the A appear 
less respectable in the eyes of the people. The employment of the Sin­
halese and Tamiles was still mainly confined to their traditional offices 
to which they clung with a remarkable fondness. Among them the farmer 
caste enjoyed a considerable accession of power.
The liberal and utilitarian environment in England gave an impetus 
towards administrative reform in Ceylon, The liberals found much to 
criticize. The efficiency and utility of the Civil Service as it was 
then organized was much in doubt. The public service was a considerable 
burden on the revenue. The revenue was in turn dependent on a socio­
economic order* which was obnoxious to the liberal critics of the day 
and oppressive to the people. The fact that the salaries of the Civil 
Servants depended on a precarious revenue made them reluctant to disturb 
it. The interests of the Headmen were also tied to the old order. The 
Civil Servants formed an important group whose interests the local Govern­
ment was inclined to respect* and the Headmen eould not be displaced with­
out affecting the social and political stability of the country.
It was in such a situation that reformers from outside had a useful
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role to play, Colebrooke and Cameron elevated disparate liberal ten­
dencies inside and outside the Colony into a unified programme of 
action. The important problem that they faced was to make the Colony 
more prosperous. The ideas of the day made them feel that this could 
be achieved only through the promotion of private enterprise. The lack 
of capitalists in the island disposed them to favour colonization.
In their view this required the abandonment of the old socio-economic 
order. This in turn required the liberalization of the administrative 
machinery. Colebrooke in addition realized the importance of winning 
over the Headmen to the change of system and gradually superceding their 
employment on the former basis. This required a more open policy towards 
the public service.
APPENDIX A
PROPOSED OFFICE ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OP CEYLON
Rank in office To be filled by
The Council
Governor in Council 
First Member 
Second Member 
Third Member 
Secretary to the 
Council
The Governor and 
his Office
Commander of the Forces 
Head of the P 
Chief Secretary to Government( 
Deputy Secretary to
Government )
No salary
The Governor 
Lieutenant Governor 
Private Secretary 
Chief Secretary 
to Government 
Dy# Secy, to Gov­
ernment 
First Assistant 
Second Assistant 
Third Assistant
Treasury
Treasurer 
Vice Treasurer 
One Assistant
Pay Office Civil 
& Military
Paymaster General) 
Civil & Military ) 
One Assistant Civil 
Department
The Governor
£10,000*
1,500
500
3,200
1,280
512
320
3300
No salary 
2,000 
384.
1,600
320
*
No Allowance for extra expenses on the King^ Birthday or otherwise#
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Rank in office To be filled by
One Assistant
Military Department
Garrison Storekeeper 
Colombo 
Depy* Paym. Galle 
Do* Do* Trincomalee
Accountants Office 
and Auditor of Civil- 
And Judicial Accounts
Accountant Genl* & 
Auditor of Civil 
Judicial Accounts 
One Assistant Audr*
Dept.
One Assistant Acct* Dept*
Board of Revenue & 
Commerce
President 
First Member 
Second Member 
Third Member 
Secy to the Board 
of Revnue and 
Commerce 
First Assistant 
Second Do*
Offices Subordinate to 
the Board of Revenue 
& Commerce__________
Cinnamon Plantation
Accountant General
Chief Secretary to Govemmt, 
Vice Treasurer 
Accountant General 
Paymaster General
Secretary
320
600
500
500
1,600
320
320
No Salaries
1,024
384
300
Superintendent 
First Assistant 
Second Do*
1,280
400
300
Rank in office To be filled by
Survey Department
512
Six Officers of Engineers 
late in the Butch Service 
@ 100 Rix Dollars 767
Land Revenue
Surveyor General 
Six Surveyors under 
him in the Six 
Provinces
Colombo
^Besides this Salary the 512
Collector to receive a 340
Commission of S2r/2 per cent 300
on the net amount which he 
shall pay into the Treasury 
& 1/2 per Cent to 1st Assistant
Jaffna
Collector* 
First Assistant 
Second do*
Collector Ditto 512
First Assistant 540
Second Do* 300
Matura
Collector Ditto 512
First Assistant 340
Second do* ^qq
Putlam
Collector 512
One Assistant 520
Trincomalee
Collector 
One Assistant
512
320
504
Rank in Office To be filled by
Batticaloa
512 
320 
320
Sea Customs
Collector 
First Assistant 
Second do*
Columbo
Collector 
Galle 
Collector 
Civil Courts
This Officer to be charged 
with the care of the Export 
and Import Warehouse to draw 
a Commission of one per cent 
on his net collection*
Ditto
320
320
Colombo
President 1,500
2nd Member &
Register of Lands 640
Secretary 384
Asastant 127
Mattura
President 1,024
2nd Member &
Register of Ldnds 512
Secretary 300
Jaffna
President 
2nd Member & 
Register of Lands 
Secretary
Putlam
President 767
2nd Member &
Register of Lands 388
Secretary 300
1,280
512
320
son
Rank in Office To be filled by
Tmcomalee
767
388 
300
Batticaloa
President 
2nd Member &
Register of Lands 
Secretary
President 767
2nd Member &
Register of Lands 388
Secretary 300
mi2ii
In the expectation of further Accounts respecting 
the Post Office it is omitted in the Establishment 
herewith transmitted*
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APPENDIX B
MAITLAND ’ S CLASSIFICATION OP THE CIVIL SERVICE
Chief Secretary to Government
Commissioner of Kevenue
Civil Auditor General
Vice Treasurer and Accountant General
Civilian Military Paymaster General
2nd Class
Collector of Colombo 
Provisional Judge of Colombo 
Collector of Jaffnapatnam 
Provincial Judge of D*
Superintendent of Cinnamon 
Deputy Secretary to Government 
Head Civil Servant at Trincomalee 
Collector of Galle 
Collector of Matura 
Provincial Judge of Matura 
Provincial Judge of Galle 
Collector of Chilaw 
Collector of Kanar 
Collector of Calhua
First Assistant in the Secretary’s Office 
Second Assistant in the Secretary’s Office 
Collector of Batticola 
Custom Master of Colombo 
Garrison Storekeeper of Colombo
3rd Class
consists of 
Assistant to the Commissioner of Revenue 
Assistant to the Treasurer 
Assistant to the Paymaster General 
Assistant to the Civil Auditor General 
Assistant to the Superintendent of Cinnamon 
Assistant to the Collector of Colombo
Assistant to the Collector of Jaffna
Assistant to the Collector of Trincomalee
Collector of the Wanny
Custom Master of Jaffna
APPENDIX C
NOTES ON THE CIVIL SERVICE OP CERTAIN OTHER COLONIES
During our period of study Ceylon was usually grouped with the 
Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Malta, and Trinidad* Apart from the 
size of these Colonies a common factor which led to this grouping was 
that in all of them there were financial difficulties* Of them only 
Ceylon had a Civil Service which was constituted according to fixed 
rules. In all of them the higher offices were usually held by English­
men, the patronage being shared by the Secretary of State, the Commis­
sioners of the Treasury, and the Governor* Recruitment was to parti­
cular situations, and not to a rank of Writer as in Ceylon* In the 
Cape of Good Hope and Malta there was a mixture of Englishmen and local 
men in the lower situations. Although unlike in Ceylon there was in 
theory no obstacles to those holding inferior situations to rise to the 
higher, in practice the higher situations went to competitors from Eng­
land* There was no regulated pension scheme comparable to the one in Cey­
lon in any of the above Colonies* Pensions were paid out of the colonial 
revenues, the amouAt varying according to time, place, and individuals. 
They were generally lower than in Ceylon. In the Cape of Good Hope, as 
in Ceylon, the highest salary drawn by a Civil Servant (excepting the 
Governor and Chief Justices) was £3>000 per annum. In Malta the highest 
was £1,000 per annum. Unlike in Ceylon in both places there was no lower
limit distinguishing offices held by Englishmen:, from the others. In 
both places the Commissioners who inquired into their affairs recommended 
a more liberal policy towards the Civil Service.
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APPENDIX D
SCHEDULE No. 1 - OFFICES ABOLISHED
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Commissioner of Revenue
Paymaster-General and 
Commissioner of 
Stamps
Second Assistant, Col­
onial Secretary's 
Office
Private Secretary to 
the Governor
Sitting Magistrate of 
Colombo
Sitting Magistrate and 
Fiscal of Jaffna
Sitting Magistrate of 
Tangalla
Sitting Magistrate of 
VSligama
Sitting Magistrate of 
Poneryn
Sitting Magistrate of 
Kandy
Sitting Magistrate of 
Galle
Sitting Magistrate of 
Kalpitiya
Registrar of the Vice- 
Admiralty Court
£ s d 
3,000 0 0
2,000 0 0
512 0 0 
500 0 0 
1,000 0 0 
610 0 0 
180 0 0 
135 0 0 
135 0 0 
135 0 8 
100 0 0 
67 10 0 
270 0 0
Abolished
8,674 10 0
SCHEDULE No# 2 
CIVIL OFFICES OF THE YEARLY VALUE OP £500 AND ABOVE
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
£ s d £ s d
Governor 8,000 0 0 Governor 7,000 0 0
^Colonial Secretary 2,000 0 0 Colonial Secretary 2,000 0 0
First Assistant, Colon­ Assistant Colonial
ial Secretary*s Office 640 0 0 Secretary and Clerk
to the Executive and
Treasurer 2,000 0 0 Legislative Councils 600 0 0
Audi tor-General 2,000 0 cO Treasurer and Com­
missioner of Stamps 1,500 0 0
Civil Engineer and Auditor-General and
Surveyor General 800 0 0 Comptroller of Revenue 1,500 0 0
Postmaster-General 512 0 0 Civil Engineer and Sur­
veyor-General 800 0 0
Easter Attendant of
Colombo 700 0 0 Postmaster-General 300 0 0
Master Attendant of Harbour Master of
Galle 500 0 0 Colombo 700 0 0
Collector of Customs 1,574 0 0 Harbour Master of Galle 500 0 0
Collector of Colombo 1,541 0 0 Collector of Customs 1,000 0 0
Assistant Collector Government Agent at
of Colombo 512 0 0 Colombo 1,200 0 0
Assistant Collector Assistant Government
at Kalutara 512 0 0 Agent at Colombo 300 0 0
Collector of Galle 1,000 0 0 Assistant Government
Agent at Kalutara 400 0 0
Collector of Tangalla Government Agent at
and Matara 1,107 0 0 Galle 1,000 0 0
*1831 s&lary £10,000 
ri831 salary £3,000*
5! t
Schedule No« 2 (cont.)
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
£ s d £ s d
Collector of Batticaloa 785 0 0 Assistant Government
Agent at Matara 400 0 0
Collector of Trincomalee
and Agent of Government Assistant Government
for Tamankaduva 1,358 0 0 Agent at Batticaloa 400 0 0
Collector of Jaffna 1,226 0 0 Government Agent at
Trincomalee 1,000 0 0
Assistant Collector
at Jaffna 512 0 0 Government Agent at
Jaffna 1,200 0 0
Collector at Mannar 788 0 0
Assistant Government
Collector at Chilaw 1,014 0 0 Agent at Jaffna 300 0 0
Revenue Commissioner Assistant Government
of Kandy 1,500 0 0 Agent at Mannar 400 0 0
Agent of Government Assistant Government
at Kurunagala 1,000 0 0 Agent at Chilaw 400 0 0
Agent of Government Government Agent at
at Ratnapura 500 0 0 Kandy 1,200 0 0
Assistant Government
Agent at Kurunagala 400 0 0
Assistant Government
Agent at Ratnapura 400 0 0
32,061 0 0 24,900 0 0
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SCHEDULE No* 5
CIVIL UNDER £500 PER ANNUM
Establishment of 1855 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
Superintendent-General 
of Vaccination
Five Assistants at 
£90 each
Master Attendant of 
Trincomalee
Assistant Engineer and 
Surveyor
Superintendent of the 
Botanical Gardens
Supervisor of the Pearl
Banks
(Agent of Government 
( at Badulla
[Agent of Government 
( at Alupota
(Agent of Government 
( at Ruanvalla
(Agent of Government 
at Matale
Agent of Government 
| at Fort King
(Agent of Government 
( at Ma$avalatanna
£ s d 
450 0 0
450 0 0
400 0 0
500 0 0
250 0 0
200 0 0
155 0 0
67 10 0
67 10 0
67 10 0
45 0 0
90 0 0 
2,522 10 0
Superintendent-General 
of Vacchation
Five Assistants at 
£90 each
Harbour Master of 
Trincomalee
Assistant Engineer and 
Surveyor
Superintendent of the 
Botanical Gardens
Supervisor of the Pearl 
Banks
Assistant Agent at 
Badulla
Assistant Agent at 
Alupota
Assistant Agent at 
Ruanvalla
Assistant Agent at 
Matale
Assistant Agent at 
Frrt King
Assistant Agent at 
Ma$avalat§nna
£ s d 
450 0 0
450 0 0
400 0 0
500 0 0
250 0 0
500 0 0
400 0 0
400 0 0
400 0 0
400 0 0
400 0 0
400 0 0 
4,750 0 0
♦These offices were held by Military officers who received 
in addition their full Military allowances*
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SCHEDULE No* 4 
JUDICIAL OFFICES OF THE YEARLY VALUE OP £500 AND OVER
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
Chief Justice
Puisne Justice
His Majesty*s Advo­
cate-Fiscal
Deputy Advocate- 
Fiscal and Master 
in Equity
Registrar of the 
Supreme Court
Provincial Judge of 
Colombo
Provincial Judge of 
Galle
Provincial Judge of 
Trhcomalee
Provincial Judge of 
Jaffna
Provincial Judge of 
Kalpitiya
Judicial Commissioner 
of Kandy
Agent of Government 
at Ratnapura
£ s d
3,000 0 0
2,250 0 0 
1,800 0 0
1,200 0 0 
600 0 0 
1,600 0 0 
1,600 0 0 
1,152 0 0 
1,500 0 0 
500 0 0
2,000 0 0 
500 0 0
Chief Justice
Senior Puisne Justice
King's Advocate
Deputy King's Advocate
Registrar of the 
Supreme Court
District Judge of 
Colombo
Distriot Judge of 
Galle
District Judge of 
Trincomalee
District Judge of 
Jaffna
District Judge of 
Chilaw and Puttalam
District Judge of 
Kandy
District Judge of 
Ratnapura
£ s d 
2,500 0 0
1,500 0 0
1,200 0 0
1,000 0 0
600 0 0
1,000 0 0 
1,000 0 0 
1,000 0 0
1,000 0 0
500 0 0
1,000 0 0
150 0 0
17,702 0 0 12,450 0 0
SCHEDULE No# 5
JUDICIAL UNDER £500 PER ANNUM
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
Fiscal of Colombo
Private Secretary to 
the Chief Justice
Private Secretary to 
the Puisne Justice
Provincial Judge of 
Batticaloa
Provincial Judge of 
Mannar
Sitting Magistrate 
of Kalutara
Sitting Magistrate 
of Papadure
Sitting Magistrate 
of Negombo
Sitting Magistrate 
of Balapifimodera
Sitting Magistrate 
of Matara
Sitting Magistrate 
of Hambantofa
Sitting Magistrate 
of Mullaitivu
Sitting Magistrate 
of Point Pedro
£ s d 
350 0 0
270 0 0
180 0 0
:250 0 0
200 0 0
135 0 0 
225 0 0 
135 0 0 
225 0 0 
135 0 0 
180 0 0 
67 10 0
£ s d
Fiscal of the Western
Province 350 0 0
Private Secretary to
the Chief Justice 270 0 0
Private Secretary to 
the Senior Puisne
Justice 180 0 0
District Judge of
Batticaloa 250 0 0
District Judge of 
Mannar 200 0 0
District Judge of
Kalutara 135 0 0
District Judge of
Papadure 225 0 0
District Judge of 
Negombo 225 0 0
District Judge of
Ambalango$a 225 0 0
District Judge of 
Matara 225 0 0
District Judge of 
Hambantofa 135 0 0
District Judge of 
Mullaitivu 225 0 0
District Judge of 
Point Pedro 157 10 0
Schedule No* 5 (cont*)
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
Sitting Magistrate 
of Hallagam
Sitting Magistrate 
of Kayts
Sitting Magistrate 
of Chavakachcheri
(judicial Agent at 
| Kurunagala
'Agent of Government 
at Badulla
[Agent of Government 
at Alupota
[Agent of Government 
( at Buanvalla
{
(Agent of Government 
at Matale
kAgent of Government 
at Fort King
Agent of Government 
| at Maturate
(
£ s d 
135 0 0
67 10 0
135 0 0
135 0 0
135 0 0
67 10 0
67 10 0
67 10 0
45 0 0
90 0 0
3,297 10 0
District Judge of 
Hallagam
District Judge of 
Kayts
Distiict Judge of 
Chavakachcheri
District Judge of 
Kurunagala
District Judge of 
Badulla
District Judge of 
Alupota
District Judge of 
Ruanvalla
District Judge of 
Matale
District Judge of 
Port King
District Judge of 
Mu vara Eliya
£ s d
225 0 0
157 10 0 
225 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0 
150 0 0
4,460 0 0
*These offices were held by Military officers who received 
in addition their full Military allowances*
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SCHEDULE No > 6
ECCLESIASTICAL OFFICES OF THE YEARLY VALUE OF
£500 AND ABOVE
Establishment of 1833
Salary 
per annum New Schedule
Salary 
per annum
Archdeacon and King's 
Visitor
Senior Colonial Chap­
lain
Colonial Chaplain at 
Galle
Colonial Chaplain at 
Trincomalee
Colonial Chaplain at 
Kandy
£ a d
2,000 0 0
900 0 0
700 0 0
700 0 0
700 0 0
Archdeacon and King's 
Visitor
Senior Colonial Chap­
lain
Colonial Chaplain at 
Galle
Colonial Chaplain at 
Trincomalee
Colonial Chaplain at 
Kandy
£ s d
1,500 0 0
900 0 0
700 0 0
700 0 0
700 0 0
5,000 0 0 4,500 0 0
5 17
SCHEDULE No. 7
ECCLESIASTICAL UNDER £500 PER ANNUM
Establishment of 1833 Salary per annum Heir Schedules
Salary 
per annum
Colonial Chaplain at 
Colombo
Sinhalese Chaplain at 
Colombo
Malabar (Tamil)Chaplain 
at Jaffna
Clergyman of the Dutch 
Church
£ s d 
400 0 0
400 0 0
200 0 0
350 0 0
Colonial Chaplain at 
Colombo
Sinhalese Chaplain at 
Cblombo
Malabar Chaplain at 
J affna
Clergyman of the Dutch 
Church
£ s d
400 0 0
400 0 0
200 0 0
350 0 0
1,350 0 0 1,350 0 0
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SCHEDULE No. 8 
OFFICES NEWLY CREATED
Salary
per annum
£
Civil:
Assistant Agent at Negombo 400
Assistant Agent at Galle 300
Assistant Agent at Hambantoja 400
Assistant Agent at Kandy- 300
Judicial :
Second Puisne Justice 1,500
Private Secretary to Second
Puisne Justice 180
District Judge of Nuvarakalaviya 150
Ecclesiastical:
College Professor 300
3,530
RECAPITULATION
Offices Establishment Establishment 
1833 New Schedule
Abolished 8,674^/2
Civil (of £500 and above 
(under £500
32,061 
2,522 /2
24,900
4,750
Judicial (of £500 and above 
(under £500
17,702, 
3,297 /2
12,450 
' 4,460
Ecclesiastical (of £500 and above 
(under £500
5,000
1,350
4,500
1,350
New Creations - 3,530
70,607 2 55,940
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